

Multidimensionality of exclusionary violence: A case of anti-Gypsy violence in Turkey

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Abstract

This article aims to explore the forced dislocation of immigrant Gypsy townspeople from a Turkish town, Bayramiç, Çanakkale in 1970. It focuses on the workings of social categories of Turkishness and Gypsiness through this exclusionary violent case, how they were re-employed and reproduced exclusively in conjunction with Turkish nationalism. It was the time of socio-economic transformation and rise in populist–nationalist discourses in Turkey. In the town, the reflections of this historical context demonstrated the transformation in power allocation and competing personal interests in highway transportation and forestry. Eventually, the attacks started as “Drivers’ Fight” but turned into “Gypsy hunt” with the effects of socio-economic competition and interests, the employment of historical stigma of Gypsiness and terrorization of the perpetrators in the town.

Keywords

Gypsiness, Gypsy stigma, social categories, exclusionary violence, Turkey, nationalism

Introduction

On 5 January 2010, a group of people attacked a group of Gypsies¹ in the Turkish town of Selendi in Manisa, Turkey (Radikal, 2010). They stoned their houses, damaged their vehicles and injured three of them. The reasons for the attacks beyond the momentous outburst were obscure. Apart from individual conflicts, how and why the local townspeople organized themselves and attacked the Gypsies was unclear. More recently, on 21 July 2013, another similar attack against Gypsies happened in Osmangazi, Bursa (Türkiye, 2013). About 500 people marched to a

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Gypsy neighbourhood, burnt their horse carriages and cars and stoned their houses.² In this case as well, individual discontent had easily turned into a mass attack against all Gypsies.

The case in Selendi, Manisa occurred when I was already working on my research on the forced expulsion of Gypsy people from another town – Bayramiç, Çanakkale in 1970. The triggering factors, the specific dynamics and the local contexts of the two cases were very different. However, the social construction of ‘Gypsyess’ along with ‘Turkishness’, and the socio-economic worlds of these towns revealed interesting similarities. The attacks in Manisa reflected the ongoing strength of the Gypsy stigma, notwithstanding the local specificities.

The reoccurrence of a similarly articulated attack points to the persistence of the stigmatization of Gypsyess and the power of anti-Gypsyism. To study and to understand such events, it is necessary to combine the socio-economic dynamics of exclusionary violence and the social construction of categories with a concrete analysis of local configurations. The term ‘exclusionary violence’ is taken from Bergmann (2002) and refers to the multidimensionality of the attacks. I believe the term is much more satisfactory than an ethnicized approach that does not question ethnicity per se and fails to take other dynamics into account.

What I mainly lay out in this article is why and how these violent attacks occurred, what dynamics constituted the relationship between the people in the town of Bayramiç in relation to the categories of Turkishness and Gypsyess and how these categories and the Gypsy stigma have been employed and have served to terrorize the town. It reveals how ethnic and other identities represented in cultural spheres were employed to conceal socio-economic and political inequalities. My analysis of the forced expulsion and exclusionary violence has three main dimensions: (1) the transformation of socio-economic relations; (2) the construction of the Gypsy threat along with the historical Gypsy stigma; and (3) the ways of terrorization and the employment of nationalism during the forced expulsion. The first dimension relies on the significance of the context and demonstrates the underlying factors for the functionality of the following two. For the realization of such particular exclusionary violence, however, the interplay of all these dimensions requires to be acknowledged.

My findings represented in this article are based on the oral history project that I conducted in Bayramiç, which is also my mother’s hometown, between March 2008 and August 2010. I traced the narratives of both Gypsies and non-Gypsies. Eventually, the narratives of about 200 people in the town contributed to my study while 47 of them constructed the backbone of the findings. Oral history was not only a choice, but also the only way to do research on this particular case. Apart from a few newspaper articles published at the time, I was not able to find any documentation despite my inquiries in the local and national archives. The scarcity of documentation was in itself meaningful as it showed how marginalized people, groups and spaces, as well as life stories are excluded from the national/official documentation and historiography. Moreover, in this context, oral history was not only a way to access information about the case, but it also

disclosed different representations and ways of remembering. These differences in memory and representation are pivotal to demonstrate meaning within the past and how it is understood through personal standings and recent relations in the town. In the current situation, although the Gypsies do not stand as the ultimate 'others' anymore, a social distance between the Gypsies and non-Gypsies in the town remains. However, in comparison to the newcomers to the town, such as the villagers and Kurds, the commonalities between the Gypsy and non-Gypsy old townspeople relying on shared local knowledge and history have become noteworthy.

Below, I will first discuss my approach in analyzing exclusionary violence in general and focus on one particular expulsion: the case of Bayramiç. This case is significant for the understanding of the perspectives of both Gypsy and non-Gypsy townspeople who are still living together in the town. It is exemplary for the impact of the overall socio-economic transformation in the country, and its local articulations along with the transformation of the social categories of Gypsiness and Turkishness. It provides fruitful ground for the exploration of the interactions between historical contexts within socio-economic and political particularities, as well as ethnic identifications. It therefore clearly demonstrates the multidimensionality of such exclusionary violence. I will elaborate on some scholars' contributions to this analysis and present my own perspective. Then, I will basically lay out what happened in the town of Bayramiç in 1970. Following this descriptive part, I will explore this exclusionary violent case through the dimensions, which acknowledge the significance of socio-economic transformation, of the functionality of the Gypsy threat and of the power of terrorization.

The multidimensionality of exclusionary violence

I endorse the analysis of Brubaker and Laitin in their approach to ethnically framed violence. They argue that the ethnic frame becomes a 'coding bias' both for actors and analysts. '[...] Today, we—again, actors and analysts alike—are no longer blind to ethnicity, but we may be blinded by it.' (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998: 428) To avoid this coding bias, the concept of ethnicity should be undertaken within its multidimensionality along with the distribution of resources and the recognition of identities.

Along with Brubaker and Laitin, there are several scholars (Berberoglu, 2004; Bowen, 1996; Crawford, 1998; Olzak, 1994; Olzak and Nagel, 1986; Steinberg, 1989) who criticize the coding bias in ethnic studies. They stress that ethnicity and ethnic conflicts may turn into myths that prevent further perceptions of underlying dynamics, with the dominant effect of automatically generating ethnicized interpretations. Instead, they point to the significant role of economic dynamics and power relations. Steinberg, for instance, shows how ethnic conflicts conceal class-based ones. 'Indeed, whenever ethnic divisions occur along class lines, there is the likelihood, or at least the potential that ordinary class conflict will manifest itself as ethnic conflict, in reality as well as appearances' (1989: 170). Similarly,

Bowen (1996) acknowledges that ethnic or cultural identities are involved in the construction and/or realization of some of these conflicts, but also argues that they were more about power, land, or other resources. As a matter of fact, in many instances, it is not actually that easy to distinguish the ethnic/racial hierarchy from other power relations, because the lack of recognition of an identity is often caused by the unequal distribution of resources.³ It requires a multidimensional analysis that distinguishes different power mechanisms and hierarchies, and allows for a better understanding of their convergences.

