

**CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF GYPSIES IN TURKEY: CASES OF ROMA AND
DOM COMMUNITIES**

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ABSTRACT

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This study aims to compare Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır with regard to their integration levels to different majorities (respectively Turks in Edirne and Kurds in Diyarbakır) and belonging to the political body (state), access to citizenship rights (civil, social, political and cultural) and the affect of transnational citizenship on Roma and Dom communities. The main argument of this study asserts that Roma community can have more access to citizenship rights than Dom community. This is related with the fact that Roma community lives with Turks, who are the ethnic majority in Edirne and in Turkey, whereas Dom community lives mostly with Kurds, who are the majority in Diyarbakır but minority in Turkey. Foremost, Roma community has closer connections with state and transnational space than Dom community.

The study has found that ethnicity appears as a common barrier for both communities in benefiting from full citizenship. However, it is noted that they experienced different historical, social and economic transformations. Social exclusion is observed at different levels for the two communities. Hence, the

study tries to explain why the equality principle of citizenship is ruptured for both communities. While forced migration in 1990s and the gradual loss of musician craft were key factors for the exclusion of Dom community in the labor market, Roma community with affect of agricultural modernization, has repositioned themselves in terms of ethnicity and class formation in last 40-50 years owing mainly to urbanization and modernization. The study has found that Dom community has very limited citizenship rights compared to Roma community. The differences can be obviously seen with regard to impact of poverty and their integration levels to the majority.

Key Words: Roma, Dom, Kurds, Citizenship Rights, Social Exclusion.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ ÇİNGENELERİN VATANDAŞLIK HAKLARI: ROMAN VE DOM TOPLULUKLARININ ÇALIŞMALARI

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Bu çalışma, Edirne’deki Roman topluluğu ile Diyarbakır’daki Dom topluluğunun farklı çoğunluklar ile (sırasıyla Edirne’deki Türkler ve Diyarbakır’daki Kürtler) entegrasyon seviyeleri ve siyasi topluluğa aidiyetlerini, vatandaşlık haklarından (sivil, sosyal, siyasi ve kültürel) yararlanma seviyelerini ve ulus ötesi vatandaşlığın Roman ve Dom derneklerine etkilerini karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda iki topluluğun sosyal entegrasyonunu, modern vatandaşlığın eşitlik ilkesine dayanarak tam vatandaşlık haklarından ne ölçüde yararlanabildiklerini açığa çıkarmaya çalışmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel argümanı, Roman topluluğunun Dom topluluğuna göre vatandaşlık haklarına daha fazla erişebildiğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu durum, Roman topluluğunun Edirne ve Türkiye’de etnik çoğunluk olan Türklerle; öte yandan Dom topluluğunun Diyarbakır’da çoğunluk olup Türkiye’de azınlık olan Kürtlerle yaşamasıyla ilgilidir. En önemlisi, Roman topluluğunun devlet ve ulusötesi alanla Dom topluluğuna göre yakın ilişkileri bulunmaktadır.

Bu alıřmada, etnisitenin iki topluluęun tam vatandaşlık haklarından yararlanmasında ortak bir engel olduęu; fakat iki topluluęun farklı tarihsel, sosyal ve ekonomik dnüşümler geirdięi ileri sürülmektedir. Sosyal dışlanma iki toplulukta da farklı seviyelerde görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu alıřma, vatandaşlıęın eřitlik ilkesinin iki topluluk iin de neden bozulduęunu ortaya ıkarmaya alıřmaktadır. 1990’larda uygulanan zorunlu g pratięi ve mzisyenlik mesleęinin kaybolmaya yz tutması Dom topluluęu iin emek pazarındaki sosyal dışlanmanın temel etkenlerini oluřtururken, Roman topluluęu tarımsal modernizasyonun etkileri ile birlikte temel olarak kentleşme ve modernleşme ekseninde son 40–50 yıl ierisinde etnisite ve sınıf oluřumu aısından kendilerini yeniden konumlandırmıřlardır. Bu alıřma, Dom topluluęunun Roman topluluęuna gre daha sınırlı vatandaşlık haklarına sahip olduklarını ne srmektedir. Bu farklılık yoksulluęun etkileri ve oęunluęa entegrasyon seviyeleri ile baęlantılı olarak aıka grlebilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Roman, Dom, Krtler, Vatandaşlık Hakları, Sosyal Dışlanma

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Gypsy¹ population is a transnational group living worldwide. The increasing identity politics and transnational Romani² movement through the post-communist decade (after 1989) bring about the significance of the Romani community studies not only in national but also in transnational space. In Turkey, Romani studies have gained special consideration and importance after Turkey's acceptance as an official candidate to the European Union (EU) in 1999 (Diler, 2008 and Kaya, 2005). Accession to EU especially accelerated Romani movement between 2002 and 2005 in Turkey (Uzpeder, 2008). In addition, transnational Romani movement and human rights context have affected Gypsy population on the ground that rights and identities have been reshaped in transnational space. As Sobotka (2006) suggests, local, national and transnational dimensions are three dimensions interrelated in Roma policy-making. On the other hand, Gypsy

¹ I am going to apply the label Gypsy as a common term instead of various self-identifications employed by sub-groups. Although the name Roma was also chosen by a Romani NGO, the International Romani Union, as a self-designator at the First World Romani Congress in London in 1971, Gypsy (*Çingene*) seems more inclusive term in Turkey. I will also use "Roma" (*Roman*) and "Dom" group names with regard to multi-layered and diverse features in its historical origins, language, traditions and their self-identification. On the other hand, since official name of Romani community is accepted as Roma, I will use the word Roma when I discuss the European case because Gypsy is assumed as pejorative.

² Vermeersh (2006) argues for the difference between Roma and Romani identity. Although the term Roma represents an attempt to break away from social stigmas and connected with the process of Romani political mobilization, Romani identity can be conceptualized in three ways: "The first defines the Roma as a historical diaspora. Scholars such as David Crowe (1995), Angus Fraser (1995; 2000), Ian Hancock (1992;1997), and Donald Kenrick (1978)...have usually viewed the Roma as the descendants of a population that travelled from the Punjab region in northwestern India and arrived in Europe at the end of thirteenth century...The second conceptualization of Romani identity has focused on lifestyle and behavior...The third conceptualization focuses on the biological kinship" (Vermeersch, 2006:13-16).

identity received public attention with the demolition of Gypsy districts under urban renewal projects in various cities, among which Sulukule in İstanbul is the well known case.

EU Progress Report (2009) warns Turkey to take measures about Roma population. In this regard, the report points at urban renewal projects and demolition of Roma houses, which have not taken Council of Europe Human Standards into consideration during the execution process. The report also indicates that Roma population face social exclusion and marginalization specifically “in access to education, discrimination in health services, exclusion from job opportunities, difficulties in gaining access to personal documentation and exclusion from participation in public affairs and public life” (EU Progress Report, 2009: 29). The government organized the First Roma Workshop in Turkey in December 2010. This workshop can be seen as a reflection of transnational space’s affect on national level.

Accordingly, Romani studies in Turkey have become visible with the emergence of Romani movement especially for the last five years. In this process, we see new political spaces in which sub-national, national and trans-national spaces are interrelated. This new formation of Romani movement, and state’s strategy in approaching towards Gypsy population in response to it, take place in the context of citizenship. The critical point is that whether new rights or demands will come into existence by Gypsy population.

There are three major Gypsy groups³ in Turkey: *Romanlar* (Roma), *Domlar* (Dom) and *Lomlar* (Lom). We also see an increase in academic and research activities related with especially Roma group in last decade. However, there are a few studies about Dom community in Turkey.

³ Marsh (2008a) suggests that “officially data regarding ethnic minorities is not recorded in Turkey. Since the mid-1960s, there are no questions regarding ethnicity included in population counts. The academic research on numbers in Turkish Gypsy groups is limited and fairly recent...During the ERRC/hCa/EDROM research [Promoting Romani Rights in Turkey] (2006-2007) which covered parts of each of Turkey’s seven regions, researchers suggested a figure of 4.5-5 million. The percentage of Roma in European provinces of Turkey has been estimated at 6-7 % of the total population, and Roma, Dom and Lom, with small groups of Travellers in Anatolia, at about 2 % of the population (Marsh, 2008a:24).

As Marsh suggests,

“Romanlar is a group to whom European Roma are directly related with sharing much in the common culture, language, and economic specialism. The Domlar are related to Dom Gypsies in the Middle East and may have arrived in the Turkish lands sometime in the early 11th century AD, in the south east (Diyarbakır, Antakya, Mardin)...The current Lom population is largely descended from those that were forced to move to Turkey in the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Russians in their conquest of the Caucauss in the 1870s. They now reside in small communities in the north east and Black Sea region” (Marsh, 2008a:24-25).

For the research, cities of Edirne and Diyarbakır are selected as comparative cases owing to their ethnic components. Edirne is one of the cities with most Roma population. It has borders with Greece and Bulgaria. In Edirne, Roma population lives with mostly Turks who are the ethnic majority in Turkey. On the other hand, Dom population lives with mostly Kurds who are the majority in Diyarbakır. With regard to majority-minority relations in Turkey, Turks appear as an ethnic majority, Kurds are minority of Turks. Moreover, Gypsies appear as a minority⁴ of both Turks and Kurds with regard to “size” of their population. On the other hand, Kurds and Gypsies are not officially minority groups since according to the Lausanne Treaty, which was signed in 1923, there are officially three minority groups in Turkey: Armenians, Jews and Greeks.

What is important for the aim of this study is thereby to compare Roma group in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır with regard to their integration levels to the different majorities and belonging to the political community; benefiting from citizenship rights and transnational citizenship’s effects on Roma and Dom communities. The study aims to compare Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır with regard to the extent that they benefit from full citizenship rights in relation to equality principle of citizenship. By equality, the study implies economic and cultural justice. In this regard, on the one hand, everyone has to have equal opportunity to benefit from

⁴ As Aydın (2005) and Oran (2008) argue, becoming minority does not necessiate only religious, linguistic or cultural differences from the majority. To Aydın, it also depends community’s perception of how the community identifies and positions itself in the dominant society (Aydın, 2005:146). In addition, if some group or community would like to assimilate voluntarily in the dominat society, they are not assumed as a minority (Oran, 2008). Kaya and Tarhanlı (2005) put forward the sociological definition. In this respect, I agree with Kaya and Tarhanlı’s conceptualization of minority, that is, when an individual compares his/her position to the majority and feel himself/herself as disadvantaged position in terms of civil, social, political and cultural rights, they are regarded as minority with regard to group affinity.

resources provided by welfare state. On the other hand, “difference” should not be set as a kind of injustice when the resources are distributed. Hence, the study also compares how the resources are shared by different groups: Roma/Turks and Dom/Kurds.

Thereby, studying Roma and Dom communities’ citizenship practice shall contribute citizenship studies in Turkey exposing the citizenship profile of both Roma and Dom communities. Until today, no academic study has been conducted about especially about Dom community. Thus, this study proposes three dimensions of comparative citizenship rights evaluation in both Roma and Dom communities.

First dimension of the study is to evaluate Roma and Dom communities’ identity and belonging; how they feel about their proximity or distance to the majority (Turks and Kurds), larger political community and overall to Turkish citizenship membership. Therefore, the study aims to compare Roma and Dom communities’ degrees of integration to the society with regard to equality principal of citizenship. Citizenship is not only a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an expression of one’s membership in a political community (Delanty, 2000:10; Turner 2001b:11). Their feeling of proximity or distance to Turks or Kurds not only shows their level of integration to the major society but also helps us in understanding their ethnic affiliations to each other. With regard to political belonging to the national level, this comparison will also expose which citizenship approaches (liberal, republican or communitarian) are related to their citizenship practices.

It is important to notice that the comparisons between Roma/Turks; Dom/Kurds and Roma/Dom will not be exercised according to the dialectical distinctions reflected as; inside/outside and us/them. Otherwise, this comparison would produce essentialist identities and categories in the complex terrain of contested identities. Identities are not given but constructed dialogically and politically (Isin, 2002).

Second dimension of this study focuses on the discourse of right of modern nation-state or welfare state. As Delanty suggest, “the modern conception of citizenship has been based on the idea that membership of society must rest on a principle of formal equality. This principle has generally been understood to be defined in terms of a particular understanding of rights” (Delanty, 2000:14). Marshall’s (1992) triad formulation of civil, political and social rights is indispensable element in analyzing full citizenship. In this regard, welfare state provides one of the main means of social integration and political stabilization. Herein, T.H. Marshall’s formulation was extended with cultural rights. These practices are formed in the city context in which both communities are living with different majorities. In this regard, the study aims to compare to what extent Roma/Dom people benefit from civil (freedom of speech, the right to property, the right to justice) political (voting, the right to exercise of political power), social (job opportunity, education, health, housing, pensions) and cultural citizenship rights (linguistic, religious, the right to perform their ethnic practices,) that are related to their urban conditions.

These basic rights are also indicators of levels of integration of Roma and Dom communities. In Europe many EU candidate countries signed the Decade of Roma Inclusion⁵ (2005-2015) proposed by Soros Foundation, the World Bank and EU, which encourages states to address inequality of Roma in the sphere of education, employment, housing and health. The Decade gives an obligation to the signatory countries to take measures in order to abolish the existing inequalities between Gypsy and non-Gypsy citizens (Sobotka, 2007:136; Marsh and Strand, 2005). It is important to note that Turkey has not signed this initiative since Gypsy population is not regarded as an official minority.

⁵ The Decade is introduced in the website: “The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 is an unprecedented political commitment by European governments to improve the socio-economic status and social inclusion of Roma. The Decade is an international initiative that brings together governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, as well as Romani civil society, to accelerate progress toward improving the welfare of Roma and to review such progress in a transparent and quantifiable way. The Decade focuses on the priority areas of education, employment, health, and housing, and commits governments to take into account the other core issues of poverty, discrimination and gender mainstreaming...The twelve countries currently taking part in the Decade...Each of these countries has developed a national Action Plan that specifies the goals and indicators in the priority areas”(www.romadecade.org last access as 13.02. 2010).

Third and final dimension of this thesis aims to examine the effects of transnational citizenship on Roma/Dom communities and the extent to which they are affected by the various forms of globalization, cultural denationalization, migration and transnational institutions which have been affective in transforming the society since 1980s. In other words, it is crucial to investigate the reflections of transnational citizenship on Roma and Dom communities' political belonging. Furthermore, human rights are indispensable parts of transnational space. As Sobotka suggests, "the application of human rights objective to the formation of Roma policy in the 1990s changed the approach of Central and East European (CEE) governments to the Roma" (Sobotka, 2007:135). Romani activists in Turkey try to gain a better position in accordance with the human rights context. Hereby modern citizenship challenges with transnational discourse where rights are no longer limited to national political sphere owing to human rights and transnational Romani activism.

The study hereby aimed to compare the levels of equality and integration of Roma and Dom communities in the major society and distribution of resources on the basis of citizenship rights. As mentioned, for the local level, equality is evaluated according to how resources are shared by different groups with regard to economic and cultural justice. In this regard, I argue that Roma population can have more access to citizenship rights (civil, social, political and cultural) than Dom community. This is related with the fact that Roma lives with Turks, who are ethnic majority in Edirne and in Turkey, whereas Dom lives mostly with Kurds, who are majority in Diyarbakır but minority in Turkey. Foremost, Roma population has closer connections with state and transnational space such as Romani activism in EU, than Dom community in Diyarbakır does. Dom community was dependent on Kurdish rural society before 1990s. The impact of the recent forced migration, however, cut this dependency, and led to conflict and an insecure environment between Doms and Kurds. The sources are scarce and poverty and deprivation in Diyarbakır are widespread among all. This leads to ethnic closure and limited access to citizenships rights for Dom community.

For a comprehensive evaluation, both communities' past/present nomadic patterns are considered in exploring the effects on the present citizen conditions in the urban context. To understand the levels of interaction between minority and majority, marriage patterns are also examined. Furthermore, the denial of full citizenship rights are identified as social exclusion which constitutes a denial of equal opportunity in relation to educational and occupational opportunities, politics, spatial exclusion, social isolation and symbolic dimension of social exclusion and how excluded groups are defined by themselves and wider society.

Having outlined the general perspective of the dissertation, Chapter II gives theoretical framework of citizenship, which is also an analytical tool for the study. Citizenship is evaluated from state citizenship through to democratic citizenship. The first condition of citizenship involves formal membership and welfare rights, whereas in the second form of citizenship the citizens are political actors constituting political spaces. The rights, responsibilities, participation and identity no longer constitute a unitary model of citizenship (Stewart, 1995; Delanty 2000). Modern citizenship is predicated on the principle of equality and universality. This principle is based on the homogenous and organic society, which precludes the different identities and groups from the public sphere. In other words, it defines the status of citizenship and closes itself to outsiders and sometimes to insiders. In the process of modern citizenship, T.H. Marshall (1992) develops triad citizenship rights -civil, political and social welfare state rights- which will help to measure both Roma and Dom communities' citizenship rights. In this evaluation, it is important to notice the welfare state's transformation during the late 1970s and 1980s. As Roche (1992) argues, welfare states have been challenged by structural and ideological changes by market driven economy threatening equality and rights. As a result of this transformation, inequality became visible. In addition, we see flexibilization of the labor, the decline of nuclear family as the dominant pattern of the household, the growth of new forms of poverty and unemployment such as the 'feminization of poverty' and social exclusion. Accordingly, during the comparative analysis of citizenship rights of both Roma and Dom communities, ethnic identities can not be considered as the

sole variable. For that reason, it is significant to evaluate how they are affected by the welfare state transformation. Like Marshallian paradigm, social rights loom large in this paradigm.

Liberal, republican and communitarian citizenship approaches argue on ideal political community in the modern citizenship context. These approaches vary according to the balance between right and duty, the individual and state or community, and help us to understand the Roma and Dom communities' proximity and distance to the political community. In the modern conditions, state is a main political community. Nevertheless, Roma and Dom communities' citizenship rights cannot only be discussed with nation-state dimension of citizenship. Modern citizenship declines with various forms of globalization, migration, cultural denationalization and transnational institutions. In this process, despite the common citizenship rights, many ethnic minorities feel themselves excluded from the common culture of universal and modern citizenship. Hence, citizenship extends with new rights and demands such as cultural rights and human rights. Moreover, Turkish citizenship practices enable us to evaluate Gypsy population in the immigration and ethnicity matrix of Turkish nation-state building process.

Chapter III explores the city profiles of Edirne and Diyarbakır in terms of historical, social, political and economic dimensions. Isin (2002) regards the city as a crucial condition of citizenship. He regards city as a “differentiated machine” because

“the city is not a container where differences encounter each other; the city generates differences and assembles identities. The city is a difference machine insofar as it is understood as that space which is constituted by the dialogical encounter of groups formed and generated immanently in the process of taking up positions, orienting themselves for and against each other, inventing and assembling strategies and technologies, mobilizing various forms of capital, and making claims to that space that is objectified as the city” (İşin, 2002:283).

Hence, Edirne and Diyarbakır are not independent variables for the study. Roma lives with Turkish majority in Edirne and Dom community lives with Kurdish majority in Diyarbakır. Furthermore, this chapter explores the historical and political transformations which were important for these communities. Social and economic aspects of Roma population in Edirne can be traced back to the

Ottoman policies because there was *Çingene Sancağı* in Rumelia province. On the other hand, Gypsies were living with the Kurdish majority in semi-autonomous Kurdish sancaks from sixteenth century to nineteenth century in Ottoman Empire. To evaluate Dom community's present conditions, Kurdish society's social and economic structures are also mentioned. With regard to transformations, modernization of agriculture led Roma community to migrate to Edirne between 1950 and 1960, whereas Dom community has been affected by the processes of resettlement and forced migration, which is completely different from the migration from rural to urban areas in the 1950s. Finally, Edirne and Diyarbakır's demographic, educational and economic profiles are represented with tables. These indicators are facilitators to compare the two cities.

Chapter IV is designed to introduce the appropriate methods and methodology of the research. In addition, this chapter discusses how research process was formed. This chapter addresses case studies, in-depth and oral history interview; confidentiality; verification; data analysis; participant selection; sample characteristics; the case study interview process; limitation; talking sensitive issues and methodological discussion with lesson learned.

Chapter V is the first analysis chapter of the study. It compares Roma and Dom communities' past nomadic patterns and simply tries to answer how they became settled in Edirne and Diyarbakır. Nomadic Roma community was delivering blacksmith and tinsmith services to the peasants but nomadism was not a general pattern among Roma community. Before settling to Edirne, some Roma families were living in the villages and made a living through agricultural laboring, livestock seller (*cambaz*) and continuing their blacksmith, tinsmith craft. Dom community had craftsmen in music field. They were playing instruments in the villages. To evaluate comprehensively, the policies toward nomadic Gypsies were discussed since Ottoman Empire. In modern nation-state, Roma community became settled as a result of agricultural mechanization eventuated by Marshall Plan in 1950s, which led to the first wave migration process. Unlike Roma community, Dom community was affected by forced migration which took place mostly in 1992 and 1993. Furthermore, this chapter also discusses the present

nomadic conditions of both communities. There are traces of nomadic modes of existence in both communities. This chapter also considers to what extent their nomadic patterns are recognized in the settled society.

Having compared the nomadic pattern and process of transition to settled society, Chapter VI analyses the citizenship rights of Roma and Dom communities in Edirne and Diyarbakır. This comparison starts with specifically the main right of being a citizen. To benefit from citizenship rights, the first and foremost priority is to become a citizen. Hence, birth registration is an important element in benefiting from citizenship rights. The comparison proceeds with to what extent Roma and Dom communities benefit from civil rights (liberty of person, the right to own property, the right to work , freedom of speech, the right to justice), social rights (access to job opportunities, participation in education, housing conditions and social bridges in the neighbourhoods, access to health), political rights (representation and participation in political decision-making mechanisms) and cultural rights (the right to exercise ethnic, linguistic and religious practices). The comparative analysis overemphasizes the social rights which are important ingredients of welfare state rights. Having compared these rights, both communities' affiliation to majority (Turks and Kurds) and larger political community (Turkish citizenship membership) are evaluated through citizenship approaches. Finally, to evaluate the social interaction, inter-marriage pattern between majority and minority is discussed.

In the Conclusion, comparative results are discussed in terms of Roma and Dom communities' levels of benefit from citizenship rights and social interaction with the majority in Edirne and Diyarbakır. In response, social policy is suggested with regard to interviewees' full and equal demand of citizenship.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF CITIZENSHIP

2.1 Introduction

The concept of citizenship has shown a dynamic character throughout the history and therefore it has no fixed boundaries. Faulks (2000) evaluates citizenship as a dynamic, contested and contingent identity which reflects the particular set of relationships and types of governance found within any given society. Hence, citizenship is regarded as not only a certain status defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an expression of one's membership in a political community (Delanty, 2000:10; Turner 2001b:11).

Besides, citizenship can be clarified by two existing forms: state citizenship and democratic citizenship (Stewart, 1995). According to Stewart (1995), state citizenship involves "the identification of citizenship with the elaboration of a formal legal status, co-terminous with the emergence of nation-states and their diverse lineages" (Stewart, 1995: 63). Stewart considers formal membership and welfare rights as important ingredients of state-citizenship. In the classical model of modern citizenship, there is a legal relationship between individual and the state (Delanty, 2000:126). In other words, in the modern conditions of citizenship, the main political community appears as a state. Accordingly, citizenship entails as a form of socio-political identity which relates individuals to the idea of the state (Heater, 2004a: 2; Tilly, 1999:8). On the other hand, democratic citizenship is related to shared membership of a political community in which citizens are political actors constituting political spaces. As for Delanty (2000), rights, responsibilities, participation and identity no longer

constitute a unitary model of citizenship. The search of equality is thereby rebuilt around the diversity and group identities. In addition, for him, democratic citizenship must be operating through the sub-national, national and transnational levels. Accordingly, there are different levels of inclusion where he refers to European Union more concretely as a model of inclusion at a transnational level. In the transformation of citizenship, transnational Romani movement, increasing identity politics and human right context through post-communist decade (after 1989) bring about the significance of the Romani community studies in both national and transnational level.

This theoretical chapter simply helps us to understand how fully and equal citizenship can be viewed in the changing forms of citizenship. In the modern citizenship, we see social rights which are provided by welfare state, which grants one of the most important means of social integration and political stabilization. Nevertheless, with the decline of welfare state, new forms of social inequalities appeared such as social exclusion. Modern citizenship is based on principles of universality and inclusiveness but many groups still feel excluded from common rights of citizenship. This chapter also considers how view of citizenship has changed the claims of various ethnic and regional identities which have put into question the modern idea of citizenship as membership in a collective, universal entity that subsumes diversity and particularity. In addition, to evaluate citizenship profile of Gypsy population in Turkey, Turkish citizenship practices are introduced.

2.2 The Evaluation of Modern Citizenship

Since 1990s, Central European states adopted various policies and introduced new institutions to manage minority-majority relations in general, and introduced measures and institutions specifically directed at Roma (Vermeersch, 2006). With regard to these policies, Vermeersch (2006) differentiates two policies: undifferentiated citizenship and minority rights model. In the first model, as Vermeersch (2006) suggests, “the problems facing ethnic minorities do not necessarily derive from distinct cultural characteristics, but generate from poor

educational, employment, social, or environmental records” (Vermeersch, 2006:64). Hence, public intervention does not include special rights for minorities but it embraces strategies creating equality of socioeconomic differences. With this understanding, citizenship is a “forum where people transcend their differences, and think about the common good of all citizens” (Kymlicka 1995:175 cited in Vermeersch, 2006:65). On the other hand, second model “endorses the strategy of granting members of national minorities special, group-differentiated rights with regard to culture, language, traditions, and participation in the social and economic domain” (Vermeersch, 2006:64). We see that the second model is totally different from undifferentiated citizenships. Hence, this section is designed to evaluate the logic of undifferentiated citizenship or modern citizenship.

In modern condition of citizenship, territorial boundaries of citizenship moved beyond the city-state and appeared at the nation-state. French Revolution destroyed the partial and privileged status of citizenship and it turned into “universal” and “equality status”. Literature on citizenship has frequently emphasized universality and inclusiveness (Stewart, 1995). Hereby, the important question is “how exclusively or inclusively citizenship is defined” (Bendix, 1964:74). Turner (1993) regards the process of modernization providing a social context in which it is possible to develop a theory of universalistic citizenship. As he argues:

“citizenship is the set of social practices which define social membership in a society which is highly differentiated in its culture and social institutions, and where social solidarity can only be based upon general and universalistic standards...[modern] citizenship stands in opposition to the particularistic forms of commitment to society which are characteristic of the family, the village or the tribe”(Turner, 1993:5).

Hence, Turner considers citizenship as a secularized version of the primordial bonds of tradition, religion and locality within the historical evolution of European societies that had been transformed from community to association. Janoski gives an example to illustrate this universality principle: “[E]mployees working for IBM or kings of Gypsies may enjoy specific group rights, but these rights are not citizenship rights unless they are universally applied within country

and backed by the state” (Janoski, 1998:10). So, the universal rights are provided by the state. Heater (2004) and Tilly (1996) regard citizenship as a form of socio-political identity that determines the relationship of the individual to the state. At this point, Tilly (1996) considers citizenship as a tie that “entails enforceable rights and obligations based on persons’ categorical membership and agents’ relation to the state” (Tilly, 1996:8).

In this framework, the citizenship language functions through both forms of inclusion and exclusion, through the domain of the nation-state (Elliott: 2001; Brubaker, 1992). Turner (2001a) explains how citizenship has acted as an instrument of closure as well as a status of inclusion as follows: “citizenship is both an inclusionary process involving some re-allocation of resources and an exclusionary process of building identities on the basis of a common or imagined society” (Turner, 2001a:192). Therefore, citizenship is inclusive only for the citizens of the nation-state. State becomes the focal point for demands for the extension of rights of citizens. According to Brubaker’s argument (1992), citizenship works as a powerful instrument for societal closure, which has a special place in the modern nation-state. The implementation of it arises within the territory of the nation-state, the right to vote, duty of military and institutions deciding the acceptance of citizen. In this regard, only citizens have right to enter and remain in the territory of the state. In addition, citizenship appears as a social closure on the ground that the territorial state accepts the foreigners or immigrants, namely non-citizens conditionally. This means that “individuals within state boundaries, legal residents, guest workers or refugees, as well as foreigners outside state boundaries, can be perceived as ‘outsiders’ or second class citizens by the dominant culture of polity” (Faulks, 2000:29). Territorial states might exclude or expel unassimilated or undesired residents. In other words, the extent of citizenship has been determined by boundaries among states. For Brubaker, “citizenship is thus both an instrument and an object of closure” (Brubaker, 1992:21-23).

To go through the modern form of citizenship, we see that the context in determining who is citizen is a basic aspect of all other political and social issues

in the nation-state. In this frame, as Jacobson (1997) argues, citizenship fulfills two principle tasks:

“first it determines the criteria of membership, that is, who may and may not belong to or join “the people”; and, second, rules of citizenship determine the nature of the “conversation” between the individual and the state- the rights and obligations of citizen, the kind of access the citizen has to the state, and the kinds of demands the state can make upon the citizen” (Jacobson, 1997:7).

Jacobson’s argument stands near Faulk’s (2000) evaluation of the extent of citizenship, discussing who is to be included as a citizen and to ask who is to be excluded from the status. Faulks (2000) also relates citizenship closely with nationality and considers that historically the extent of citizenship has always been limited in terms of social membership.

When we consider the formal functions of citizenship, its regulative functions in terms of inclusion and exclusion makes the inherent link between citizenship and nationality important. As Heater suggests: “nation-creation and building required the construction of coherence through civic and national equality and standardization” (Heater, 2002[1999]:103). Furthermore, for Turner , “[T]he creation of the citizenship within the political boundaries of the modern nation-state has typically involved or required the subordination or incorporation of ethnic minorities and/or aboriginals” (Turner, 1990:197).

In this framework, Heater regards the creation of emotive symbols, ‘invented traditions’ by indoctrination in the schools and treating all the people as citizens mobilize the masses. In addition, “by persuading citizens to identify with a unified nation-state, rather than a province, nationalism secures the cohesion of legitimacy and citizenship secures the cohesion of transmuted and strengthened patriotic virtue” (Heater, (2002) [1999]:104). Citizen and nation are tightly bounded together especially in civic republican tradition. Marshall (1992) advocated that citizenship has an integrative function providing equality principle and considered national consciousness as the familiar instruments of modern democracy fashioned by the upper classes and then handed down, step by step, to the lower.

Within the discussion between nationality and citizenship, Tambini considers national citizenship as an institution that emerged with European modernity (Tambini, 2001:196). He also argues that once national citizenship was institutionalized, nationalist concepts such as nation⁶, culture, *ethnie* served as legitimizing function in distribution of resources, collective action and the exercise of the power. Yet, “the language of nation tends to mask other important differences and sources of identity” (Tambini, 2001:198).

Turner (2001a) links the production of an institutional framework of national ideologies with the creation of national identities. He asserts the nineteenth century national citizenship within its exclusive aspects:

“Nineteenth century national citizenship was constituted around racial divisions, because it excluded outsiders from access to resources on the basis of an (ascribed) ethnic or national identity. Because citizenship is a set of processes for the entitlements, obligations and immunities within a political community, these entitlements are themselves based a number of principles, that describe and evaluate the specific contributions that individuals have made to society, for example through war service, or reproduction, or work” (Turner, 2001a:192).

As a similar view, Janoski emphasizes war service among entitlements and relates it to ideology of nationalism. As he claims that: “the state’s movement toward citizenship requires an ideology of nationalism to promote military exploitation. The obligations of citizenship may be connected to nationalism through military service to defend the core nation” (Janoski, 1998:8). Sassen contends that “it is the evolution of polities along the lines of state formation that gave citizenship in the west its full institutionalized and formalized character and made nationality a key component of citizenship” (Sassen, 2006:15).

However, Faulks (2000) criticizes the confusion between nationalism and citizenship owing to the conflation of state and nation. According to Faulks’s argument, as a matter of fact that “instead of acting as an inclusive concept, which could bind people from different cultural backgrounds together, citizenship has

⁶ Anderson (2004) assumes nation as an imagined community. In addition, for him, nationalism should be examined with relation to initial cultural systems like religious communities and dynasty property instead of political ideologies. Holy communities decreased in the fact that human re-conceptualized the world. Capitalism, technology and language differentiation contributed to the formation of modern nations.

been racialised and therefore rendered exclusive in a similar way to nationality” (Faulks, 2000:43).

So far as to, the argument was that nationalism is a key instrument in institutionalizing citizenship. In the nation-state dimension, homogeneity and subordination of ethnic identities is essential, which is exclusive part of modern citizenship⁷. Historically nation-states followed different citizenship paths.

In this framework, Brubaker (1990, 1992) analyzes how France and Germany have been shaped along with distinctive traditions of national self-understanding grounded respectively in differing historical paths to nation-statehood and citizenship practices. In Brubaker’s (1990) analysis of nationhood for French conception of nation “in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of state: political unity, not shared culture, has been understood nationhood” (Brubaker, 1990:386). In this regard, French nationhood and citizenship is unitarist, universalist and secular. We see that there is a model of “state to nation”, which demands outsiders’ complete assimilation into French culture. Jacobson (1997) contends that American style hyphenated identities are largely excluded in France. In this regard, as Brubaker (1990) puts, “political inclusion has ideally entailed cultural assimilation, for ethnic peripheries and immigrants alike; the universalist theory and practice of citizenship have depended on confidence in the assimilatory workings of school, army and centralised administration” (Brubaker, 1990:386).

⁷ For example, during the communist period, in Central and Eastern Europe, as Ringold et al., indicate, “although the extent varied, socialist governments made a concerted effort to assimilate Roma and minimize ethnic differences. Communist parties issued decrees and adopted policies that aimed at socioeconomic integration by providing housing and jobs for Roma. These measures were frequently culturally repressive, though their stringency varied” (Ringold, 2005:7). In this regard, Poland was the first communist state to provide employment and house for Gypsies. Romania adopted systematization policy in which Gypsies were forced to settle and their Gypsy identity was rejected. Gypsy quarters were demolished and Gypsies were forced to live in apartments. Former Yugoslavia was the only country which did not force Gypsies to settle (Fraser, 2005). On the other hand, Vermeesch (2006) argues the attitude of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe toward ethnic groups and he finds ambiguity. As he claims, “[o]n the one hand, these regimes condemned all forms of national loyalty and regarded ‘ethnic nationality’ as an epiphenomenon of the capitalist society. On the other hand, they reified nations and national minorities as “naturally” occurring entities, supported their cultural development, and institutionalized boundaries between them” (Vermeesch, 2006:48).

Unlike France, Germany represented a nation in search of state where national feeling developed before nation-state. Hence, German idea of nation was not related to political or abstract idea of citizenship. Yet, German nationalism developed a volkish reference to the concept of people as an organic cultural and racial entity marked by a common language. Therefore, German nationhood is “constituted by ethnocultural unity and expressed in political unity (Brubaker, 1990).

In short, French conception of nationhood has been universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centered, whereas German conception of nationhood has been particularistic, organic, differentialist and Volk-centered. Following this exemplary, laws of citizenship present in terms of *jus soli* (place of birth) or *jus sanguinis* (line of descent) in terms of determination of nationality. In France, *jus soli* principle is affective, while in Germany *jus sanguinis* principle is. In other words, as Brubaker (1990) suggests, “the French citizenry is expansively, as a territorial community, the German citizenry restrictively, as a community of descent” (Brubaker, 1990:379).

French and German cases are different expressions of the modernist contradictions of citizenship. As Roche contends, “citizenship is nation-state based, and thus relates to particularistic and exclusionary versions of membership and rights, and as such is tied to the limitations of a passage in the history of modernity” (Roche, 1995:723) In similar lines, Benhabib (2002) criticizes both the principles of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* because they are not consistent and plausible enough to justify the theory and practice of democratic citizenship. Because for her, “[w]hile democracy is a form of life which rests upon active consent and participation, citizenship is distributed according to the passive criteria of belonging, like birth upon a piece of land and socialization in that country or membership in an ethnic group” (Benhabib, 2002:169).