In the case of Gypsiness, overt ethnic discrimination is inextricably linked to lower class positions. In analyzing how the Gypsy stigma became pivotal in the socio-economic transformation within which some Gypsies' positions were improving in the town, I find the multi-layered approaches of Bergmann (2002) and Van Arkel (1985, 2009) very well articulated for the understanding of the mechanisms of demonization and the attacks against socially constructed 'others'. They also demonstrate how groups can be constructed as a threat and under what conditions people resort to collective violence against a stigmatized group. Bergmann's approach is enlightening for its focus on power mechanisms and social control in such violent cases, drawing upon the usage of violence especially when the perpetrators perceive a negative change in power relations. Van Arkel similarly emphasizes how a historical stigma can become functional within particular socio-economic contexts, as the categories and stigmas are not self-explanatory for such violent cases.

Anti-Gypsyism is not an unfamiliar phenomenon, especially in the European context. Whereas the holocaust in Europe⁴ may have been the most brutal phase in their recent history, many Gypsies still face violent attacks, murders and racism in several countries.⁵ The historical construction of the Gypsy stigma contributes a lot to this discrimination. Besides, recent political and socio-economic relations affect the content and extent of anti-Gypsyism. Stewart (2012), for instance, lays out the interplays between anti-Gypsyism and wider racist and xenophobic politics on the rise all over Europe. In his articulation, a new anti-Gypsyism is at stake in connection with populist-integrative European politics.

The multidimensionality of the exclusion of Gypsies also becomes visible considering recent phases in Turkey. Recently, the country has been experiencing a massively intensified threat to public spaces and natural resources like forests, parks and rivers all over the country being capitalized following global neoliberal economic policies.⁶ The Urban Transformation Project targeting gentrification of squatter neighbourhoods and the displacement of the urban poor from the city centres constitutes a phase of this process. In the implementation of this project, Gypsy people also have become a prominent community that faces the demolition of their houses and their forced expulsion. This constitutes a major threat to their housing rights in several cities in Turkey. In this context, the demolition of a historical Gypsy neighbourhood, Sulukule in Istanbul from 2006 to 2009, in spite of the protests by several rights-seeking organizations and independent activists, pointed not only to a housing problem but also signified a threat to Gypsy culture and history.

Appadurai (2006) emphasizes the effects of globalization on redefining boundaries, as well as the essential role of such transformations of economic structure in violent attacks that take place increasingly within a cultural framework:

[...L]arge scale violence is not the product of antagonistic identities but that violence itself is one of the ways in which the illusion of fixed and charged identities is produced, partly allay the uncertainties about identity that global flows invariably produce. [...E]specially when the forces of social uncertainty are allied to other fears about growing inequality, loss of national sovereignty, or threats to local security and livelihood. (2006: 7)

Within such transformations leading to social uncertainties and changes in the social order, violence can be used as a means of law making (Benjamin, 1921), and of building or rebuilding the boundaries between 'us' and 'them'. Friedman (2003) similarly draws attention to 'hybrid zones' within boundaries, and to the increased possibility of violence in these 'liminal spaces' where categories and social control become difficult to attain in the age of globalization (2003: 24). Gypsies with their high potential for adaptation to the dominant cultures of the countries in which they live and accept as their homelands, and their tendency to avoid Gypsy identity due to stigmatization and discrimination can easily occupy such liminal spaces. They become uneasy with being placed in fixed and homogenous categories. The heterogeneity and contextuality of Gypsiness in the Turkish case, for instance, demonstrate that they can be both Turk and Gypsy, or neither Turk nor non-Turk according to the context. These liminal spaces become problematic and threatening especially when there is increased competition and greater hierarchies between people due to the effects of socio-economic transformation. As power relations change, the control of these liminal positions and fixing categories and boundaries all become overwhelming.

Correspondingly, the boundaries between some Gypsies and non-Gypsies were blurring in the process of socio-economic transformations that created uncertainties, changed the power relations and the social order in the town of Bayramiç in 1970. As will be explored below, the feeling of real and/or imaginary threat, and the blurring of boundaries had remarkable impacts on the transformation of Gypsiness and Turkishness in the context of the socio-economic transformation in the town. The forced expulsion in this sense was aimed to reorder power relations and the boundaries between these categories and the people in the town.

The forced expulsion of 1970

In the town of Bayramiç, people who were present in the late 1960s and in the beginning of 1970 recalled the attacks on Gypsies as a moment of great violence (such as the recent mayor Ilker Tortor, born in 1944; the housewife Meliha, born in 1942; the retired teacher Necla, born in 1940; the old town counsellor Salih, born in 1924).⁷ People's houses in the town were attacked, some people were beaten, and as

a result, hundreds of inhabitants fled. The perpetrators were villagers and townspeople, including the friends and neighbours of the attacked, and the targets were 'the Gypsies'. The same crowd also beat the attorney of the town almost to death in the municipality building.

All over the town, the reason most frequently mentioned as the cause of the attacks was the immorality and misbehaviour of some immigrant Gypsies who were accused of making passes at schoolgirls and peeping at women in the Turkish baths [*hamams*]. The common phrase was that 'they were spoiled,' which referred to their misbehaviours as the result of their increased power in the town's economy (such as the taxi-driver Karaahmet, born in 1961; the former mayor of 2003, Solmaz, born in 1943). This, however, is the story on the surface that appears as the main narrative of almost all of the non-Gypsies and the few Gypsies who are considered as locals. The immigrant (*muhacir*) Gypsies, who were the prime targets, mention other reasons and point primarily to the clash of socio-economic interests within the town (such as the housewife Kismet, born in 1926; the ex-driver Bidon Hilmi, born in 1930; the daughter of the main target family Rana, born in 1935). They were the ones who came during the population exchange from Greece in 1925–26, were accepted as Turkish citizens by the founding state and took their place within the service sector of the town. They identified themselves with Turkishness in a way that was compatible with the approval of the founding father, Atatürk. However, they were still called Gypsies in the town and felt offended by the label (such as the housewife Meral, born in 1933; the domestic labourer Berrin, born in 1960; the ex-postman Mahir, born in 1947). The other group of Gypsies who were called local, on the other hand, was engaged mainly in professions such as musicianship and blacksmithing that were recognized as traditional Gypsy professions. They emphasize their locality, closeness to the Turkish tradition and religion (such as the baker Fazil, born in 1937; the housewife Ezgi, born in 1931). They identify themselves both with Gypsiness and Turkishness (and sometimes only with Gypsiness).

According to the second story, the attacks were triggered when the leading immigrant Gypsy family, Kocayar, had a disagreement over their partnership in a truck with the most powerful figure among the driver ruffians at that time, Kadir. This side of the story is neither known nor remembered properly by most of the non-Gypsies, who emphasize the first (immorality) narrative. Only a few, who knew, remembered and talked about the events in a more or less fair manner supported the Gypsies' narrative (such as the lawyer Ahmet, born in 1946; the ex-grocer Aydın, born in 1923; the ex-mayor Solmaz, born in 1943). Not many of the non-Gypsies, however, were eager to talk about this narrative. Thus, if the narrative does appear, it is usually only as a second narrative among a limited number of non-Gypsies.

The account of the attorney Rahmi Ozel, which was published in the newspapers at the time, verifies the immigrant Gypsies' narrative and appears as the only available written source that reports the attacks in a formal way (Milliyet, 1970: 4). According to his narrative, on 18 January 1970, the first attack occurred against

the immigrant Gypsies and resulted in the damaging of 38 houses. The second one on 22 February happened after the word spread about the critical health condition of the driver Halit Er, who had been injured by immigrant Gypsies in Çanakkale for being one of the key perpetrators of the first attack. This second attack targeted all the Gypsies in the town. At least 3000 people started marching in the streets with flags in their hands and in open violation of state authority. The people stood outside the municipal building, which was at the entrance to the town bazaar on the main avenue that also led to the neighbourhoods where both local and immigrant Gypsies lived. As the attorney tried to stop the crowd, a group of 30–40 people attacked and beat him almost to death. After the attacks, the attorney was transferred somewhere else while ‘the Gypsies’ went to nearby towns as well as to the big cities. They had to stay out of town for a certain time, between months and years, depending on their kinship and community ties, level of acceptance in the town, property ownership, savings and ability to survive in the places they fled to. After a while, some, most of whom were local Gypsies, came back to the town, while others never returned.

The transformation of socio-economic relations in Bayramiç

How did individual fights escalate into group conflicts and lead to outrageous violence? What motivated the people involved in the attacks? Why was the category of Gypsiness activated at the moment of the attacks? What was happening in Bayramiç was connected to the perpetrators’ perception of a change in power relations as Bergmann (2002) emphasizes in such violent cases: it was due to the effects of socio-economic transformation in Turkey, which was extensively observed in the transportation sector in the town.

The 1960s witnessed a change in Turkey’s overall politics concerning the private sector, modernization in agriculture, rapid urbanization and foreign finance through the effects of American investments (Hershlag, 1968; Lehman, 1955; Tekeli and Ilkin, 2004). Transportation was the most rapidly developing sector, especially after the 1950s (Kaynak, 1992). This enabled the further transportation of some goods that were restricted to local markets until that time. It also gave a boost to the development of industries and the penetration of the market economy into the rural areas.

In Bayramiç, as in other towns across the country (Benedict, 1974), this transformation entailed a gradual change in power, accelerating in the late 1960s. Instead of landholding, the transport and service industries linked to the interaction of rural and urban markets became more prestigious (the ex-grocer Aydın, born in 1923; the former mayor Solmaz, born in 1943). The town of Bayramiç has never been an important socio-economic centre, but it was still a hub for the surrounding villages. In 1970, the total population of the town was 29,513; 5282 in the centre and 24,231 in the villages. The economy relied mainly on agriculture and limited dairy products. The main agricultural products were wheat, chickpeas and horse beans. The production of *helva*, a type of sweet, and forestry

products also contributed to the town's economy. Situated on the skirts of Mountain Ida, almost all of the villages in the area are surrounded by woods. Forestry therefore had an important place in people's lives.

In the late 1950s, the transportation business was not sought after much among the non-Gypsies since the mountain roads that led to the forests were very dangerous for doing business (the ex-driver *muhacir* Bidon Hilmi, born in 1930; the old secretary of the Drivers' Association Erman, born in 1935). It was therefore the sector in which some immigrant Gypsies took part as skilled drivers. An old non-Gypsy driver of the 1960s, Tayfun (born in 1949), acknowledged the difficulty of the job and how it had changed over time:

At that time, driving was said to be a Gypsy art. Where you are in the evening, there you would wake up in the morning. Now, driving is not like that. We had a place on the way to Izmir, Kabakum, we were seeking to find a *hasir* [very rough mattress] to sleep on and not come back home, the work was like that. Those times were hard. Now, is there any tough work? The vehicles are better. The roads are better. Now, the guy loads his truck, he sleeps, gets up in the morning and goes to Izmir in five to six hours.

When in the 1960s, the overall highway transportation and forestry developed (Karatepe and Gürlevik, 2006), the number of drivers and trucks in the town increased, while new opportunities, profits and prestige also attracted more non-Gypsies into the sector (the old secretary of Drivers' Association Erman, born in 1935; the registration book of the Drivers' Association). Furthermore, by 1970, being a driver was a very attractive position, especially for people who came from the villages and wished to establish a new life for themselves with better living conditions (the ex-driver Salim, born in 1942; the retired teacher Mahmut, born in 1948). These newcomers mostly lacked the capital to start their own businesses and were dependent on low-skilled or unskilled labour in the town. An easy way to enter the urban labour market was through the service sector, in which most immigrant Gypsies were active. Even relatively low-paying jobs, such as shoe polishing, would constitute a good beginning for someone who wanted to start a new life in the town. The immigrant Gypsies thus came to hold positions that had come into demand. It was at this time that they started to be perceived as more unpleasant and disturbing.

Rana (born in 1935), the oldest daughter of the leading immigrant Gypsy family Kocayar, rejected the dominant narrative on the reasons that triggered the attacks as if caused by the misbehaviour of the Gypsies. Instead, she indicated that this narrative was just used to cover the real reason, which was the jealousy that the townspeople felt towards the Gypsies as they became wealthier and bought a truck:

As if they were looking at the schoolgirls. Hahay, that is a lie. When did they look at schoolchildren! It is a lie! They got jealous of us. [. . .]. My father was very rich. Then he bought a Leyland [truck]. Kadir said, 'Brother Dilaver, let's be partners'.