In short, modern citizenship functions as both forms of inclusion and exclusion through the domain of the nation-state. It is inclusive only for citizens; giving rights and responsibilities to them. It is also exclusive and conditional for non-citizens and foreigners. In each condition, state becomes the focal points for

demands for the extension of rights of citizens. Modern citizenship has also close relationship with nationality. When we consider the formal functions of citizenship, its regulative functions in terms of inclusion and exclusion makes important the inherent link between citizenship and nationality. Political boundaries of nation-state required civic and national equality, involving subordination or naturalization of ethnic minorities.

On the other hand, through the development of modern citizenship in nation-state, the extension and transformation of citizenship should be taken into account with an aim at considering the role of social class and social struggles. In this sense, Bottomore (1992) considers the impact of social classes on the extension of citizenship and explains in the following manner:

“the extension of political rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and of social rights in the twentieth, was accomplished largely by the rapidly growing working class movement, aided by middle class reformers, and in the case of social rights ...facilitated by the consequences of two world wars” (Bottomore, 1992:56).

Likewise, this view is parallel to Isin’s (2002) notion of worker citizen presenting how laboring classes exploded after 1848. The radical democratic demands of 1848 revolutions for citizenship were “rights and constituting workers as legitimate holders of citizenship in the 1830s and 1840s were a testimony of the working class constituting itself” (Isin, 2002:202). Accordingly, the critical problem was whether and to what extent social protest would be accommodated through the extension of citizenship to the lower classes in the emergence of nation-states of Western Europe (Bendix, 1964).

Therefore, the argument based on the fact that denying the rights of citizenship to those who are economically unsuccessful necessitates an approach that can arouse a new sense of right on the part of the lower classes and that can bring groping efforts to define the position of lower classes in the national political community. In this sense, Bendix (1964) considers the emergence of citizenship as a by-product of industrialization, which lead to the political mobilization of an emerging industrial work force and suggests that, “[Lower] class protest may progress from a demand for full citizenship within the prevailing political community to a demand for a change in order to make a full citizenship”

(Bendix, 1964:71). Here, Bendix keeps with Tocqueville's stress on the reciprocity of rights and obligations as the hallmark of a political community. He refers to the rising awareness of the working class as an experience of political alienation. Hence, working class protested against their second-class citizenship, demanded the right of participation in terms of equality in the political community of the nation-state as in the case of English workers demanding full citizenship.

On a very general basis, the excluded groups' struggle is expected to contribute to the extension of citizenship. Similarly, Turner (1990) emphasizes the role of social struggle and finds it as a central motor of the drive for citizenship. The growth of social citizenship typically has been the outcome of violence or threats of violence, bringing the state into the social arena as a stabilizer of the social system. Hence, he regards the real importance of new social movements for change in the post-war period with the new issues of citizenship appearing to centre on gender politics and the Green movement which he thinks T.H. Marshall underestimates. According to Janoski (1998), Turner situates the role of conflict more dominant than Marshall and Bendix who regarded "trade unions as a pressure group for extending citizenship to the masses, conflict was sometimes transparent in the development of specific rights in their theories" (Janoski, 1998:7).

However, according to Faulks (2000), Mann (1987) and Heater (2002), the emergence of modern citizenship cannot be simply attributed to class conflict⁸. In addition, for Heater, "different groups and individuals have campaigned for rights without necessarily acting for or against class interests" (Heater, 2002[1999]:23).

⁸ Unlike class conflict, cultural affirmation is one of the key elements of Romani mobilization. As Gheorge and Acton (2001) argue, "the world's Romani population is increasingly becoming part of a process of political mobilization, manifest throughout Europe. Cultural affirmation is a component of such a process. We can identify among Romani communities in various countries the indicators (or symptoms) of the cultural mobilization which preceded and accompanied the process of nation-and state building described above. An emerging Gypsy political elite has now been for twenty years engaged in a type of self-rallying process. Here and there are cultural festivals, publications in and about the Romani language, readings in Gypsy folklore, textbooks for Romani children in schools and advertising of Gypsy groups and events" (Gheorge and Acton, 2001:55).

For Faulks (2000), it is a mistake to try to place either struggle or political expediency in a privileged position in the history of citizenship. As she suggests,

“the history of citizenship can in part be understood as a series of bargains and trade offs, whereby elites seek to maintain their power through managing the effects of social change and containing the demands of social movements through concessions in the form of rights” (Faulks, 2000:25).

To extend citizenship Faulks gives the examples of how marginalised groups within the state have had to apply pressure to privileged elites in order to remove unjustifiable restrictions upon the practices of citizenship. Thus, for her, “the extent and content of citizenship is intimately bound up with the context of this status” (Faulks, 2000:9). She gives the example of women. Although women are formally viewed as equal citizens with men, they exercise their citizenship within the constraints of a patriarchal system.

2.3 Capitalism, Welfare State and the Promises of Citizenship

This section introduces the tension capitalism and citizenship’s equality principle. It mainly discusses how rights and equality occurred in the modern state and how welfare states have been challenged by structural and ideological change by market driven economy which threatens equality and rights. Ethnic identities of Roma and Dom communities cannot be considered as a sole variable. In order to analyze their citizenship rights profiles, it is significant to consider the transformation of welfare state’s effects on ethnic minorities. Social exclusion, new poverty will be discussed in response to these transformations.

According to T.H. Marshall (1992), citizenship mitigates the negative impact of the capitalism by redistribution of resources, which indicates social rights. Social rights are an indispensable part of social welfare state. However, as welfare system declined, inequality became visible with new terms such as; new poverty, underclass and social exclusion. Equality and rights are threatened by market driven economy. In addition, we see commodification of citizenship as a process driven by the withdrawal of the state by a systematic dismantling of civil, political and social rights.

Heater (2002) investigates wide variety of meanings attached to the word 'equality' that are pertinent to the study of citizenship. She assumes a hierarchy of expressions or experiences of citizenship which blurs any pure equality.

In this regard, she categorizes hierarchy of citizenship in five parts:

“At the top of the ladder the full and also active citizens, those depending on the society we are examining, who have the most complete set of rights and who most fully discharge their civic duties...On the second rung down are the full but passive citizens...in the sense of being apathetic about performing duties. Thirdly, there are the individuals who have the legal status of citizen but, because of discrimination, are denied full rights in practice. For the fourth level we may use the term 'underclass'...These people have the legal standing of citizens, but are so economically and culturally impoverished that they are in effect excluded from the normal style of social and political activity which the term citizen connotes. Fifthly, there are residents, sometimes referred to by the recently revived word 'denizens'. These are persons who are not nationals of the state in which they live; they are therefore not legally citizens and have no political rights, but nevertheless enjoy many civil, social and economic rights associated with citizenship”. (Heater, 2002 [1999]:87).

Despite this kind of hierarchy within citizenship itself, the idea of citizenship is predicated on the 'principle of equality' but this conflicted with the inequality embodied in the capitalist economic system and the class structure. (Heater, 2002:101; Bottomore, 1992:72).

T.H. Marshall noticed that twentieth century citizenship and the capitalist class system had been at war in a sense that, “citizenship is status position that mitigates the negative effect of economic class within capitalist market...by redistribution of resources on the basis of rights” (Turner, 2001:190). T.H. Marshall outlines a discussion of citizenship in the late 1940s in his classical work called *Citizenship and Social Class* (1992). He applies to Alfred Marshall's essay and he explores the latent sociological hypothesis that “inequality of the social class system may be acceptable provided the equality of citizenship is recognized” (Marshall, 1992:7). He asks two basic questions at this point. First, “is it still true that basic equality, when enriched in substance and embodied in the formal rights of citizenship, is consistent with the inequalities of social class” (Marshall, 1992:7). In response, he thinks that both equality of citizenship and inequalities of social class are compatible and citizenship itself legitimates social inequality. Second, “is it still true that the basic equality can be created and preserved without

invading the freedom of the competitive market?” (Marshall, 1992:7) For Marshall, it cannot be possible within his time.

According to Marshall’s explanation, early form of citizenship rights was not in conflict with inequalities of capitalist society. On the contrary, it was aiming to maintain that particular form of inequality. For Marshall, the reason was depicted as:

“the core of citizenship at this stage was composed of civil rights. And civil rights were indispensable to a competitive market economy. They gave to each man, as part of his individual status, the power to engage as an independent unit in the economic struggle” (Marshall, 1992:21).

In addition, by modern contract, status was eliminated from the social system. Differential status associated with class, function and family transformed to the status of citizenship provided the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be building. Marshall also asserts that “the diminution of inequality strengthened the demand for its abolition, at least with regard to the essentials of welfare” (Marshall, 1992:28). As a result of this transformation, he asserts a war in the twentieth century between citizenship and capitalist class system. Nevertheless, “Marshall saw this war as slowly being won by citizenship and by its egalitarian and integrative effects and implications” (Roche, 1992:19). Turner thinks that the importance of Marshall’s contribution is the claim as:

“citizenship modifies the negative impact of the capitalist market by a redistribution of resources on the basis of rights, and as a result there is a permanent tension between the principles of equality that underpin democracy and the de facto inequalities of wealth and income that characterize the capitalist market”(Turner, 2001:190).

Marshall (1992) sees citizenship even in its early forms, as a principle of equality. He is primarily concerned with citizenship’s impact on social inequality. He defines citizenship as a “status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed” (Marshall, 1992:18). In addition, this path is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality; social system of inequality. Nevertheless, Linklater (1998) criticizes Marshall’s argument on the ground that “full membership of the political community is impossible if citizens do not have

sufficient economic and social power to be able to exercise their rights is equally relevant to national and international arrangements” (Linklater, 1998:192).

Marshall believes that “social equality is the latest phase of an evolution of citizenship which has been continuous progress for some 250 years” (Marshall, 1992:7). In this context, he evaluates citizenship in Britain as an evolutionary path including three distinct sets of citizenship rights: civil, political and social. He refers to civil rights as liberty of person, the right to own property, the right to sell his free labour, freedom of speech, thought and faith and the right to justice. By political rights he means the participation in the exercise of political power. Finally, Marshall highlights the social rights related to the welfare state rights such as educational system and the social services. Civil rights appeared in 18th century, then followed by political rights brought in the 19th century, which laid groundwork for social rights in 20th century. Historically these rights have moved beyond from local to national.

Likewise, Elliott (2001) and Faulks (2000) regard Marshall’s formation of citizenship indicating a liberal tradition. Marshall also explains the inherent tension between different kinds of rights in a common theme of liberalism. Civil rights are seen as indispensable in liberal tradition. Faulks (2000) explains this tension between civil and social rights in terms of liberal tradition:

“The whole purpose of [civil rights] is to protect the individual’s basic liberties from the potentially damaging implications of political decisions, which may, for example, decide to abolish private property. Social rights, in contrast, are perceived as restrictions on economic freedom and as enhancing the power of state. Second, social rights are seen as resource dependent in a way that civil rights are not. Third, for neo-liberals civil rights are inherently positive in their effects for create autonomy and freedom. Social rights on the other hand can lead to a ‘culture of dependency’ and destroy the sense of personal innovation and initiative that are essential to the survival of the liberal state” (Faulks, 2000:64).

Hence, we see that civil rights were not in conflict with early forms of capitalism because it is the safeguard of private property. Yet social rights create an equality and ‘culture of dependency’ which is a real tension between civil and social rights.

Roche (1992) considers Marshall’s view of citizenship as the ‘dominant paradigm’ of postwar Western social citizenship. According to Roche, “[t]his

paradigm, which stresses social rights and the need to construct major state policies and institutions of welfare, underpins both American liberal social policy and European democracy” (Roche, 1992:6). Turner (2001) also indicates postwar period citizenship in Britain as an embodiment of social Keynesianism. In this sense, “citizenship is a status position that mitigates the negative effects of economic class within capitalist society” (Turner, 2001:190).

Meanwhile Bottomore (1992) evokes Brubaker’s distinction between formal and substantive citizenship. The former refers to the membership of a nation-state, the latter in terms of Marshall’s conception, as an array of civil, political and social rights. Critically, as Bottomore says, “[t]his body of rights will necessarily vary between different groups of countries, depending to a considerable extent, especially in the case of social rights, upon the level of economic and social development” (Bottomore, 1992:85). Similarly, Roche (1992) and Turner (2001) also indicate that there have been huge differences between British, American and European approaches to social citizenship. In these and other ways, the existence and success of the welfare state is tacitly dependent upon the existence and effectiveness of modern nation states, which overlaps with Brubaker’s definition of formal citizenship.

In general, Turner sees Marshall’s account of citizenship as “both a description of the evolution of welfarism in the context of British post-war resettlement and a liberal defence of a hyphenated society which contained both the inequalities of the capitalist market and...advanced parliamentary system” (Turner, 1993:15). Marshall and others saw the welfare state as an important ingredient of social citizenship. As Sassen argues, “the development of welfare states in the twentieth century became a crucial institutional domain for granting entitlements to the poor and the disadvantaged. Today, the growing weight given to notions of the “competitiveness” of states puts pressure on states to cut down on these entitlements” (Sassen, 2006:16). In this aspect, the welfare state has been criticized by the Left for its failure in bringing about a fully egalitarian society. Sassen thinks that “[f]or many critics the reliance on markets to solve political and

social problems is a savage attack on the principles of citizenship” (Sassen, 2006:16).

So far as to, we saw that the welfare state and social citizenship has been creating ‘culture of dependency’ which eliminated the negative effects of capitalism. Yet welfare state went into some alterations which led to the new gaps and inequalities in the form of citizenship. Now, the section will discuss the results of the decline of welfare state and its direct effects on citizenship.

Roche (1992) argues that in the late 1970s and 1980s welfare state systems have been seriously challenged by two sets of social forces, namely structural and ideological change. By structural change, Roche means Western societies’ shift from industrial to post-industrial and from national level to the global level in the contemporary capitalist economy. For her, the main ideological challenge for social citizenship comes from the New Right. Besides, a new centre left ideology has taken up communitarian themes of individual responsibility in a growing concern with ideas about social obligation and duty rather than simply rights and entitlements (Turner, 1993; Bloomfield, J & Bianchini, F, 2001). Roche refers to two different implications of the ideological challenges for social citizenship. As she mentions,

“(1) emphasizing social duties as against rights and (2) extending social duties into previously relatively uncolonized non-state... As against this, the implications of the structural changes for social citizenship are generally those of (1) emphasizing social rights and (2) extending social rights into new post-national political formations, of which the European Community (EC) is the leading and historically most important example” (Roche, 1992:5).

Roche (1992) regards that ‘dominant paradigm’ or Marshallian paradigm of social citizenship has been eroded and British welfare consensus has been transformed by structural economic and social changes which led to the disappearance of full employment, increase in flexibilization of labour, the decline of the nuclear family as the dominant pattern of the household, and the growth of new forms of poverty and unemployment such as the ‘feminization of poverty’ and the emergence of an ethnic underclass.

The crisis of welfare state can be grasped particularly in the 1980s. Hence policies and rights could be questioned under the changes in fiscal policy, large –

scale unemployment and diminishing social expenditure which have combined to inequalities of income and wealth. Somers (2006) sees the domination of naturalism of rights recently taking place not in the interstices of nation states, but in the rise of market fundamentalism, the degradation of the public sphere and the social state. These market regimes are transforming the foundations of citizenship from social and political to contractual and civil. She makes links between social exclusion, statelessness and losing the right to have rights. Accordingly, there is “increasing numbers of socially excluded *stateless nationals* – people who hold formal de jure citizenship, but from whom the state has withdrawn its institutions of social citizenship (via the privatization of public services, the decline of the social welfare state, etc)” (Somers, 2006:50). In this regard, Somers highlights that

“the state’s increasing abandonment of its institutions of inclusion, protections, and rights (market interferences, employment regulations, and so on) all driven by mechanisms that are forcing people and social life into unmediated and unprotected exposure to market demands, forcing them into commodification and turning them into stateless people” (Somers, 2006:52).

She refers to the commodification of citizenship as a process driven by the withdrawal of the state which is accompanied by the systematic dismantling of civil, political and above all, social citizenship rights. Likewise, Faulks (2000) argues commodification of citizenship in neo-liberalism and how it has created greater divisions. She gives example from Thatcherite years in Britain. As she claims,

“inequality grew sharply during the Thatcherite years. Moreover, those who could not take the advantage of the new opportunities were increasingly labeled as ‘work shy’, or as seen as part of a state-dependent ‘underclass’...Women, the poor and ethnic minorities were most vulnerable to the dilution of their social rights and were more likely to lack the resources necessary to meet the government demand that they take more responsibility for their own lives and for those of their family and local community” (Faulks, 2000:67).

On the other hand, active citizenship in Britain was seen “as those who were able to assert their market rights of consumer choice, inequality and conspicuous consumption” (Faulks, 2000:67). Somers argues the commodification of citizenship as being related to statelessness, “[which] is both ends and means of exclusion” (Somers, 2006:53). Somers’s ‘stateless nationals’ working poor and degraded middle classes relocate into the zone of the nation and its thick identity endowing patriotic and religious culture of belonging and participation. They try

to compensate the excluded for their loss of rights by allying them with the dominant political and social order. Somers argues that today's stateless persons find themselves in considerably different position than the European Jews and other stateless people did. Today they move from the exclusions of citizenship to the inclusions of nationalism. Yet for Somers,

“the working poor under the banner of national identity makes these socially excluded patriots unlikely to become victims of the Patriot Act or other forms of political policing. But it is more than likely, in fact inevitable, that they will become economic victims, as all the righteousness of national inclusion and identity cannot erase the fact that they have lost the right to have rights” (Somers, 2006:60).

Hence, the implication of Somers's argument is that both equality and rights are threatened by market driven economy that entail parallel to Arendt's nationalist and naturalist-driven inter-war exclusions. In response to market driven economy, Bottomore (1992) argues that the term 'underclass' has come to be widely used in the USA and Britain to describe a large category of very poor, predominantly working-class citizens. However, Bottomore applies to Lister who points out “an ideological element involved in applying this stigmatising label, which tends to define the poor in moral rather than economic terms and indeed to revive nineteenth-century conceptions of the poor as being responsible for their own property” (Bottomore, 1992). Lister considers the debate about citizenship during the past decade, in which the ideas of the New Right have been directed against what is called the 'dependency culture' as the body of social rights established by the community as a whole. For Lister, the dominance of this ideology “undermined social rights as an attribute of citizenship, placing all the emphasis on privatised activities and treating the poor generally as recipients of charity who are effectively regarded as second-class citizens” (Lister, quoted in Bottomore, 1992:71). In this process, Lister sees that the poor tend to lose political rights and become politically marginalized.

In a similar way, Roche (1992) regards the dominant paradigm of social citizenship in Western society as being shadowed both by the persistence of traditional forms of poverty and growth of new forms of poverty. Roche evaluates that

“Poverty thus represents a strategically important limit for the concept of social citizenship. Beyond this limit in some respects people are not full and participating members of society (Townsend 1979), and also they are not full citizens. Beyond this limit people are politically and civically as well as socially ‘excluded’, they are ‘second-class citizens’ or less (Lister 1990b)” (Roche, 1992:55).

In addition to this explanation, Roche (1992) asserts that ‘new poverty’ is not only associated with unemployment and inequalities, but also associated with change in family structure and with multiple deprivations connected with inequalities of gender, ethnicity and age. And this process has been a growing feature of every major Western society since 1960s. Bottomore (1992) criticizes social rights as not being equally distributed within welfare capitalism. To him,

“if social rights are interpreted broadly to include access to education, health care, employment, and adequate housing (as is certainly implied in many conceptions of the post-war welfare state), and in addition provision for the special needs of particular groups (for example, working mothers), then it is evident that some of these rights are still very unequally distributed, not only between men and women, but also between groups defined by ethnic and/or cultural characteristics, in many of the countries of welfare capitalism” (Bottomore, 1992:69).

In this sense, Sassen (2006) argues why the principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled and legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights. In addition, citizenship is affected by the position of different groups within nation-state. As she expresses,

“Groups defined by race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation and other identities, still face various exclusions from full participation in public life notwithstanding formal equality as citizens. Second, because of full participation as a citizen rests on a material base (Marshall, 1977;Handler, 1995) poverty excludes large sectors of the population and the gap is widening” (Sassen, 2006:19).

Likewise, for Bloomfield, & Bianchini, this trend threatens and criminalizes ethnic minority subcultures. “The new poor are labelled as an ‘underclass to be dealt with, rather than accorded the dignity and agency which social and cultural citizenship confers” (Bloomfield & Bianchini, 2001:100). Roche (1992) considers that ‘new poverty’ and exclusion from full citizenship in being poor and being consigned to ‘underclass’ are significantly urban problems as a result of the general impact of post-industrial and post-national processes on unemployment, national labour markets and national welfare systems.

In this framework, according to Wilson, “one of the main trends and sources of conflict affecting the meaning and the politics of citizenship in the

advanced societies in the late twentieth century is the emergence of an ‘underclass’ consisting of the long-term unemployed, the persistently poor, disadvantaged ethnic groups and others” (Roche, 1995:720). The concept of underclass in America refers to the American poor who are spatially concentrated in big cities, particularly in the Black ghettos of the traditional industrial cities. But after 1980s, the concept of underclass shall be discussed in terms of post-industrial flexibilization on the ground that full employment, a living wage within state-organized contribution-based welfare system is difficult to achieve on the basis of segmented labour market.

Lister (2004) contends on her book *Poverty* that American language of the underclass and ‘dependency culture’ show those excluded as culturally distinct from mainstream society, because this approach assumes values and behavior of individuals. Nevertheless, the meanings attached to the social exclusion also differ between and within countries in European scale. She asserts that its theoretical root goes back to classical sociology in the work of Max Weber, “the idea referred to the ways in which groups can, through a process of ‘social closure’, secure and maintain privilege at the expense of those different from their own members” (Lister, 2004:75).

According to Lister’s argument, the modern usage of social exclusion can be traced back to France which deployed it for the people who had fallen through the net of the French social insurance system in the 1970s and early 1980s. To examine the process of social disintegration and conditions of precariousness, the notion was applied in a more expanded way owing to the rising unemployment and the spread of poverty. Roche argues that there are different formulations of an empirical link between poverty and social exclusion and the notion of an overlapping relationship that conveys the idea that “some people experience material poverty and social exclusion simultaneously, while others can be in poverty without being socially excluded without being poor” (Lister, 2004:83).

Hence, poverty is not an essential feature of social exclusion. In addition to the dimension of material poverty and deprivation, Lister also assumes different indicators of social exclusion: exclusion from labour market, social isolation,

political exclusion and exclusion from public and private services. According to her argument, the term also has relational meanings; “the denial of social rights or ‘the extent to which the individual is bound into membership of [the] moral and political community’” (Room, quoted in Lister 2004:89). Another relational meaning of it is the symbolic dimension that assumes how excluded individuals and groups are defined by themselves and the wider society. Finally, social exclusion is related to social divisions in the society. In this sense, discrimination, poverty and prejudice can exclude people from full participation in society and from full benefit from citizenship rights. According to her, the human rights context should be discussed in relation to poverty and social exclusion because of the fact that

“the denial of full citizenship rights is frequently identified as a signifier of social exclusion, it is also important to the conceptualization of poverty...Poverty inhibits to access citizenship rights in the social, economic, political, civic and cultural spheres and lead to second-class citizenship” (Lister, 2004:164).

Similarly, for Barry (2002), social exclusion is more than poverty. He argues that social exclusion conflicts with equal opportunity in two ways. One is “social exclusion leads to unequal educational and occupational opportunities, and second, social exclusion constitutes a denial of equal opportunity in relation to politics” (Barry, 2002:20). In the first dimension, he assumes that social exclusion is creating social homogeneity of schools that is significant indicator. He also regards that the results of social exclusion are dangerous because this process also leads to stigmatization.

Dagnino (2008) evaluates social exclusion in Latin America. Although she does not define social exclusion, she defines it as an extreme poverty and exclusion but she also relates it to the social authoritarianism that pervades the unequal and hierarchical organization of social relations. In this sense, she uses being poor not only as material and economic deprivation but also as “to be subjected to cultural rules that convey a complete lack of recognition of poor people as bearers of rights” (Dagnino, 2008:63). Hence, she suggests the struggle for “the right to have rights” must be a political struggle against this pervasive authoritarianism. As she argues,

“[t]his lays the bases for a connection between culture and politics that has become embedded in the actions of urban popular collective movements...The reference to rights and citizenship has come to constitute the core of a common ethical-political field in which many of these movements and other sectors of society have been able to share and mutually reinforce their struggle” (Dagnino, 2008:64).

Lister assumes that ‘social exclusion’ is a quite new phenomenon adopted by European Commission in the late 1980s, and then embedded in EU discourse with combat against exclusion in 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. In addition, 2000 Lisbon Summit followed action on ‘social inclusion’.

For Lister, the term of ‘social inclusion’ is contested as ‘social exclusion’. She criticizes the equalization of social inclusion with paid work which is challenged on two main grounds:

“First, inclusion in the labour market through marginal, low paid, insecure jobs under poor working conditions does not constitute genuine poverty-free social inclusion. Second, both the (gendered) unpaid work of reproduction and care, and community and voluntary activities are thereby discounted and effectively devalued and marginalized” (Lister, 2004:79).

Nevertheless, for Lister, “the struggle for social inclusion has been an important theme in citizenship studies and activism...Much of the contemporary citizenship literature is marked by the challenge it poses to citizenship’s exclusionary tendencies” (Lister, 2007:50).

In sum, the attempt in this section was to argue on how the principle of equal citizenship remains unfulfilled and legal citizenship does not always bring full and equal membership rights in terms of the war between capitalism and citizenship. Welfare state is an important ingredient of social citizenship. Although modern citizenship is based on the equality principle, it has been dissolved after the welfare state’s withdrawal of civil political and social citizenship’s rights in 1980s. As Roche (1992) argues, welfare state systems have changed ideologically and structurally. By structural change, welfare states have shifted from industrial to post-industrial and national level to the global level. By ideological change, social citizenship is threatened by New Right that is concerned with ideas about social obligation and duty rather than rights and entitlements. As a result of erosion of ‘dominant paradigm’ or Marshallian paradigm of social citizenship, we see the process of commodification of citizenship where equality and rights are threatened by market driven economy.

The reflection of this process can be seen in such new forms of poverty and social exclusion which affected mostly women, poor or ethnic minorities.

2.4 Philosophical Approaches to Modern Conditions of Citizenship

There are mainly three philosophical understanding in modern citizenship: liberal citizenship, civic republican citizenship and communitarian citizenship. Differences among these approaches depend on mainly the balance between individual and community as well as between individual rights and obligations in modern nation-state. Republican citizenship and communitarian citizenship stand near each other and both of the approaches are critical for liberal citizenship. Hence, the section will explain these approaches in a way that how they are in tension or complementary to each other.

Historically we see liberal citizenship can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Civic republican citizenship appeared in academic field in 1960s and communitarian approach comes into scene since 1980s. Hence, these approaches are useful for this study in order to evaluate Roma and Dom community's proximity and distance to the political community.

2.4.1 Liberal Citizenship

Liberal conception of citizenship is related to the "development of capitalism and nation-state" (Dwyer, 2004:22). In this approach, citizenship represents a utilitarian characteristic based on individuals maximizing their own benefits. This assumption makes agency-centered explanations because of regarding individual as a rational and atomistic actor. Therefore, citizenship and other political institutions have only conditional role in society because they only furnish the conditions for individual calculation as to maximizing benefit (Van Gunsteren, 1994). Similarly, Dwyer argues the political and economic context of this liberal individual approach's relevance to the citizenship debate. With his words,

“[c]itizens here are held to be independent, rational beings able to be best judges of their interests....A ‘neutral’ and minimal state is assumed appropriate, with government seen as a referee of varying individual interests while simultaneously stressing individual rights to liberty and property”(Dwyer, 2004:24).

Classical liberalism can be traced back to the seventeenth century. Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and John Stuart Mill were the earliest political theorists who considered the relationship between the individual and political community in new liberal context. Delanty (2000) calls this tradition as a market-based model rather than state-based model in citizenship.

As a nineteenth century philosopher and political economist John Stuart Mill (2002) criticizes the power of society over the individual, by the force of opinion and even by legislation. He also assumes state action as limiting the freedom of individuals. Yet Mill did not develop inclusive citizenship within liberal tradition. As Dwyer notes, “Mill was against extending the right to vote to those people who he believed lacked the relevant education to make sound judgments” (Dwyer, 2004:22). Schuck summarizes the bedrock principles of classical liberal theory as:

“the primacy of individual liberty understood primarily as freedom from state interference with one’s personal development and projects; a very broad protection of freedom of inquiry, speech, and worship; a deep suspicion of state power over individuals; the restriction of state coercion to those areas of activity in which individuals’ conduct affect others; and a strong though rebuttable presumption in favor of privacy, markets, and other forms of private ordering” (Schuck, 2002:134).

As Faulks mentions, “the first liberal theorists to assign a central role to rights, such as Locke and Paine, believed that citizen needed to be protected from the growing power of state” (Faulks, 2000:56). Hence, public realm functions to protect interests of individuals.

Liberal tradition attributes to citizenship primarily a set of individual rights and keeps the number and intensity of duties to a minimum. For Faulks, rights are crucial to any rounded sense of citizenship because of the fact that “[rights] denote political agency and recognize the individual as worthy of respect and consideration...It is only with the development of liberalism that citizenship was furnished with egalitarian logic” (Faulks, 2000:21-74).

Likewise, Oldfield (1994) evaluates liberal citizenship in terms of rights and status. He assumes rights and status inhere in individuals since individuals have prior place to the both society and state. And status “requires the endorsement of civil law for its protection; and the status needs protection both from the predatoriness of other individuals, and from the arbitrariness of governments” (Oldfield, 1994:190) He considers that this conception of citizenship had a dominant place in Anglo-American thinking since middle of the seventeenth century. Besides, sovereign and autonomous individuals have no duties in a way “beyond the minimally civic and that of respecting other individuals as sovereign and autonomous citizens” (Oldfield, 1994:190).

So far as to we saw classical liberal citizenship appearing with the development of capitalism and nation-state. Individual’s needs and interest – thereby rights - occupy an important position since appearance of classical liberalism in the seventeenth century. Independent, rational and atomistic individuals aimed to maximize their own benefit with a conditional role to the institutions. Moreover, neutral and minimal state together with individuals and institutions form a utilitarian citizenship character. In this respect, liberal citizenship denotes individual as a set of rights and keeps the number and intensity of duties to minimum. In the following parts of this subsection, the aim is to specify distinct traditions that appeared within liberal citizenship.

There are two different arguments in liberal theory: Libertarian liberalism or neo-liberalism (Delanty, 2000) and egalitarian liberalism (Dwyer, 2004). These arguments are related to the egalitarian logic of citizenship. In this respect, these approaches attribute different roles for state. Kymlicka (2001) draws main distinctions between two different liberalisms as:

“the right-wing libertarianism associated with Robert Nozick and David Gauthier, which affirms the sanctity of property rights, and which is hostile to all forms of state-enforced redistribution; there is the left-wing liberal egalitarianism associated with John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Bruce Ackerman, which affirms the necessity of rectifying underserved inequalities, and which gives moral priority to the well-being of the least-off” (Kymlicka, 2001:328).

As Nussbaum (2005) affirms, libertarian liberalism exists since 1960s and its roots are traced back to the seventeenth century, to John Locke. For him, “in

the Reagan/Thatcher era and since, libertarian ideas have taken or increasing importance in the public debate” (Nussbaum, 2005: Foreword). Hence, we can say that this approach stands close to New Right which was effective in the 1980s. Delanty also asserts that neo-liberalism had a wider applicability in government policies in the 1980s through “decentralization, deregulation, privatization and monetarism” (King, 1987 cited in Delanty, 2000:20).

Nozick (1974) and Hayek (1960) are libertarian liberals and they assume a limited role for state. In addition, “they believe that the function of government is to ensure basic limited civil and political rights but beyond this it should not intervene and attempt to promote or sustain any particular ideal of a just society” (Dwyer, 2004:24) For Nozick (1974) state should be ‘night-watchman’ that is often called minimal state. Both Hayek (1960) and Nozick (1974) criticize state’s coercive power because they assume that state’s distributive justice may not be equal. Nevertheless, for Hayek, the main function of the law is to secure the essential condition of individual freedom.

Dwyer (2004) shows how Adam Smith’s *laissez-faire* approach looms large among libertarian liberals. Because ‘invisible hand’ of the market is seen as producing spontaneous order in which individual citizens are liberated from state interference and they engage in economic transactions of their own choice. State simultaneously keeps civil and political rights within such economic framework in order not to cheat or violate another person’s individual rights.

As a second realm of liberalism, egalitarian liberalism, takes the issue of individual rights and distributive justice. Dwyer (2004) sees Rawls and T.H. Marshall as egalitarian liberals. Although independent individual and neutral state are common elements for both right wing libertarian and left wing egalitarian liberals, only left-wing libertarians rectify morally arbitrary inequalities (Kymlicka, 2001).

Unlike right-wing libertarians who do not attribute to state any socio-economic function, egalitarian liberals emphasize social justice. Right and left-wing procedural liberalism have different implications of virtue and identities. From a liberal egalitarian point of view, Kymlicka suggests that “communal identities and civic virtues can only play a secondary role, to be judged by the extent to which they are consistent with, or promote, foundational values of individual agency and social justice” (Kymlicka, 2001:332).

As an egalitarian liberal, Rawls (1971, 1993) develops the term *justice as fairness* which is a higher level of abstraction, the social contract as found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant. He explains two different principles of this term:

“the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1971:14-15).

To implement redistributive justice, Rawls admits state interference in distributive justice and he defends welfare state and economic equality in terms of individual freedom and right discourse. Rawls’s justice as fairness is egalitarian because his term is based on “its fair value requirement for the political liberties, its demand of fair equality of opportunity, and its difference principle” (Pogge, 2007:148).

Having given the essential points and differentiations within liberalism, it is necessary to revise the critical arguments about liberalism. In this sense, Faulks (2000) evaluates failure of citizenship in liberal societies in generating appropriate obligations not due to the moral or cultural decline but rather political failures of capitalist society. Liberals offer an unbalanced vision of citizenship by emphasizing the protection of market rights and the exclusion of responsibilities. In this regard, she argues that “a citizenship that is built upon the exclusive state and the inequalities of the market is a thin citizenship indeed” (Faulks, 2000:82).

Marx made the critique of liberal citizenship and considered the rights of the liberal state representing a false universalism that masks the real sources of domination in *Jewish Question*. As Roche states,

“for Marx, the liberal doctrine of equality is important but limited. This is because in the liberal state, individuals are considered equal only in the public sphere, when they are participating politically as citizens. In their private lives, as workers or capitalists, individuals are subject to the market laws of supply and demand...These market interactions inevitably result in serious inequalities that, for Marx, undermine the significance of formal rights” (Faulks, 2000:62).

Unlike Marx, social conservatives and communitarians have criticized liberalism for its neglect of the duties of the citizen and losing civic bonds. They also regard social rights as problematic. According to these critiques, “social rights create subjects, not citizens and have destroyed an ethic of civic virtue upon

which the moral order is built” (Faulks, 2000:70). They argue for the dilution of rights and the assertion of duty where allegiance and cooperation are secured by the coercive force of government.

2.4.2 Republican Citizenship

Republican citizenship is regarded as a version of communitarian conception of citizenship (Faulks 2000; Van Gunsteren 1998). Quill argues how modern-republican citizenship debate appears in academic field. He describes as follows:

“[w]hile the liberal-communitarian debate raged during the last two decades of the twentieth century, the impetus for a ‘republican revival’ occurred much earlier, in the field of academic history in the 1960s, with a reassessment of the American Revolution and the philosophies of the founding fathers. In the process, the dominant assertions of Louis Hartz (1955) were contested” (Quill, 2006:8).

Quill (2006) considers republicanism as an umbrella concept which includes antique republicans Aristotle, Cicero; the Italian republicanism of Machiavelli; from French republicans Rousseau, Montesquieu; American republicans Jefferson, Rush and modern republicans Arendt, Pettit, Dagger, Skinner and Miller.

In this regard, Van Gunsteren (1994) notes that public community has a main role in developing republican virtues such as courage, devotion, military discipline. For him, these virtues are mainly masculine and there is little appreciation for diversity of other communities. Republican and communitarian view of citizenship takes place within a society centered on civic virtue of Durkheimians. From the republican point of view, as Dagger suggests, “citizenship has an ethical as well as legal dimension” (Dagger, 2002:148). He also regards republican citizenship as an *ethos* –a way of life. In this context, citizens are required to commit to the common good and to participate actively in public affairs. Dagger remarks that republican citizenship requires civic virtue. In this sense, “the republican conception seems to demand unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizen” (Dagger, 2002:150).

Heater (2002) calls the above mentioned tradition as civic-republican. She points out to republic as “a constitutional system with some form of sharing out of power to prevent concentrated and autocratic government” and uses the term civic “as the involvement of the citizenry in public affairs to the mutual benefit of the individual and the community” (Heater, 2002[1999]:44). In this sense, republican way of thinking considers citizens not merely as a collection of individuals but as an organic society on the necessity for the state. Hereby, Van Gunsteren deduces that “citizens of a republic are both rulers and ruled” (Van Gunsteren, 1998:7). Hence, according to him, citizens must have a minimum autonomy, judgment and loyalty to fulfill this double function. Civic republicanism therefore defends the primacy of public life over the individual. In doing this, as Dagger (2002) shows, republic needs a rule of law to avoid absolute or arbitrary rule of others.

Oldfield (1994) assumes civic republicanism as a communally based citizenship which allows citizens to retain their autonomy “but only if it is exercised not just with respect given to others’ autonomy but also in accordance with a practice which is socially defined, and which they have a duty to engage in” (Oldfield, 1994:101). In contrast to individualistic liberalism, civic republicanism stresses duties instead of rights. Oldfield suggests that military service is one of the duties of citizens to defend the community or the republic against those who would threaten it. Furthermore, the rearing of the young in appropriate ways is another duty in order to provide intergenerational continuity. Oldfield notes an important point about duties which are “associated with their very identification of themselves as citizens; not to fulfill them is to cease to be a citizen” (Oldfield, 1994:192).

In addition, Oldfield (1994) considers the perception of freedom as a crucial division between civic republicanism and liberal individualism. Although in liberalism, autonomous individual shall act in an unconstrained manner “in those areas of life where they are left alone by society and the state”, civic republican thought does not give such freedom (Oldfield, 1994:195). Individuals are free when their interests overlap their duties. To republicans, “for maximizing freedom individuals should sacrifice themselves to the public service” (Skinner,

2006:179). Here, this public community is considered as an organic society prioritizing public life over individuals and duties over rights.

We cannot observe the politics of recognition in modern republican citizenship. As Laborde and Maynor assert, “instead of the fixed representation of differences, republicans tend to favor inclusive participation in deliberation with others” (Laborde and Maynor, 2008:18).

Heater (2002) argues about the relevance of civic republicanism to the modern states and politics. She assumes one of the most compelling reason for the revival of the civic republican ideal as being laid on the conviction that “many people in western countries are not paying their dues; they are abusing the social security system, for example and giving nothing in return. Such people are, in short, ‘free riders’ ” (Heater, 2002:72). In response, civic republicans defend the new balance between freedom and rights on the one hand, commitment and duties to the community on the other. Moreover, republican vision of harmonious, co-operative community ideally expects unquestionable patriotism and self-sacrifice.

The image of individual in civic republican ideal is represented “as part of an organic community” (Heater, 2002:72). For Heater, the ultimate objective is to bring benefits to the individual by the “educative assistance of school and religion, the individual is continuously supported in the bearing of the burdens of the civic status” (Heater, 2002:72). Hence, this civic regime leads to “a loss of personal freedom, autonomy and the power of fully independent critical thought” (Heater, 2002:73).

Heater (2002) also argues that modern civic republicans take the Aristotelian polis as a model of citizenly participation in the politics of the state. In this sense, she finds citizenship as a phase of becoming an elitist because only well-educated and wealthy people would have time to participate in formal politics. In addition, narrow definition of public participation excludes civil society activities. Moreover, she finds civic republican citizenship essentially a male concept because military is an important virtue.

Heater observes that citizen-soldier of classic times appears in present times as young people working for civil community service. Oldfield (1994) indicates Michael Ignatieff's critical claim that "communitarianism with which civic-republicanism is often associated, as a warm and cosy retreat for all who feel themselves morally superior to 'the vulgarity of market values', and thus as a form of 'moral narcissism' " (Oldfield, 1994:192). Civic republicanism influenced contemporary communitarian scholars who promoted a very different understanding of citizenship among many liberal thinkers (Dwyer, 2004:22; Heater, 2002:77-78). Like republican tradition they emphasized the feeling of community and sense of duty. Yet, it should be noted that communitarian approach shows differences from civic republicanism. The argument that will follow in the next section is that, in contrast to civic republicanism, communitarian approach omits the design of civic participation in the governance of state and the central republican concern for freedom (Heater, 2002).

2.4.3 Communitarian Approach

American social scientists associated and worked on the concept of 'communitarianism' since 1980s (Heater 2002; Delanty 2000). According to Berten,

"social politics of government in USA has been criticized rigidly by communitarians in 1980s because of the fact that citizens regarded state just protecting their rights and benefits. Nevertheless, when economic stagnation and budget deficit appears the state had not ability to request public spirit in order to provide social justice" (Berten et al., 2006:206-207).

In twentieth century, Amitai Etzioni (2003), William Galston, Alasdair MacIntyre (2007)[1981], Michael Sandel (1995), Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer (2004) and Benjamin Barber were followers of communitarian approach⁹ and criticized liberalism for different reasons. Communitarian citizenship is generally critical about liberal society's atomized individual and common good view based

⁹ Delanty (2000) differentiates communitarianism within itself as liberal communitarianism and conservative communitarianism. He mentions that Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer, Alisdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor as defenders of liberal communitarianism. On the other hand, he considers conservative communitarianism as a reaction to the neo-liberalism. Popular conservative communitarianism can also be found in Etzioni's writing.

on social contract. In liberal society, the state should be neutral to guarantee equal freedom of citizens. In this way, individuals take caution against both other individuals and government. According to Berten et al, “for some communitarians, this kind of society will demolish core legacy of the society ...[because of the fact that] liberal government neither provide the conditions of cultural plurality nor social conditions for its own core legacy” (Berten et al, 2006: 203).

In the communitarian vision of citizenship, according to Van Gunsteren, “the citizen acts responsibly when he stays within the limits of what is acceptable of community...Individuals are formed by the community” (Van Gunsteren, 1998:15). Hence, we shall assert that communitarian citizenship is interested in the renewal of community to regenerate public life which is opposed to the atomizing tendencies of individualism and liberal commitment to individual rights. In other words, politics of rights should be replaced with politics of common good.

The aim of the communitarians is not to retrieve the community from the state project (Delanty, 2000) but to recover a lost dimension of community that modernity destroyed (Delanty, 2000; Phillips, 1993). Phillips defines the particularistic elements in definition of community among communitarian thought such that: “A *community* is a group of people who live in a common territory, have a common history and shared values, participate together in various activities, and have a high degree of solidarity” (Phillips, 1993:14). The loss of community was also expressed by Durkheim, Tönnies and Weber during nineteenth century. To Phillips, “both contemporary communitarian thinkers and their nineteenth-century counterparts emphasize the primacy of the collective life over that of the individual” (Phillips, 1993: 175). Thereby, we shall assert that the idea of the primacy of collective life is the main view of communitarian approach which challenges with liberalism.

Moreover, in the communitarian approach, culture is one of the providers to keep the majority of society together. Communitarians stress the significance of culture and culturally homogenous, consensus model of society which depends

“partly on the group members agreeing about what constitutes the common good and about the proper means to achieve it” (Phillips, 1993: 158). In addition, socialization and education help to achieve this agreement. Galston suggests that “one of the hallmarks of communitarianism is its sensitivity to cultural and historical differences that may differentiate one community or subcommunity from another” (Galston, 1998 [1995]: 107).

Delanty (2000) compares the view on cultural identities between liberals and communitarians. He compares both approaches in the following manner: “[w]hile liberals get around the problem of protecting minority groups by a commitment to tolerance (Kymlicka 1995), communitarians are on the whole more concerned with protecting the majority culture; this is not an issue for liberals” (Delanty, 2000:27). Nevertheless, in Berten’s argument (2006), liberal state should be neutral and should not interfere for even protecting cultural communities. Moreover, it provides some supplies for cultural rights, for example language rights. Thus, liberal state trusts the cultural market and does not interfere positively or negatively. Liberal state just gives scope for individuals not for cultural communities.

However, the communitarian perspective does not affirm the neutrality of state to the social cultural field. There are diminishing cultural minorities due to historical reasons. Hence, state should interfere directly to this field. For example, Canada did this interference for protecting Indians (Berten, 2006). To sum up, Moody’s words would be useful for a comparison between liberalism and communitarianism with:

“liberalism has liberty as its chief value, whereas communitarianism has respect for persons and mutual aid. Liberalism endorses a metaphysical atomism, and in many of its forms, a political individualism, both of which communitarianism rejects. And liberalism sees a strong defense of property rights as a necessary condition for liberty, whereas communitarianism does not, but rather takes a strong socialist position on property rights. Finally, liberalism has traditionally been based on some form of foundationalism, usually in the form of contractarianism, which communitarianism rejects in favor of some version of immanent critique” (Moody, 1994: 100).

As a critical view of communitarian thought, Heater (2002) and Phillips (1993) regard that communitarians have failed to offer a clear definition of what

they mean by community. (Heater, 2002 [1999]:78; Phillips, 1993:8). Phillips gives our attention to the dangers of pursuing communitarian ideal because “common identification as a group with the same attributes always entails reference to those lacking such attributes and results in policies of exclusion” (Phillips, 1993: 164). She also thinks that the attempt to achieve a monolithic culture may be accompanied with the withdrawal or refusal of the rights of citizenship. The cases of Jews and Gypsies in Germany and Austria in the 1930s illustrate this situation. She argues that Hitler and Nazis made a sharp differentiation between “us” and “them” emphasizing the integrity of the organic body of the German Volk as the embodiment of racial and cultural superiority. In this regard, Gypsies, Eastern Europeans, Jews and many others were viewed as inferior and a threat to racial purity. In this sense, “community boundaries severely identified despised outsiders” (Phillips, 1993: 163).

So far, three citizenship approaches are analyzed. Liberal citizenship was discussed through two different strands: libertarian liberalism or neo-liberalism and egalitarian liberalism. At the same time, these strands could be read as right-wing liberalism and left-wing liberalism. Libertarian liberalism advocates a limited role for state. On the other hand, egalitarian liberals focus on rectifying morally arbitrary inequalities. For egalitarians, state interference is significant for distribution of justice. Independent individual and neutral state are common elements for both view and just egalitarian liberalism assumes social justice. Furthermore, liberal citizenship attributes individual as a set of individual rights and keeps the duties at minimum. Unlike liberal citizenship, view of republican and communitarian citizenship is based on the civic virtue of Durkheimians and society rather than individual is significant. For civic republican citizenship, ethos and legal side appear as determining factors. With regard to ethos, citizens are required to commit to the common good and participate actively in public affairs. Unlike liberal citizenship, citizens have minimum autonomy and judgment. Hence, individuals are not independent as in the liberal society since individuals are regarded as part of organic society. In addition, the public life is above the individual where republic should have a rule of law to avoid absolute or arbitrary

rule for others. Citizens are both rulers and ruled by good laws and institutions supporting by civic virtue or civility. In this sense, republican vision requires harmonious, co-operative, community expecting patriotism and self-society. As far as for communitarian approach, the main concern is how public spirit can be provided. Communitarians do not retrieve the state project as republicans do, but they aim to recover a lost dimension of the community that is destroyed by modernity. In this regard, developing virtues and common good have determinate attitude in terms of social and political realms. Culture is seen as one of the providers in keeping majority together. Communitarians focus on voluntary organizations, associations, family, and religion and so on. Furthermore, communitarian values are more organic than they are in civic republican citizenship. The individual cannot escape from the society's definition of code of virtues. Thus, the self is constituted by communal ends not by individual ends. Thereafter, in the following section, the transformation of citizenship with the decline of the nation-state will be explored.

2.5 The Decline of Modern Citizenship

Globalization has changed the connection between citizenship and nation-state. With European Community, transnational citizenship and new political belongings have appeared. Hence, the relation between citizenship and nation-state has decreased. In this new political arena, Romani movement also gains moment.

The collapse of communist control in Eastern Europe, the widespread post-war immigration combined with a growing internalization of employment especially in the European Community and the increasing international claims on citizenship by immigrants and refugees are the political changes which entail for the enlargement of citizens' rights (Bottomore, 1992:72; Janoski 1998:4). In addition, economic globalization, cultural denationalization, migration and transnational institutions have been affective in transforming the institutions, the meaning of nation and its relationship to citizenship (Tambini, 2001). Furthermore, Kivisto&Faist (2007) conceptualize this new form of citizenship as

‘nested citizenship’ and resembles it to Russian dolls because “citizenship is articulated at both the national and the supranational levels” (Kivisto&Faist, 2007:12). Accordingly, the new developments challenge state sovereignty and create multiple ties and loyalties on the part of citizens in border-crossing social spaces.

Linklater (1998) argues that the new form of political community “which overcame invidious dualisms between citizens and aliens, and between hegemonic and subaltern groups, would remain bounded by virtue of being confined to Europe” (Linklater, 1998:181). In this framework, members of community have no requirement to share a single national dominant identity or supremacy of a single political authority. In addition, this political transformation, post Westphalian Era¹⁰, led to the divergence of citizenship from state. He assumes that “post-Westphalian communities would promote a transnational citizenry with multiple political allegiances and without the need for submission to a central sovereign state” (Linklater, 1998:181). In a similar line, Elliott acknowledges that

“the nation-state today has to react to the twin forces of globalism and localism, and its associated transformation of the world economy. One comprehensive result of these trans-national events or structures is that the nation-state is no longer the main regulator of socio-economic order, and thus no longer politically accountable for finding solutions to major and traumatic crises” (Elliott, 2001: 48).

Since 1980s various forms of globalization significantly altered the necessary connection between citizenship and nation-state. Within the citizenship framework, Sassen (2006) interprets these transformations as denationalized forms of citizenship on the ground that

“the destabilizing of national state-centered hierarchies of legitimate power and allegiance has enabled a multiplication of nonformalized or only partly formalized political dynamics and actors. These signal a deterritorializing of citizenship practices and identities, and of discourses about loyalty and allegiance” (Sassen, 2006:14).

As a result of deterritorialization of citizenship, the national as container of social process and power is cracked, which produces new forms of power and politics at the subnational level (Sassen, 2006). Hence, “cities are foremost in this

¹⁰ The old form citizenship bounded to the Westphalian order symbolically started with the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Hettne implies by Westphalian order as an interstate system constituted by sovereign states. Hence, “inside the states are citizens with obligations and rights defined by citizenship and allegiance to the state” (Hettne, 2000:37).

new geography....[It]is once again today a scale for strategic economic and political dynamics” (Sassen, 2006:26-27).

After the state sovereignty has been frayed and the institution of national citizenship has been disaggregated, new modalities of membership have emerged, like dual citizenship. Kivisto and Faist (2007) discussed the reasons behind the expansion of dual citizenship. They recognize the high levels of migration as affecting the proliferation of dual citizenship, which is influenced by “technological advances in information, communication, and transportation, combined with sizeable economic disparities among nations, widespread armed conflicts, systematic violations of fundamental human rights, and other worldwide forces” (Legomski, 2003 quoted in Kivisto and Faist, 2007:107). According to them, countries of emigration want to encourage enduring ties with their foreign nationals because of economic networks. In addition, the shifting interests of immigrant-sending countries led to the expansion of dual citizenship because dual nationals are actors of political transnationalism. Dissolution of empires and nations and differentiation of diplomatic protection are other factors in this realm. In this regard, European Convention on Nationality of 1997 focused on “achieving greater unity between its members, the legitimate interests of individuals, averting statelessness and discrimination and determining the rights and duties of multiple nationals”(Kivisto&Faist, 2007:111). The Maastricht Treaty (1993) requires comment in this regard because elements of transnational citizenship have been introduced to the European Union in this treaty. In this frame, Linklater states that European Union has a “thin conception of citizenship which brings an international civil society into existence rather than the thicker conception of citizenship which active membership of a political community” (Linklater, 1998:199).

Linklater (1998) directs our attention to the new balances between universality and difference. For him, the new post-Westphalian state is different from sovereign powers and nationalist presuppositions. Its tasks are

“to harmonise the diversity of ethical spheres including sub-national or sub-state, national and wider regional and global associations, and to do so by creating forms

of citizenship which pass beyond sovereignty to institutionalize advances in universality and diversity” (Soysal cited in Linklater, 1998:198).

The European Commission (2004) Glocalmig Final Report argues how new modes of belongings and citizenship practices add to persons’ lives within the framework of globalization. In this sense, the report points to four spheres of being public and citizens’ involvement. The first sphere is essentialized modes of belonging such as religious and ethnic and minorities in some European states. The second sphere is national mode of belonging, which was created by nation-states. The third sphere accommodates transnational spaces comprising transnational organizations and associations with non-spatial expressions and de-territorialized symbolisms. And fourth space is *glocal* spaces, which

“constitute an alternative to the traditional notions of spaces, and they may be seen as the prototypes of diverse societies of the future, accommodating diversity on the societal level and multiple identities and hybridity on the individual level. They are spaces which accommodate essentialized, national, transnational and glocal modes of belonging” (EC [Glocalmic Final Report], 2004:41).

Within different types of space and belonging, Hettne (2000) suggests ‘regional multilateralism’, a regionalized world order, facilitating a regional civil society transcending the nation-states. For her, globalization and regionalization are not compatible trends because of their dialectical relationship. She also deals with the regionalism as an approach which is a reduction of structural gap between Core and Periphery. Therefore, the new regionalism “implies the possibility of a regional formation with a distinct identity and a capacity as an actor; namely a regional community. It does not preclude a function for the old nation-state” (Hettne, 2000:45). For Hettne, “regionalized world order rather than continued globalization would facilitate a genuine cultural pluralism which is a requisite for a substantive global citizenship” (Hettne, 2000:45).

As Stevenson indicates (2001) during past decade, growing crisis of the welfare state, the demise of actually existed socialism and the development of informational capitalism led to appearance of new politic spheres and belongings. In this new politic sphere, Romani political mobilization has increased especially after 1989. In fact, Vermeesch (2006) argues that international Romani political movement can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s. He considers the foundation of the *Comité International Tzigane* in Paris in 1965, the establishment

of local Romani organizations in the United Kingdom, Spain, France, Czechoslovakia in the latter half of the 1960s and organization of the First Romani Congress in London in 1971 as “the first efforts in organizing an international movement in Europe around a common identity, raising demands on the state and publicly constructing and defending the interests of the group as a whole” (Vermeesch, 2006:105). In this transnational discourse, Vermeesch (2006) differentiates two related group of actors toward Roma group. First, he refers to international governmental organizations (IGO); especially Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe and the EU. Second, he argues the role of internationally active NGOs focusing on the plight of the Roma.

With regard to international institutions, OSCE was the first organization in Europe to place the issue of minority protection at the center of the activity in Central and Eastern Europe. Romani issue was understood by OSCE with two developments in 1990s. First, the topic of Roma was separated from the topic of conflict prevention and national minority protection. Second, it was believed that Roma needed special attention since their ethnicity associated with problems they encountered although diversity could not be denied. OSCE framed the problems as racial violence, unequal access to education, substandard living conditions (housing, health) and lack of political participation. In this regard, a separate institution called Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues was established in 1994. Hence, OSCE supported the emergence of an international Romani movement. In response, international Romani activists expressed their concerns on the international level (Vermeersch 2006). For Vermeersch, the problem related to OSCE was that their policy is not country specific circumstances but to universal anti-Roma discrimination.

Vermeersch (2006) considers the second international actor actively involved in Romani issue as the Council of Europe since 1993. The Parliament defined Roma as a European group characterized by a common culture. In 1994, special bodies for Romani issues were established within the Council of Europe. Their policy is based on the fact that “rather than organizing the inclusion of

Roma on a European level...to encourage member states individually to take positive steps to facilitate such participation by Roma/Gypsies” (Vermeersch, 2006:193). Furthermore, European Roma and Traveller Forum (ERTF) was established in 2004, which functions as independent international body to advise European institutions.

Vermeersch (2006) emphasizes EU as a third and important international actor. According to him, EU has a growing concern for the protection of minorities in Central Europe since 1990s. As Rövid (2009) points out, “until the 1990s, European international organizations paid little attention to Roma (Rövid, 2009:4). In addition, EU had a direct affect on candidate members, since it is associated with normative pressure with membership conditionality. In 1990s, the topic of Roma gradually became an important point of reference for the conditionality policy (Vermeersch, 2006).

The second point of international Romani movement is related to internationally active NGOs transforming state sovereignty. Vermeersch (2006) discusses that NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe started to research and document the human rights situation of Roma in Europe. Accordingly, NGOs found that “Roma were disproportionately affected by economic and political changes after 1989 and had become the number one victims of discrimination” (Vermeersch, 2006:202).

In short, international Romani NGOs “provided domestic Romani activists with a powerful tool in the language of international human and minority rights with which to make their claims to the government and attract support from ordinary Romani citizens” (Vermeersch, 2006:206). Vermeersch also points out the civil society development related to the EU which was one of the main financial supporters of projects on involving Roma in Central Europe.

Within this human right/antidiscrimination discourse, Rövid (2009) indicates a dilemma that “International Romani Union struggling for the recognition of the Romani nation, whereas there are several NGOs focusing on the protection of the human rights of Romani peoples, such as the European Roma

Rights Centre” (Rövid, 2009:5). The First Romani World Congress held in London in 1971, adopted a national flag and hymn, and agreed on the dissemination of a new ethnic label as Roma. As Rövid says, “the term Roma was constructed as the official name to encompass a variety of communally based identities across different countries” (Rövid, 2009:10). Rövid adds that by 1990s the concept of Roma¹¹ as a “trans[border]-national minority” has emerged. In fact, the Fifth World Romani Congress held in 2000 in Prague claimed a manifesto that “Romani nation offers to the rest of humanity a new vision of stateless nationhood that is more suited to a globalised world than is affiliation to traditional nation-states” (Rövid, 2009:11). Along with these developments, for him, the Roma increasingly challenge with the principle of territorial democracy and Westphalian international order.

In short, in the new post-Westphalian state new balances have been established between universality and difference. There has been an increase in new identities and group rights which challenge the homogenous nation-state. In the following section, cultural and group rights, as well as human rights will be evaluated.

2.5.1 Cultural and Group Rights

The claims of ethnic and regional identities have put into question the modern idea of citizenship as membership in a collective, universal entity which subsumes diversity and particularity. Linklater (1998) suggests that, feminist movements, national minorities and indigenous peoples are not simply concerned with universalizing citizenship. In this framework, Kymlicka and Norman (1995) ask that “can citizenship provide a common experience, identity and allegiance for

¹¹ Rövid also criticizes the term of Roma which refers to diverse groups such as Sinti, Gitano, Manoush, Musicians and Travellers, and for him, this term could not be inclusive for the entire Gypsies who do not necessarily identify themselves as Roma. This situation might lead to disagreement. For Rövid, “European level policy-makers and activists cannot neglect the significant differences in the social position of various groups considered to be Roma and the forms of discrimination and exclusion that they face” (Rövid, 2009:8). Hence, for him, measures of “one-size-fits-all-Roma” should be thoroughly debated.

the members of society? Is it enough simply to include historically excluded groups on an equal basis?”(Kymlicka & Norman, 1995:286). For Heater (2002), states and societies cannot be viewed as homogenous. Besides, citizenship is not a unitary concept but a mosaic of identities, duties and rights. These questions and arguments include the politics of difference or cultural politics.

As a result of the development of transnational spheres of governance, the groups based on ethnic, racial, gender and sexual identities struggle for recognition and redistribution of rights not only in national borders but also in the new transnational spaces. By the new claims based upon identity and cultural rights, the connection between citizenship and nation-state has been questioned.

In the previous forms of citizenship, the rights and obligations were limited to nation-state. Yet, as Turner (2001a) argues, cultural identity is one of the extending aspects of citizenship. As he contends,

“[w]ith the erosion of national citizenship, Marshall’s three forms of rights (legal, political and social) have been augmented by rights that are global, namely environmental, aboriginal and cultural rights. These are driven by global concerns about the relationship between environment, community and body such that the quest for social security has been replaced by concerns for ontological security” (Turner, 2001a:189).

Although Marshallian framework underestimates the problem of ethnic identity, there has been fundamental discussion related with identity and difference. In response to Marshall, Turner (2001a) alleges that ‘cultural rights’ (to language, to a share in the cultural heritage of a community, and to a religious identity) could augment Marshall’s tripartite division of citizenship rights. Yet, these rights “have neither precise nor necessary connections with membership of nation-state” (Turner, 2001a:206). In addition, the state has been eroded in terms of cultural hegemony and political sovereignty both from below and above. This means the challenges are coming from above with global pressure and from below with local, regional and ethnic challenges to its authority (Turner, 2001b).

In this new political space, we need to consider the relationship between citizenship and identity¹². Isin and Wood (1999) criticize the basic belief surrounding citizenship as universal and identity as particular. They do not regard citizenship and identity as conflicted principles. Rather, they assume citizenship “not only as a set of legal obligations and entitlements which individuals possess by virtue of their membership in a state, but also as the practices through individuals and groups formulate and claim new rights or struggle to expand or maintain existing rights” (Isin and Wood, 1999: 4). Accordingly, they describe the new politics “arising from the new social movements as cultural politics¹³, which began forming new forms of identities and sought new group rights” (Isin and Wood, 1999:14).

Hence, the emergence of new social movements and identity politics has been crucial in this respect. Stevenson (2001) argues that social movements including ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, disability and others seek to interrupt the construction of dominant cultures and challenge with modern citizenship in two respects. On the one hand, they struggle to widen ‘inclusive’ fabric of the community. On the other hand, they create space for difference and otherness.

With regard to first dimension, the main question is how modern citizenship could be more inclusive. Dagnino (2008) finds out a difference between previous conceptions of citizenship as a strategy of the dominant classes with aim of social integration and a new conception of non-citizens, of the excluded – a citizenship below. Hence, for her, Arendt’s notion of ‘right to have rights’ has been redefined with the emergence of new social subjects actively

¹² As Hall (1993) suggests, identity is the process of identification. In this respect, “identities are never completed, never finished; that they are always as subjectivity itself is, in process” (Hall, 1993:47). Hall (1993) considers Gramscian notion ‘war of position’ with the strategy of establishing hegemony: “any counter-politics of the local which attempts to organize people through their diversity of identifications has to be a struggle which is conducted positionally. It is the beginning of anti-racism, anti-sexism and anti-classicism as a war of positions” (Hall, 1993:57).

¹³ To Isin and Wood (1999:1), cultural politics is a general concept and includes diverse representations. In this respect, they classify it in three zones: (i) earlier movements called as ‘identity politics’ which were based on the establishing durable identities; (ii) movements based on a ‘politics of difference’ and claimed of group difference; (iii) recent movements that searched to transcend the conflict between politics of identity and difference.

identifying what they consider as their rights and struggling for their recognition. In this frame, Dagnino (2008) considers social movements- such as those of women, blacks, ethnic minorities, homosexuals, environmentalists, urban and rural workers, etc.- organized around the recognition and extension of rights has helped the expansion and deepening of democracy in Latin America since the late 1980s and 1990s. She regards building process of citizenship in terms of demands of plurality of identity and social rights (housing, education, health, etc.) that would expand democracy. Dagnino emphasizes that

“the general demand for equal rights embedded in the predominant conception of citizenship has been extended by such movements and used as a vehicle for making more specific demands related to their particular concerns. In this process, the cultural dimension of citizenship has been emphasized, incorporating contemporary concerns with subjectivities, identities and the right to difference....On the other hand, this emphasis on the cultural dimension of citizenship has made explicit the need for a radical transformation of those cultural practices that reproduce inequality and exclusion throughout society” (Dagnino, 2008.62).

Thus, to make promises of citizenship real, universalistic claims of citizenship from the particular perspectives of a range of marginalized groups and of nation-state “outsiders” has to be interrogated. Unlike Mann’s (1987) argument that rights are dependent upon the decisions of elites, Gaventa argues in the following sections of the book called *Inclusive Citizenship* that although policy document are mainly related to right-based approach, few studies examine the meanings of expressions of rights and citizenship ‘from below’ and how these meanings are acted upon through political and social mobilization.

Kabeer refers to the inclusive citizenship, which is viewed from the standpoint of the excluded (Kabeer, 2005:1). In a similar line, for Sassen, “citizenship is partly produced by the practices of the excluded” (Sassen, 2006:20). Within this framework, for Kabeer (2005), the four values of inclusive citizenship emerged from below are: justice, recognition, self-determination and solidarity. In this regard, Kabeer refers to justice as “when it is fair for people to be treated the same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently” (Kabeer, 2005: 3). Self-determination refers to people’s ability to exercise some degree of control over their lives. And solidarity implies the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with them in their claims for justice and

recognition. Kabeer states that “the form that solidarity takes varies, not only according to the ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ status of particular individuals and groups, but also the extent to which they hope to transcend their excluded groups” (Kabeer, 2005:7).

With regard to inclusive forms of citizenship, the section will continue exploring the politics of difference or cultural politics which will be a kind of remedy argument for those who are excluded from citizenship rights and premises. In this respect, Fraser’s identity politics -recognition and redistribution- Young’s differentiated citizenship, Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship and Mouffe’s radical democratic citizenship will be evaluated henceforth. These identity politics are also critical for Gypsy population because equality is not established just solely by economic terms, but also necessitates “recognition” and “justice” for their identity.

First of all, Nancy Fraser’s (1998) argument is related to the rise of a new political imaginary, centered on notions of “identity”, “difference”, “cultural domination” and “recognition”. Her aim is to overcome economic and cultural injustices. For Fraser (1998), disadvantaged groups may suffer injustices that are traceable to both political economy and culture. In this dilemma, Fraser (1998) proposes a set of analytical distinctions; such as, cultural injustices versus economic injustices and recognition versus redistribution. In addition, redistribution and recognition are conceptualized as a dilemma, but for Fraser, justice today requires both redistribution and recognition. In this dilemma, first she refers to the socio-economic injustice, which is rooted in the political-economic structure of society. Exploitation, economic marginalization and deprivation can be seen as examples of economic injustices. The second form of injustice is defined as cultural or symbolic which is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation and communication. Fraser gives following examples to cultural injustices:

“[c]ultural domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and /or hostile to one’s own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one’s culture); and

disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and /or in everyday life interactions” (Fraser, 1998: 22).

On the other hand, Fraser (1998) distinguishes two distinct kinds of remedies for economic and cultural injustice. In this regard, the remedy for economic injustice is called as “redistribution”, which is political-economic restructuring of some sort. That might refer to redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labor or transforming the other basic economic structures. But Fraser sees the remedy for this kind of injustice as opposed to cultural recognition.

The other remedy for cultural injustice is some sort of cultural or symbolic change. For Fraser (1998), this could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups. Fraser (1998) discusses as an example groups of “despised sexualities” whose state of oppression stems from cultural devaluation rather than political arrangements. Although she recognizes that gays and lesbians are discriminated in social and economic life-style, she finds these inequalities stemming from cultural devaluation. Accordingly, she recommends the remedy for injustice as recognition, but not redistribution.

In addition, according to Fraser (1998), although recognition claims tend to promote group differentiation, redistribution claims often call for abolishing economic arrangements that underpin group specificity. For Fraser (1998), disadvantaged groups may suffer injustices that are traceable to both political economy and culture. In addition, she distinguishes two approaches to remedy injustice that cut across the redistribution-recognition divide: affirmation and transformation remedies. By affirmative remedies, she means remedies which aimed to correct inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying frame that generates them. Fraser (1998) thinks that affirmative remedies for injustices have been associated with liberal welfare state. Affirmative recognition remedies tend to promote existing group differentiations by surface reallocations of existing goods to existing groups. In addition, affirmative redistribution is currently associated with mainstream multiculturalism. For Fraser (1998), although affirmative redistribution generally presupposes a universalist conception of recognition, it stigmatizes group identities, which contradicts with universalism. By contrast, Fraser (1998) evaluates transformative remedies as

currently associated with deconstruction and historically with socialism. These remedies, for Fraser, aimed to restructure the relations of production and to blur group differentiation.

As a response to Fraser, Iris Marion Young criticizes the dualistic conceptualization of redistribution and recognition in her essay called “Untruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser’s Dual Systems Theory” (1998). According to Young, “Fraser’s opposition of redistribution and recognition constitutes a retreat from the New Left theorizing which has insisted that the material effects of political economy are inextricably bound to culture” (Young, 1998:52). Therefore, Young criticizes Fraser due to her reductionist approach in terms of grouping injustices. Young defends group-differentiated policies as a response to oppression, of which she outlines five forms: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. Moreover, Young is against separation of culture from economy and, as Fraser argues, they tended to pull against each other in movements against injustice. Young advocates a “politics of difference” for achieving the material goals of equal protection and equal opportunity.

For this aim, Young (1995) develops a concept called “differentiated citizenship” in order to make a critique of the universal citizenship. As she expresses,

“The attempt to realize an ideal of universal citizenship that finds the public embodying generality as opposed to particularity, commonness versus difference, will tend to exclude or to put at a disadvantage some groups, even when they have formally equal citizenship status (Young, 1995:182).

Hence, according to Young (1995), the universal conception of citizenship expresses a general will, which has tended to enforce homogeneity of citizens. The meaning of universality is referred to as generality and equal treatment. However, as Young mentioned above, this conception of citizenship transcends group differences, which is fundamentally unjust, as it oppresses historically excluded groups. Accordingly, culturally excluded groups have distinctive needs which can only be met through group-differentiated policies. Young gives importance to group identity because leftist social movements have mobilized

around group identity rather than exclusively class or economic interests. For example, land rights for Aboriginal groups, reproductive rights for women, language rights for Hispanics might be included in these policies. Universal definition of citizenship also excluded workers, Jews, blacks, Asians, Indians, Mexicans, etc by means of suppressing group differences in the public and in practice and forcing the excluded groups to be measured according to norms derived from and defined by privileged groups. In this frame, Young criticizes European and American republicans as well as participatory democrats on the ground that their fear is disruption of the general interest.

For Young (1995), the advantage of group differentiated citizenship is that different social groups influence their interpretation of the meaning and consequences of policy proposals and influence the form of their political reasoning. In addition, she put forwards the ideal of a “rainbow coalition” that expresses such a heterogeneous public with forms of group representation. However, we can hardly distinguish the concept of social group. Young only enables us to differentiate social group from aggregate and association and emphasizes the group identity.

Kymlicka and Norman (1995) also criticize differentiated citizenship. In this regard, citizenship will cease to be a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose. They state that differentiated citizenship would create a politics of grievance and the obstacle is that: how do we decide which groups are entitled to such representation, and how do we ensure that their representatives are in fact accountable to the group. Therefore, they mention the necessity of a theory of citizenship not just a theory of justice or democracy.

Kymlicka (1997) views minority rights as a defensive response to nation state building and criticizes the ideal homogeneous policy of governments throughout the history on his book called *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* because of the fact that some minorities were physically eliminated (called also ethnic cleansing)¹⁴, others were coercively

¹⁴ At this point, Stewart (2010) indicates persecutions of Gypsies and Jews occurred between 1939 and 1945 under the Nazi rule but he claims that “the general European public remains almost

assimilated and also in other cases minorities were treated as resident aliens, subjected to physical segregation and economic discrimination, and their political rights are denied.

In addition, Kymlicka (1997) criticizes the notion that, the new emphasis on 'human rights' would resolve minority conflicts after World War II. This assumption is basically adopted by many liberals. Y. Soysal also hoped that if basic individual rights are ensured to all human beings without reference to membership in ethnic groups, cultural minorities would be protected indirectly. As Kymlicka says, "United Nations deleted all references to the rights of ethnic and national minorities in its Universal declaration of Human Rights" (Kymlicka, 1997:3). In addition, Kymlicka considers that many post-war liberals make the distinction between public and private in terms of ethnic identity. In this regard, ethnic identity like religion is something, which people should be free to express in their private life, but which is not the concern of the state. In short, post-war liberals are opposed to the idea that specific ethnic or national groups should be given a permanent political identity or constitutional status.