[My brother] Fikret was his old friend. They gave money [and became partners]. It was an open truck. My brother Husam was an assistant driver. My other brother was a driver too. They [other non-Gypsy townspeople] incited him [Kadir] by saying that they [her brothers] would cheat.

The description from Solmaz (non-Gypsy and former 2003 mayor, born in 1943) of the economic background and shifts into ethnic framing are illustrative:

This bread fight started among the drivers. The chiefs were drivers, I mean. An event would need chiefs to realize it. [...] "Driving! They [Gypsies] started beating the drivers. It went on from there. In essence, it was a drivers' war [with stress]. The drivers' war turned into a Gypsy war [war against the Gypsies]. At that time, the drivers were united. Who could look at the Bayramiç drivers disdainfully! If one beats one of the drivers, they would get together and would go to beat the guy. The Gypsies wanted to take over the business. This time, the people of Bayramiç stood behind the drivers. Since they were the majority, the majority won out.

The increasing power of the drivers was one of the signifiers of the transformation in power and status allocation. Therefore, it was not a change in Gypsiness itself, but a transition in power relations in the society altogether, in which Turkishness was used to improve one's social position and status. Political allegiances are also significant to an understanding of these changing power relations in Turkey as well as in the town of Bayramiç. The era of the Democratic Party (1950–1960) and that of its successor, the Justice Party (the only party in power between 1965 and 1971, and with coalitions from 1971 to 1980) that were mostly supported by merchants, craftsmen and peasants (Karpas, 1959), were the periods in which the domination of the former wealthy families was broken in the town. These families were part of the elite whose power depended on land holding and who generally supported the founding party, the Republican People's Party (RPP). Therefore, while some people were losing their power, others were gaining new positions in the town's economy (the daughter of the first mayor in the town Canan, born in 1947; the leading perpetrator Kadir, born in 1927).

The decline of the old elite's position fitted well with the populist ideology of the government, which centred on ordinary townspeople and villagers as the core of the nation and the real and legitimate owners of the national wealth (Bora and Canefe, 2002). This ideology also underlined feelings of exploitation among the peasants. In the forced expulsion, we see how the townspeople and villagers manipulated similar nationalist feelings in order to attack the Gypsies despite the opposition of the old elites in the town (demonstrated more in the next sections of this article). The beating of the attorney, who stood up for the Gypsies, in a way also symbolized their dissatisfaction with the old order.

Hence, apart from the discontent with the immigrant Gypsies and the personal interests involved, the attacks should be seen as part of a hidden rebellion against the elites and bureaucrats who embodied the dominant class and the modernization

ideas of the founding state. The members of the old elite and the bureaucrats in the town who were mostly protecting the Gypsies were also terrorized during the attacks (as will be exemplified in the last section). Some of these were the employers of immigrant Gypsies both in their businesses and in their homes (such as Canan's and Hale's families). The perpetrators told the employers to either fire the Gypsies or face ostracization from society and be boycotted. Still, some employers resisted and protected the Gypsies while others did not dare to protest.

Eventually, the nationalism of the time reinforced ethno-nationalist feelings over other identifications, which were based on e.g. citizenship, class interest, local ties and religion. The discontent that had started as a 'Drivers' Fight' turned into a full-scale Gypsy hunt that was nourished by historical Gypsy stigma and nationalism. As the local Gypsy woman Ezgi (born in 1931) pointed out: 'They [attacked] over the truck, my beautiful girl. Over the truck, they said "you" and "me". Then they did not differentiate any of us, my lovely child.'

The construction of Gypsiness in Turkey

At the national level, the structure of the society at the time of the Ottoman Empire offers some clues to the historical construction of Gypsiness in relation to other categories that would become influential during the republic. Gypsiness has been an ambiguous and liminal category between Muslim and non-Muslim, as well as between Turks and non-Turks. Gypsies have been included in Turkishness to some extent through their territorial ties and religious identifications. However, they have also faced discrimination through the Gypsy stigma.

In the Ottoman Empire, Gypsies were not considered a major threat to the well-ordered society as they were in most European countries (Barany, 2002; Ginio, 2004; Lucassen and Willems, 2003). The Gypsies in Ottoman society were in a somewhat better position compared to, for instance, those in the Habsburg Empire, but they still faced different treatment that indicated discriminative practices. When Mehmet the Conqueror took Constantinople in 1453, the Gypsy population in the Ottoman Empire increased with the addition of those from the Byzantine lands. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, following the *kanunnames* (legislations) concerning Gypsies, marginal status was attributed to them (Çelik, 2004).

The proof of their marginalization and otherization is reflected in the terminology that is used in the registers, *ehl-i fesad* [people of malice] (Çelik, 2004: 5). However, there were also respected and wealthy Gypsies, as well as Gypsy guilds that could afford to even build a palace (the Sepetçiler Pavillion) for the sultan in gratitude for his patronage in 1643 (Marsh, 2008). Some Gypsies even had a special status as Gypsy *sancaks* (governing administrative districts) in the empire and followed other professions such as musicians, blacksmiths and ironworkers (Marushiakova and Popov, 2006).

At the administrative level, the most visibly different treatment of the Gypsies was their taxation. Although some were Muslims, all were obliged to pay the *cizye*

tax that was collected from non-Muslims. Similarly in the tax and population records of the nineteenth century, they were categorized separately as well, unlike any other Muslim community (Karpas, 1985). Moreover, in the seventeenth century, the attitudes against the Gypsies toughened through a state campaign that increased their taxes and accused them of widespread pimping and prostitution (Barany, 2002). The spread of Orientalist ideas from Europe about Gypsies was also in evidence, as Gypsies were increasingly seen within a civilization–savage dichotomy in the late Ottoman period, especially after 1878 during Abdulhamid's regime (Marsh, 2008).

In the Turkish Republic, on the other hand, the self and the other binary was constructed primarily through religion according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, although it was not systematically applied. In the treaty, only non-Muslims were considered as minorities without any reference to ethnicity (Oran, 2004). Thus, ethnic Muslim minorities, including Gypsy people, were not recognized officially as such. However, as exemplified in the 1934 Law on Settlement, their mobility and lifestyles served as grounds for discrimination, similar to what took place in many other countries (Bedard, 2004).⁸ Additionally, in Article 21 of the law on the settlement of foreigners and their travel within the country, Gypsies are once again mentioned particularly as potential objects of evictions. Moreover, in the instruction manual for policemen, 'Gypsies without well established businesses' are classified as suspicious (Danka, 2008).

How Gypsies are treated as a different group and excluded through the specific features that are attributed to them is also observable in sayings and phrases in the Turkish language. The commonly held knowledge about Gypsies depends mainly on prejudices, stereotyping and mystification, which actually reproduce the ones that have been prevalent since Ottoman times. Both demonization and romanticization reinforce each other in Gypsies' exclusion; Gypsies are usually either stigmatized through unwelcome attributes such as idleness, robbery and immorality or envied because of their supposedly joyful life. In literary works as well, negative terms such as 'begging', 'ill-mannered', 'shameless', 'importunate', 'pimp', 'uncivilized', 'ignorant', 'untrustworthy' and 'godless' are regularly used to refer to Gypsy people (Kolukırık, 2005).

In spite of the discriminatory discourses and practices against Gypsies in society, the Gypsies of Turkey are mostly reluctant to identify themselves as a separate ethnic group. The inclusiveness of Turkishness as a national identity is influential in this context, as it allows the recognition of territorial and religious commonalities. On the other hand, traditional perceptions of minorities have a tendency of regarding them as traitors through collaborating with enemies. Historical events related to discrimination, the negative representations in national discourse, exclusionary violence against minorities in Turkey such as Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Alevis (Aktar, 2000; Bali, 2008; Gürel, 2004; Güven, 2006; Tuğal, 2007), and the recent position of other minorities that claim their own ethnic identity (like the Kurdish people) all contribute to this reluctance of Gypsies to acquire a separate ethnic identification. Besides, the relatively small size of their organized population in

Turkey, their organizational obstacles and lack of resources also contribute to this factor.

As a result, whereas recognition as an ethnic minority is considered as a means to social integration and access to equal sources in the European context, Turkish Gypsies tend to overemphasize their Turkishness and loyalty to the state as is experienced in different instances. Still, the historical Gypsy stigma, prejudices and discrimination are largely connected to the construction of Gypsiness all over the country.

Revisiting the historical Gypsy stigma and constructing the Gypsy threat

The moment of the attacks, the socio-economic transformation and changing power relations in the town all point to the reasons why the people who were called 'immigrant Gypsies' attracted particular attention. However, this, in itself, still does not explain why the Gypsies were targeted. That is why we have to look at the social construction of Gypsiness as a category and the historical stigma attached to it.

The construction of Gypsiness in the local context of Bayramiç had its own particularities, but it also interplayed with the perceptions, stereotypes, stigmas and discrimination of Gypsiness at the national level. Although the townspeople had other ways of relating to one another beyond these categories, when a certain type of competition or conflict arose, the Gypsy stigma was easily activated. The 'master status' (Hughes, 1945) that Gypsiness had acquired was fuelled and maintained by the social distance between Gypsies and non-Gypsies. This can be characterized as 'labeled [sic] interaction' (Van Arkel, 2009: 90–2), which was based on the existing hierarchized and limited relations between Gypsies and the rest of the local society. The Gypsy category had been used historically to maintain this status quo. At the same time however, as a reference point, it could fade within day-to-day contacts. Thus, the effect of the category also depended on the context.

Almost all non-Gypsy townspeople characterized their relationship with the Gypsies as close. 'Our Gypsies are good', and 'not like others', or 'We intermingled' are typical narratives (the Helva producer, Fatima, born in 1935; the housewife Fitnat, born in 1912; the primary school teacher Ismail, born in 1959). Good neighbourhood memories carry a nostalgic tone. They usually do not mention any discrimination prior to the attacks. Still, many people disclosed their negative feelings towards Gypsies in several ways, which were also compatible with the general stereotypes and derogatory terms that referred to them negatively in Turkey (Kolukırık, 2005; Oprisan, 2006). These stereotypes relied on the 'darkness' of Gypsies, their proximity to dirt and impurity, their immorality, their being only allegedly Muslim and their incompatibility to Turkish traditions, manners, limited relations. Another very significant factor was the taboo on intermarriage,

which existed within Turkish society. Besides this, some townspeople pointed to the social distance and hierarchy between the Gypsies and non-Gypsies by revealing that the Gypsies had always been second-class citizens (such as the ex-grocer Aydin, born in 1923; the former mayor Solmaz, born in 1945). The story told by my uncle Mahmut (born in 1948) is devastating, as it displays the degree of the discrimination involved through a particular anecdote before the attacks:

The restaurant owner Babacin Ismet worked with the Gypsies to carry his materials. He would also hire a Gypsy as a servant while we were going on a picnic together. On the way to the picnic place, the Gypsy would follow us at some distance carrying the basket. I remember Babacin Ismet's humiliation of the Gypsy. We were all sitting and drinking in the presence of the Gypsy man a few meters away from us. Babacin Ismet shouted at the Gypsy: 'You are standing towards the wind, your Gypsy smell comes to me. Do not stay there!'

When the group boundaries within society were blurring with the immigrant Gypsies in the time of the socio-economic transformation and changing power relations, some people, especially the ones in the transportation sector, regarded the process as dangerous (such as the ex-driver Salim, born in 1942; the ex-driver Nitki, born in 1940). In such times, a social problem can be constructed as a threat and thereby legitimize the violence through blaming, demonizing and/or criminalizing the stigmatized group. For the tension to turn out to be an exclusionary act of violence, the '[...] opposing interests and individual conflicts have to be "collectivized" into an ethnic antagonism. This occurs when the dominant ethnic or national group perceives a collective threat to its group position from an out-group.' (Bergmann, 2002: 165–6).

In the context of the attacks, the townspeople were pushed to act upon the categories of Turkishness and Gypsiness more than ever to differentiate 'us' and 'them'. The Gypsy stigma carrying all these stereotypes became functional while commonalities and open interactions were undermined. When hostile feelings and competition along with the increasing opportunities in the transportation sector met with the category of Gypsiness and the blurring boundaries between the Gypsies and non-Gypsies as experienced in the town, personal issues gathered national meanings and thus constructed a Gypsy threat. Institutional legitimization of the stigma (in Van Arkel's work, by the church and state) was significant in this process, as the Gypsies were religiously condemned and became the object of discriminative state policies.