Therefore, for Kymlicka (1997), minority rights cannot be subsumed under the category of human rights. Cultural minorities are vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of majoritarian decision-makers within each state, which exacerbates ethno-cultural conflict. Kymlicka's solution is that it is necessary to supplement traditional human rights with minority rights. As he suggests, "a comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or 'special status' for minority cultures" (Kymlicka, 1997:6).

totally unaware of the Nazi treatment of the Romany peoples and in no European country are these persecutions taught as a part of the national curriculum" (Stewart, 2010:173). Besides, he argues that after Second World War II the official treatment towards Roma and Sinti was in terms of financial compensation. Stewart criticizes the compensation procedures since the victims had to assert their Gypsy or Jewish identity. For Stewart (2010), this misapplied model had no relation with the personal histories or the political stance of the individuals involved. Moreover, he claims that "the judges and investigators had great difficulty sustaining an equation of the Jewish and Romany genocides" (Stewart, 2010:182). Stewart relates the case of Gypsies in the context of "denial" or forgetting to the terrible treatment towards Gypsies in today's Central and Eastern Europe.

It is also important to note that Kymlicka does not refuse totally liberal principles of freedom, in a similar way with Iris Marion Young. For him, many forms of group differentiated citizenship are consistent with liberal principles of freedom; they are interrelated with each other. Herein, Kymlicka distinguishes three different types of minority rights that ethnic and national groups may demand:

“self-government rights (the delegation of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism); polyethnic rights (financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups) and special representation rights (guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state)” (Kymlicka, 1997:6-7).

To Kymlicka, although representation rights and poly-ethnic rights are consistent with integrating minority groups, self-government rights pose a serious threat to social unity, since they encourage the national minority to view itself as separate people with inherent rights to govern themselves¹⁵. Kymlicka gives also another important differentiation among minority groups. The first one is national minorities that wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture and demand various forms of autonomy. Kymlicka argues that many Western democracies are multinational. For example, there are a number of national minorities in the United States including the American Indians, Puerto Ricans, the descendants of Mexicans, etc. But these groups were all involuntarily incorporated into the United States, through colonization or conquest. The second source of minorities is immigration. When developing a theory of minority rights, according to Kymlicka, it is necessary to make distinction between ethnic groups and national minorities¹⁶.

¹⁵ Vermeersch (2006) gives Hungary as an example of minority rights model. After the collapse of communism, the first minority “self-governments” established in Hungary between 1994 and 1995. In addition, the Act of Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities was adopted in 1993. It guaranteed thirteen historical minorities including Roma that they have right to use minority languages, the right to organize their own educational activity, the right to political representation, the right to achieve cultural autonomy through self-governmental bodies. With regard to Roma, Minorities Roundtable brought together old and new political elites. Thus, both members of the communist led National Gypsy Council and representatives from newly established independent Romani organizations especially from the Roma Parliament sat around the table (Vermeersch, 2006).

¹⁶ Sobotka (2007) indicates that Roma increasingly have been seen as national minority during the 1990s in Europe. However, some states hesitate to see Roma as national minority. To Sobotka, “the discussion in academic scholarship has focused on whether policies toward Roma should be drafted in reference to national/ethnic minorities or immigrants (Sobotka, 2007:147).

The last issue about remedy politics is related to radical democratic citizenship. Mouffe (1992) considers that the conceptions of citizenship of both the liberal and the civic republican tradition need to be expanded, while building their respective strengths. On the one hand, for her, liberal view regards the capacity for each person to form, revise and rationally pursue his/her definition of the good. Yet as Mouffe says, “[w]hile liberalism did certainly contribute to the formulation of the idea of citizenship, based on the assertion that all individuals are born free and equal, it also reduced citizenship to a mere legal status, setting out the rights that the individual holds against the state” (Mouffe, 1992:227). In addition, for Mouffe, liberal approach ignores the limits imposed on the extension of pluralism on the ground that some existing rights have been constituted on the very exclusion or subordination of the rights of other categories. Then, for Mouffe, “individualism is seen as an obstacle not to theorise pluralism in adequate way” (Mouffe, 1993:77). For Mouffe, those identities must be first deconstructed if new rights are to be recognized.

On the other hand, the communitarians as an alternative to liberal approach is the revival of the civic republican view of politics that emphasizes the notion of a public good, prior to and independent of individual desires and interests. Mouffe (1992; 1993) argues that this kind of tradition has almost disappeared today because it has been displaced by Liberalism. For Mouffe (1992;1993), civic republican solution is much richer than the liberal one and she emphasizes the value of political participation, but the recovery of a strong participatory idea of citizenship should not be made at the cost of sacrificing individual liberty.

According to Mouffe (1992), it is necessary to formulate the ethical character of modern citizenship in a way that is compatible with moral pluralism and respecting the priority of the right over the good. This kind of citizenship envisages a form of commonality that respects diversity and makes room for different forms of individuality. She implies citizenship not as a legal status but as a form of identification, a type of political identity to be constructed, not empirically given.

Mouffe (1993) gives importance to new social movements, such as women, workers, black, gay, ecological, etc. She aimed to construct a conception of citizenship through a common identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality. Through this conception of citizenship “a sense of we is created by a recognition that the demands of these various movements can form a chain of democratic equivalence” (Mouffe, 1993:83). Therefore, we see that radical democratic citizenship is not totally against to liberalism or republican citizenship on the ground that Mouffe considers citizenship as not just one identity among others, as in liberalism- or the dominant identity that overrides the others, as in civic republicanism. Instead of liberalism or republicanism, she argues on her essay *called Liberal Socialism and Pluralism: Which Citizenship?* (1993) that it is necessary to reinscribe socialist goals in terms of pluralist democracy, which needs the articulation of the institutions of political liberalism.

By the principle of liberty and equality in the context of citizenship, Mouffe (1992) also rejects the distinction between public that refers to an abstract universalist definition and private that is seen as realm of particularity and difference. In addition, she is opposed to distinction between individual and citizen. Radical democratic citizenship, for Mouffe, attempts to get a perfect harmony realizing the fact that a true democracy can only lead to its destruction. Therefore, a project of radical and plural democracy is seen as the impossibility of the complete realization of democracy and the final achievement of political community.

In brief, this subsection evaluated whether the tension occurs between universal status of citizenship and identity. Social movements with regard to ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, disability and others seek to interrupt the construction of dominant cultures and challenge with modern citizenship in two respects. On the one hand, they struggle to widen ‘inclusive’ fabric of the community. On the other hand, they create space for difference and otherness. A new conception of citizenship develops from below. The next section will

continue with human rights and how it overcomes the modern nation-state citizenship.

2.5.2 Human Rights

Although the modern notion of citizenship links rights and political participation membership to a nation-state, human rights became universal and dissociated from bounded community through the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Like cultural rights, human rights challenge with national sovereignty. As Delanty (2000) suggests, “human rights are now overriding the rights of citizenship and reshaping democratic politics” (Delanty, 2000:68). Before evaluating human rights’ present conditions, Delanty (2000) discusses the older form of human rights with regard to the differentiation between human rights and citizenship. In this respect, although human rights are based on an ethical and legal concept of individual, citizenship rights are based on a political and legal understanding of the individual. With Delanty’s words, “human rights are basic ethical rights that all individuals enjoy by virtue of their common humanity, whereas citizenship rights are specific to a particular community” (Delanty, 2000:69). In this regard, human rights introduced the autonomy of the human being which is prior to all social and political structures. The basic principle of human rights is universality. Hence, citizenship rights differ from human rights on the ground that they are particularistic and shaped by nation-states. In addition, the citizen is based on political understanding rather than an ethical conception.

To Delanty (2000), by United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the older term ‘rights of man’ began to be replaced by the term ‘human rights’. He suggests that human rights are transformed following from the abstract notion of human nature and have become contextualized around gender, race and geographical criteria. As a result of transformation, the boundary between human rights and citizenship blurred.

Basok and Ilcan (2006) argue other various features of human rights. “[H]uman rights also reveal commitments to civil, political, and social rights, as expressed in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (Basok&Ilcan et al, 2006:268) They argue that norms of human rights exerted a certain degree of influence upon national citizenship rights. In response, minority groups demand changes in national constitutions and constitutional rights. The reverse case is also valid. Therefore, struggles for expansion of citizenship have engendered the international human rights regime to entertain new domains of rights.

Shafir and Brysk outline three key changes in the historical trajectory of citizenship rights which include: “(1) the transfer of citizenship from one political context of sovereignty to another; (2) the extension to members of new groups; and (3) the expansion of the content of the rights of citizenship” (cited in Basok, et al. 2006:270). In this regard, they assume that “unlike citizenship rights, human rights lack support derived from global solidarity and global institutions to enforce them” (cited in Basok, et al. 2006:270)

To sum up the argument above, the discourse of human rights is interrelated with national sovereignty and international law owing to the legal pluralism.

In the post-national level, universal personhood replaces nationhood, as universal human rights also replace national rights. Soysal (1994) ascribes human rights a universal status, undermining the boundaries of nation-state because human rights discourse provides a hegemonic language for formulating claims to rights above and beyond national belonging.

To Soysal (1994), the only paradox lies between two elements of citizenship: rights and identities. Although rights are defined at the global level referring to universality, legal uniformity and abstractness, identities are ascribed particularity and conceived of as being territorially bounded. According to Soysal, claims to particularistic identities, cultural distinctiveness are legitimated by reference to post-national rights. Soysal calls this process quoting from Roland

Robertson as “the universalization of particularism and the particularism of universalism” (Soysal, 1994: 160).

Yet for Evans and Ayers, the paradox lies in the neo-liberal era. They are critical of the context of global organizations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank who “use the language of human rights to draw citizens into new social relationships of responsibility, accountability, and participation” (quoted in Basok, et al. 2006:271). For them, these institutions transform citizens into consumers of global finance with specific initiatives such as microfinance. Basok and Ilcan conclude that these governing practices undermine the human rights of the poor and other “beneficiaries” of these programmes, and increasingly deny social justice for them.

In general, human rights extended the rights of citizen in a new political space. Today, there is a blurring boundary between human rights and citizenship rights. Thus, human rights intervene in the affairs of the states. Before 1948, human rights referred to civic and political rights such as, the right to life, the right to personal liberty in terms of speech, association and the right to be free from arbitrary violence, today it has become highly contextualized around gender, ethnicity, race and geographical criteria (Delanty, 2000). With regard to Roma, for Sobotka (2006), following the fall of communism in 1989, policy making has been increasingly influenced by human rights political processes. Three levels of influence that exist in Roma policy making transnational, state and local level had to be mobilized in order to achieve effective human rights norms in policy making.

2.6 Turkey’s Citizenship Practices

In this section, the aim is to introduce Turkish formal citizenship and how it is developed and defined through the nation-state. Since Ottoman policy was composed of a new citizenship view and constitution with regard to modernization, westernization and centralization policies in the nineteenth century, the section will begin with citizenship policy of Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) will be introduced with regard to how their nationalism policies (population shifts and assimilation) affected today's society. In this respect, majority-minority relations will be considered. Besides, Turkish citizenship practices since the foundation of republic (1923) will be considered in order to present how national citizenship was constructed.

During the Ottoman era, the concept of citizenship began with the idea of modernity in *Tanzimat* Reform era (1839-1876) (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998:175). In this period, Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu (Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) was announced in 1839. Enforcement of these laws would ensure the protection of life, property and honor of its subjects including both Muslims and non-Muslims. *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) was a complementary legislation to the Gülhane Charter in 1856 so that Muslim and non-Muslim subjects' religious and social rights were preserved under this legislation (Işın and İşyar, 2005:70). Here upon, *Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi* (Law on Ottoman Nationality) was issued in 1869. It was the first time that legislation was issued describing the subjects apart from their religious affiliation (Işın and İşyar, 2005:70; Keyman and İçduygu, 1998:175). Yıldız (2007) indicates that religious affiliation was the main determining principle in Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Christians, Armenians and Jews, then each of the non-Muslim communities were regarded as "millet". Thereby, the legislation tried to create a new identity based on universal equality and it also equalized Muslim and non-Muslim subjects (Işın and İşyar, 2005). As Yıldız (2007) argues, Ottomanism was adopted as the official political identity. In 1876 the first Ottoman Constitution *Kanun-u Esasi* stated the main loyalty as one that is showed towards government and administrative dynasty, instead of religious affiliation. Hence, the transition of territorial citizenship led to the ambiguous borders among millets. To Işın and İşyar (2005), Ottomanism discourse shows parallels with French citizenship discourse which disregards the identities in the public space apart from French citizenship. Ottomanism was regarded on the fact that all *millet* (nation) would participate in the political life

equally. On the other hand, Ottomanism failed in the late 19th and 20th century owing to the nationalism and revolts.

Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Turkism were three different political features of Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Until the Balkan Wars, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), dependent upon Ottomanism politics, aimed to increase the loyalty of ethnic groups to the Empire. After Balkans War, CUP turned towards active Turkism (Yıldız, 2007:73-77; Dündar, 2001:31). In this respect, “in the search of citizenship in Turkey, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) tried to ground Turkish identity on citizenship initially between 1908 and 1919” (Keyman and İçduygu 1998:175).

In this framework, CUP applied some of the ethnic methods such as assimilation and deportation which was part of the general politics of CUP in especially between 1913 and 1918. Dündar (2008) describes this period as an ethnic engineering project of CUP with an aim of “Islamization” and “Turkification” with the help of ethnographic, ethno-statistic and ethnic mapping studies through transposition, demographic exchange, deportation and resettlement. Today Turkey’s ethnic mixture resulted from this kind of population and settlement politics. In this regard, Arab, Albanian, Gypsy, Circassian, Georgian, Kurd and Laz ethnic groups were mixed with each other in order for them not to be as a threat to the nation-state. The aim was to intensify the population as Muslim and Turk. After deportation of non-Muslim communities, Muslim communities would mix with each other in these lands (Dündar, 2001).

Turkish citizenship practices can be traced in specific periods. Yıldız (2007) differentiates Turkish national identity¹⁷ evolving from religious (1919-1923), to secular and republican (1919-1923) and lastly ethno-cultural motifs (1929-1938). According to Yıldız (2007), ethno-secular feature of Kemalizm were

¹⁷ Kadioğlu (2005) compares Turkish nationalism between French conception of citizenship which is assimilationist and state-centered manner, and German conception which refers to organic, differentialist, dissimilationist and Volk-centered character. In this regard, Turkish citizenship practice had similarities with both of conception. As she puts, “[w]hile in most instances Turkish nationalism looked similar to the civic French nationalism, there were certain periods in the founding years of the Republic when the organic, ethnic face that is akin to German nationalism became more pronounced” (Kadioğlu, 2005:111).

used as national integration and Turkification politics. By this nationalism, three ways of policy (Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism) were rejected. After foundation of republic (1923), the definition of Turk became political that Turkish republic citizens who adopted Turkish language, culture and national ideals were regarded as Turk¹⁸. On the other hand, religious Turks, Muslim people whose mother tongue is not Turkish and non-Muslim minorities took place in “other” definition of Turkish nationalism (Yıldız, 2008:18-125)

With regard to “other” definition of Turkish nationalism, Kadioğlu (2007) differentiates three groups. The first set of others refer to non-Muslims in the empire. She finds the tension of the roots of this otherness with the onset of Westernizing reforms within the Ottoman Empire. Second group indicates to Muslims, yet non-Turks ones. Third is past of Turkish national identity itself. In this regard, westernization plays a major ground and Islam is seen as backwardness. With regard to first group, Lausanne Treaty shaped last version of political status of non-Muslims, living in Turkey through stating who will be considered an official minority.

According to the Lausanne Treaty, which was signed in 1923, there are officially three minority groups in Turkey: Armenians, Jews and Greeks. The common element of these groups is that they are non-Muslims. It should be emphasized that Gypsies are not officially a minority group in Turkey. Nevertheless, apart from Lausanne Treaty, there are other minority groups in terms of ethnic, language and religious differentiation, yet they are Muslim groups (Oran, 2008).

In this respect, there are officially non-recognized minorities in Turkey: Arabs, immigrants who came from the Balkans (Bosniak, Pomak, Albanian), immigrants from Caucasia (Circassian, Georgian) who migrated during the nineteenth century and Gypsy groups. Nevertheless Alevi and Kurds do not evaluate themselves as minority group. Oran (2008) argues about why Kurds and

¹⁸ Yeğen (2004) evaluates the undeciability character of Turkish citizenship whether it is a territorial/political category or ethnic content of citizenship. He examines the constitution and finds that inconsistent terminology in relation to the category of Turkishness.

Alevi do not consider themselves as “minority”: First, for Kurds, the concept of minority evokes non-Muslims. Kurds consider themselves as one of the founder members of this republic like Turks. In this consideration, although Kurds participated to Independence War, after the war Turks forgot the Kurds. Kurdish nationalists consider themselves as halk (*nation*). Besides, Alevi community like Kurds does not regard themselves as minority because of the fact that they see themselves as founders of this country (Oran, 2008)

To evaluate the difference between Turks and Kurds, Çagaptay’s statement gives Turkish nationalism’s definition of ethnicity. With his words:

“The use of the term “Turk” in modern Turkey is a puzzling phenomenon. Most people in the country see all Muslims as Turks, regardless of their ethnicity or language. In view of this, not only ethnic Turks, but also other Muslims such as Kurds, Circassians, or Bosnians are regarded as Turks, while non-Muslims, especially Christians (including Armenians and Greeks) are not, even when they speak Turkish. This is not simply matter of semantics: in Turkey, being a Turk has tangible benefits. Since only Turks are full members of the nation and considered to be loyal citizens, this perception is key to joining the mainstream of the country” (Çagaptay, 2006:61).

In this regard, Keyman and İçduygu (1998) consider the notion of Turkish to be a constructed term¹⁹, rather than determined by biological bonds. The immigrants were accepted from Balkans; even though they were not Turks but Muslims. In this regard, although Christian *Gagavuz* community was Turk, they were not accepted, owing to their religion. Moreover, non-Muslims are accepted as Turk in terms of citizenship connection but they are not seen as natural members of Turkish society. On the other hand, in 1923, compulsory migration occurred between Greece and Turkey in both directions. To Dündar (2008), the idea of compulsory migration was first mentioned in Athena Agreement (1913) but with the First World War the negotiations were interrupted. Finally, CUP’s undone project had been finalized during the Republican period. The thought behind the accords was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population structure with regard to Turkification of Anatolia (Kadıoğlu, 2007). The definition of Turk can be grasped in specific periods of Turkish citizenship practices.

¹⁹ Nations are imagined political community in terms of sovereignty and territorial context (Anderson, 2004[1983]).

Accordingly, the development of republican citizenship is divided into three periods (Keyman and İçduygu,1998; İçduygu, Soyarık and Çolak 2006): first from the foundation of republic (1923) to 1950 -single party period- second, the period from 1950 to 1980; and third the 1980 military intervention and its aftermath.

During the first period or early republican period, as İçduygu et al. (2006) argue, “the creation of a new Turk or Turkish citizen who had to be, first of all, ‘civilized’ and ‘patriotic’ was the most significant civilizing mission of the Kemalist reformist elite” (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık, 2006:194). In this respect, the national citizenship was based on the secular notion of Turkishness “formulated on the basis of homogenous, generalized and unique secular national culture” (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık, 2006:196). Turkish elites followed the politics based on ‘Westernization by Turkification’ and aimed to approach West by secularism with socio-cultural and politic reformation (Yıldız, 2007:115).

In similar lines, Keyman and İçduygu (1998) display two features of citizenship in the foundation of republic: first they refer citizenship as organic and homogeneous society conception. According to them, citizenship is defined as a political identity and it is internalized to the “politic-organic society” discourse which is defining feature of Kemalist modernization (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998:172). In addition to this definition, for them, there is epistemological priority to the “loyalty to the state and political citizenship”.

Second, the conception of citizenship developed without the notion of ‘individual’ and it is based on the duty principle towards state (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998:172). In this regard, they find the position of citizenship as “modern” but representing “militant citizen” who adopts a “will to civilization” in this sense serving to “common good”. Likewise, As Kadioğlu suggests, “it is possible to argue that in the founding years of the Turkish Republic, Turkish citizenship was defined from above by state elite within the civic-republican tradition, by emphasizing duties over rights and by disregarding the privacy of the individual” (Kadioğlu, 2005:117). In this civic-republican tradition, Turkish citizens embraced the fundamental principles of Turkish revolution: nationalism,

secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism and revolutionism. In civic republican tradition, civil, legal, political and social rights were given from above. Hence, these rights were not acquired as a result of struggles from below. Moreover, according to Kadioğlu's (2005) argument, Füsün Üstel, who makes research on the books used in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools in Turkey in the republican era refers to a 'militant' citizen who evolved until the end of the 1940s and was "burdened with duties" (Kadioğlu, 2005:114)²⁰.

Hence, according to Keyman and İçduygu (1998), citizenship is not based on liberal citizenship which makes distinction between public and private place²¹. In this framework, sub-identities were disregarded in the face of Turkish identity. In addition, locality, ethnic and other identities which do not overlap with constructed national identity were pushed out from the public sphere because of the fact that, as Keyman and İçduygu (1998) suggest, the notion of citizenship is defined with regard to Kemalist secular Turkish identity, which refers homogenous political and cultural national identity (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998:178). Similarly, Kadioğlu (2005) considers that liberal individualistic dimension did not develop in Turkey owing to the concept of modern citizenship. As it was argued in first section of the chapter, modern citizenship rests on the

²⁰ Before nation-state process, CUP aimed to recreate Turkish nation identity with a "citizen soldier" concept. In order to militarize the society, CUP called upon education and civil associations (Dündar, 2008).

²¹ In addition, for Turner (1990), there could be many diverse and different formulations of the citizenship principle in different social and cultural traditions (Turner, 1990; 1993). He develops four different forms of citizenship whether citizenship is developed from below or from above (related to whether citizenship is active or passive) and to what extent citizenship is developed in a private or public place (Turner, 1990). Passive or active nature of citizenship depends on whether citizenship developed from above (via the state) or from below (local participatory institutions). Active and passive forms of citizenship is related whether the citizen is conceptualised as merely a subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent. So far as to the relationship between the public and private arenas within civil society, citizenship is passive and private when political space is limited. Turner gives example France as a revolutionary conception of active citizenship which attacks to the private space of the family, religion and privacy and also citizenship is handed down from below. In this regard, citizenship develops within a revolutionary struggle for entitlements. On the other hand, private sphere combined with a view of state as the only source of public authority that was seen in German case. Within this typology, Mouffe is critical about universalistic notions of citizenship in a way that "they drive particularity and difference" into the private domain" (Mouffe, 1993:81; cited in Linklater, 1998: 187).

nation-state in terms of universal citizenship. As Baban (2005) expresses, “one of the main promises of universal citizenship of civic republicanism is equal representation before the law, which assumes that despite differences within the private realm, individuals are located in the public sphere as equals in terms of fulfilling their potentials and participating in their own affairs” (Baban, 2005:52). He also indicates that universal citizenship in Turkey shows different aspect from Western experience. Although Western citizenship practices are based on the exclusionary practices on marginalized groups, Turkish citizenship was inclusionary from the beginning. It means that “Turkish modernization included various ethnic and religious groups under the umbrella of universal citizenship” (Baban, 2005:56). Therefore, for Baban (2005:55) Turkish republican experience in Turkey referring to universal citizenship is the basis for social integration formulated by a Rousseauian General Will.

Having discussed Turkey’s citizenship conceptualization above, first period (early republican) of citizenship practices will be evaluated now. According to Cagaptay’s (2006) argument, population shifts through the dissolution of Ottoman Empire led Turkey to become largely Turkish in 1920s, but multi-ethnic Muslim majority among of which Kurds was the largest non-Turkish nationality. In this regard, Yeğen (2007) puts the differences between Turkish citizenship practices with regard to Kurds as:

“the disparity between non-Turkish citizens of the Republic, i.e. between non-Muslims and Kurds in exercising citizenship rights was because of the following: while non-Muslims of the country were treated as those who may/would not be assimilated into Turkishness, Kurds were thought of within the confines of the project of assimilation. In other words, the disparity at stake was profoundly connected with the constitution of the idea of Turkishness” (Yeğen, 2007:138).

Oran (2008) argues that Kurdish population is estimated between 12 million and 15 million in Turkey. 75 % of Kurdish population is Sunni and 25 % is Alevi. Similar to Cagaptay’s argument, for Oran (2008), unlike other Muslim groups, Kurds preserved their identity which conflicts with Turkish supra-identity. In addition, Kurdish rebels throughout the history and especially during Republic era were suppressed severely which led to the sharpening of Kurdish identity consciousness. Oran (2008) argues that the reasons of the friction between

Kurdish and Turkish identity is that the Kurdish population is much higher than the other Muslim groups and they especially live in East and South East of Turkey. Kurds are economically and geographically isolated and this leads to the preserving pre-capitalist mode of production and tradition. By this way, they are differentiated from western part of the country.

On the other hand, Kurdish question is perceived by the state as ideological. In this regard, state perceived Kurdish question as mutineer, banditry, tribe resistance, alien provocation or regional backwardness instead of ethno-political question (Yeğen, 2003). Moreover, as Yeğen (2003) suggests, “according to the state discourse, there was no Kurd in Turkey from at the end of 1920s to first years of 1990s” (Yeğen, 2003:130). On the other hand, one perception did not change in terms of Turkish nationalism: “Kurds could become Turkish” (Yeğen, 2007:119). In addition, for him, the denying of Kurds’ political and juristic rights process traced back to the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire. The process was related to westernization, centralization and nationalism in this century.

At the last periods of Ottoman Empire, being Kurd was equal to being Muslim whereas they situated as “other” of Turkish nationalism since 1925s. The aim of Turkish nationalism was to assimilate non-Turks (Şahin, 2005). Early republican period of Republic geared secularization and centralization at the state administration at the expense of ethnic, cultural and religious differences in the periphery. In this respect, Caliphate was abolished in 1924 to bring to an end to the power of Islam among different ethnic groups. This affected the leaders of Kurdish people to be pushed to the periphery of the politics because they derived their legitimacy from the Caliphate. Afterwards, Kurdish rebellions occurred as an opposition to the unjust discourse of the central state (Kadioğlu, 2007:288). The abolition of Caliphate and selection of Turkish identity as inclusive identity on various ethnic identities can be perceived as determining point of assimilation towards Kurdish people and assuming them as other (Şahin, 2005:103).

After the abolition of Caliphate, Turkish national identity adopted assimilatory practices towards the non-Turkish Muslims within the Turkish

Republic. There were restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language, names, traditional costumes, etc. The most striking assimilatory practice was held by national campaign of “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!*) in 1928. Moreover, languages other than Turkish were forbidden in public sphere (Kadioğlu, 2007:289). Hence, language became an element of nationalism and practice of assimilation (Çağaptay, 2009:250).

In the 1930s, Turkish politics can be observed as statist, authoritarian and nationalist. Not only religion and language but also ethnicity and race designated Turk in terms of Turk History Thesis. Race referred to ethnicity in terms of language practices in late period of Kemalizm, which had three perceptions of Turk. The first definition of Turk was determined with 1934 Constitution, which had a territorial meaning. The second definition was based on religion in that Islam was seen as one of the ways of identifying as Turk. This definition excluded Non-Muslims, which challenges with territorial definition. The third definition was the least inclusive one that being Turk related to ethnic and religious identity. Even all Turks were Muslim; some of them were not ethnically as Turks, especially Kurds (Çağaptay, 2009:249-255).

In response, Turkish nationalism dealt with the country’s heterogeneity promoting territorial definition of Turkish nation. In this respect, compulsory population shift practice was observed with the Settlement Law Numbered 2510 which was enacted in 1934²². This law aimed to recompose Anatolia’s demographic structure by ethnic arrangements by dual operation. In response, non-Turks would be settled in Turkish areas and Turks would be settled in non-Turkish areas (Yeğen, 2006). The ultimate aim of the law was Turkification (assimilation) of non-Turks (Yeğen, 2007). In other words, this policy related to invention of a nation based on Turkishness.

²² The Settlement Law of 1934 will also be argued on Chapter III with regard to forced migration and on Chapter V for the nomadic Gypsies. According to this law, “the one who are not loyal to Turkish culture, spies, anarchists, and nomadic Gypsies could not be accepted as a refugee in Turkey “(Article 4 of the Settlement Law and the Law:2510). The amendment of the law passed by Assembly in 2006 in the following way: “Foreigners who are not from Turkish descendant and not loyal to Turkish culture, the ones who are loyal to Turkish culture but deported and the persons who are eligible to live in Turkey owing to the security reasons cannot be accepted as refugees” (<http://www.resmi-gazete.org/sayi/9816/5543-iskan-kanunu.html> (28.12.2009 last access)).

In 1940s, Turkification of non-Muslims²³ was observed as nationalization of economy whereas Turkification of Kurds appeared as a cultural assimilation. The reason of Turkification process of Kurds was not only related to their Kurdish language but also they had loyalty to the past equated with sultanic rule and caliphate, had self-administration, tribe organization, political and economic resistance producing the tradition (Şahin, 2005:104).

So far as to, Turkish citizenship can be summarized by following Yeğen (2004) who suggests that studies on Turkish citizenship show a consensus in three key dualities: “Turkish citizenship reflects a passive rather than active citizenship a republican citizenship over liberal one, and citizenship colonizing the private sphere instead of one limited to the public” (Yeğen, 2004: 54). In addition, as Soyarık (2009) indicates, Turkish citizenship during early republican period was more close to French citizenship. Since the attitudes towards minorities, the importance given to adoption of Turkish culture, Turkish citizenship had similarities with German citizenship since 1930s.

Second period of citizenship appears with the Democrat Party’s politics in which Islam, traditional and local accrued to the notion of citizenship in 1950s. By the 1961 Constitution (after military coup in 1960), citizen was regarded as active in terms of political and social. Yet these active and participative features of citizen were limited to “voting, tax-paying and serving in the army” view (Keyman and İçduygu: 1998). The citizen of this period was more active when it was compared with the citizen who donated with duties in early republican period” (Soyarık, 2009: 142). Soyarık (2009) also asserts that welfare state features can be seen in the 1961 Constitution. In this regard, social rights such as; the right to rest, the right to fair wage, the right to establish trade union, the right

²³ In 1942, non-Muslims in Turkey were obliged to pay “Wealth Tax” at once. The aim of this tax was to abandon non-Muslims who were perceived as non-national from the economic life. Wealth tax was continuity of politics on nationalization of economic life since the second half of 19th century. The location of non-Muslims in citizenship practice is vague as they are not seen as Turk with regard to territorial definition of Turkish citizenship. Discriminative practices towards non-Muslims were also seen in the events of 6-7 September in 1955. There was a conflict between Greece and Turkey about Cyprus. Having outspreading the news about bombing of Atatürk’s home in Salonika, non-Muslims’ homes, work places, schools, graveyards, churches were vandalized, the stores were plundered (Yumul, 2005:88-91).

to labor agreement and strike, the right to social security and benefit from health access extended. These rights reflected evolution of rights (from civil to social rights) in Marshallian perspective. However, civil, political and social rights were given from “above”. This constitution also gave importance to the individual and it signifies liberal citizenship. Hence republican citizenship was quitted. However, Soyarik (2009) indicates that most of the rights and freedoms were abandoned in the 1982 constitution.

In the third period of citizenship, after the 1980 coup, secular Islam added to Kemalist citizenship discourse. Individual and societal differences were left aside to form homogenous public as did in the first years of foundation of republic years (Keyman and İçduygu, 1998; Soyarik 2009). İçduygu et al. (2006) indicate two important debates for Turkish citizenship since early 1980s: emigration of Turkish citizens which led to dual citizenship entered in Turkey with legal change in 1981. And the other is revival of various ethnic and religious identities with regard to constitutional citizenship. Kurds, Islamist and Alevi identities struggled for recognition. Constitutional citizenship entered Turkey’s political agenda by Süleyman Demirel who became president in 1994. As İçduygu et al. put, “the main idea behind the concept of constitutional citizenship is fabrication and promotion of a new socio-political identity for everyone in the country, and that identity’s relation to citizenship” (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarik: 2006:200). In this regard, instead of Turk, Turkey entered as a creation of a new ‘super identity’ which includes fragmentations into various identity groups. The last development for Turkish citizenship is that “Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU) at the Helsinki Summit” (Kadıoğlu, 2007:283). For Kadıoğlu, since this summit democratizing process of citizenship gained momentum.

In sum, the attempt in this section was to introduce Turkish citizenship based on the modern citizenship related to the nation-state. Modernization, westernization and centralization policies loomed large in citizenship practices. From the early republican period to present, Turkish citizenship developed from territorial to ethnic definition of citizenship. The ultimate aim was to achieve an

organic and homogenous society. In these definitions, modern citizenship's inclusive/exclusive aspects were argued on settlement and population movements. Hereby, how Turkish nationalism dealt with the country's heterogeneity promoting territorial definition of Turkish nation was discussed through implemented Turkification process. The state kept distance to non-Muslims and ethnically different Muslims, especially Kurds even though Turk was territorially defined. During the nation-building process the elites defined rights and duties from above. Besides, Turkish citizenship reflects a republican citizenship prioritized duties over rights. 'Patriotic' and 'civilized' citizen is expected with regard to republican citizenship. In this regard, citizen is more passive and identities and belongings limited to the private sphere. During the second period citizenship, social rights were extended by 1961 Constitution, but they were again given from above. In the third period of citizenship, globalization and EU candidacy process have opened new political spheres for Turkish citizenship.

In short, the main aim in this chapter was to follow the transformation of citizenship, through state citizenship to democratic citizenship which overlaps new rights and claims. To evaluate Roma and Dom community's citizenship rights in the national level, modern citizenship is considered on the ground of how modern citizenship has created inequality within nation-state considering the war between capitalism and citizenship. In this regard, equality principle of citizenship has been dissolved with welfare state's withdrawal of civil political and social citizenship's rights by 1980s. In other words, in this process of commodification of citizenship; equality and rights are threatened by market driven economy. The reflection of this process was evaluated with regard to the new forms of poverty and social exclusion which affected mostly women, poor or ethnic minorities who started unable to benefit from social rights. This has created new statelessness in a view that these groups could not benefit from citizenship rights equally. As long as they lose their citizenship rights, they converge to the sphere of nationalism. This evaluation is useful to understand to what extent Gypsy population has been affected from this transformation. Besides, three philosophical approaches in modern citizenship -liberal citizenship, civic republican citizenship and

communitarian citizenship- are introduced to compare Roma and Dom community's proximity and distance to the political community.

Despite the unitary model of citizenship, the search of equality is rebuilt around the diversity and group identities with democratic citizenship. In this regard, transnational Romani movement has been increased especially after 1989. Local, national and transnational spaces are interrelated in order to search for equality. Today, the nation-state is not the main guarantor in distributing the rights. New conception of rights appeared, namely cultural rights, group rights and human rights. These rights reflect the extension of citizenship and undermine national citizenship. Delanty (2000) finds identity politics as a powerful context and he emphasizes multiple identities which is one of the main changes in identity formation in today's politics. He also suggests that "[o]ne of the great challenges facing democratic citizenship is to accommodate diversity...Citizenship is no longer exclusively about the pursuit of equality; it is also about the finding ways to preserve difference" (Delanty, 2000:131).

Up to now, we face two dimensional side of democratic citizenship as discussed above: equality and diversity. Romani transnational movement also challenge with modern citizenship in two respects. On the one hand, they struggle to widen 'inclusive' fabric of the community to demand equality. On the other hand, they create space for difference and otherness, which overlaps Stevenson (2001)'s distinction. At this point identity remedy discussion of questions relating to identity and difference which challenges the universal status of citizenship has been explored. In this framework, group rights, differentiated citizenship, minorities rights and radical democratic citizenship has been discussed.