The state discourse and policies around Gypsiness were influential in legitimizing the discrimination and the attacks in the town. Solmaz draws a direct connection between state discrimination and its counterpart in the society: 'The state was discriminating against the Gypsies at that time anyway'. Thus, if the state does it, every other citizen would feel that it was legitimate to follow its example. Even if the state did not openly execute harsh discrimination, the hierarchies between

Gypsiness and Turkishness created, reinforced and shaped the relations with the Gypsies. Solmaz explained the discrimination by the state at that time:

They [Gypsies] could not be commissioned as officers. For instance, when I was in military school, one was admitted by mistake. He was a Gypsy from Edirne. They found [out about] the kid. He was my classmate. He was in the second grade. His name was Oguz. They kicked him out in 1959 or 1960. Then he became a teacher. They would make them teachers, but did not commission them as officers. Now they do.

Gypsies were excluded from state jobs until the 1960s, as being a state official was restricted to people of Turkish ethnic origin (Soner, 2005). The change in the Civil Servant Law, which stipulated that all Turkish citizens instead of only ethnic Turks were full citizens, was realized in 1965 (Aktar, 2000). This change also may have affected the relative socio-economic positions of the non-Gypsies either in reality or in perception.

Many townspeople, especially the perpetrators and their supporters, referred to the guiding role of the state in the discriminatory treatment of Gypsies (such as the leading perpetrator Kadir, born in 1926; the ex-driver Ramazan, born 1948). They referred to the state as the primary actor in determining the nature and the origin of this discrimination, as the non-Gypsy Nebahat (born in 1940) asserted: ‘After all, *kıpti* [Ottoman term for Gypsy] was written on their identity cards’. The term *Kıpti* had been used for Gypsies since the Ottoman times, when the population had been divided as Muslim, Christian, Armenian, Jewish and Gypsy (*Kıpti*) in the first modern population census of 1828/1829 (Karpas, 1959). The practice of putting the sign of K for *Kıpti* on ID cards ended in the 1950s while some older Gypsy people indicated that their cards still contained the ‘K’ until the 1970’s (the *muhacir* Kismet, born in 1926; the local Gypsy Fazil, born in 1937). Moreover, there was some recognition of Gypsies as an ethnically different group, albeit in a discriminative way, in the 1934 Law on Settlement. This law ‘explicitly lists “itinerant Gypsies” among groups of persons to be subject to differential treatment’ (Bedard, 2004: 1–2).

Nevertheless, the prevailing political atmosphere that was stimulated by the government at the time – which, as Bora and Canefe assert, stressed the centrality of Turkishness – encouraged violent expressions of ethnic nationalism. As repeated by the immigrant Gypsies, the current government’s role was crucial in intensifying stigma and social distance (such as Cevza, born in 1955; Bidon Hilmi, born in 1930). The connection between the centre-right populist politics and the nationalist emphasis was strengthened during the late 1960s by depicting villagers and peasants as the core of the nation. This depiction stressed the idea of national loyalty as a condition to be considered as a reliable citizen. This stress on nationalist and conservative articulations and ‘the [ordinary people] as real owners of the country’ (Bora and Canefe, 2002: 658) provoked a feeling of injustice among villagers and small townspeople, especially against the bureaucratic elite and the intellectuals.

The perception of 'the other' as a threatening subject was crucial in legitimizing the attacks, similar to other cases (Bergmann, 2002; Gross, 2003; Lucassen, 2005; Ray et al., 2003; Tambiah, 1996). There were a few instances that highlighted the Gypsy threat as narrated by the non-Gypsies in Bayramiç. At the time, there was a widespread tendency to underline the Gypsiness of the immigrant Gypsies and to label them in negative terms (triggered by their misbehaviour). The evil image of the Gypsies and the idea that the non-Gypsy townspeople could themselves be in danger had they not attacked them, were also very powerful motives. This representation of vulgar Gypsies strengthened the idea that non-Gypsies were the victims, and posited the attacks as inevitable if the town was to be rescued.

The victimized position of the townspeople and the articulation of the Gypsies' forthcoming domination served to justify the attacks as a rebellion against brutal Gypsies. The story of domination reveals the feelings of the non-Gypsies about losing power within the town. This story overlapped with the struggle for the redefinition of power in the town, which, in the eyes of many, was actually at stake. Since the hierarchies between non-Gypsies and Gypsies were strong whether the Gypsies attempted to dominate or not, even those few Gypsies who neglected the hierarchies might be seen as violating the norms. The Gypsy threat was thus constructed in an unrealistic and extreme way. Some people even mentioned the rumours that the Gypsies were taking over the town. A neighbour, Meliha (born in 1942), presented a similar narrative, which illustrates the overwhelming feelings that Gypsies constituted a real threat to the town:

The Gypsies made people hate them. They were very numerous. They would almost take over Bayramiç. They were going to take over Bayramiç! They [non-Gypsies] attacked them and people got rid off [them – Gypsies]. Now they [Gypsies] would not do anything like that. I mean they would not raise their voice. It was good in a way. It has been very good; children could not go to school passing through the Gypsy neighbourhood. Would people let their children have passes made at them, my girl?

The president of the Chamber of Drivers, Nitki, affirmed the victimized position of the townspeople. He was among the perpetrators of the attacks. He was 20 years old and working as an assistant driver. During the attacks, he was among those who stoned the Gypsies' houses. He explained how terrified they were by the Gypsies:

Because of the Gypsies, we were not able to pass through the streets on Wednesdays. They would go out in the streets; they were busy with their animals like packing saddles, etc. While we were passing, I do not know... For instance, if you stepped on their stuff or passed close by them they would immediately beat you. The people said: Enough! Then they also made passes at our girls. [...] You just pass by, and someone would kick you, you cannot even imagine. There were the Yasars, they were powerful. When we saw them, we looked for an escape route. I was 16 or something.

They hung the flag here in front of the municipality. I was happy, I mean. Instead of being upset, I got happy. Why? They hurt us. [...]

In the town and the surrounding areas, the attacks even created a heroic perception of the townspeople with an emphasis on their solidarity and intolerance of inequality. By criminalizing the Gypsies, the non-Gypsies were depicted as innocent, while the Gypsies were imagined as people who did evil things just for fun. Many non-Gypsies pointed to the vulgarity of the Gypsies preceding the events (such as housewife Meliha, born in 1942; ex-driver Ramazan, born in 1948). They indicated that the Gypsies were disturbing and attacking non-Gypsies and mentioned a widespread fear of the Gypsies.

Eventually, the use of nationalist symbols and discourses as well as the mobilization of people to stand up against ‘others’ made people imagine that they were staging a war. Most viewed the attacks as a natural way of treating ‘unfits’ and ‘unreliable others’ in society. With the construction of the perceived threat and the terrorization of the perpetrators being so strong, many people were scared to oppose the violence. Moreover, the fear and the images of terrorizing Gypsies opened a channel for solidarity among the perpetrators against ‘the common enemy’ and ‘the collaborators’. The Gypsies of the town were symbolically excluded from national and local society, no matter how much they had felt they were members before. The attacks then acquired a heroic and nationalistic character that was stimulated by nationalistic symbols such as flags and anthems, which were used broadly during the attacks and reinforced the effects of terrorization. ‘March, march! [They were singing] the independence anthem [the national anthem] in the streets. I mean [as if they were saying] “we have saved Turkey”. They passed by flags. I mean as if we were *gavur* [giaour] and they were Turks and they took over’ (Immigrant Gypsy Sebiye, born in 1955).

The significance of terrorization

The Gypsies were degraded and ‘otherized’ to a great extent during the attacks. Some shops did not even sell to the Gypsies, while most Gypsies were too terrified to go to the centre to shop for their basic needs. They hid indoors day and night, while some neighbours brought them news and food. People who employed or protected Gypsies were also threatened, leading to what Van Arkel (2009), in his theoretical model to explain violent outbursts against minority groups, called ‘the terrorization [sic] to discriminate.’

The crucial point for creating fear in some non-Gypsies was the beating of the attorney (such as the housewife Meliha, born in 1942; the old town counsellor Salih, born in 1924). It symbolized the uncontrollability of the violence, the people’s outrage and the impotence of a state representative against the perpetrators. It also illustrated the perpetrators’ power in their attack of a state representative. In addition, their feelings of fighting against inadequate and failing state authorities, and presenting themselves as the legitimate executors of the state’s actual will were

pivotal in the attacks. While the perpetrators beat the attorney who decried the illegitimacy of their actions, the police joined the mob in stoning the Gypsy houses. Although the state may seem absent from the violent attacks of the townspeople, it was, in fact, not that passive. None of the perpetrators was punished for the attacks. Moreover, the actions of the security forces and governing authorities were insufficient, as they permitted and even joined the perpetrators. Many townspeople felt that most state authorities agreed with the violence against the Gypsies and that they helped the security forces by 'doing the right thing'. The state, however, was responsible for the protection of its citizens – in this case, the Gypsies.

The leading perpetrator, Kadir, described how the gendarmes and security forces backed them up. He was drinking in the *meyhane* (bar-like restaurant) together with the head of the police when the people left to attack the Gypsy houses. He said that all the state officials had supported them. The local ones consented to everything, and the ones who came from the outside were reluctant to stop them. Kadir stated that the government at the time also encouraged them, as it did not do anything against the attacks, and some members even overtly supported them.

Many perpetrators engaged in anti-semitic violence narrated similar feelings, such as believing that 'this action was of course wished "from above"' and 'no one can and will punish [...them for the attacks]' (Bergmann, 2002: 168). Van Arkel not only points to the lack of strength among the state authorities to stop the perpetrators, but also explains how, in many cases, state functionaries joined the mob. Thus, they empowered the attackers, and helped in terrorizing those people who (would have) opposed the violence against Jews. In the words of Van Arkel, '[f]ear of punishment compels participation' (1985: 278). In Bayramiç, the terrorization mechanism was mentioned in some ordinary people's narratives as they revealed their feelings of powerlessness in standing against the perpetrators (such as the old town counsellor Salih, born in 1924; the retired teacher Selim, born in 1945). Even at the time of this research, some protectors were afraid that their role as protectors would become known, some 40 years after the attacks (such as the petty businessman Ramiz, born in 1946; the old town counsellor Salih, born in 1924). Non-Gypsy townspeople who were seen as too close to the Gypsies or who protected them were terrorized by means of verbal and physical threats by the perpetrators. Even ordinary townspeople who had no business with the Gypsies felt terrorized during the attacks. This was because the risk of becoming an outcast and a traitor to the local society was very real, and few people dared to stand up against the leading figures as a result.

The fear was still vivid for Hale (born in 1952) from the *helvacis* (halva makers and sellers), whose family protected their employee Ummuhan. Even while describing this in a café, she was whispering to me. She said that during the attacks they could not go out to look at what was happening although they heard the noises and sounds of people running around. She asked me not to give her name and narrative

to anybody in the town. She still had trouble talking about the leading perpetrators. She spoke about threatening letters that they had received during the attacks:

They wrote a letter to us. Sister Ummuhan was working with us. ‘Do not let them [the Gypsies] work for you.’ [...] One [Driver Halit] even came and yelled in front of our door. But do not tell him that I told you this; he insulted us. No one came out or even made a call [to the policemen]. There were phones at that time; not many, but the ones who had them, did not [make calls]. But everybody was afraid. For what if they phoned and people found out about it?

The uncontrolled rage of the leading figures terrified many people in the town. Aydin, born in 1923, who did not give the names of any leading figures during our conversation, stated his reluctance to talk at the time and also afterwards. When I asked him directly whether he had heard that Kadir had been involved as the leading figure in the attacks, he just said, ‘I mean even though I knew, I would not say Kadir, etc, for instance’. He went on telling about the fear and silence he experienced himself as well as by many others: ‘The people kept silent. The attorney was beaten and he was left like that. The Gypsies were stoned, etc. If someone testified, they [the perpetrators] would catch him.’

Jan Gross, who studied the anti-Jewish pogroms undertaken by their Polish neighbours during and immediately after World War II, drew attention to the fear of being an outcast. He argued that it was not the Nazis but the perception of self-interest, and the mechanisms of social control and terrorization that largely explained why Polish people killed their Jewish neighbours: ‘[...]those who do not conform become social outcasts’ (2006: 251), and thus even risk being stigmatized and labelled in the same way as in Gross’ example of a protector’s son who was called a Jew by other children (Gross, 2003: 131). The fear of becoming an outcast forces people to hide their true feelings even while they help the members of the persecuted minority group, as Gross articulates.

In Bayramiç, many townspeople described similar fears about standing up for the Gypsies, the threats that they faced and their ongoing hesitancy to reveal their help to the Gypsies (such as Hale born in 1952; Salih, born in 1924; Selim, born in 1945). The non-Gypsy neighbour Meliha’s (born in 1942) narrative is remarkable in its demonstration of the reaction that ordinary people gave to terrorization – their fear and silence. She related how her older neighbour advised her not to talk about the attacks:

The next morning we got up. I asked, ‘Sister Aysel [her older neighbour whose husband was working in the municipality – *zabıta*], did you see what happened here? [She imitated her whispering] “Wipe your mouth”. “Do not raise your voice.” I mean “wipe your mouth”. She said. ‘Look they broke in here [her neighbor’s house] tonight. Then let’s not make any noise. I mean they are enraged, they would come and harm us too.’ That poor woman told me this. ‘Do not make any noise. Go into your house.’