Furthermore, Turkish formal citizenship practices have been examined considering the nation-state building process and modernity formation. Yet, elements of modern citizenship process of Turkey have been traced back to the Ottoman Empire's citizenship policy. To understand Gypsy population's citizenship profile, Turkish citizenship ethnicity matrix is introduced.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL AND CURRENT CITY PROFILES OF EDİRNE AND DİYARBAKIR

“The city as a difference machine relentlessly provokes, differentiates, positions, mobilizes, immobilizes, oppresses, liberates. Being political arises qua the city and there is no political being outside the machine”

Engin F. Isin (2002:50) – Being Political

3.1 Introduction

This chapter of the study aims to introduce Edirne and Diyarbakır’s historical, social, political and economic profiles. It is for sure that in comparing Roma and Dom²⁴ communities with regard to benefiting from citizenship rights, the research cities’ historical and social structures could not be undervalued. In this regard, Roma and Dom Gypsy communities live with different ethnic

²⁴ As Marsh indicates that “Gypsies of Turkey can be identified in three major groups: Romanlar, Domlar and Lomlar (Rom, Dom and Dom)...Romanlar is a group to whom European Roma are directly related sharing much in the common culture, language, and economic specialism. The Domlar are related to Dom Gypsies in the Middle East and may have arrived in the Turkish lands sometime in the early 11th century AD, in the southeast (Diyarbakır, Antakya, Mardin)...The current Lom population is largely descended from those that were forced to move Turkey in the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Russians in their conquest of the Caucasus in the 1870s. They now reside in the North east and the Blacksea region...During the research of ERRC/hcA/EDROM research (2006-2007) suggested a figure of 4.5-5 million population” (Marsh, 2008: 24-25).

majorities. Non-Roma population in Edirne is mainly Turkish citizens but non-Dom population in Diyarbakır is mainly Kurdish²⁵. Hence, ethnical differentiation of population based on the cities entails us to explore the historical background of the cities, both of which were affected by immigration and resettlement policies. These policies also can be attributed to de nationality related dilemmas of contemporary Turkey.

The first section thereby tries to introduce Edirne which is located as a border city in the western side of the Turkey. Edirne is also known with its considerable Gypsy population and their history could be traced back to the Ottoman policies towards Gypsies in Rumelia province. Hence, what follows is an attempt to introduce Gypsy population in a retrospective view regarding immigration and resettlement policies in the history. In this sense, in “Çiftlik System” Gypsy people were agricultural laborers in the late 18th century (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001). During the modern nation-state, modernization process of agriculture with First Migrant Wave: 1950-1960 period led to the migration from rural to urban areas in Turkey. In this regard, it is crucial to examine how the transformation of agricultural structure affected Roma population living in Edirne villages in early 1950s. Besides, a great many of Roma population was agricultural laborers who then migrated from villages to Edirne city center due to the commencement of widespread use of tractors in agriculture. In those years, apart from Roma agricultural laborers, most of the interviewees mentioned that their fathers worked as blacksmiths, repairing the farmer’s farm implements like plow before the mechanization in agriculture. Hence, agricultural transformation appears as an important breaking point in history for Roma population based on the ground that their craftsman ability diminished with the widespread expansion in technology.

By the end of the 1960s, another migration process can be observed specifically from Turkey to Germany. The first immigrants who went to Germany were skilled laborers. Nevertheless, following immigrants were unskilled ones

²⁵ To evaluate the differences between Turk and Kurd and evolution of citizenship practices of Turkey, see Chapter II.

who had just migrated from village to the cities (Zürcher, 2000:394). Moreover, apartheid or illegal immigrants appeared henceforth. They had no social security and they were working at unskilled jobs (Zürcher, 2000:395). During my case study, I also encountered a great many Roma immigrants who went to Germany.

The second section aims at evaluating Kurdish society's economic, social and cultural features of whom constitute mainstream position in Diyarbakır (see Table 3.1 for estimated statistics for Roma and Dom community).

As for Diyarbakır, the process of forced migration with different stages since 1980s has highly affected city population. Especially during 1992 and 1993, internal displacement took place mostly, affecting social rights of both Kurdish and Dom people. In other words, this has led to obstacles in exercising citizenship rights, participating fully in the labour market, accessing health services and educational opportunities. In other words, urban poverty has appeared in the city centre after the forced migration. Yet, the effects of it on Kurdish and Dom people appear differently because of the ethnic boundaries between Dom community and Kurds.

On the other hand, most of the members of Dom community who were interviewed in Diyarbakır were nomadic in the sense that they were travelling to Kurdish villages except for three months in the winter. They are affected by the internal displacement of Kurdish villages because they were economically dependent on Kurdish villagers. Dom men generally used to be musicians playing *davul* and *zurna*. In response, the villagers were giving them food supply. Having settled down in the city, Dom community started to live with Kurdish internally displaced persons at the periphery of the city. Hence, resettlement led to appearance of new economic strategies and new social interaction between Dom minority and Kurdish majority. For these reasons, the section will argue the effects of forced migration on inhabitants in relation to civil, social and political citizenship rights. Without examining resettlement and forced migration in East and South East of Turkey, Diyarbakır's profile would not be understood properly.

The third section of this chapter provides Edirne and Diyarbakır's demographic, educational and economic profiles with regard to indicators in a comparative sense. In addition to city profiles, I also added some of my research findings about Roma and Dom community when interpreting the indicators with related tables.

3.2 Gypsy Population's Historical Background in Edirne

Social and economic aspects of Gypsy population in Edirne can be traced back to the Ottoman policies towards Gypsies in Rumelia province. After the extension of Ottoman Empire's borders to the West, Gypsy population living in Rumelia province and İstanbul were regarded as being adhered on the *sancak* (*Çingene Sancağı or Liva-i Kıbtıyan*) and one person called *Mir-i Kıbtıyan* was appointed to be in charge of collecting taxes in 1520. (Marushiakova &Popov, 2001:35; Altınöz: 1995:137). Besides, *Mir-i Kıbtıyan* was non-Gypsy man who had been selected among *sipahi* and soldiers (Altınöz, 1995).

The head of the *sancak* was based in the town of Kırkkilise (Kırklareli in modern Turkey) in Rumelia province comprised of the areas of Hayrabolu, Malkara, Döğenci-Eli, İncügez, Gümülcine, Dimetoka, Pınarhisar,Pravadi, Keşan, İpsala and other areas in Thrace. The *sancak* was not a territorial area but "a group of the Gypsy population comprising auxiliaries in the service of the army" (Marushiakova &Popov, 2001:34-35). Marushiakova &Popov (2001) also argue that Gypsies had also been recruited in the army until the end of the 18th century. Moreover, a large number of the craftsmen included in the Gypsy *sancak* were indeed blacksmiths, but their number was limited and their work served only the army. Gypsy blacksmiths and ironworkers were exempted from tax registers (Marushiakova &Popov, 2001:43-44).

Gündüz Hoşgör (2007) indicates that making soap was traditional craftsman for Gypsies in Edirne during Ottoman Empire period. She also performed oral history about this craftsman and learnt how the name of the *Kemikçiler -Menziliahir-* neighborhood had been inherited from this craftsman. In

this sense, Gypsy people used to collect bones of animals to prepare soap for the Palace in Edirne. These soaps were used by concubines. In addition, these soaps were designed as fruits. In modern times, Edirne is still famous with these fruit soaps. Nevertheless, they are not being produced by Gypsy people anymore.

We see the law concerning Gypsies in the province of Rumelia in 1530 (*Kanunname-i Kıptiyan-i Vilayet-i Rumeli*) showing certain rights of self-government and relative legal independence guaranteed to the Gypsies. On the other hand, according to the law,

“The Muslim Gypsies from Stambul, Edirne and elsewhere in Rumelia pay 22 akche for each household and each unmarried person. The infidel (Christian) Gypsies pay 25 akche, and, as for widows, they pay one akche tax(1)...If Muslim Gypsies begin to nomadise with non-Muslim Gypsies, live with them and mix with them, they should be admonished; after being punished, the infidel Gypsies pay their taxes as usual(7)” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:32).

In the Ottoman Empire, people were classified into two different groups: Muslim and non-Muslim. The local government did not request tax from Muslim people. However, Gypsy people were not considered to be within these two groups and they were registered as *Kıpti* which was a religious affiliation.

In 1831, the first population census was conducted with regard to modernization and reorganization of the Empire (Dündar, 2008). In addition, the main dimension of census population was religion. Only men were counted. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to mention that Gypsies and Jews are registered separately and the religion of Gypsies was mentioned as *Kıpti*²⁶ no matter whether they were Muslim or non-Muslim (Karpat, 2003:58; Dündar, 2008:88).

The state collected taxes from Muslim and non-Muslim Gypsy groups. Moreover, the law above clearly shows that there was a different tax policy directed to Muslim and non-Muslim Gypsies, where the latter were obliged to pay more. In addition, the decree (7) that involves the penalties for Muslim Gypsies who wandered alongside non-Muslim Gypsies indicates a problem since by travelling they did not pay their taxes regularly (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:35). Marushiakova & Popov also argue that the official administration about nomadic Gypsies was related to their temporary settlement, spending the winter in

²⁶ The word of *Kıpti* was abandoned from religion part of identity cards in 1950s (Hoşgör, 2007).

populated areas, which was a general pattern in Balkans. Yet this pattern was not unique to Gypsies in Balkans. Dom people in modern Turkey also followed the same pattern before they settled. They are/were travelling in the warm weather and spending the winter in Diyarbakır.

In 1638, *çeribaşı* was appointed to be in charge for the sub-contracting of the collection of the poll-tax from the Gypsies and other nomadic communities for each fifty heads of Gypsy households (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:39). For Marushiakova & Popov, *çeribaşı* was indicating a military title pointing out a leader of an auxiliary unit, which later comprised only among Gypsies. Hence, we shall assert that the *çeribaşı* position was different from *Mir-i Kıbtıyan*. The first one was the local authority; the latter was responsible from the whole *sancak*. The period between 1604 and 1605, various taxes were collected as the poll- tax, land tax, fines and penalties from settled and nomadic Gypsies (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:40). Accordingly, Marushiakova & Popov state that “the decree paid special attention to the problems of nomadic Gypsies. If they moved away and failed to pay their taxes, the local judicial authorities must find them and make them pay their taxes as well as fine them 300 aspri” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:40).

Moreover, Kazancıgil (1992)’s research about *Edirne Neighborhoods History (1529-1990)* shows that Gypsy populated neighborhoods at present are not newly formed neighborhoods. Since the 16th century, we might see *Kıpti* (Gypsy) population’s registrations on these neighborhoods. During the tax register of 1522-1523, majority of the Gypsies along with nomadic pattern had a permanent residence. Semi-nomadism was widespread with a fixed winter (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001: 38).

Edirne had a cosmopolite character since Turk, Bulgarian, Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Gypsy population used to live there (Dündar, 2008:184; Kazancıgil, 1992:113). Gypsy population used to live together with especially Greek, Armenian and Muslim population in the 16th century. For example, *Yıldırım* neighborhood was composed of Muslim and Gypsy as it is today. *Çavuşbey- Süpürgeciler* district was composed first of and foremost Muslim and

Armenian, then Gypsy and Armenian inhabitants. *Menziliahir* (*Kıyık*) neighborhood was composed of Muslim and Greek, and then it involved Muslim, Greek and Gypsy population in the 1920s (Kazancıgil, 1992:34-70). According to Ottoman laws, the inhabitants of the *mahalla* were responsible from each other. The inhabitants could select their neighbors or they could ask for their neighbors to be sent away (Kazancıgil, 1992:112). Hence, we shall not assert that social exclusion was common in Gypsy neighborhoods in these centuries.

However, in the 19th century we see *Kıpti* populated quarters or *mahallas*. The only information on these quarters was shown as Islam and *Kıpti* (Kazancıgil, 1992) but we are not able to estimate whether Gypsy people had lived together with Muslim population. But we see that Gypsy population did not live together with non-Muslim population in the 19th century. We may assert from settlement policy of Ottoman Empire that these neighborhoods had transformed into Gypsy populated neighborhoods.

In addition to city centre of Edirne, we observe Gypsy population in Edirne's towns such as Eğridere, Vize, Dedeğaç, Çorlu and Enez. Kazancıgil' and Gökçe's research (2005) shows that population schedules prepared in the 19th century represent Muslim, non-Muslim and Gypsy population. Therefore, although in some schedules Gypsy population are placed separately, some other schedules present population Muslim, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian and Gypsy. Moreover, one village of Enez was called as *Çeribaşı*. Hence, this might indicate the existence of Gypsy villages in the 19th century. Moreover, a Western traveler observed one Gypsy village near Edirne and Voyniko in the Pind Mountain and their inhabitants were agricultural laborers. According to arguments of Marushiakova & Popov,

“a further development in the settlement of the Gypsies and the adopting of farming as their regular occupation was the springing up of the farm villages (*çiftlik köy*), dormitory villages in the neighborhood of newly established farms, from where the Gypsies were recruited as hired workers throughout the year or seasonally... (in Tatar Pazarcık district) The Gypsies in a number of villages were farm-workers and cattle-breeders” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:64).

Çiftlik formation was in common in the late 18th and 19th century. In the classical Ottoman system, independent peasants were paying a customary tax to

the state and thereby agricultural surplus was collected by state. In this regard, for İnalçık, “the decline period the Ottoman economy and social structure were transformed from being on Asiatic mode of production to a complete dependence on European capitalism” (İnalçık, 2001:23). Hence, it is regarded that Ottoman Empire was incorporated in the world-system by the Çiftlik system with the growing demand of European markets for the agricultural products of the Ottoman Empire. İnalçık also states that the ayans emerged as a new type of entrepreneur. Accordingly, “[ayans] were economically motivated to maximize their revenues under both the impact of an expanding external market, and under the pressure of pecuniary needs in order to sustain their position as tax farmers and heads of local mercenary forces” (İnalçık, 2001:23).

Kasaba points out the role of migrants and nomads in Western Anatolia in çiftlik. Although he does not imply Gypsies, he argues that “nomads occupied a crucially important position not only as suppliers of livestock and purveyors of the main means of transportation in the area, but also as seasonal migrants and gatherers of Anotolian exports that grew in the wild such as madder and valonia” (Kasaba, 2001: 120). Marsh claims that “as the *defters* clearly show, the majority of Christian Gypsies in the Balkans or *Rumelia* were sedentary, whilst nomadism in Anatolia was, and remains a consistent mode of existence for Gypsies and others” (Marsh, 2006:172).

In the early 20th century, according to Dündar’s (2008) argument, Edirne was a central city for the nationalist *Committee of Union and Progress’s* Bulgaria policy. Due to its ethnic character, Greek, Bulgarian and Ottoman claimed rights over the city (Dündar, 2008:184). At this point Dündar notes that the Balkan Wars which started by 1912 was a population war rather than a front war because target of Bulgarians was Turks and Muslims. Edirne was taken back by Ottoman Empire in 1913. During the war, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria oriented to the villages, and they were devastated²⁷. Hence, the only settlement areas for Muslim

²⁷ During Edirne case study, one elder Gypsy woman who is 98 years old remembered the days of Balkan War. Gypsies were the only survivals in their village because of their occupation, blacksmith. She said that Bulgarian army let them release because they could benefit from blacksmith occupation during the war.

immigrants were being left as Greek villages. At the end of 1913, Bulgarians who settled in Thrace Area and Anatolia were subjugated to the forced migration (Dündar, 2008:189). The critical point was that immigrants should have been loyal to the state. As Dündar displays, “the aim was to increase the Turkish population in Thrace. Hence, neither Gypsy, nor Albanian were welcomed. The other feature of the people who was going to be sent to Anatolia was to be hard-working” (Dündar, 2008:191). Moreover, during 1877-1878 and after the Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913, 1.5 million Balkan migrants and 640.000 Balkan emigrants migrated to the Ottoman Empire (Dündar, 2008:48). Marushiakova & Popov assert that “after the end of the First World War some of Gypsies in east Thrace (not only Christians but Muslims as well) moved to neighboring Bulgaria” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:89).

The other important population movement was the compulsory migration between Greece and Turkey took place in 1923. According to Article One of the Lausanne convention,

“There shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece without the authorization of the Turkish government or of the Greek government respectively” (Clark, 2007:11).

The mass deportations of the 1923 convention occurred as an exchange between Christians and Muslims rather than an exchange between Greeks and Turks (Clark, 2007). With regard to Gypsies, they were also affected from this population movement migrating in both directions (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001; Kolukırık, 2006). Arı claims that the immigrants were made to settle mostly in Edirne, Balıkesir, İstanbul, Bursa, Kırklareli, Samsun, Kocaeli, İzmir, Niğde and Manisa (Arı, 2003:113). In 1923, 75% of population was living in the villages (Zürcher, 2000:240). To Yeğen this population exchange shows the ambivalent openness and closeness of Turkishness. As he asserts, “Turkishness was open to non-Turks, but not to all of them. It was open to Muslims of non-Turkish origin settled in Anatolia or on the territory once ruled by Ottoman State” (Yeğen, 2007:138).

To sum up, this section attempted to explain Edirne's historical importance since 16th century for Roma community living in Edirne. On the one hand, they had certain rights of self-government and relative legal independence during the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Roma population was attributed religious affiliation as *Kipti* which is neither Muslim, nor non-Muslim. The main policy towards Roma during Ottoman Empire was settlement policy. Roma population was also affected by population movements with regard to nationalism policy of nationalist *Committee of Union and Progress*. Apart from compulsory population exchange, the next section will try to introduce the voluntary migration movement towards cities which started with agricultural transformation in the early 1950s.

3.2.1 The Modernization of Agriculture and First Migrant Wave: 1950-1960

The transformation of agricultural structure also affected Roma population living in Edirne villages in early 1950s. Besides, among Roma population who were agricultural laborers migrated to Edirne because of the commencement of intense use of tractors in agriculture. Moreover, most of the interviewees' fathers were blacksmiths, repairing the farmer's farm implements like plow before the mechanization in agriculture. Some Roma people in Edirne used to be nomadic in those years, travelling through villages. They had economic relationship with the villagers. This section briefly introduces the agricultural transformation within Marshall Plan which took place during the 1950s.

Democrat Party became the governing party in 1950. Keyder (1987) indicates two pillars of this new dimension of populist contestation, which were economic and religious freedom and remarks that "in 1950, out of a population of 20 million, 80 percent lived in the countryside- the great majority being small producers" (Keyder, 1987:118). He also claims that vast majority of the population were petty producers who were ready to embrace market freedom. In this regard, US government had a vital role in economic reconstruction. They suggested a new economic model, which assumed free market. Zürcher suggested that US government brought forward Marshall Plan in case of communism's

enlargement. Hence, Turkey and Greece was supported financially (Zürcher, 2000:304).

Keyder notes that “this new agenda implied investment in agriculture and agriculture-based industry rather than inefficient factories” (Keyder, 1987:119). By US aid, the most striking investment was the purchase of tractors. Cheap credit and import of tractors led to the agricultural mechanization (Zürcher, 2000:531). For Ertürk, this transformation was the result of green revolution experience which symbolizes the Third World development strategies of the 1960s. As she claims, “it was commonly assumed that introduction of new technology into the ‘stagnant’ agricultural sector of these countries would stimulate increases in productivity and hence accumulation of wealth” (Ertürk, 1994:8). For Zürcher (2000) large landowners were the ones that profited most from this transformation.

In this regard, although the impact of mechanization in the 1950s led to the growth in the number of family farms and expansion in the cultivated area; agricultural mechanization, thereby tractors had driven some of the former sharecroppers out of the countryside (Ertürk, 1994:11; Keyder, 1987:130). In this regard, urban migrants of the first wave (1950-1960) were mostly former seasonal agricultural workers who had found temporary work in the cities (Keyder, 1987:135; Zürcher, 2000:329; Ertürk, 1994:13).

For Zürcher, only some migrants who came to city in the 1950s could have applied for skilled labor. Thereby, inconsiderable migrants could find jobs at the factories, but the other migrants have become peddlers or have found temporary jobs.

By the end of the 1960s, migration process started from Turkey to Germany. The first migrants who went to Germany were skilled laborers. Nevertheless, the following migrants were unskilled ones who had just migrated from village to the cities (Zürcher, 2000:394). According to Zürcher’s argument, a lot of migrants had brought their families to Germany. Moreover, apartheid or illegal immigrants appeared. They had no social security and they were working

in unskilled jobs (Zürcher, 2000:395). During my case study, I also encountered many Roma who migrated to Germany and returned to Edirne.

As a final point, mechanization of agriculture in the 1950s was important migration process through cities in Turkey. Roma population was also affected from this transformation economically and socially. During the research, I also learnt that immigration from Edirne to Germany was an important economic and social break-point for many Roma people in Edirne. The following section thereafter tries to introduce Diyarbakır in which Dom community live with Kurdish majority.

3.3 Historical Background of Diyarbakır

Diyarbakır is expressed with different political discourses. During the Ottoman Empire, Diyarbakır was considered with multiculturalism, instead of special cultural identity. As Bruinessen (2006) argues, there were semi-autonomous Kurdish sancaks from sixteenth century to nineteenth century. In this regard, the new territories added to the Empire were shared into the three principalities: Diyarbakır, Rakka and Musul. The first administrative organization was executed in Diyarbakır between 1514 and 1517 (Bruinessen, 2006:239). As Yeğen (2003) argues, Ottoman Empire faced with problems such as reforms, ethnic groups' separatist tendencies and diplomatic pressures in the nineteenth century. For this reason, Ottoman Empire implemented centralization politics in these Kurdish principalities. In response, Kurdish chiefs rebelled to this process, which led to the end of Kurdish tribes' confederal unity. Furthermore, Kurdish tribes became individual. Sheiks became new actors of Kurdish society. Yeğen (2003:233) evaluates this centralization process. For him, denying of Kurds' political and juristic rights can be traced back to the Ottoman Empire with regard to process of Westernization, centralization and nationalism.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Diyarbakır had a heterogenic population composed of Sunni Muslims, Armenians, *Süryani* (Assryian), Yakubi,

Keldani, Greeks, Yezidi, Jews and Gypsies²⁸ (Jongerden, 2008:327). Diyarbakır lost its multicultural identity and today mostly Kurds remain. Dom community lives with Kurdish majority in Diyarbakır. Hence, analyzing the Dom community's level of integration to society first entails us to consider Kurdish society's social structure. In this regard, the economic structure and the main division of the society called as tribe will be introduced.

The second issue in the historical evaluation of Diyarbakır is Resettlement and Forced Migration in East and South East in Turkey, since Dom community lives with Kurds in Diyarbakır and has been affected especially in the beginning of 1990s by the forced migration practice. Forced migration that eventuated from villages to the province intensified in 1992 and 1993. Not only Kurdish people but also Dom community migrated to Diyarbakır. Internal displacement affected social rights of both Kurdish and Dom people. In other words, this had led to obstacles in exercising citizenship rights, participating fully in the labour market, accessing health services and educational opportunities. The background of forced migration can also be traced back to the Turkish citizenship practices (see also Chapter II).

3.3.1 Social Structure of Kurdish Society

In this section, the attempt is to introduce briefly Kurdish society' economic structure depending on land. In this regard, we notice the key structure of Kurdish society as tribe as well as sheikhs.

The main economic activity of Kurdish society is agriculture. As Bruinessen (2006) considers, until the 1950s, most of the villagers were

²⁸ Owing to the autonomous structures of Kurdish Sancaks, there were not *timar* and *zeamet*, then *tahrir* register (Yeğen, 2003). In this regard, although historically Gypsy population can be followed through Rumelia province because of their central position in the Ottoman Empire, we cannot follow the Gypsies in Diyarbakır in the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, in Ottoman Empire one of the main politics towards Gypsies was related to their nomadic practices. To Arslan, although nomadic groups in Ottoman Empire could select their route of travel, they were also subjected to the state's population politics. This policy was determined that Gypsy community could migrate to the only permitted sancaks (Arslan, 2001:226-227). Arslan also says that Gypsy community was adjudged as a rower for the maritime perils not only from Rumelia province, but also from Diyarbakır in the sixteenth century.

cultivating the land themselves. In response, agha was giving them some part of the crop. The other agricultural workers were taking wage from agha. Meanwhile, a cattle breeding was made by waged shepherds. As a result of increasing of agricultural implements after the 1950s, first kind of agricultural laboring called as *yarıcı* was left. Hence, a lot of landless aghas became dependent on small landowners who began to use developed agricultural machines. Similar to the case in Edirne, temporary seasonal agricultural labor appeared or households started immigration to the industrial cities. Bruinessen considers (2006) this migration as the dissolving effect in terms of social bonds among the villagers (Bruinessen, 2006:32-137). For the same period, Yeğen (2007) argues that Kurdish question was considered by the state authorities as resulting from lack of economic integration. According to Yeğen,

“nationalism in power in the fifties and sixties perceived Kurdish unrest through the discourse of economic integration and of development. In view of the mainstream nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, what Kurds needed to do was simple. Now that their resistance against political integration had been crushed, they were expected to integrate into the new nation-state-society through the market” (Yeğen, 2007: 132).

As far as to social structure of Kurdish society, Bruinessen (2006:186-197) indicates the main division within society as tribe. In this sense, there are three main social strata: the people belonging to a tribe, the people who do not belong to any tribe and Gypsies (Dom). Also each stratum has a hierarchical system within itself. Although their relation with the land is a determining factor in forming hierarchy among villagers, military supremacy and political sovereignty are the main determinants for the nomadic tribes. Yet, for Bruinessen (2006), there is also horizontal (geographically from one tribe to another or from one agha to another) and vertical mobility between these groups. That is to say, there is always a possibility of transition within and along these positions and the state of belonging to any tribe or vice versa is not an absolute and impassable situation. In this sense, while nomadic people might become settled, villager or settled people may turn into nomadic. Kurds who do not belong to any tribe are subjected to Kurdish people organized in tribes, which is the best way of protection against different attacks. Hence, the tribe structure becomes the main determinant of feudal relations. He defines Kurdish tribe as “socio-politic unit

which is based on real or imaginary predecessor and in general having territorial integrity” (Bruinessen, 2006:82). He mentions “approach” (*yanaşma*) lineages which have medium position between tribe members and the villagers not belonging to any tribe. In this regard, Bruinessen (2006) evaluates Gypsy community as approach lineages but at the bottom of the hierarchy among other tribes. And even the landless villagers that are considered as the lowest stratum among others despise these Gypsy groups and also reject the even possibility of marriage relations with them.

Most of the Gypsy people are nomadic. Their main economic activity is making colander and broom as well as playing music. Bruinessen claims that “in Cezire musicians are called as *Mutrip* form as a different group that they do not get married other Gypsy communities such as Karaçi” (Bruinessen, 2006:192). He also asserts that although they are not socially acceptable, they are well paid for their musical performance.

The marriage pattern is generally endogamy within tribe. In order not to break up the unity of the tribe, girl would get married with uncle’s son²⁹. Hence, parallel cousin marriage is widespread among Kurdish society. Groom paid money to the bride’s family that is called as bride wealth. Uncle’s son pays less than the other men (Bruinessen, 2006: 118).

Bruinessen (2006) also adds that tribes are generally considered with the lands. Villagers control the land and pasture. Every village has their own pasture and avoid the usage of these places by other villagers (be even if from the same lineage). He also points out the relations between nomadic and settled Kurdish groups. When nomadic Kurdish groups pass through from settled Kurdish groups’ territory, they have to pay a fee and the amount of this fee is always a matter of conflict between these groups and settled groups generally accuse nomadic groups of damaging their grain with their crews during passage process (Bruinessen, 2006:90).

²⁹ During the research in Diyarbakır, I also encountered considerably parallel cousin marriages in which the girl preferably gets married with her uncle’s son in Dom community.

The only conflict within tribe ethos is blood feud. When such conflict appears Kurdish citizens who have tribes make solidarity with clans and lineages against to other tribe (Bruinesen, 2006:98). This condition affects both tribes' members in terms of avoiding relationship with them. To solve this problem, lineages of the tribe pay blood money or intermediaries appear. Sheikhs have important roles in solving these conflicts (Bruinesen, 2006:113). Sheikhs are treated as the person who establishes relation between God and the people. This position makes differentiations from other religious authorities such as *imam* or *hoca*. Most of the sheikhs do not have kinship with the tribes, which provide them equitable position among behalves. Hence, they are respectable persons in Kurdish society to solve blood feud and establish peace (Bruinesen, 2006:113). Bruinesen argues that disappearance of semi-independent Kurdish principalities and centralization of Ottoman Empire led an increase in the political roles of sheiks. In addition, Kurdish people selected to solve their conflicts with community elders instead of government officials. Therefore, there was a kind of rivalry between local authorities and government officials. As Yeğen (2003:234) argues, sheikhs became new leaders of Kurds. Kurdish rebellions eventuated with the leadership of sheikhs between 1870 and 1930. For Yeğen (2003:237), sheikhs affected Kurdish political sphere that they symbolized the articulation between religion (Islam) and ethnicity. On the one hand, with this articulation sheikhs became the new leaders of Kurdish nationals. On the other hand, they built a bridge between Kurds and Islam. Meanwhile, Kurdish question was perceived by state discourse in a different way. Yeğen (2007) notes one of the state discourses as follows:

“For a considerable period, the Turkish nationalism of the time perceived the Kurdish question on the basis of such a fatal rivalry between the past and present. Believing to be representing the present, Turkish nationalism considered the Kurdish unrest of the time as the resistance of pre-modern structures and adherences. Tribes and banditry were the leading components of such structures. As the Kurds “did not exist any more, those who resisted the new regime could not be Kurds with an ethno-political cause, but only the tribes and bandits threatened by the dissemination of modern state power into the region” (Yeğen, 2007: 128-129).

To put together, herein the attempt was to introduce Kurdish social structure with regard to economical relationship, tribe and sheikhs. The critical point is that Kurdish question has not appeared after the foundation of republic. At

the end of the nineteenth century, the tension between Ottoman Empire and Kurdish principalities appeared owing to the centralization, westernization and nationalism movements. In response, new balances occurred in Kurdish structure. Today, the tribe and sheikhs seem to have important dimensions in Kurdish society. Furthermore, the agricultural transformation in the 1950s affected Kurdish villagers. Similar to the case in Edirne, temporary seasonal agricultural labor appeared or households started to immigrate to the industrial cities. Another crucial issue regarding the changing pattern of social bonds is forced migration. The migration from rural to urban areas was affective for Roma community in Edirne in 1950s, whereas forced migration affected Dom community. The next section will explore the causes and the results of the forced migration.

3.3.2 Resettlement and Forced Migration in East and South East in Turkey

The process of forced migration with different stages from 1980s until the end of 1990s in Turkey is completely different from the migration from rural to urban areas in the 1950s. According to UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement definition, “internal displaced persons are groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters” (UN, 2001)

Before arguing the effects of forced migration in details, it is necessary to evaluate the context of forced migration politics. Jongerden (2008) focuses on resettlement in South East area of Turkey and how Kurds were affected from this internal displacement. In this regard, Kurdish people have been internally displaced from their villages to the cities during 1990s. He suggests that resettlement is reinvented to create a population regarded as appropriate features. In other words, resettlement in a cultural background has been seen as a way of Gellner’s modernity to create political formation (Jongerden, 2008:89). This resettlement policy had close relationship with the growing strength of PKK after

1980 military coup and depletion of villages. Moreover, for him, the background of this resettlement policy can be traced back to the number of 2510 Settlement Law in 1934. In the 1930s, the aim was to invent a nation based on Turkishness and it was believed that villagers of Anatolia should define themselves as Turkish to become a part of this political creation. Likewise Yeğen (2007) considers the Settlement Law of 1934 as a privileged text of Turkish nationalism of the 1930s. He ends with the following remark:

“Resisted by two large-scale Kurdish rebellions in 1925 and 1930, the new regime embarked on solving the Kurdish question by means of an extensive settlement law. Despite its having been clearly pronounced that the ultimate aim of the law was the Turkification (assimilation) of non-Turks, the text produces the impression that those intended to be assimilated were some tribal people having no ethnic identity” (Yeğen, 2007:129).

After 1991, the practice of forced migration was the main feature of Turkish army in struggling against PKK to deprive them logistic support from the rural area (Jongerden, 2008:394-395). As a result of the conflict between Turkish army and PKK until the end of 1990s, many villages were “evacuated” and many agricultural areas were devastated. Many areas in agriculture were forbidden to enter (Jongerden, 2008: 85).

According to Human Rights Association and Solidarity Association for Oppressed People (Mazlum-Der), period between 1992 and 1994 were the years during which intensive “evacuation” of the villages occurred (cited in Yüksekler, 2006(a): 121). Likewise, Diyarbakır Development Centre Report (DDC) claims that, “ [d]uring the first half of the 90s, especially in 1992 and 1993, migration from villages to district centers and provincial capitals accelerated upon the intensification of unrest and armed clashes in Cizre, Bingöl, Kulp and Lice and this process continued in waves until 1995” (Diyarbakır Development Centre, 2006:15).

For Jongerden, the aim was to destroy isolated agricultural areas and to increase the forced migration of the people who live in these areas to the cities. In addition, the strategy was depriving PKK from the villagers’ possible support. By the internal displacement, the population of cities which had taken migration from

internally displaced villages increased to 1.500.000 (Ünalán, Çelik, Kurban, 2006:70).

According to TESEV researchers, Ünalán, Çelik, Kurban (2006) there is no common definition about internally displacement in Turkey. In 1998 TBMM (Assembly) report, it was claimed that the reasons of the “evacuation” of the villages were: “(a) descending of livestock and agriculture owing to the prohibition of pasture and conflict; pressure of security forces to the villages which do not adopt *korucu* (b) oppressing of PKK to the villages having *korucu* (village guard); (c) “evacuation” of the villages which are regarded as helping to PKK (Ünalán, Çelik, Kurban, 2006:69). These writers conducted research in Diyarbakır, İstanbul, Batman and Hakkari. For them, although three reasons mentioned in TBMM report are valid, there are also other reasons for forced migrations which are claimed by households in these cities. In this regard, their villages were “evacuated” by security forces without any reason or due to rejecting to become *korucu*. In 2006, there are 57.174 temporary *korucu* who work for the security forces. *Korucu* (village guards) could also go to the military operation with gendarmerie at other villages.

Some of the villagers found themselves in a dispute between security forces and PKK. For the other villagers, they had to leave their villages because of the fact that the villages around their village were “evacuated”. Besides, there was no available place for their livestock and also for agriculture (Ünalán, Çelik, Kurban, 2006:69-70). Diyarbakır Development Centre conducts a research (2006) with internally displaced families in Diyarbakır. In this regard, “31% of families stated their forced migration to Diyarbakır resulted from ‘burning of their villages’, for another 31% of this was the result of ‘security concerns’...[and] leaving their villages because of economic difficulties was 22%” (DDC,2006:16-17).

Not only Kurdish people but also Dom community also had to migrate to Diyarbakır. As Diyarbakır Development Centre Report asserts, “Romans (locally *Mirtip*) who used to make their living by visiting villages during weddings and

other fests and playing instruments also had to move in Diyarbakır after their mobility from village to village was banned” (DDC, 2006:20).

During 1990s, Diyarbakır is one of the most affected cities from the internal displacement by taking in migration. To Diyarbakır Development Centre, “as a result of displacement taking in a specific time period (especially in May 1994) there was rather high inflow of people to Diyarbakır during that period” (DDC, 2006: 19). At the same time, Diyarbakır gave out migration to South and East cities because of internal displacement and economic reasons.

According to Göç-Der, in Diyarbakır, nearly 133.000 people had to “evacuate” their village and hamlet and almost 41.000 people among these internally displaced people returned to their villages in 2003 (Yükseker, 2006 (b): 144-146). Jongerden claims that although official statistics show that 30% has returned back to their village that is located around Diyarbakır but it is not clear that returned households are those originally internally displaced households (Jongerden, 2008:396). Since some of the people seasonally go to their villages during the summers, for Yüksekser, the exact numbers on the people who returned to their villages is not known. In other words, forced migration is mixed with temporary seasonal migration.