Consequently, many townspeople experienced terror and fear in various distinct ways during the forced expulsion. They were not necessarily Gypsies. Some were only the Gypsies' neighbours (such as Aydin, Ayfer, Meliha and Necla); some were wealthy non-Gypsies who employed Gypsies (such as Canan, Hale, Ramiz and Salih); some were ordinary townspeople who chose not to engage in the attacks (such as Selim, Solmaz and Mahmut); and some became involved in the attacks against their own will or interests (such as Huseyin Kiltas and Karaahmet). Some were passive spectators while others were active protectors of the Gypsies. The town was terrorized in such a way that most people felt and experienced at least some part of the violence.

The role of the state representatives in leaving the perpetrators unpunished prolonged the effect of this terrorization, as well as the threat of further violence. The attorney was reassigned to another city and no one was punished for the exclusionary violence against the Gypsies. In other, similar cases, unpunished perpetrators are seen to be the norm in Turkey. Several state authorities further naturalize this kind of violence with statements that stress the Turkish people's nationalist sensitivity. Bora (2010) pointed to a similar tendency in the last 10 years to regard lynching in Turkey as normal, especially against Kurdish people. Therefore, we should recognize exclusionary violence also within a more general unquestioned and legitimized framework of violence against people who are classified as opponents or enemies to the national body and social order.

Conclusion

The forced expulsion displayed how some townspeople activated the exclusive category of Gypsiness against their neighbours when socio-economic relations were shifting. For them, the improved class position of immigrant Gypsies violated the ethnic/racial hierarchy. As discussed in the theoretical part of this article especially through the works of Bergmann (2002), Steinberg (1989) and Bowen (1996), the economic dynamics and power relations were significant for the realization of the expulsion. It was not that the townspeople finally found out that these people were Gypsies and that the Gypsies were evil, but that the increased power of the latter mobilized the anti-Gypsy stereotype with the aim of restoring the ethnic hierarchy and of putting the Gypsies back in their place.

Violence was used to redefine the contents of Turkishness and Gypsiness, as well as the relationship between the two. The people who had once been confused about the boundaries between themselves and the Gypsies in the town, all of a sudden attacked their neighbours in the name of Turkishness versus Gypsiness. However, the attacks were not *caused* by the existing categories. The categories became powerful and functional for the attacks, not the other way around. This poses the question of what particular dynamics at that particular moment made

them accept this imposed and rigid dichotomy. The socio-economic transformations, the changes in power relations and the prevailing political discourse on ethnic nationalism in the country comprised the atmosphere. Eventually, with the increase of social uncertainties and the acceleration of social change, as well as the increase in socio-economic competition similar to that described by Appadurai (2006), the redefinition of boundaries and rigid categories became functional in the 'liminal space of Gypsiness' as Friedman (2003) would refer to it. This functionality of the historical stigma within a certain socio-economic context and power relations has been significant for the realization of the expulsion as argued by Van Arkel (2009).

The Gypsy stigma was revisited and the unambiguous articulation of the Gypsy threat dominated the stories about the attacks. The content of Gypsiness was enlarged and demonized in the process. It became more rooted in the concept of evil and led to the alienation between Gypsies and non-Gypsies. The same people who were once referred to as 'our Gypsies', and with whom non-Gypsies could trace commonalities in other contexts, were also demonized. What made the Gypsy threat so tempting was its power to conceal the personal interests and power struggles of the time. Putting the blame on the Gypsy and the terrorization of the protectors not only legitimized the actions of the perpetrators at the time, but also made the townspeople remember the incidents within this same framework. This representation, therefore, is also crucial for the ongoing perceptions and fear.

In consequence, inclusionary and exclusionary mechanisms changed according to the transformation of socio-economic context, power relations and personal interests, and the people who were called 'Gypsies' were excluded from the social whole of which they were previously considered a part. It should also be noted that the fear of the perpetrators and the potential for becoming social outcasts were crucial in the realization of such violence and exclusion. Moreover, leaving such cases unquestioned and unpunished officially reinforces and prolongs the effects of terrorization, and causes the further legitimization of violence in the society. This is especially the case for the treatment of people with minority and/or marginal positions and categories in Turkey. All these multiple dimensions in both the local and national spheres eventually work together to influence the realization, remembrance and representation of the forced expulsion.

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Notes

1. Together with some other scholars in Turkey and in Europe, I prefer using the term 'Gypsy' and its Turkish counterpart 'Çingene' to Roma although I respect others who avoid the term for its pejorative usages. In Turkey, some refer to themselves as Roman in the hope that this will rescue them from discrimination. By referring to others as *Çingene* they just repeat and reinforce existing prejudices and stereotypes about *Çingenes*. The term serves as an umbrella concept and covers many groups. In Europe, some groups do not accept the term 'Roma' because it leads to misrepresentation. For Turkey, the term 'Roman' has become popular in the process of incorporation to international Roma politics and it has the potential to exclude some others as well such as Doms or Loms in cases. Thus, I only use 'Roma' or 'Roman' when I refer to those specific self-declared groups, for the ones who identify themselves as such and for the sake of clarification in reference to certain literature and international Roma politics.
2. Available at: <http://www.yuksekovahaber.com/haber/bursada-roman-yurttaslara-saldiri-107493.htm> (accessed 25 July 2013).
3. For a discussion on historical interplay between ethnic status hierarchy and political and economic empowerment of blacks in United States, see Fredrickson (1997: 90–93). For the specific debate on misrecognition and misdistribution, see Butler (1998).
4. For the Gypsy holocaust, see Kenrick and Puxon (1972), Rosenberg (1999) and Sonneman (2002).
5. For examples of research on anti-Gypsyism in Europe, see Ljujic et al. (2012) Marinaro and Sigona (2012) and Nicolae (2007).
6. In this context, since June 2013, triggered with the demolition attempt against Gezi Park in the centre of Istanbul, many people in several cities of Turkey have been protesting and emphasizing their discontent about this process, authoritarian government, marginalization and otherization of human rights and democracy demands.
7. All the names of the interviewees all over the article are pseudonyms.
8. The law was revised on 19 September 2006 after the success of persisting objections of human-rights and Gypsy activists, and the new law regarding settlement (No. 5543) abolished these discriminatory statements.

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