Yükseker makes interviews with internally displaced people living in Diyarbakır. She evaluates the factors that are important for them to return to their villages. In this sense, they mentioned that economic reasons were important. For example, they claimed the need for a house, school, as well as livestock. Yet, another important issue was security. The most challenging issue in returning to the villages was the system of *koruculuk* (village guard) who threatened individuals and villagers’ properties. Besides, military operations kept going on their villages (Yükseker 2006 (b): 152). Moreover, according to Jongerden’s (2008) argument, the people who returned to their villages built a home but economic activity was forbidden. He gives examples such that, it was forbidden for villagers to grass their cattle at plateau. There was no economic opportunity for the villagers except for *koruculuk* (village guard). Rebuilding of the schools is

also prevented. There is no utility services for reverts. In short, returnees could only come in some periods or seasonally to their ex-villages.

Yükseker (2006 (c) also evaluates the conditions of internally displaced people who migrated to İstanbul and Diyarbakır. In this sense, when internally displaced people migrated to the city, housing was problem for them. *Suriçi* and *Bağlar* are some neighborhoods where internally displaced settled in. When they settled in their houses, some of the households brought their small cattle. To Yüksek, this is also an indicator of poverty. According to Diyarbakır Develepment Centre Report,

“1991 to 1994 is the period in which migration was intensified. During these years there is a boom in demand for houses especially in the outskirts of the city. Prices of houses and rents doubled as a result of this high demand. Families who had their own houses in Fatihpaşa, Savaş and Benusen sold these houses at relatively high prices and moved to wealthier parts of Diyarbakır” (DDC, 2006: 21).

Internally displaced people’s livelihood strategies appear after they migrated to the city. Sarmaşık Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development Association and Yerel Gündem 21 conducted a research in Diyarbakır in order to prepare poverty map of the city in terms of socio-economic indicators. In this regard, they evaluated livelihood strategies of inhabitants living in *Körhat*, *Huzurevleri* and *Peyas*, *Fatihpaşa* and *Gürdoğan* neighborhoods. Before inhabitants migrated to these neigborhoods, 92.5 % of them subsisted on with agriculture and livestock. These people became unskilled workers in urban conditions between 1990 and 2000. Since there is no labor opportunity in the urban area, they also work as seasonal agricultural laborers. For example, in *Gürdoğan* neighborhood, inhabitants of 59% are temporary seasonal agricultural labor, and of 4.2 % live on with agriculture and livestock³⁰.

Likewise, Yüksek (2006: (c) examines the livelihood strategies of households. In this sense, almost most of the members of the households enter to the labor force to increase income. With regard to occupation in Diyarbakır and Van, men are unskilled labor such as, construction workers, peddlers, selling vegetables on the street. Women go for the cleaning works or baby sitting.

³⁰ (http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=13425, last access 22.02.2010)

Children sell water or other materials on the streets. All members of the household also go for the seasonal agricultural labor to the West or the Black sea Area. Boys drop out the school in order to work, and girls drop out the school generally from fifth class at primary school in order to help their mother at their. Yüksekler argues that poverty and not benefiting from education appears as a problem especially for women and children. And for her, child labor also is an indicator of urban poverty.

Research of Akşit, Karancı and Gündüz Hoşgör (2001) working street children in three metropolitan cities, Adana, Diyarbakır and İstanbul give us a profile of the children working in the streets. In this regard, majority of the children working in the streets are male. In Diyarbakır, 90, 9 % of the working children are boys. They explain this with two reasons:

“Both parents and children believe that it is culturally unacceptable for girls to work on the streets instead of staying at home, particularly after age 12. They are restricted by social norms regarding the “purity” of women and the “honour” of the family...[In addition], domestic work is performed primarily by women, therefore girls may be needed for their labour” (Gündüz Hoşgör et al., 2001:36).

These gender roles are important in understanding also Dom community’s working children’s profile. Gündüz Hoşgör et al (2001) find a statistically significant relationship between mothers’ education level and the number of dropouts among the working street children. Accordingly, “the mothers’ educational level was very low in all three cities, particularly in Diyarbakır and Adana, where almost 75 percent of the mothers of these children were illiterate” (Hoşgör et al., 2001:39). In addition, the majority of fathers were employed in the informal sector. The percentage of unemployed fathers was highest in Diyarbakır (38%).

3.4 Demographic, Educational and Socio-Economic Profile of the Research Cities

This section mainly provides Edirne and Diyarbakır’s city profiles with statistical information. First, the section of Demographic Profile of the Research Cities shows how city population changed from 1990 to 2008 with regard to in

migration and out migration rates. There is also approximate Roma and Dom population rate which are arranged according to Edirne and Diyarbakır municipalities data. There is huge difference between Roma population (21% of Edirne central metropolitan city population) and Dom population (1% of Diyarbakır central metropolitan city population). Second, in evaluating education profiles of Edirne and Diyarbakır, it is important to note the difference between female and male literacy and illiteracy rates. Finally, economic profiles of the research cities introduce means of the livelihood of the cities which helps us to evaluate Roma and Dom communities' economic positions and to what extent they benefit from city opportunities.

3.4.1 Demographic Profile of the Research Cities

Table 3.1 Demographic Profile of the Research Cities *

	Edirne	Diyarbakır	Turkey
Total Population 1990	404.599	1.094.996	56.473.035
Total Population 2000	402.606	1.362.708	67.803.927
Estimated Roma/Dom Population in 2008 (**)	30.000	5000–8000	-
Estimated Rate of Roma/Dom Population	$(30.000/138.222) \times 100 = \% 21$	$(8000/799.447) \times 100 = \% 1$	-
Provincial Population Increase 1990-2000	- 0,5 %	24,4 %	20,1 %
Provincial Population Increase 2000-2008	- 2 %	9,5 %	5,5 %
Urban Population 1990 %	52,0 %	54,9 %	59,0 %
Urban Population 2000 %	57,4 %	60,0 %	64,9 %
Urban Population 2008 %	66,4 %	70,4 %	75,0 %
Central Metropolitan City Population 1990	102.345	373.810	33.656.275

Central Metropolitan City Population 2000	119.298	545.983	44.006.274
Central Metropolitan City Population 2008	138.222	799.447	-
Central City Population Increase 1990-2000	16,6 %	46,1 %	30,8 %
In Migration 2000	35.973	62.996	4.098.356
% in 2000 Population	10,0 %	5,4 %	6,7 %
In Migration 2008	11.202	31.677	2.273.492
% in 2008 Population	2,84 %	2,12 %	3,18 %
Out Migration 2000	41.079	111.060	4.098.356
% in 2000 Population	11,4 %	9,4 %	6,7 %
Out Migration 2008	14.249	47.777	2.273.492
% in 2008 Population	3,61 %	3,20 %	3,18 %
Net Migration 2000	- 5.106	- 48.064	-
Net Migration Rate	- 14 %	- 40 %	-
Net Migration 2008	- 3.047	- 16.100	-
Net Migration Rate	- 7,69 %	- 10,73 %	
Average Size of Household's (2000)	3,55	6,23	4,18
Total Fertility Rate / Rank among 81 cities (2000)	1,66 / (81)	4,51 / (10)	2,53
Divorcement increase rate between 2001/2008	19,6 %	72,4 %	8,3 %

* Almost all the data in this table is taken from the 1990 and 2000 Census Population and 2008 New Based Population Registration System, conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute and data regarding the Total Fertility is gathered by State Planning Organization. All the data are presented in the following internet addresses: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr> and <http://www.dpt.gov.tr> (Last Access: 28.01.2010)

** The estimated Roma/Dom population are prepared according to Edirne and Diyarbakır municipalities datas. These figures show the population that lives within City Central Metropolitan in 2008. That is to say such figure does not involve the population living in towns and villages.

Demographic characteristics of Edirne and Diyarbakır are presented in Table 1. For Diyarbakır, total provincial³¹ population increased by 24,4 %, in ten years from 1990 to 2000 where it reached 1,362,708. Total provincial population only increased by 9.5 % in eight years from 2000 to 2008 (Table 1, column2, rows 2, 5 and 6). Hence, the total provincial population sharply increased more between 1990 and 2000 than between 2000 and 2008. Nevertheless, for Edirne, total population decreased by 0.5 % from 1990 to 2000. Similarly, total provincial population decreased by 2 % in eight years, from 2000 to 2008 (Table 1, column 1, rows 5 and 6). Hence, we can see easily that provincial population decrease in Edirne. There is a dramatic difference between Edirne and Diyarbakır in terms of provincial population increase. One of the factors is fertility rate. In Edirne, fertility rate is 1,66 and it ranked as last city among 81 cities (Table 1, column 1, row 27). Nevertheless, for Diyarbakır, fertility rate is 4,51 and it ranked among 81 cities as 10th.

In Turkey, there is no official ethnic census population. Municipalities in Edirne and Diyarbakır estimate the Roma/Dom population. Accordingly, there is approximately 30.000 Roma people living in Edirne, which constitutes 21% of population (Table1, column 1, row4). On the other hand, Dom population is estimated between 5000 and 8000 in metropolitan area, which is 1% of Diyarbakır central metropolitan population (Table 1, column 2, row4). Mehmet Demir who was the leader of Dom Association claimed that 14.000 Dom people live in Diyarbakır province. Yet it is only 0,9% of Diyarbakır's total population both in metropolitan area and towns. Hence, Roma population is considerably high in Edirne population.

Another important fact is that Diyarbakır's central city population has increased by 46,1 % between the years 1990 and 2000, which is higher than the average of Turkey's 30,8 % (column 2 and 3, row 13). At the opposite extreme, in Edirne, central city population increased only by 16,6 % which is lower from

³¹ Turkey is administratively organised as 81 provinces, which include urban as well as rural populations. Total population in Table 1 refers to total urban and rural population in two provinces. Urban population in rows 6,7 and 8 refer to the population living in all cities in the province; whereas, central city and/or metropolitan population refers to the urban population living in the capital and adjacent centres of a province.

Turkey's average 30,8 % (Column 1 and 3, row 13). The internal displacement led to the intensification of the population to Diyarbakır in 1990s. In Diyarbakır, according to the 2000 Census data, the in-migration rate to the province was 5,4 % , and out migration from the province was 9,4 %; net migration being -40 % (Table 1, column 2, rows 15, 19 and 23). According to Gündüz Hoşgör et al., “this is an expected migration pattern for a first-degree metropolitan city like Diyarbakır. It attracts populations from neighboring provinces and smaller cities, yet loses a portion of the population to larger metropolitan cities” (Gündüz Hoşgör et al., 2001:15-16).

The sharp difference between Edirne and Diyarbakır can be seen in terms of divorce rate increase. Although in Edirne divorce rate increase between 2001 and 2008 is 19,6%, in Diyarbakır this rate is 72,4 % during the same years. It is dramatically high from country's average divorce rate increase of 8,3 % (Table1, column 1, 2 and 3, row 28). One of the strongest factors affecting the divorcement rate could be financial difficulties.

3.4.2 Educational Profile of the Research Cities

Table 3.2 Educational Profile of the Research Cities *

	Edirne	Diyarbakır	Turkey
% Literacy rate / Rank among 81 cities (2000)	88,89 % / (25)	69,57 % / (75)	87,30 %
% of illiterate women (2008)	8,4 %	23,8 %	12,3 %
% of illiterate men (2008)	2,6 %	6,6 %	3,1 %
% of women with primary school (2008)	32,6 %	10,6 %	28,9 %
% of men with primary school (2008)	25,7 %	14,5 %	27,4 %
% of women with 8 years of Education (2008)	12,1 %	11,9 %	12,8 %

% of men with 8 years of Education (2008)	16,5 %	16,8 %	16,5 %
% of women with high school education and above (2008)	27,2 %	11,8 %	17,9 %
% of men with high school education and above (2008)	33,6 %	22,6 %	25,0 %

* Almost all the data in this table is taken from the 2008 Census conducted by TSI and data in the first row of this table is gathered by State Planning Organization. All the data are presented in the following internet addresses: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr> and <http://www.dpt.gov.tr> (Last Access: 28.01.2010)

Literacy rate among 81 cities shows Edirne as ranking 25th with 89 %, but Diyarbakır is ranking 75th with 69,57%. The educational profile of the two cities shows especially high female illiteracy. However, women illiteracy rate in Diyarbakır is more than two times higher than in Edirne according to the census conducted in 2008. Especially female illiteracy for Diyarbakır exists in alarming proportions (23,8%). In addition, the percentage of illiterate men in Diyarbakır is 6,6 % , double of country's percentage.

Moreover, “during times when migration was intensive...many children who had no schooling back in their villages faced problems when they started schools here joining classmates many of whom are younger than them” (DDC, 2006: 32). In addition, during my research, I learnt that most of the Dom families had to send their children to the school because of 8 years compulsory education. When they were nomadic, they had no birth certificates. Hence, Dom boys attended to the school in their older ages, unlike their classmates. However, dropout from schools is common especially in Dom girls, especially after 5th grade of primary school. They are seen as grown up waiting their husbands, who are considered as suitable by their fathers. Although I did not conduct statistical study, I also encountered high amount of children whose ages were 6 and above and not attending to the school. Apart from children, I did not encounter literate

mother or father at the households. Hence, illiteracy rate seems very high in Dom community.

For Roma community in Edirne, literacy rate is high compared to Dom community. In most of the households father or mother are graduated from primary school. They sent their children (boys or girls) to the high schools. There are also Roma university students in Edirne. In Diyarbakır, there is only one person among Dom community who finished high school and went to İstanbul to study conservatory. This huge difference between Roma and Dom communities can be explained in terms of being settled and showing nomadic tribe pattern. Although Roma community in Edirne settled nearly 40-50 years ago, Dom community settled to Diyarbakır in less than 15 years.

3.4.3 Economic and Social Profile of the Research Cities

Table 3.3 Economic and Social Profile of the Research Cities *

	Edirne	Diyarbakır	Turkey
Per Capita Income 2000 / Rank among 81 cities (1987 Prices, TL.)	2.271 / (10)	1.056 / (55)	1.837
% Employment in Agriculture, 2000	49,60 %	63,86 %	48,38 %
% Employment in Manufacture, 2000	9,01 %	3,82 %	13,35 %
% Employment in Service, 2000	6,4 %	6,9 %	7,5 %
% of Professionals in Total Employment, 2000	1,0 %	0,6 %	1,4 %
% of Wage Labour in Total Employment, 2000	43,29 %	32,21 %	43,52 %
% of Women Wage Labour in Total Employment, 2000	7,61 %	4,45 %	8,81 %
Participation in Total Labor Force, 2009	52,2 %	32,7 %	48,8 %

Unemployment rate, 2009	13,4 %	20,6 %	12,3 %
Socio-Economic Development Rank among 81 cities, 2003	16	63	-
% Green Card Usage	15 %	23 %	15 %

* The data in this table are taken from the 2000 Census Population and 2008 New Based Population Registration System and 2009 Labor Indicator conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute and State Planning Organization. All the data are presented in the following internet addresses: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr> and <http://www.dpt.gov.tr> (Last Access: 28.01.2010)

Economic and social indicators chosen show that Diyarbakır is below the national average, while Edirne is above the national average. Diyarbakır is still an agricultural province (63, 86% labour force) with little economic and technological resources (only 3,82 % in manufacture) to support recent forced and voluntary in-migration into the city. Nevertheless, city profiles vary more strikingly according to unemployment rates in 2009. Diyarbakır is ranked as second with 20,6 % unemployment rate, whereas Edirne is ranked as 36th with 13,4 % unemployment rate among 81 cities.

In both Edirne and Diyarbakır, industry did not develop. 49,60 % of Edirne's economy is agricultural sector. According to 2000 Census, wage labour in total employment in Edirne is % 43,29. However, women's wage labour in total employment is 7,61% which is under country's average percentage, %8,81. In Diyarbakır women's wage labour in total employment is 4,45 % which is nearly country's half of the percentage. According to Development Centre's research (2006) on internally displaced families in Diyarbakır, job opportunities are limited for both men and women. They generally found jobs which are mostly temporary, unqualified and based on manual labour. In addition, the number of unemployed males is very high. Similarly, according to the report,

“job opportunities are limited for women, too. Some families do not allow women to go out for work such as cleaning in houses or offices or child care. To allow women to go out for work, one important criterion is ‘reliability’. Women mostly go out for seasonal agricultural work together with other family members or other places where women do some jobs collectively” (DDC, 2006:46).

In addition, according to income generating activities among women, seasonal employment is 54 %, daily cleaning work 27 %, childcare 20 %, handicrafts 19 %, other 19%.

With regard to economic activity, Dom people who were nomadic before 1993-94 settled in Diyarbakır are mainly affected by the forced migration. They are mainly seasonal workers now. Men used to be musicians playing *davul* and *zurna* at Kurdish weddings. Yet they are unemployed now because of transformation of Kurdish society. In the weddings, the main instrument is saz. According to the interviewees, instead of open air weddings, weddings are eventuated in wedding salons. It also lasts only a few hours, leading to a decrease in their work. Since men are generally unemployed, women support their households by begging. Seasonal agricultural labor is also common for Dom women. They go to West side of the country with their households. Moreover few women work as cleaning workers without insurance.

In Edirne, seasonal agricultural labour and temporary seasonal work for breeding villagers' livestock in villages near Edirne are important occupations for Roma population in Edirne. In the city, Roma men generally do temporary jobs, such as porter, sewerage worker, paper collector, musician, peddler, fog collectors, etc. The workers who have wages generally reside in *Yıldırım Beyazıt* neighborhood. They are municipality's garbage collector or working for private company as garbage collector. Women also do temporary work. They are mainly temporary agricultural worker, baby sitter, nursery, domestic cleaning worker and paper collector. Child labor is also common in both Dom and Roma community.

Briefly, the main attempt in this chapter was to compare Roma and Dom communities' city profiles in terms of historical, economic and social dimensions. With regard to historical aspect, Roma community stands near to the power since Ottoman Empire. Today, they also live mostly with Turks in Edirne who are the ethnic majority in Turkey. On the other hand, Dom community has been living with Kurds and stands in the periphery since Ottoman era. In response, Kurdish social structure seems affective on their relations with Kurds. In fact, Dom community also positions themselves as not having a tribe with regard to

horizontal hierarchy. For the economic aspect, Roma and Dom communities lived through different transformations with regard to migration practices. Although Roma community's migration practice occurred voluntarily in the past, Dom community experienced forced migration with Kurds. This difference also has affected their citizenship profiles in the present. To compare both communities' citizenship practices, ethnicity is not enough to understand their current positions. It is also important to compare city profiles, which vary more strikingly according to unemployment rates of 2009. Diyarbakır is ranked as 2nd with 20.9 % of unemployment rate, whereas Edirne is ranked as 36th with 13.4 % of unemployment rate among 81 cities. Hence, economic, social and demographic indicators are facilitators in order to evaluate how resources are shared in different groups.

Having introduced Edirne and Diyarbakır's historical, economical, social and political background, the following chapter, namely Methodology, will mainly discuss how fieldwork has been conducted in Edirne and Diyarbakır and which methods and methodology are adopted during the research process.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to introduce the appropriate methods and methodology of the research process and discuss how research process was formed. This chapter will therefore present following sections: case studies, in-depth and oral history interview; confidentiality and verification; ethnographic research analysis; participant selection; sample characteristics; the case study interview process; limitation; talking sensitive issues and methodological discussion: lesson learned.

First, case studies, in-depth and oral history interview are selected as qualitative research techniques in order to understand the meaning of central themes of subjects' lived world. Case study gives in-depth understanding of a specific topic but case study has also some limitations. The major challenge is that case study cannot be generalized. To overcome the limitations of the case study, I applied cross-case generalization technique. In this regard, I moved from case to case (Edirne and Diyarbakır), identified themes and explored patterns and interconnections and adopted inductive approach. In-depth interviewing is another significant qualitative research technique which helps us to understand the world from the subjects' points of view. Oral history, as Kvale (2007) suggests, is useful to cover communal history which goes beyond the individual's history. Oral history was also useful for me to compare the historical structural changes on my respondents' lives.

Second, confidentiality and verification will be taken as an ethical dimension and validity of the research. Confidentiality involves all stages from

entering to the field to the analysis of the research. The researcher should introduce his/her aim in the field correctly since trust is very important. With regard to recognition of facts, the researcher should avoid “symbolic violence” by falsifiable interpretations. As Simons (2007) argues, the main fundamental ethic is ‘do not harm’ the respondents since case study describes people and their experiences in unique contexts. Furthermore, I applied pseudonyms when I described the respondents to protect their privacy. Verification will be introduced considering the validity within trustworthiness. For qualitative research validity is taken for trustworthiness which involves continually checking, questioning and theoretically interpreting the findings. Validity is not a separate step but also involves *emic* and *etic* perspectives. For emic perspective, the researcher looks for the patterns and themes which are perceived by the members of the community. Etic perspective increases the validity of the research examining the literature. To increase the validity of the research, I will discuss the importance of comparison groups and constant comparison. To make constant comparison, coding which breaks down the data into segments is necessary. On the one hand, I applied comparisons between Roma and Dom communities to check the consistency and accuracy of codes. On the other hand, I looked for the variation across the cases, setting and events.

Third, ethnographic research will be discussed. Ethnographic research is useful to produce general patterns and it also provides an understanding of group life. This study was appropriate for the research since there are limited Romany studies in Turkey. Moreover, I also argued the researcher’s role in constructing readings of meanings in data analysis process. Similar to researcher’s position in the research, the respondents are not considered as static. They also develop “tactics” towards majority or the state institutions in the way of benefiting from citizenship rights in both cities.

Fourth, participant selection will be introduced. In this regard, Edirne and Diyarbakır are selected as comparative cases. Roma and Dom communities live with different majority. Non-Roma composed of mostly Turkish and non-Dom composed of mostly Kurdish majority. Besides, Roma and Dom are different

Gypsy ethnic groups in Turkey. The thesis aims to compare and contrast Roma and Dom communities benefiting from citizenship rights, ways of levels of integration to the majority and transnational citizenship's effects on Roma NGOs. Before starting to my case study, I preferred to conduct pilot research in both cities. I will discuss within this section how I conducted pilot research and how useful it was for this study.

Fifth, the reader will find socio-demographic profiles of Roma and Dom interviewees illustrated with two tables. These tables are arranged with regard to age, sex, place of birth, marriage status, number of child, occupation, education level and neighborhood. There are 31 Roma interviewees and 30 Dom interviewees. The ethnic identities are arranged with respect to self-affiliation of their identities.

Sixth, the case study interview process will be introduced through how Edirne and Diyarbakır case study are conducted. In this regard, I visited Edirne and Diyarbakır several times between 2007 and 2009. I stayed in Diyarbakır for 30 days and stayed in Edirne for 25 days.

Seventh, limitations of the research will be discussed. In this regard, limitation section will argue my identity experience, gate keeper factor, gender of the interviewees as well as language problem, the feature of asking questions and finally methodological matters. Finally, I will discuss how I coped with talking sensitive issues and the methodological lessons from this research.

4.2 Case Studies and In-Depth and Oral History Interviews

In this section, I will cover methodological issues about the arguments on case studies, in-depth interview and oral history techniques which are parts of qualitative study. The primary purpose of case study is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic. In other words, for Simons, the aim of case study research is “to present a rich portrayal of a single setting to inform practice, establish the value of the case and/or add to knowledge of a specific topic” (Simons, 2009:24).

Besides, in-depth interview is another significant method in qualitative study. To Kvale, “a qualitative research interview attempts to understand the world from the subjects’ points of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations” (Kvale, 2007:Preface). Hence, for Kvale, the interview tries to understand the meaning of central themes of subjects’ lived world.

Moreover, there are some specialized ways of narrative interviews, such as oral history, that I applied. As Angrosino defines, oral history is a

“field of study dedicated to the reconstruction of the past through the experiences of those who have lived it...Oral history therefore provides a way of those previously marginalized and rendered voiceless (e.g. women, members of minority groups, the poor, people with disabilities or of alternate sexual orientation) to put their on the record” (Angrosino, 2007:46).

My understanding of how and why Roma and Dom people migrated from villages to the cities was shaped by the oral history. I collected data from men and women who were in their forties and fifties at the time of my original research. They remembered the days of nomadism. In addition, I learned what was important at their lives. As Kvale (2007) argues that oral history helps the researcher to cover communal history which goes beyond the individual’s history.

Agar (1996) in his book advocates the concept of new ethnography. Instead the old model of ethnography which led to a picture of the isolated groups, “[n]ow ethnography considers the political and personal circumstances of the research, views the local group as a diverse crowd in a world of blurred edges, and foregrounds how larger historical currents fill the study with life” (Agar, 1996:7). Like Agar, I tried to evaluate Roma and Dom community in terms of citizenship rights regarding historical factors. Besides, I learned how historical structural changes were affective on my respondents’ lives applying oral history. Although for Edirne, modernization and industrialization are main transformative factors, forced migration affected Dom community’s citizenship practices. On the one hand, I adopted inductive approach and on the other hand, I evaluated the data according to citizenship theory. In other words, I conducted the research as inductive.

4.3 Confidentiality and Verification

In this section, I will underline ethical consideration and verification issues within trustworthiness. With regard to confidentiality, there are some research ethics between the researcher and the respondents. Angrosino (2007) pays some attention to the ethical consideration. In this sense, the researcher should represent his or her identity truly entering a private domain. Moreover, researcher should not deliberately misrepresent the character of the research. Otherwise, it would be unethical. Related to misrepresentation issue, I will apply Bourdieu's term of symbolic violence "which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity" (Bourdieu, 1992:167). He adds that "I call *misrecognition* the fact of recognizing a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such" (Bourdieu, 1992:168). During the field-work, the most dangerous symbolic violence could be reducing the facts to the cultural traits of Roma and Dom communities. This kind of symbolic violence is generally seen especially in the newspapers. İncirlioğlu (2009) also indicates this kind symbolic violence in Romani studies in which she emphasizes that researchers should avoid romanticized attitudes. Otherwise, they would produce stereotypes. I avoided this violence and tried to control myself by being self-reflexive as much as I could.

For Simons (2009), the fundamental ethical research is not to harm because of the fact that case study research describes people and their experiences closely in unique contexts. Besides, offering confidentiality is important in the relationship between interviewer and interviewee. It means that interviewees sometimes could not expose their sensitive or personal information. Researcher should not reveal these issues because trust is important in the fieldwork. Hence, I also used pseudonyms when I described the respondents to protect their privacy.

With regard to verification, I will underline validity within the "trustworthiness". Kvale (2007), considers the validation as an entire process including continually checking, questioning and theoretically interpreting the findings. Therefore, validity is not a separate part of an investigation. Moreover, Angrosino (2007) regards qualitative research generally with validity. This is

because of the fact that when one researcher observes a community at one time, it can not be truly replicable by a different researcher observing the same community at a different time. In addition, there are two perspectives when social scientist engages in constant validity measuring called emic and etic perspectives.

For Angrosino (2007), it is important to look for the consistencies and inconsistencies in what informants tell you in terms of emic perspective. In this regard, it is important to compare community's knowledge with different individuals who do not belong to the community and institutions. I also applied social mental mapping when I conducted in-depth interviews with institutions.

As an etic part of the research, social scientist can increase validity of the research examining the comparative literature. In this sense, Angrosino argues that the etic perspective is related to how the researcher can link data from the community under study to similar cases conducted elsewhere (Angrosino, 2007:75).

Besides, Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue for the importance of comparison groups to increase the validity of the research. I purposely compared Roma and Dom communities in Turkey. If I had not applied this comparison, I could not easily understand ways of integration of Roma and Dom communities in other dominant communities.

In addition to comparative method, constant comparison, which is introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967), helped increase the validity of my field research. Gibbs (2007) discusses two aspects of the constant comparison. On the one hand, the comparisons are used to check the consistency and accuracy of the codes when the researcher first develops them. On the other hand, Gibbs suggests that constant comparison necessitates looking for "differences and variations in the activities, experiences, actions and so on that have been coded. In particular, looking for variation across cases, settings and events" (Gibbs, 2007:96). I tried to take two aspects of constant comparisons within the case itself (Edirne or Diyarbakır) and between the cases.

In the next section, I will discuss the data analysis process regarding methodology of the research.

4.4 Ethnographic Research Analysis

Angrosino makes a definition of ethnographic research: “Ethnography is a method of research that seeks to define predictable patterns of group behavior. It is field-based, personalized, multifactorial, long-term, inductive, dialogic, and holistic in nature” (Angrosino, 2007:18).

He also highlights that the ethnographic research can be conducted in respondents’ natural settings. For example, I went to Roma festival called *Hıdırellez/Hıdırellez* and interviewed with Roma people, I also participated both Roma and Dom wedding ceremonies. Besides, I tried to conduct interviews at respondents’ houses to make participant observation. I also visited Dom people who live at tents in Diyarbakır surrounding. Hence, I did not arrange special conditions for the interviews. Although I did not stay for years at the fieldwork as ethnographers do, I tried to benefit from ethnographic method during my research.

The main idea of the ethnographic research is to produce general patterns and understand group life. For Agar (1996), ethnographic study should produce new concepts and patterns.

In the research process, I did not start with theory to modify or falsify it, as a positivist research does. Yet, I adopted inductive approach. When we look at Roma studies in Turkey, we do not know statistically how many Roma people live in Turkey. Besides, there are three Roma groups in Turkey: Rom, Dom and Lom. There is limited academic study about especially for Dom and Lom groups. Hence, this situation does not allow us to see the overall picture of Roma studies in Turkey. For these reasons, inductive approach was suitable for the research process.

When I was carrying out the fieldwork, I applied memory writing techniques as descriptive analysis. In this sense, I took organized field notes in terms of chronology of events. During the data analysis I began with a description

of what I have seen in my notes. I prepared my in-depth interview questions before going to fieldwork. Yet I had to change them when I was there. Since I was learning new patterns from the respondents on each day, I rearranged my questions. Then I identified themes. I also looked for these themes in the literature which were helpful in organizing my own data, such as identity and belonging, citizenship rights, statelessness, trans-nationalism, dual citizenship, republican citizenship, liberal citizenship, integration and social exclusion. The generation of these themes was initially 'etic' because they derived from the comparative literature. Moreover, I systematically sorted the data into useful codes. In short, coding and categorizing helps build cumulative and comprehensive understanding of the research. As a result of the fieldwork, I searched for the patterns with coding and presented them with matrices to represent the relationship among categories.

Hence, I tried to compare different ethnic Gypsy groups; Rom and Dom comparing their patterns within the light of citizenship rights. In this regard, my theoretical consideration is citizenship rights. On the other hand, I did not aim to use the the citizenship theory for verifying aims. My aim also was to contribute citizenship theory adding Roma studies in Turkey.

In this sense, I considered the agents' view as basic premise. Weberian interpretive sociology appears as important for the research. As Neuman says, "his idea of *Verstehen* (emphatic understanding) also reflects his concern for looking at how people feel inside, how they create meaning, and how their personal reasons or motivations can be used to understand them" (Neuman, 1994:61). Hence, interpretation is important for the researcher to understand the agents. In other words, the researcher's role is not passive during and after the research within interpretive approach.

In addition to researcher's role, the agents, then the members of Roma and Dom population, are not treated as passive subjects. In this regard, I tried to understand the agents' "tactics" towards majority or the state institutions in the way of benefiting from citizenship rights in both cities.

4.5 Participant Selection

As mentioned in the Introduction, Roma, Dom and Lom are three Gypsy groups living in Turkey. For the research, Edirne and Diyarbakır are selected comparative cases owing to their ethnic components of the cities. Edirne is one of the most Roma populated city, which has borders with Greece and Bulgaria. In Edirne, Roma population lives with mostly Turks who are the ethnic majority in Turkey. On the other hand, Dom population lives with mostly Kurds who are also the majority in Diyarbakır. With regard to majority-minority relations in Turkey, Turks appear as an ethnic majority, Kurds are minority of Turks, and Gypsies appear as a minority of both Turks and Kurds with regard to “size” of their population. On the other hand, Kurds and Gypsies are not officially minority groups since according to the Lausanne Treaty which was signed in 1923, there are officially three minority groups in Turkey: Armenians, Jews and Greeks.

In this regard, the study aims to compare Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır to see to what extent they can benefit from full citizenship rights with regard to equality principle of citizenship. By equality, the study implies economic and cultural justice. In this regard, on the one hand, everyone has to have equal opportunity to benefit from resources provided by welfare state. On the other hand, “difference” should not be set as a kind of injustice when the resources are distributed. Thus, the study also aims to compare how the resources are shared by different groups: Roma/Turks and Dom/Kurds.

The increasing identity politics, human rights discourse and transnational Romani movement bring about the significance of Romani studies not only in national but also in transnational space. Romani studies in Turkey have become visible with the affects of transnational space in last five years. In this process, we see new political space in which sub-national, national and transnational spaces are interrelated. For the analysis, these three parts are considered.

The study with an overall view compared the equality and integration levels of Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır in the

major society and distribution of resources on the basis of citizenship rights. For the local level, equality is evaluated in a way that how resources are shared by different groups with regard to economic and cultural justice. In this regard, the study aims to compare Roma and Dom communities to the extent that they can benefit from full citizenship rights (civil, political, social and cultural). For the national level, in order to evaluate Roma and Dom communities' citizenship practices their proximity and distance to the political community is compared. At the transnational level, the effects of transnational citizenship on Romani activism on Roma and Dom communities are compared.

Hence this kind of a comparative study shall contribute citizenship studies in Turkey exposing the citizenship profile of both Roma and Dom communities. Until today, there are few academic studies about especially Dom community.

In this framework, the following research questions guided my research study: How equality of Roma and Dom communities are formed in Edirne and Diyarbakır in terms of sharing resources with Turks and Kurds; to what extent Roma/Dom people benefit from civil (freedom of speech, the right to property, the right to justice) political (voting, the right to exercise of political power), social (education, health, housing, pensions) and cultural citizenship rights (linguistic, religious, the exercise to do their ethnic practices,) related to their urban opportunities; o what extent Rom and Dom communities have been integrated to the society as being full citizens; what are the levels of Roma and Dom community's proximity and distance to the political community; what are the effects of trans-national citizenship on the Romani activism on the Roma/Dom communities as far as the NGOs are probably affected?

For the research, I have visited Edirne and Diyarbakır several times between 2007 and 2009. Before starting my case study, I preferred to conduct pilot research in both cities. First of all, I have visited Diyarbakır Dom Association, which I have only heard of but never had the chance to meet. The second reason for starting my research with Diyarbakır is that although I could make "sociological imagination" about Roma community in Edirne owing to my master thesis, I had no idea about Dom community in Diyarbakır. Therefore,

instead of directly starting my case study research, I preferred to establish initial contacts so, I visited Diyarbakır. Next, I will explain how I conducted my pilot research in Diyarbakır and Edirne.

4.5.1 Pilot Research in Diyarbakır

In September 2007, I met Dom leader, Mehmet Demir at Diyarbakır Dom and Roma Youth Sport Club Culture Association. Gypsies in Diyarbakır call themselves as “Domari speaking Gypsies” and in this way they differentiate *Domari* language from Romani speaking group which is observed in Edirne. In addition to Turkish, Dom people also speak Kurdish.

Since 1980s, the process of forced migration with different stages highly affected Dom community which showed heterogenic features. In this regard, for example, a group of Dom people have moved to Diyarbakır as a result of recent forced migration. But there are also significant amount of Dom people who have been living with other Kurd migrants in the same neighbourhoods for some years. Pre-interviewees showed that they compete with each other for scarce resources.

Dom people are mainly musicians but have lost their jobs as the result of rural transformation. Formerly, their main instruments were “*davul* and *zurna*”, but increasing popularity of “electronic saz” in the wedding ceremonies led them to lose their ways of traditional earnings. Recently, as unemployment in Diyarbakır seems very high and poverty is very widespread, Dom people go to Blacksea region to collect hazel and also go for seasonal agricultural labourer to the West side of the Turkey such as Adapazarı, Manisa, Polatlı. Among Doms, education level is limited at most to the primary school level and illiteracy level is very high. It seems that stereotypes and prejudices work strongly against Dom people and the community seems more isolated and marginalized in Diyarbakır than Roma community in Edirne.

In my pre-interviews, I also listened to how Dom people considered themselves as discriminated. For example, Dom leader, Mehmet Demir, talked about how hard it is to find a place for their NGO as many householders would

not want to rent their houses to Dom people. For Doms, segregations take place as, “they are Kurds, and we are Gypsies”. However, according to the municipality of Diyarbakır, the rent of the Dom association was paid by the Municipality.

The Dom leader also complained about the fact that Dom people were not being employed as civil servants. Foremost, they have no Dom mukhtar. When they would apply to the positions like construction worker, mediators asked, “which *aşiret* do you belong? ”Depending on their reply, it is understood that they are Gypsy and they are not hired. In such a small environment, it is also not possible to hide the Gypsy identities. I should also note that during the research I have learnt that Dom community is culturally different from Roma community in terms of *Domari* language, *Dengbej* tradition and *Newroz* celebrations.

Later, I also met with Mehmet Demir at the Evaluation Meeting of “Promotion of Roma Rights in Turkey” organised by Helsinki Citizens Assembly on April 2008 in Ankara. He seemed not pleased with his identity being visible. He was feeling that their community problems could not be solved by such a general symposium. When he was speaking at the meeting, he mentioned that many of Dom people were at jail and their problems are very different from the problems of the Thrace Roma. He commented as, “What is Edirne? Come and see Diyarbakır!” He also assumed that other associations’ problems were far away from the case of Diyarbakır.

In summer 2008 I went to Diyarbakır once more to attend an NGO meeting arranged by my thesis supervisor. Depending on her suggestion, I invited people from Dom association but nobody could attend.

Later with the son of Dom leader in Diyarbakır I went to Civil Society Promoting Center (STGM) to learn about their activities and also introduced Dom NGO to this center. After coming back to Ankara, I heard Diyarbakır STGM visited Dom association.

Also, I conducted interviews with different NGOs such as Sarmaşık Association, Diyarbakır Development Centre and Dikasum. All the associations have stated that they have never heard the name “Dom” but they were calling

Gypsies in Diyarbakır as “*Mitrip*”, “*Karaçi*” or “*Aşık*”. In common, they work among disadvantaged people in terms of poverty but they did not know the problems about Dom people.

It seems that my pilot research in Diyarbakır, which lasted only respectively two weeks by 2007 and 2008, offered me the chance to establish some links for my further research.

4.5.2 Pilot Research in Edirne

I conducted my pilot research in Edirne by the first week of May 2008. Since I have never been to *Hidrellez* festival, I came to Edirne to take part in this festival held on 5-6 May and to conduct my pilot research. I started visiting Edirne Roma Association (EDROM) and met to one of the Roma NGO activists at the evaluation meeting of ERRC and Helsinki Citizen Assembly’s project, “Promoting Roma Rights in Turkey” on April 26 in Ankara. After one week, I met her at Edirne Roma Association (EDROM) in Edirne. When I wrote my master thesis in 2003³², Roma Association³³ had not been established yet. Hence, setting up Roma NGO and then becoming a Roma Federation seemed to me as an important development for Romani movement. I wondered what happened in five years after the foundation of Roma NGO in Edirne.

Before conducting interviews with NGO Roman activists, I explained why I came to Edirne. First of all, I wondered about their activities, what they have done since 2004. There was only one woman working in the NGO. For her, NGO needs more Roman woman and young people. She talked about the role of EDROM for Roma community. She expressed the establishment process of the association, the future plans and projections such as setting up computer and English training courses and theatre project. She also expressed the hesitations of Romani people when the association was first established. But after a while,

³² My master thesis title was “A Case Study of Gypsy/Roma Identity Construction in Edirne”.

³³ Edirne Roman organization process started with establishing Edirne Çingene Kültürünü Araştırma, Geliştirme ve Yardımlaşma Derneği (EDÇİNKAY) in 2004. NGO changed its name as Edirne Roma Association and also became Roma Association Federation (EDROM) in 2006 (<http://www.edrom.org.tr/?pid=13>, accessed as 22. 05. 2009).

Romani people started to adopt the association. Now, everybody who is in trouble comes to association to ask for help. Moreover, when I was in the NGO, which is located at the city-centre, I met lots of Roma people. Apart from the association members, Roma people, most of whom were women, came to the NGO and asked for help in such as writing petition, applying to social assistance and so forth. Hence, I had the chance to conduct participant observation. This helped me a lot to understand the NGO's role between society and state during my case study.

Moreover, the leader of EDROM Association Erdiñ Çekiç and Remziye visited Diyarbakır for the ERRC project of "Promotion of Roma Rights in Turkey". They compared Thrace Roman and Dom people in terms of their inclusion experiences in society. According to them, "one subaltern people make another community victimized". Remziye thinks that Kurds are subaltern people but at the same time they subordinate Dom people. She considered that Dom people are the "other" of Kurdish people. She also talked about how Dom leader could not find a place at the city centre called *Ofis* district for Dom Association in Diyarbakır city centre because of his ethnic identity. But by the help of municipality, they could find a place and municipality also paid their rent. Abdullah Demirbaş, mayor of Diyarbakır Sur Municipality, expressed why municipality paid the rent for Dom Association. On the one hand, he evaluated Dom community's position as the epitome of discriminated "otherness" by Kurds. On the other hand, Demirbaş finds Kurdish society in the embodiment of "otherness" [by Turks]. Hence municipality has decided to make positive discrimination towards Dom community regarding Kurdish society's position. Remziye compared Thrace area Roma people with Domari people in Diyarbakır. For her, Roma people in Edirne are not being discriminated as Dom people in Diyarbakır are. For her, this is related with the "size" of the Gypsy community.

Also, I noticed that when I visited Dom leader in Diyarbakır he always added the word 'God' to his sentences. However, in Edirne, Roma people generally emphasized how they are loyal to 'state'. The words that are emphasized actually surprised me because these words were the signifiers for how they conceptualized their worlds. In this regard, on the one hand, EDROM expressed

how they have good relationships with state but on the other hand, he always mentioned “state” as a sacrificed issue. The general problem for Roma associations in Turkey is paying rents. For Edirne, Abdullah Gül, who was foreign minister during ex-government, paid two years of rent for EDROM. I saw Gül’s picture on the wall of NGO. In addition, Erdiñ Çekiç who is the leader of Roma NGO (EDROM) and Remziye said that President of Security General Directorate in Edirne helped them to take a computer to one primary school and also showed his solidarity for Roma people. Hence, during even my pilot research I tried to understand their relations with hegemony.

Through applying snowball sampling method in Edirne, I reached to ex-Çeribaşı and Romani leader with the help of Remziye. I visited Mehmet Ali Körüklü, who was *Çeribaşı* (traditional Roma leader in Edirne) between 1992 and 1999, and now he is the Chief of Roman Public Dance Group which performs under the Ministry of Culture. During the interview, his main concern was related to the Romani identity politics. He complained about the categorization of Gypsy people with different terms like “*Kıpti*”, “*Çingene*” and “*Roman*”. Likewise, Dom leader in Diyarbakır also complained about this identity reappearing.

Roma leader’s musician friends from his band also contributed to our interview. I explained the reasons of my visit to Edirne as comparing Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır. After that, an argument started about “who we are?”, “what are the common aspects between European and their communities?” During the pilot interviews with musicians, I also learned about important points regarding education. One of the interviewee, for example, talked about the homogenization of schools on the ground that non-Gypsy people were taking their children away from schools as they do not want to have education with Gypsy kids. He asked me, “isn’t it discrimination?” He also gave example from his personal experience. When he was walking at the street with his sun-glasses, some non-Gypsy children called him as “Çin-Gin”. He said that “Ok, they are children but who teach these issues to children?” Hence, I talked about their discriminatory habits against Gypsies regarding unequal participation in education.

All of the interviews with musicians were indicating that music is very important in Roma people's life. Some of them showed me Roma people belly dance and argued that now "Gaco" also can play like them. In Edirne, the atmosphere was relaxed compared to Dom people meeting in the NGO in Diyarbakır and Ankara. Dom people used to be musician as well but they are unemployed now because their main instruments were "davul and zurna". Nowadays, "electronic saz" is the main instrument in Kurdish weddings and nobody calls Dom people to play "*davul and zurna*" in Diyarbakır. Hence, they are affected by this transformation negatively.

In Edirne, I also visited municipality to get information about Roma community. Employers asked me whether I have visited EDROM. For people, talking about Roma community was not a taboo anymore. It was interesting for me, because when I was conducting my field-work during my master study in 2003, non-Gypsies were not as much reluctant as now, while I was talking about Romani people. At that time it was like a taboo. Non-Gypsies live with Romani people side by side but they were ignoring them. Hence, it seems to me that foundation of Roma NGO changed the atmosphere from invisibility of Roma identity to visibility in public place. I asked whether the urban transformation projects are applied for Roma people living in Edirne. According to municipality, inhabitants of *Menziliahir -Kıyık-* neighborhood are resisting to this. Hence, municipality has not started yet, but they are planning the restoration of Roma houses if they receive EU fund. On the other hand, NGO and Roma people think in different ways. For them, if *Kıyık* area had been profitable, Roma people's resistance could not stop the municipality's urban transformation plans. Although on the surface things seem as they have changed against Roma community, at deeper levels there are differences between Roma and non-Roma people.

Remziye was my key access to the Roma women community. She introduced me to a woman in *Çavuşbey* neighborhood. We visited her and went to celebrate *Hidrellez* on the night of 5th of May. She was also my main mediator in the neighborhood. I also conducted in-depth interviews and discovered newly emergent patterns when I talked to her friends and acquaintances, such as

increasing level of divorce among Roma woman. It was also interesting for me, because divorce was a taboo when I conducted my master research five years ago.

I went to *Sarayıcı, Hıdrellez* fest place, to make participant observation and make interviews on 6th of May morning. When I introduced myself, people easily declared their ethnic identity as “Roma” and they were proud of this identity. Mainly we talked about Hıdrellez, but I could have also asked questions about their daily life practices. The pilot research had been useful to discover new patterns. Through this way, I also recomposed my in-depth interview questions.

4.6 Sample Characteristics

Table 4.1 Social Demographic Profile of Roma Interviewees in Edirne

	Name*	Age	Sex	Place of Birth	Marriage Status	# of Child	Occupation	Education Level	Neighbourhood**
1	Celal	45	M	Edirne Village	Married	2	Unemployed	Primary School	Menziliahir
2	Necla	73	F	Kırklareli Village	Widowed	4	Non-Working	Uneducated	Çavuşbey
3	Dicle	20	F	Edirne	Single	-	Non-Working	University Student	Çavuşbey
4	Bülent	55	M	Edirne	Married	5	Grocer	Secondary School	Yıldırım Hacısarraf
5	Şener	60	M	Edirne Village	Married	2	Peddler	Primary School	Çavuşbey
6	Sultan	98	F	Edirne Village	Widowed	?	Non-Working	Uneducated	Çavuşbey
7	Kemal	35	M	Edirne	Married	3	Grocer	Primary School	Yıldırım Hacısarraf
8	Kazım	57	M	Edirne Village	Married	?	Musician	Primary School	Menziliahir
9	Sinan	50	M	Edirne Village	Married	2	Lavatory Attendant	Primary School	Menziliahir
10	Meltem	47	F	Edirne	Married	4	Metal Worker	Primary School	Çavuşbey
11	Murat	38	M	Edirne	Married	2	NGO Volunteer	Secondary School	Çavuşbey
12	Fevzi	46	M	Edirne	Married	1	Peddler	Primary School	Yıldırım Beyazıt

* All names are pseudonym, except for NGO volunteers and Çeribaşı with their permission.

** Apart from Binevler, inhabitants are mainly Roma people in these neighborhoods. *Menziliahir* is the oldest neighborhood in Edirne. This neighborhood is dramatically different from other neighborhoods and in worst situation in terms of socio-economic level of people and housing conditions. Inhabitants separate this neighborhood symbolically as *Yukarı Kıyık* or *Çadırcılar* [tenters] where agricultural laborers reside at and *Aşağı Kıyık*. Other Roma people call the Roma inhabitants of this neighborhood as *Poşa* which has a pejorative meaning. In general, Roma people also call neighborhoods according to people occupation. For example, paper collectors generally reside at *Menziliahir*. *Çavuşbey* is located at city-centre and socio-economic level of people in here is higher than *Menziliahir*. There is a model primary school which develops different courses towards Roma children. According to inhabitants of *Yıldırım Beyazıt* and *Yıldırım Hacısarraf*, these neighborhoods involve mostly Roma laborers who work at the municipality. But they are mostly garbage men. Kurdish people who came by migration from East also generally reside at Roma district of this neighborhood. Besides, Turkish people also inhabit in this neighborhood but not near to Roma people houses. In *Binevler*, generally non-Gypsy people inhabit.

	Name	Age	Sex	Place of Birth	Marriage Status	# Child	Occupation	Education Level	Neighbourhood
13	Funda	68	F	Edime Village	Married	6	Non-Working	Unknown	Çavuşbey
14	İbrahim	16	M	Edime	Single	-	Non-Working	High School Student	Yıldırım Beyazıt
15	Müjde	43	F	Edime	Divorced	1	Peddler	Drop Out From Primary School	Çavuşbey
16	İlyas	30	M	Edime	Married	1	House Painter	Primary School	Çavuşbey
17	Nihal	56	F	Kırklareli	Divorced	4	Domestic Cleaner	Uneducated	Çavuşbey
18	Eda	20	F	Edime	Married	-	NGO Volunteer	High School	Yıldırım Beyazıt
19	Sibel	28	F	Edime Village	Married	1	Non-Working	Primary School	Menziliahir
20	Mehtap	60	F	Edime Village	Married	7	Temporary Worker	Uneducated	Çavuşbey
21	Bilge	30	F	Edime	Married	2	Stair Cleaner	Uneducated	Menziliahir
22	Coşkun	38	M	Edime Village	Married	6	Unemployed	Uneducated	Menziliahir
23	Taner	27	M	Edime	Single	-	NGO Volunteer	Secondary School	Çavuşbey
24	Mustafa	28	M	Edime	Married	2	Musician	Drop Out From Primary School	Menziliahir
25	Ali	50	M	Edime	Married	4	Metal Worker	Primary School	Çavuşbey
26	Aliye	48	F	Edime Village	Widowed	1	Paper Collector – Stair Cleaner	Unknown	Menziliahir
27	Müzeyyen	47	F	Edime	Married	1	Retired Worker From Germany	Primary School	Binevler
28	Elfida	50	F	İstanbul	Married	?	Non-Working	Uneducated	Menziliahir
29	Pınar	32	F	Edime	Married	2	Domestic Cleaner	Primary School	Yıldırım Hacısarraf
30	Emel	66	F	İstanbul	Widowed	6	Retired Worker From Germany	Uneducated	Yıldırım Hacısarraf
31	Zeki	41	M	Edime Village	Divorced	2	Frog Hunting	Primary School	Menziliahir

Table 4.2 Social Demographic Profile of Dom Interviewees in Diyarbakır

	Name*	Age	Sex	Place of Birth	Marriage Status	# of Child	Occupation	Education Level	Neighborhood**
1	Ahmet	28	M	Diyarbakır Village	Married	3	Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Laborer	Uneducated	Cemal Yılmaz
2	Mehmet	66	M	Diyarbakır Village	Married	5	Non-Working	Uneducated	Cemal Yılmaz
3	Nuri	32	M	Diyarbakır	Married	5	Temporary Musician & Seasonal Agricultural Laborer	Uneducated	Yeniköy
4	Veli	42	M	Diyarbakır	Married	8	Temporary Musician	Uneducated	Yeniköy
5	Ramazan	35	M	Siverek	Married	4	Musician & peddling cloths and woman's garments	Primary School	Living in Siverek but nomadic during summer
6	Deniz	26	F	Diyarbakır	Married	5	Non-Working	Uneducated	Yeniköy
7	Yaprak	21	F	Diyarbakır	Married	2	Beggar	Drop out from Primary School	Yeniköy
8	Defne	18	F	Diyarbakır	Unofficial Religious Marriage	1	Non-Working	Uneducated	Yeniköy
9	Ayşe	28	F	Diyarbakır	Unofficial Religious Marriage	4	Beggar	Uneducated	Yeniköy
10	Fatoş	19	F	Diyarbakır	Single	-	Temporary Seasonal Worker	Uneducated	Cemal Yılmaz
11	Türkan	42	F	Diyarbakır Village	Unofficial Religious Marriage	6	Beggar	Uneducated	Cemal Yılmaz
12	Hamdi	41	M	Diyarbakır	Married	4	Non-Working	Uneducated	Hasırlı
13	Zerrin	35	F	Lice	Married	5	Beggar	Uneducated	Hasırlı
14	Berfin	20	F	Diyarbakır	Married	2	Non-Working	Drop out from Primary School	Hasırlı

* All names are pseudonym.

** *Alipaşa*, *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* neighborhoods in which considerable Dom people inhabit reside in Sur Municipality. It is estimated that nearly between 60 % and 70 % of inhabitants of *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* neighborhood are Dom people who settled to Diyarbakır after 1990s. Most of households live on with woman's begging and temporary seasonal agricultural labor. *Hasırlı* neighborhood is placed near to city walls, of which the socio-economic level and housing conditions are very limited among other *Suriçi* districts. In *Hasırlı*, social interaction between Kurd and Dom people is so limited whereby they live side by side. Because of the reconstruction of city walls, some houses were demolished. For this reason, the inhabitants of this neighborhood moved to *Benusen* or *Bağlar*. Besides, people generally called *Hasırlı* as *Kore* neighborhood where ex-panel house used to be. *Yeniköy* is totally a new district. Before 1990s, Dom people used to live in tents. Afterwards, when they understood they could not be nomadic anymore, they built *gecekondu*s [shacks]. Most of the inhabitants come after the forced migration since 1990s settled to *Bağlar*. In this neighborhood, Dom inhabitants came from Lice, Hazro, etc, therefore, out from Diyarbakır. Although the other Dom inhabitants of different neighborhoods know Dom people in *Bağlar*, their interaction is low. *Benusen* is also a neighborhood where socio-economic conditions are limited.

	Name	Age	Sex	Place of Birth	Marriage Status	# of Child	Occupation	Education Level	Neighbourhood
15	İdil	30	F	Diyarbakır	Married	5	Temporary Building Cleaner	Uneducated	Hasırlı
16	Elif	15	F	Diyarbakır	Unofficial Religious Marriage	-	Non-Working	Drop out from Primary School	Hasırlı
17	Erdal	15	M	Diyarbakır	Single	-	Temporary Worker at the Car Park	Drop out from Primary School	Cemal Yılmaz
18	Tarık	17	M	Diyarbakır	Single	-	Student	Student at Primary School	Cemal Yılmaz
19	Gönül	41	F	Hazro	Married	8	Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Laborer	Uneducated	Alipaşa
20	Baran	42	M	Diyarbakır Village	Married	8	Non-Working	Uneducated	Alipaşa
21	Nermin	40	F	Diyarbakır Village	Married	10	Beggar	Uneducated	Alipaşa
22	Barış	21	M	Diyarbakır	Married	2	Non-Working	Uneducated	Alipaşa
23	Rıza	35	M	Diyarbakır Village	Married	7	Non-Working	Uneducated	Alipaşa
24	Onur	16	M	Diyarbakır	Single	-	Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Laborer	Uneducated	Alipaşa
25	Çiçek	42	F	Diyarbakır	Married	10	Beggar	Uneducated	Benusen
26	Aylin	40	F	Diyarbakır	Married	4	Temporary Building Cleaner	Uneducated	Benusen
27	Yüksel	44	F	Diyarbakır Village	Married	8	Non-Working	Uneducated	Hasırlı
28	Şebnem	15	F	Diyarbakır	Single	-	Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Laborer	Drop out from Primary School	Hasırlı
29	Burhan	45	M	Diyarbakır	Married	8	Non-Working	Primary School	Hasırlı
30	Zarife	22	F	Diyarbakır	Married	4	Beggar	Uneducated	Alipaşa

4.7 The Case Study Interview Process

To evaluate the comparison between Edirne and Diyarbakır, I applied qualitative research “to understand themes of the lived daily world from the subjects’ own perspectives” (Kvale, 2007:10). During my research, I applied in-depth interview, oral history and participant observation techniques as data collection methods depending on their appropriateness. I also prepared separate in-depth interview questions for interviewing with children and the persons working at different public institutions.

4.7.1 Edirne Case Study

I completed my pilot-research in Edirne in eight days. Apart from this, I came back to Edirne twice and stayed for twenty five days in total. There are eight Roma populated neighborhoods in Edirne: *Yeni İmaret*, *Karaağaç*, *Umurbey*, *Menziliahir*, *Yıldırım Beyazıt*, *Ayşekadın (Araplar District)* and *Yıldırım Hacısarraf neighbourhood*. These are old settlement areas and homogenized as non-Gypsies generally live in new settlement areas, such as *Binevler*, *Ayşekadın*. I should have note that Edirne received migrants for the last ten years, most of whom are Kurds. Spatially, Kurds also live in Roma neighborhoods. During my master research, I could not visit *Menziliahir* or *Kıyık*. This time I went this neighborhood and conducted interviews. It was important for me, because other inhabitants of neighborhoods generally compare their daily lives with this neighborhood. Hence, I made participant observation and had a chance to compare the neighborhoods.

I conducted in-depth interviews with 31 Roma people and 4 primary school students. Generally I tried to apply oral history with elders. In sum, respondents were youth, adults and elders. I tried to reach to different groups in order to understand the differences among generations. Moreover, I conducted in-depth interviews at institutions like at two primary schools, at the Social

Assistance and Solidarity Foundation and at the Edirne Director of Bar Council and the Edirne Municipality.

During my pilot study, I had new friends and mediators who introduced me with their acquaintances and neighbors. I had especially built up good relationship with one Roma woman who was introduced to me by NGO. She was my key access to enter the community. When I felt tired, I called and visited that Roma woman, who lives in *Çavuşbey- Gazimihal* district. She got divorced and had one child. In my pilot study, I generally conducted interviews with gate keepers, NGO activists, Romani leaders. Yet this time, I was on the field research. I asked to my female mediator that I would like to visit other women in the neighborhood. Hence, I applied “snowball sampling”.

Women started to visit our house when they heard a “Gaco” was in their neighborhood. They asked my mediator, “Who is she?” She replied, “She is writer” or “She is Erdinç’s guest³⁴”. Yet, when I try to correct her reply, she said “Don’t worry, they would not understand what you are doing”. On the contrary, I wanted them to know what I was exactly doing.

I conducted interviews not only with women but also with men. Depending on their permission I used my recorder. As the field research is “two-way” process, meantime they also asked where I am living; whether I am married or not; and some other personal questions. I tried not to have power relations and tried to be action oriented during my research. I shared my experiences in Diyarbakır, what Dom people are doing or I tried to help translations from English to Turkish at EDROM³⁵. Once, I did cleaning in EDROM with other women I was together. I thought that if I would not have taken place in such cleaning activities while the others were doing, I would not only be considered as snobbish but also established power over them.

Not only the Roma people but also non-Roma people were helpful in conducting my research. I applied snowball sampling technique and accessed to

³⁴ Erdinç Çekiç, the leader of Roma NGO (EDROM).

³⁵ EDROM is member of European Roma Grassroot Movement (ERGO) which held a meeting on September in Edirne. I participated their meeting helping translation

the community via different mediators. But I have to stress that I was not able to ask all the questions. During the in-depth interviews, if one passes days on the field, she/he learns new things about the city and the people. For example, one day I was reading a newspaper at EDROM. The news was about agricultural seasonal laborers. Then, the issue came to Roma seasonal laborers in Edirne. Until now, I did not know how the network works, and then I decided to make discussions on the usage of this traditional labor. Another example: One day I noticed there were a considerably high numbers of Roma immigrants, who were working in Germany. As I discovered new patterns, I examined these issues through adding new questions. I believe that if the researcher is not open to these new patterns, the fieldwork would be useless.

At the end of the research, I have transcribed the interviews for two months.

4.7.2 Diyarbakır Case Study

As mentioned above, the pilot research process in Diyarbakır lasted a total of 15 days in 2007 and in 2008. Thereafter, I went to Diyarbakır for the case study interview which lasted for 15 days, one week in June 2009 and one week in September 2009. Hence, I conducted Diyarbakır case study within 30 days. There are six Dom populated neighborhood in Diyarbakır: *Ali Paşa, Hasırlı, Cemal Yılmaz, Yeniköy, Bağlar and Benusen*. Apart from *Bağlar* and *Benusen* neighbourhoods, I visited the interviewees at their households. Dom population in Diyarbakır is nearly estimated between 5000-8000³⁶. Meanwhile, it is important to mention that there is no specific population census about Dom community in Diyarbakır or Roma community in Edirne as census based on ethnic identity is considered as discriminatory according to the Turkish Constitution. I conducted in-depth interviews with 30 Dom people. Like in Edirne case, respondents were youth, adults and elders. I tried to reach to different groups in order to understand

³⁶ According to the results of census registration system based on address show that 1492 828 inhabitants live in Diyarbakır in 2008. (TÜİK Area Indicators 2008, TRC2 Şanlıurfa Diyarbakır <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>) Nevertheless, *heimatlos* percentage and the migration from villages to Diyarbakır owing to the forced migration make this population percentage increase.

the differences among generations. I also have to mention that I could not determine the number of interviewees before I entered in the fieldwork. When I started to get common responses from the different households patterns were seem saturated, so I stopped the field research.

Before I went to Diyarbakır in June 2009, I phoned my first access Mehmet Demir who was the leader of Diyarbakır Dom and Roma Youth Sport Club Culture Association. Yet, he was not in Diyarbakır when I went there because his family had moved to İstanbul. Hence, I decided to start making in-depth interviews at public institutions. Like in Edirne, I conducted in-depth interviews at institutions at two primary schools, at the Diyarbakır Director of Bar Council, the Diyarbakır Suriçi Municipality, at the Beyaz Kelebek Çamaşirevi (White Butterfly Laundry, which is a municipality service in Diyarbakır), at the Office of Public Prosecutor at the Metropolitan Municipality Social Services Department, at the Democratic Society Party, Bağlar Municipality Child Education Centre and with mukhtars.

First of all, I arranged an appointment with Abdullah Demirbaş who is mayor of Diyarbakır Sur Municipality. *Alipaşa*, *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* are the neighborhoods in which considerable Dom inhabitants reside in Sur Municipality. At the end of the interview, mayor suggested me whether I would like to visit Dom neighborhoods. He introduced me with ex-mukhtar of *Savaş* neighborhood, which is located in *Suriçi* district and municipal police who accompanied me during my visit to Dom families in *Cemal Yılmaz* neighborhood. Thereby, my case study started.

Hasırlı and *Cemal Yılmaz* neighborhoods are close to each other and situated in the oldest area of the city called as *Suriçi*. According to Diyarbakır Development Centre report,

“[u]ntil 50 years ago Syriac, Keldani, Jewish, Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian communities lived together in these neighborhoods. *Suriçi* neighborhoods which once hosted the leading families of the city lost its wealthy families to new settlement areas in the city within the last 30 years” (Development Centre, 2006: 12).

Moreover, *Hasırlı* neighborhood used to be known as *Gâvur* (Infidel) neighbourhood in the history (Diken, 2003). This name is given to the neighborhood as mainly non-Muslim population used to live in there. Moreover, narrow streets are peculiar to old part of the city and “houses and streets in these neighborhoods are marked by basaltic stone as construction material” (Development Centre, 2006:12). Some of the houses which I visited were enlarged by adding storey in *Cemal Yılmaz* neighbourhood. In addition, I encountered that some of the households were very crowded like including 25-30 person per house.

Today, the inhabitants of these neighbourhoods came to Diyarbakır owing to forced migration. Besides, it is estimated that nearly between 60 % and 70 % of inhabitants of *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* neighborhood are Dom people who settled in Diyarbakır after 1990s. As a result of interviews, I learned that the households who improve their economic condition in *Suriçi* neighborhood move to other neighborhoods and cities that are respectively in better condition. Yet, they are especially Kurdish families.

In *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* neighborhoods, most of the inhabitants of Dom community used to be nomadic, who travelled around Diyarbakır villages. They settled in these neighborhoods with the main affect of forced migration after 1990s. Nowadays, Dom people inhabit in these neighborhoods side by side with their Kurdish neighbors, who also came to Diyarbakır owing to the forced migration.

In this regard, the years of 1993-94 appear as a breaking point. Most of the Dom interviewees are settled in Diyarbakır after these years. I applied oral history technique especially with elder people who used to be nomadic. It was important for the research to evaluate citizenship right practices before and after the migration process. Most of the Dom people had no birth certificate when they migrated to the city. I also encountered that many of Dom women did not have birth certificate because they married as young as 12, 14 and did not handle the bureaucratic processes. Lack of birth registration seemed more widespread in Diyarbakır than Edirne. Rather than civil marriages, religious marriages appeared

to be more widespread in the community. But during the interviews at the institutions, the authorities mentioned that this condition is not only peculiar to Dom community. After the forced migration, lots of Kurdish families migrated from the villages, also did not have birth certificate.

During my case study, my key access was an old Dom man who was introduced to me by the ex- mukhtar of Savaş neighborhood. He was my key access in helping enter the community. He is regarded as a respected man among Dom community and by his help I received a warm welcome. During the research, my accesses to the community have changed because it was impossible to conduct research in different neighborhoods by help of only one person among Dom community. For example, I arranged an appointment with the mukhtar of *Hasırlı* neighborhood to conduct in-depth interview. At the end of the interview, I also asked him whether he knew any Dom families inhabiting in this neighborhood. He suggested me to visit a Dom family. And again I applied snowball sampling technique which refers to “going from one case to the next, asking interviewees for other people who might be relevant for the study and the like” (Flick, 2007:28). The man whom I visited at the beginning of the research helped me to meet other Dom families in other neighborhoods.

Having visited the neighborhoods, *Cemal Yılmaz, Alipaşa, Hasırlı, Yeniköy*, I had also chance to go nomadic Dom people’s tents around Diyarbakır villages through medium of an elderly Dom man who used to be nomadic before 1990s. One of my respondents in Diyarbakır said that “go and see nomadic Doms. They are real Dom”. Similarly, during my Edirne field study most of Roma people signified *Kıyık* neighborhood where “real Roma” people live *Kıyık* neighborhood. Socio-economic level of inhabitants living in *Kıyık* neighborhood is considerably lower than other neighborhoods. Hence, respondents in both Edirne and Diyarbakır regarded “real Gypsy” as those in worst socio-economic condition or having nomadic patterns. In other words, if the degree of benefiting from citizenship rights is limited, it leads producing stereotypes among Roma or Dom people. For example, Roma people in Edirne call the inhabitants of *Kıyık*

neighborhoods as *Poşa* which has a pejorative meaning. Likewise, Dom people in Diyarbakır call nomadic Gypsies as real Dom owing to the cultural patterns.

Dom people living in tents were coming from Siverek. They are semi-nomadic group travelling around Diyarbakır through the summer. Although they wanted to pitch up tent in Diyarbakır, they turned back to Diyarbakır villages because Diyarbakır municipality has forbidden tents. Dom women were selling cloth and female garment by knocking on villagers' doors. Interviewees mentioned that they were buying these garments from Diyarbakır, Urfa, Gaziantep and Mardin. Moreover, they are sometimes doing this job during winter as they have cars. Men were musicians. This group was the only nomadic group I have met on the ground that Dom people are settled in Diyarbakır now. I learnt that there is language difference between Diyarbakır and this group. Although a lot of Dom people speak *Domari* language in Diyarbakır, my Dom access who brought me this group said that they speak *Karaçi* dialect of *Domari*.

During the in-depth interviews I learnt that there are two Dom tribes called according to occupation. *Karaçi* group's occupation are making sieve. The other group call themselves just Dom. And they used to be musicians. Nevertheless, the name of Dom in the region differs such as *Aşık*, *Mıtrıp*, *Karaçi* and *Çingene* (Gypsy).

At the end of the research, I have transcribed the interviews for two months.

4.8 Limitation

In this part, I will discuss the limitations of my research which are related both to the content as well as methodological issues. These limitations are related to my identity experience, gate keeper factor, gender of interviewees as well as language problem, the feature of asking questions and finally methodological matters. I will start to discuss identity of the researcher at the fieldwork as the role of the researcher's role is not passive especially if the person is conducting qualitative study. I will also elaborate why Roma and Dom respondents accepted

me and answered my questions related to my identity experience. Then, I will continue with the other limitations which I have mentioned above.

First limitation was about my identity. Gypsy people considered me as “*Gaco*” (Gadjo) in Edirne and as “*Perev*” in Diyarbakır. Both of the words mean non-Gypsies. Hence the ethnic identity one holds, whether Turk, Kurd or other identity, does not matter. If one is not Gypsy, then he/she is *Gaco/Perev*³⁷. Therefore, I was a stranger in their neighborhood and if one is a *Gaco/Perev*, they wonder what that person is doing in their neighborhood. But I have to stress that I was welcomed with hospitality³⁸.

Meanwhile, in Edirne I was just a *Gaco* researcher. On the contrary, in Diyarbakır, since most of Dom people consider themselves having both identity Dom and Kurd, I was not only just *Perev*, but also a non-Kurdish researcher.

Beginning of the research, I was a total outsider for the community. I also did not also know what I encountered. Yet when the time passes, I felt their close friendship as they started treating me as insider of the community. Having closed the recorder, they shared their food, living places and personal stories. This situation also led me to think to myself about my researcher position.

For example, when I was walking with my translator at a narrow district in Diyarbakır, I unintentionally encountered an elder Dom woman who was begging. First of all, I did not notice her but my friend recognized because we visited her acquaintances’ household. I could not conduct an interview with her, but we had seen each other before. My friend later told me that when she first saw us she had changed her direction and entered a shop in order not to encounter us because of feeling embarrassed of begging. After a while, when she left the shop, she

³⁷ For the females, non-Gypsy is attributed as *Gaci* in Romani language. However, in my field research, I was called as *Gaco*. As I do not want to intervene the evidence of the field research, I used the attribution of “*Gaco*” in my analysis.

³⁸ Meanwhile, I also have to tell extra knowledge about my identity experience when I went to Bulgaria, *Stara Zagora* to make field research out of this research. Gypsies and Turks live in the same neighborhood in the outskirts of the city. When inhabitants asked my identity, I told them, I was coming from Turkey. They called me *Horahane* which means Turk. It was allowable identity in their neighbourhood because Turks are their neighbours. They called themselves as *Horahane Gypsies*. Therefore, who you are is an important, effective issue in Roma studies.

hesitated to look at me but later asked people around for money. Then she stopped besides us waiting for us to give money. While I was a researcher at her neighborhood, it was totally unethical to give money to any inhabitants from the related neighborhoods. I was on the other hand not a researcher on the street and this was causing an identity conflict and the feeling of being stranger of being a researcher or a friend of her acquaintance. Conversely, she also felt the conflict in a way. I was an ordinary people whom she was begging while performing her daily occupation, but on the other hand I was a researcher who was visiting her neighborhood and talking to Dom people. Hence, researcher's position is not passive at the fieldwork and the respondents are not static subjects frozen in time and space. Researcher interacts with people, which brings a dynamic change both for the researcher and the respondents.

Being a *Gaco* in Edirne, I was stranger to their daily life practices. For example, when I learned about agricultural seasonal laborers and the concept of the mediator between employer and employee, called *Dragamon*, it was something new to me. But, these things were part of their daily life experiences. Sometimes they answered me, as if I knew these cultural or practical things. But I did not know. Therefore, I tried hard to grasp their situations as much as possible through asking flood of questions. But this time they got bored. Briefly, it was a challenging experience for me.

As to Diyarbakır, the situation of my research was considerably different from Edirne. I did not know Diyarbakır well. I am not Kurdish either. Nevertheless, my husband's family is living in Diyarbakır and he knows Kurdish and the environment so he helped me. During the research the most important limitation was that I did not know Kurdish especially when conducting in-depth interviews with women. Therefore, I used a translator. On the other hand, I could easily recognize the patterns as an outsider such as marriage in terms of custom, differentiation in Dom ethnic identity –*Karaçi* and *Domari* – and so on.

Although I am a *Gaco* or *Perev*, why did they talk to me? I explained my purpose to the inhabitants that I try to compare two cities, Edirne and Diyarbakır. In Edirne, people generally complained about their situations with regard to

poverty, unemployment conditions of Edirne, how stereotypes about Roma affect their daily life. One of the respondents in Edirne said that “people and politicians should know our life the way we explained”. I responded, “yes, I am exactly trying to do the same thing”. From ex-Çeribaşı to inhabitants of Edirne, I listened to their complaint: “The researchers and television show us in pejorative way. They just sit and write a paper and generalize it about all Roma people”. At that moment I realized that qualitative methods are the most suitable techniques for my research. As Agar argues, “[n]o understanding of a world is valid without representation of those members’ voices” (Agar, 1996:27). One of my respondents said that “if you went to rich people to make interview, they would probably not accept you”. Hence, he drew a line between rich and poor people’s perception of stranger. Some of the respondents asked me to call on a Roma conference to declare their daily lives by themselves. But generally they asked me to “write how we are living”.

Like Roma people, most of the Dom people accepted me to “reveal the reality” rather than complaining about stereotypes or prejudices towards Dom community as in Edirne. Poverty is a common element both for Roma and Dom community. For example, one Dom man talked about poor conditions of his house, lack of toilet and bathroom. He could not afford his house to be repaired as he was unemployed. Afterwards he said that “We have to speak reality now. She may have the recorder listened by whoever she wants tomorrow. If she came from Edirne for us, we had to give her the reality because of the fact that destitute people live in Diyarbakır. That is we have no life and there is no point in living”.

Moreover, the research was interesting for some of the respondents when they learned I had also visited Roma people in Edirne. This condition was also valid for Edirne field research. Hence, dimension of the comparison affected respondents to heed the research. Some of the respondents were interested with Edirne field-research and asked me questions about Roma people.

In all interviews that I conducted in both Edirne and Diyarbakır, I had the impression that they were being neglected. With my research, I believe and hope to make their invisible lives visible.

Apart from the reason of showing me the reality of their lives, there were different reasons of Dom respondents for accepting me. Until now there has been limited academic study about Dom community. Edirne Roma Association, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and Helsinki Citizens Assembly implemented a project on Promoting of Roma Rights in Turkey between 2006-2008. A research team also visited Dom community in Diyarbakır. In this way, the least known Gypsy communities, Dom and Lom were heard. When I went to the field-study in Diyarbakır, one of my respondents, a Dom woman, asked to me: “How do you know Dom people? We are least known”. I explained my reason to come Diyarbakır. For most of them, I was the first researcher to ask questions about Dom community. In response, they took an interest for the research.

On the contrary, lots of researchers or people from television have gone to Edirne. One Roma man said that when Savaş Ay, who is popular on television wanted to make a television program in a Roma neighborhood, the inhabitants did not let him to enter the neighborhood. According to him, Roma people had enough of this kind of interest because nothing changes in their life.

In addition to my identity experience in Diyarbakır, some of Dom respondents asked me whether the government might send them to Romania. I was so surprised with this expectation. I learnt that a Roma woman coming from Romania visited Dom community before I was in Diyarbakır. Besides, when I conduct in-depth interviews, some of them talked among themselves that “they will send us Romania”. One of my respondents wanted to be sent by government to Northern Iraq or even to Africa. All of them emphasized that there is no job opportunity in Diyarbakır.

In Edirne, some of the respondents wanted government assistance. Yet, they have never mentioned going to another country. Hence, this kind of expectation is an indicator of the hopelessness. In fact, most of the respondents in Diyarbakır mentioned that nobody cares about Dom.

For Edirne, the second limitation was about gatekeepers, who have a kind of status or power in their society; such as, Çeribaşı or the leaders of the

neighborhood, sometimes a husband or grand mother-in law. The problem with the gate keepers was that they did not give opportunity to the others to state their views. Also I experienced difficulty while exploring the respondent's migration histories. For example, I tried to interview with Körüklü who was ex-Çeribaşı but he was always changing the subject. I tried to re-ask the questions but he was guiding me.

Besides, I generally talked in crowded public locations. Houses were too small, I had to stand in the gardens with the household members and mostly ended up interviewing with different household members. Many people interfered to the interview. Hence, the space was also limited. I also encountered with this limitation in Diyarbakır.

The third limitation was related to the gender of interviewees. For example, when I met with ex-Çeribaşı and his friends from the Romani band in Edirne, there was a woman who never talked to me. We were five people sitting in the room. Although all the men interfered to the conversation in some means that woman never spoke with me. The silence of woman led me think whether the place of woman in the public space is limited when men are around.

In addition to gender issue, when I asked the same questions to both woman and men; I got different answers among Dom community. For instance, when asked to men about the relation between Dom and Kurdish people, they answered me they had good relations. Nevertheless, Dom women said that although they try to build a relation with Kurdish women in their neighborhood, Kurdish women hesitate from neighborliness. Although social interaction between Dom and Kurdish people depends on the neighborhood, the answers also depend on gender issue. The other example is that when I asked a Dom man whether his wife works or not, men generally replied to me saying their wives were not working. On the contrary, most of the Dom women replied to me that "I am working and I am begging". For instance, one Dom female respondent said that she is the only one working –begging- at their household among fifteen people. In addition, begging is seen as an occupation among Dom community because of high increase in male unemployment. And last example in gender issue is that I

was trying to understand intermarriages between Dom and Kurds. One Dom man said that they approve intermarriages between Dom and Kurdish people. However, when I talked to his daughter, she answered differently from his father. Although she fell in love with a Kurdish man, her father did not approve of this intermarriage. In response, she did not want to get married with arrangement of her family.

Hence, gender dimension is important affective factor in evaluating how women and men regard the same issues. In addition to gender issue, I encountered the limitation of language problems when I conducted research among Dom women in Diyarbakır. A great amount of Dom women, especially elder ones did not know Turkish. In this regard, translators helped me in some way. As I mentioned above, husbands or fathers could be gatekeepers, they can direct the research to how they wish. Woman's perception would be very important. I sometimes did not investigate deeply position of women in the households; for instance how woman have been affected when *kuma*³⁹ comes into house or how they felt as a result of arranged marriages.

Fourth limitation was related to the feature of asking questions. For example, in Edirne, when I asked the question how many children they have, some respondents answered this question by considering only boys. Hence, I arranged my question as how many boys and girls do you have. I asked this question without changing to Dom respondents; they gave me the numbers of boys and girls. The other example is that when I asked to Dom women whether they have married, they replied to me positively. However, during in-depth interview, I understood that some of them regarded religious marriage as equal to civil marriage. Hence, the feature of asking question is vital for qualitative study. Related to my experiences, I sometimes felt confused.

Fifth limitation I have to mention is that I could not determine invisible Roma identities in Edirne. Some Roma families talked about other rich Roma people but for them those rich groups define themselves not as Roma after being rich. Also, I heard that there were educated Roma people like doctors, teachers

³⁹ Kuma is a fellow wife in a polygamous household.

and nurses but I am told that they were hiding their identity because of being subject to discrimination. Keeping identity secret is a kind of survival strategy for the educated and rich Roma people. This was main blind point in my research.

Last but not least limitation was related to the representation of the groups. The comparison between Roma and Dom communities might lead to regarding these two communities as uniform in itself. On the contrary, there are variations within community in itself in terms of neighborhood, migration patterns, age, gender, and so on. As Agar says, “[g]roups no longer have clear edges, and people present multiple and often conflicting identities, some of them rooted outside the community” (Agar, 1996:11). During the data analysis, I aimed to compare two cases. Variations are very important but patterns reflect the uniformity of the community. By participant observation, I tried to give the variations of the community. I conducted case study which investigates two cities deeply, Edirne and Diyarbakır, yet the samples are only limited for both cities. Hence, we cannot generalize the research for all Roma and Dom communities living in different parts of Turkey.

4.9 Talking Sensitive Issues

In this section, I will discuss sensitive issues for the Roma community members in Edirne and Dom community members in Diyarbakır. When I was conducting my pilot research on 4th of May before Hıdırellez, there was *çeribaşı* election in *Menziliahır* neighborhood in Edirne, but I could not go there by myself. Some people from the community first promised to take me there but they did not show up. It seems to me that this issue is a private matter and belongs to the community. Therefore, I believe that it is critical to know where to stop the research in the field.

Besides, when I was conducting in-depth interviews with recorder, sometimes, some of the respondents wanted to stop the recorder in the middle of the interview because of privacy. They generally stopped me when they talked about discriminatory practices or political relationships. I generally talked about

these sensitive issues at the end of interview without tape recorder and most of time I promised them not to mention in my thesis. Hence, confidentiality is a serious concern while conducting the field research with Roma and Dom people.

In addition, there were some sensitive issues related to women. For instance, some Dom women respondents encountered a *kuma* problem in their households. Or some women had to get married to the man according to the customs of society. These arranged marriages sometimes occur to pay blood money or to solve the conflict between families. Hence, I tried to talk about these issues with women when men were being apart so that women could feel comfortable.

4.10 Methodological Discussions: Lesson Learned

Field-study is an important element of case study, yet it is also important to decide with whom you will conduct in-depth interviews at first. In this sense, it is impossible to know without going to field. But what I learnt from my field-study is that gate keepers have the power to direct you to with whom to interview or represent some cultural patterns in the way he/she mentions. As Angrosino says, gatekeepers are “members of a potential study community who control a researcher’s access to that community” (Angronisa, 2007: 98). During my beginning of my research, the main gate keepers I encountered were NGOs and the leaders of the society in both Roma and Dom communities. I started my pilot studies with NGOs in Edirne and Diyarbakır because I just met Gypsy people from these NGOs.

For Edirne, I met with EDROM volunteers before my field study. EDROM had a determinate affect for me to enter the community. Although Dom community is invisible in Kurdish society because of cultural affinity, Roma population is major minority in Edirne. Hence, EDROM has an important place in Edirne for the Roma people. Moreover, EDROM has good relations with Security General Directorate and governorship. Yet Dom community has a good

relationship with municipality. Especially EDROM was wondering what I asked and what the respondents said to me.

As for Diyarbakır, Diyarbakır Dom and Roma Youth Sport Club Culture Association was the main gate keeper at my pilot study. Turkey's the first Dom Association's activities lasted for three years and it was closed in 2009. The Dom Association was established with endeavors of ERRC research team. They applied to join the Edirne Roma Federation (EDROM) in 2007. The leader of the Dom association, Mehmet Demir told me that he founded the Dom association especially for young Dom people to break up from the vicious circle of unemployment and poverty. When I went to Diyarbakır in 2009 for my field-study, M.Demir was not in Diyarbakır. Afterwards, I met new persons among Dom community through the Sur Municipality. During my field-study, most of the respondents were critical about the association. I tried to understand its reasons. If M. Demir would be my main access to enter the community, I could never learn how community regarded the association. In short, if I could restart my field study both in Diyarbakır and Edirne, I would go to the Roma and Dom neighborhoods and then compare the data between NGOs and respondent's interviews certainly if possible.

CHAPTER V

THE TRANSFORMATION OF ROMA AND DOM COMMUNITIES

5.1 Introduction

Today, Roma and Dom communities are mostly settled in Edirne and Diyarbakır⁴⁰. In order to evaluate their citizenship rights and ways of integration in the urban conditions, it is necessary to evaluate Gypsies' nomadic patterns starting from the Ottoman Empire period. Hereafter, this chapter simply aims to answer following questions; what is the relation between settled society and nomads? What are the ways of nomadic Gypsies to enter economic relations to the host society? In this regard, how Roma and Dom communities become settled? Is nomadism irreversible in the modern nation-state?

During the decline period of Ottoman Empire, nomads were generally considered as problematic and threatening. It was hard to recruit them into military as well as part of tax collection, which made them difficult to govern. Besides, their mobility pattern was considered as potential threat. As Lindner indicates, "they might appear suddenly in a distant location and cause trouble by grazing their sheep on cultivated land or raiding villagers" (Lindner, 1983:55).

Ottoman regulations aimed to sedentarize the nomads into the empty and abandoned lands. By this way, they would be agricultural producers (Dündar,

⁴⁰ This chapter is designed to understand Roma and Dom interviewees' past nomadic patterns with regard to historical and economic transformations but it should not be generalized to all Gypsies. Roma and Dom communities are not homogenous. As argued in the Chapter III, Roma neighborhoods were present in Edirne since 16th century. In addition, not all Roma community was nomadic before 40–50 years ago. Hence, it is simply wrong to describe all Gypsies by one single pattern that all Gypsies were nomadic. In addition, nomadic pattern is taken as a cultural pattern.

2001:53; Altınöz; 2007:23-24). Accordingly, whole nomadic tribes would be settled and become agricultural labor. The Gypsies in a number of villages were also farm-workers and cattle-breeders within çiftlik formation in the late 18th and 19th century (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:64, see Chapter III). Ottoman regulations conformed nomads to pay their taxes and to participate in population census. According to Lindner, Ottoman fiscal regulations played a major control in nomads. Sheep tax and fines were enacted. As he notes that, “the sheep tax forced marginally capitalized nomads out of the pastoral cycle and into settlement. The fines along the lines of march prevented nomads from escaping the effects of irregular rainfall upon their customary pastures while on the move” (Lindner, 1983:66).

Ottoman regulations also circumscribed nomadic Gypsies’ migrations within predictable *sancak*. Anyone could leave the *sancak* without permission. (Arslan, 2001:226). We see the law concerning Gypsies in the province of Rumelia in 1530 (*Kanunname-i Kıbtıyan-i Vilayet-i Rumeli*). According to the decree (7), “If Muslim Gypsies begin to nomadise with non-Muslim Gypsies, live with them and mix with them, they should be admonished; after being punished, the infidel Gypsies pay their taxes as usual” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:32). In addition, Ottoman regulation in 1571 desired to lead Gypsies to a settled way of life. According to the regulation, “they have to renounce their nomadic way of life, to settle down and to take up farming. The Gypsies must from now on forced to sell their horses, and if anyone objects they must be punished with a prison sentence” (Marushiakova & Popov, 2001:37). The aim of the sanctions seen in *Mühimme* registers towards nomadic Gypsies were related to the fact that they were identified as sources of social discontent as well as moral and civil disorder (Altınöz, 2007:16-17; Çelik, 2003:67-68). Hereby, the attempts were made to control the movement of Gypsies. In addition, Çelik states that “they were not allowed to settle anywhere in the city...but on the outskirts or relatively peripheral neighborhoods” (Çelik, 2003: 68). She gives *Edirnekapı* as an example which was a Gypsy quarter in İstanbul.

Nomadic Gypsies and other nomads also were recruited into the military in the sixteenth century (Arslan, 2001:235; Lindner, 1983: 62). However, their roles were at auxiliary military duties in the sixteenth century. As Lindner suggests, these duties were: “army labor gangs, ship construction, road work, transport services and the like” (Lindner, 1983: 62). Yet, “they were never permitted to achieve *askeri* [military] status at least not through the will of Ottoman authorities” (Çelik: 2003: 67). Gypsies continued to be recruited in the Ottoman army until the end of eighteenth century (Marushiakova &Popov, 2001).

After Tanzimat Era, the laws were enacted to dismantle nomadic life and force them settle. Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) made special settlement regulations towards Arab, Albanian, Kurd and Gypsy communities (Dündar, 2001:56-247). CUP also aimed Gypsy nomadic population to transform into settled and become producers like other ethnicities because they were considered as damaging the settled people’s environment. According to one *Kıpti* regulation in 1917, Gypsies were hired at factories and mills (Dündar, 2001: 128). Thus, cultural assimilation was applied to destroy nomadic features.

During the early republican era of Turkey, nomadic Gypsies affected from immigration and resettlement politics in 1920s and 1930s. First Resettlement was adopted in 1926 and resettlement policies aimed to repopulation and Turkification. Accordingly, it authorized to relocate the nomadic tribes and others around suitable centers. In this regard, the term nomad was euphemism for Kurds and the occasional Roma, both of which were only migrant groups in 1920s (Cagaptay, 2006).

Moreover, Settlement Law of 1934 designated three zones in Turkey for the implementation of this policy. As Cagaptay (2006) mentions, these zones were as follows:

"Zone 1, set aside for ‘populations’ who share the Turkish culture’; Zone 2, for the ‘...relocation and resettlement of populations which are to be assimilated into the Turkish culture’; and Zone 3, areas to be vacated and closed to resettlement and habitation due to ‘sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and security’ reasons” (Cagaptay, 2006:70).

Critical decree for Gypsies was that “[t]ribal or nomadic people, as well as individuals ‘who did not share Turkish culture’ would not be allowed to settle in or enter Zone1” (Cagaptay, 2006:70). In this regard, Article 9 of Settlement Law determined that “nomadic Gypsies in Turkey and nomads who are not loyal to the Turkish culture would settle Turkish villages into Zone 2” (Cagaptay, 2009: 143).

In 1934 Settlement Law, ethnicist nature was the determining factor on the ground that Kurds would settle in “Zone 2” and migrant Roma and nomads who do not share the Turkish culture would be settled in Turkish villages in the same “Zone 2” area. (Cagaptay, 2006:67). Zone 2 is designed for the populations who are to be assimilated into Turkish culture. Therefore, the ultimate aim of this relocation process was to assimilate Kurds and Roma by integrating them with Turks. In this regard, the common point between Kurds and Roma was that they were seen as not sharing Turkish culture. As Cagaptay (2006) indicates, “based on Gökalp’s definition, the term Turkish culture in this law referred to the common heritage of Ottoman-Turkish Muslims. It covered their joint history, traditions, belief system, values and mores” (Cagaptay, 2006:73). In 1930s, Ministry of Interior determined the qualification of being immigrant that “settled or nomadic individuals of Turkish origin and settled persons who share the Turkish culture would qualify as immigrant” (Cagaptay, 2006:72). In this regard, the Settlement Law, which prevented “nomadic individuals of non-Turkish origin from immigrating, blocked the Kurds, Roma, Arabs, Assyrians, Circassians, and other Muslims of the Caucauss from coming Turkey” (Cagaptay, 2006:73).

Moreover, during the Turkish Republic period, there was an article in Turkish law, which was published in June 14 1934. According to this law, “the one who are not loyal to Turkish culture, spies, anarchists, and nomadic Gypsy people could not be accepted as a refugee in Turkey” (Article 4 of the Settlement Law and the Law No: 2510). The Settlement law about nomadic Gypsies in 1934

was against the equality principle. Yet, this law was also related to modernity and nation-state's overwhelming position towards nomads⁴¹.

One of the deputies, Erdal Kesebir tried to abolish this law in 1993, but Kesebir's proposal was rejected in National Assembly (Alpman, 1997:130). According to Kesebir, this law was against the 'equality principle' of Constitution. The amendment of the law was passed by Assembly in 2006 in the following way: "Foreigners who are not from Turkish descendant and not loyal to Turkish culture, the ones who are loyal to Turkish culture but who were deported and the persons who are not eligible to live in Turkey owing to the security reasons cannot be accepted as refugees"⁴². This time the basic criterion for being refugee is stated as loyalty to Turkish culture.

Yeğen (2006) points out that, Settlement Law of 1934 was made in order to change Anatolia's demographic structure in terms of ethnic arrangements. In this regard, the law has been applied to non Turkish citizens and they had been forced to settle to Turkish citizens' areas and vice versa. According to Yeğen (2006), this law shows that Turkishness is open to non-Turkish people, but not to all non-Turkish people (Yeğen, 2006: 108). In addition, for Şahin (2005:107) Settlement Law of 1934 aimed to diffuse the villages and towns of which the inhabitants' mother-tongue was not Turkish. The law indicates indirectly to diffuse tribe mechanism of Kurdish structure which was an important step for identity process.

⁴¹ According to Berland and Rao, most documented information on the history of peripatetics attest to the tension between sedentary and nomadic. They give examples from Europe and South Asia. Nomadism in Europe was associated with poverty. The criminalization of the poor led to the idea of "dangerous classes" in 18th and 19th century. As they say, "[n]omadism or rather 'wandering' ...which itself was increasingly being explained as genetically based...Gypsies and other Travellers in Europe were major victims of such European social theory" (Berland and Rao, 2004:11). Besides, British colonies in South Asia regarded nomads as uncontrollable and potentially criminal. Criminal Tribes Act was enacted. In Europe, there were also different examples of sedentarization policies enacted towards Gypsies. As Fraser (2005) claims, in the case of Czech Republic, nomadic and semi-nomadic Gypsies were registered in a specific area and prohibited to work in other areas according to the law enacted in 1958. At the same year, nomadism was forbidden for Gypsies, and they were obliged to work at factories and cooperatives in the case of Bulgaria. Special places were opened for Traveller and Gypsy caravans with 1968 law in England (Fraser, 2004:236:242). Gulf States and Jordan was forbidden for all *Nawar* living in Syria to travel because some of them had been caught for begging and stealing (Meyer, 2004: 87).

⁴² <http://www.resmi-gazete.org/sayi/9816/5543-iskan-kanunu.html> (28.12.2009 last access).

In addition, the other discriminative Law of Movement and Residence of Alience numbered 5683 which was published in 1950 still stands. The second paragraph of the law authorises Ministry of the Interior to expel stateless and non-Turkish Gypsies and aliens not bound to the Turkish culture (<http://www.tisk.org.tr/yayinlar.asp?sbj=ic&id=1037> last access 7.11.2010) This law promotes discrimination towards Gypsies. EU Progress Report (2009) warned Turkey to take steps to amend this law. The amendment of the law was negotiated in Assembly in 2010 but it is still not concluded.

Today, Gypsy communities' nomadic pattern continues in Turkey. However, it is estimated that only 5% of Gypsy community are nomadic. Besides, their migration routes are not known (Gündüz Hoşgör, 2007). Likewise Marsh asserts that the current position of nomadic Gypsies in Turkey is not clear. As he claims,

“the Geygelli, Gezginler and other göçebe groups are primarily nomadic Gypsy groups who are often identified as “Yörüks” in ethnographic studies. Most are Alevi and some that have settled have ‘become’ Alevi and deny a Gypsy heritage (though they speak creoles or contact languages using elements of Romanes, such as the Alevi in Kuştepe, İstanbul or Geygelli nomads of central Anatolia” (Marsh, 2008a:25:26).

In evaluating the extent to which Roma and Dom communities' benefit from citizenship rights in Edirne and Diyarbakır in present conditions, I started to analyze how both of the communities became settled and transformed. Roma and Dom communities had nomadic pattern travelling from village to village but not all of Roma community was nomadic. In this regard, firstly my attempt is to evaluate their nomadic modes of existence whether they were *peripatetics*, pastoral nomadic or food extracting⁴³.

In Edirne, some interviewees emphasized that Roma community had craftsmanship in three fields since Ottoman times: blacksmith, tinsmith and basket-making. I generally conducted in-depth interviews with people whose ancestors were blacksmiths. They used to deliver these services to the peasants.

⁴³ Peripatetic nomadic refers to nomads offering services to the settled persons. Besides, they are endogamous communities. The term is well known in Gypsy/Roma studies. The term has similar relations of closeness and remoteness as in Georg Simmel work, “Stranger”. Moreover, like middleman trader in “Stranger”, the subsistence activities of peripatetic peoples are a direct response to the needs and desires of the host communities (Berland and Rao, 2004).

However, it seems that they have lost craftsmanship today, which is directly related to proliferation of technology. Besides, Roma community was not entirely nomadic but some of the families mentioned that they were once living in villages. Their occupations were agricultural laboring, blacksmith, tinsmith, and livestock seller (*cambaz*). Besides, peripatetic Roma nomads also performed agricultural labor for the farmers.

Dom community also had craftsman especially in music field, playing *davul* and *zurna* which are not widely played by Kurds. Besides, they also dealt with making sieve and traditional dentistry, which continues at the villages. Dom community's nomadic mode of existence was different from Roma interviewees on the ground that they were travelling to villages for food extracting. When they arrived back in Diyarbakır to stay for winter, they used to play in Kurdish weddings.

Second, the transition of both Roma and Dom communities from nomadic to settled society entails us to take into account historical effects of first migrant wave of 1950s from rural to urban area and the forced migration which eventuated mostly in 1992 and 1993.

Agricultural mechanization eventuated with Marshall Plan in 1950s led to the first wave migration process. This migration process had "push" and "pull" effects. Mechanization of agriculture resulted in excess of labor in the rural areas. Thus, this created a push effect from the rural. In addition, cities appeared as a new labor demand with growing industries, thereby pull factor occurred. Nomadic Roma community's peripatetic mobility changed as a result of this transformation because they were delivering their blacksmith services to the peasants. Technology and increase in the use of tractors affected not only sharecroppers, but also economic survival strategy of Roma community because they had economic relationship with them. Not all of the Roma community was nomadic in those years. Agricultural Roma workers became temporary seasonal agricultural workers after migrating to Edirne.

However, forced migration related to the Kurdish question led Dom population sedentary in Diyarbakır. Unlike Roma community, all of the interviewees mentioned that they were nomadic before 1992 and 1993, which forced migration eventuated mostly in the villages. In a different way from Roma community, they were “internally displaced”. In addition, Roma community has been settled for 40-50 years in Edirne, but Dom community is settled nearly for 15 years.

Finally, the chapter introduces the present nomadic conditions of both communities as a semi-nomadic pattern. Roma and Dom semi-nomadic groups are dealing with different occupations; basket-makers in Edirne and peddling cloth and women’s garments around Diyarbakır villages. As McVeigh suggests, “the nomadic-sedentary shift was never as total as social evolutionism implies. There are survivals of nomadic modes of existence in every sedentarist social formation...So the nomadic-sedentary transition was neither irreversible nor inevitable” (Mc Veigh, 1999:10-12). Being nomad also affects their identity construction and integration to the society because of the fact that nomadism is not totally acceptable by settled society. Thus, this section also tries to consider to what extent their nomadic pattern are acceptable in the host society. Furthermore, interviewees’ nomadic “tactics” will also be taken into account.

5.2 Past Nomadic Pattern of Roma and Dom Communities

During the field research, I encountered the Roma interviewees who were nomadic around Edirne villages. Interviewees who lived as nomadic were children then, since their ages range from 45 to 60 now. Interviewees mentioned that their mothers or fathers were tinsmith and blacksmith travelling around the villages. Yet I generally met with people whose ancestors were blacksmiths. Today, most of the interviewees are performing manual jobs, such as porter, sewerage worker, peddler, domestic cleaner, garbage worker.

Apart from Roma interviewees who remember the nomadic life, other interviewees emphasized that they were not nomadic but living in the villages.

And their fathers and mothers were agricultural laborers, livestock sellers, tinsmiths and blacksmiths. Roma interviewees whether being nomadic or not emphasized that they migrated from the villages to Edirne.

There were Roma villages around Edirne in the 19th century. In addition, Roma population was affected from the compulsory migration between Greece and Turkey in 1923 (see Chapter III). According to Lausanne convention, Greek Orthodox and Muslim population was exchanged mutually. When we look at the distribution of population, 75% of population was living in the villages in 1923. (Zürcher, 2000:240). Some interviewees mentioned that their mothers or fathers came from Bulgaria and Greece. Accordingly, when interviewees' parents immigrated to Turkey, they were settled in the villages, and were not accepted to the cities. During the research I also learnt that there were Roma villages in which some interviewees' families lived because of the fact that Turkish citizens had left those villages. On the contrary, Dom community had no villages. Dom interviewees mentioned that they had nomadic pattern traveling from village to village.

As for Roma community, some Roma interviewees mentioned that exclusion was apparent in the villages before they settled to Edirne. Unlike Dom community, they were settled and excluded by Turks in the villages. As Şener (60, M, Peddler, Roma)⁴⁴ says,

“I had a sister here (in Edirne) in those day. She bought this house to reside in. They made cadastral survey of the village for 50 times but they did not give an inch to us. Look, would you believe that since I was graduated from primary school, I could not go to Kepirtepe which I have mentioned before. During a religious holiday, I went to the mosque. Person was excluded in those times. We formed in lines of worship, one came and squeezed, another came and squeezed, would you believe me, there remained no place to prostrate while performing the namaz. In brief, after some time, I saw all the children attending to Quran course given by hodja of that mosque. I told to my mother and father that I would also like to go to the Quran course. But there was no one knowing Quran, neither the old and new Turkish within the family. After that, they said I would not be able to learn it, I said I will do and I will learn. I went there my dear; I came in first out of 29 friends of boys and girls. When I came home I was crying because I could not read the old Turkish. You could not go and ask for someone, you could not go anyone's house. You are being excluded my

⁴⁴ The data collected from the interviewees stressed the significance of factors like age, gender, the type of occupation and self-description of ethnic identity. For this reason, I used these abbreviations to represent these factors in sequence.

dear. Afterwards, I was muezzin in that village. While I was performing as muezzin, everybody said amazed where this man did come from, where this talent came from. I call to ezan and then came here. What was happened in Edirne, in a big city is that we were suffocated my dear, we could not manage in there without our father near us.”⁴⁵

We shall trace the migration pattern from rural to urban area in the 1950s when agricultural modernization took place. In addition, interviewees mentioned that their relatives no longer live in the villages because they passed away or migrated to the cities. They go to the villages only for temporary seasonal agricultural labor or for temporary livestock nowadays.

During nomadic life, there was a kind of economic relationship between settled society and nomadic Roma group. In this regard, it is useful to introduce the term *peripatetics*. As Ries suggests,

“At the end of the 1970s, the anthropologist Robert Hayden (1979) introduced the term service nomads for mobile ethnic groups which offer services for the settled population. Aparna Rao (1987) has made the term peripatetics well known in Romani/Gypsy studies. She analyses the peripatetic strategy as a combination of spatial mobility and non-subsistent commercialism on the economic level, and endogamy on the social level. Her definition of peripatetics is: “primarily non-food-producing/extracting, preferentially endogamous, itinerant communities subsisting mainly on the sale of goods and/or more or less specialized services to sedentary and/or nomadic customers” (Rao 1987:3). While peasant survival strategy rests on maximal food production and minimal mobility, peripatetic minorities choose the opposite: minimal food production and maximal mobility” (Ries, 2008: 278).

In addition to this definition, Berland and Rao (2004) argue that many of the characteristics of peripatetic’s niche have close relationship with Simmel’s “Stranger”. The “stranger” is likely to be understood as no owner of land. In addition, the “stranger” is attributed to

⁴⁵ “Ablam vardı burda (Edirne) o zamanlar. Ablama aldı bu ev, otursun diye. Kadastro geçti, 50 sefer bir karış yer vermediler bize köyde. Bak inanır mısın? İlkokuldan çıktım, o dediğim Kepirtepeye gidemedim. Şeye camiye gittim bir bayram zamanı. Şimdi dışlanıyo ya insanlar o zamanların zamanında. Safa durduk o geldi sıkıştırdı, bu geldi sıkıştırdı bana inanır mısın secdeye varacak yer kalmadı. Velhasıl aradan bi geçti zaman, baktım bütün çocuklar kuran kursuna gidiyorlar, köyün cami hocası. Dedim ben anneme babama ben de dedim gitcem, ama evde de kimse bilen yok, eski Türkçeyi, yeni Türkçeyi bilen yok zaten. Ondan sonra ya yapamazsın, dedim yapıcım, öğrenicem. Gittim yavrum o 29 arkadaşın kız erkek birinci ben oldum. Geliyodum okuyamıyom diye eski Türkçeyi başlıyodum ağlamaya. Kimseye gidip soramazsın, evine gidemezsin kimsenin. Dışlanıyosun be yavrum. Sonra sonra en sonunda o köyde müezzinlik yaptım. Müezzinlik yaptım herkes dediler, hayret nerden geldi, bu beceri nerden geldi? Ezan okudum, geldim buraya. Nolcak Edirne’de büyük şehirde boğulduk yavrum, idare edemedik, baba yok başta”.

“the specific character of mobility...[that] occasions that synthesis of nearness and remoteness which constitutes the formal position of the stranger...[who] comes incidentally into contact with every single element but is not bound up organically, through established ties of kinship, locality, or occupation, with any single one...” (Berland and Rao, 2004:99).

Roma interviewees who talked about nomadic years can be described as *peripatetic* in those years. Roma group was travelling from village to village with horses and donkeys and was pitching their tents for some days. Before they settled down in Edirne, they were offering goods and services to the peasants. Their main service was blacksmith and tinsmith. Blacksmiths forged iron of the farmer and repaired their agricultural implements. Ali (50, M, Metal Worker, Roma) mentions about the nomadic years and how they earned their lives in the villages. He remembers the days of which his father told him. As he says,

“While we were performing forging we were wandering village by village. Let me tell you what my father had told before I came into the world. Now, we (my lineage) were a group of people settled in the village of Edirne where our origin and roots lean on. Now, there comes the sowing-time, right? After September it is the sowing-time. When sowing-time came, villagers, farmers were forging; were repairing their plow; that is to say, were dealing with whatever they need in the farm. They were looking for a blacksmith in order to repair their grid, tongs, spades...etc. Huh! What were my father and grandfather doing in those times? Look, I have shown you the forge bellows; maybe that forge bellows is aged for more than 200 years. He would take his forge bellows and his family then would pitch up his tent. For example, let’s say we pitch up tent. During sowing-time, we were meeting all that Demirhanlı village’s needs such as: his forging, spades, welding. When we finished that place, we would go to thevillage. We would go for that village. Likewise, we would wander village by village. We would meet all the farmers’ needs, and then we would come and earn money. Since we serve for them, we also were earning money. Ottoman was not collecting tax from us. Why not? Because we, the blacksmiths, were making the swords of that Ottoman Janissary. Recently there was a show in TV. There was a Roma contest. They have always talked about tinsmith but never mentioned blacksmith. In fact, we, the

blacksmiths, are the master of Roma. Look, the one you see there is a 200 years old forge bellows.”⁴⁶

As the statement above shows, one of the craftsmen of Roma people in Edirne was blacksmith and so was his ancestor since Ottoman times. The interviewee also indicates that blacksmiths were exempted from the tax during the Ottoman Empire. As he mentioned, there was a special decree about this exemption: *Rumeli Etrakinün Koyun Adeti Hükmi* (Decree on the Number of the Sheep of Inhabitants in Rumelia) was promulgated during the reign of Mehmet II (1451-1481) (Akgündüz, 1990:397). Due to their craft, blacksmiths and sieve-makers were exempted from the poll tax as early as the fifteenth century. Moreover, during the conquest of İstanbul, Gypsies had an important function of making artilleries (Gündüz, 2007). Gypsies also produced nails for the construction of Süleymaniye Mosque (Altınöz, 2007).

The other interviewee, Kazım (57, M, Musician, Roma) talks about how his father’s occupation was important for the peasants. Like Ali, he also emphasizes the vital importance of blacksmith during Ottoman Empire. Yet he complains that there is no information that occupation of blacksmith was being performed by Roma people in Ottoman Empire. With his words,

“My father was a blacksmith. Master blacksmith, a forge welder. He was getting up early for namaz, and then was serving for those farmers. As an artisan, if there was not my father, woe is that villager. He had substantially rightful share on them. What they call is Gypsy nail; they even made Fatih’s ship, and even his bayonet. But I did not read any writing mentioning that Roma people have done these things at that date. When my father was a soldier, in wars there was plenty of horses at that time,

⁴⁶ “Şimdi biz demircilik yaparken köy köy gezerdik kızım. Ben dünyaya gelmeden babamın anlattığını söyleyeyim sana. Şimdi biz aslen ve köken Edirne’ninköyünde ikamet eden insanlardık, benim sülalem. Bak şimdi ekim zamanı geliyor di mi? Eylülden sonra ekim zamanı geliyor. Ekim zamanı geldiğinde köylü çiftçi demirini dövürürdü, pulluğunu tamir ederdi, efendim bütün yani tarlada ne lazım? Izgarası, işe bonbey, monbey bunları tamir ettirmek için demirci arardı. Maşasıdır, küreğidir. Ha bizimkiler de o zaman babamlar, dedemler ne yapardı? İşte bak körüğü gösterdim sana, belki 200 seneden fazladır o körük. Alır körüğünü ailesini alıp çadırını kurar. Mesela buradan diyelim ki Edirne’nin Demirhanlı köyüne gittik, diyelimki çadır kurduk. O Demirhanlı köyünün bütün ekim zamanında yapacak olan demirini, pulluğunu, kaynağını maynağını o köyün ihtiyacını görürdük. Orası bitti mi ondan sonra giderdikköyüne. O köye giderdik. Böyle köy köy, köy köy gezerdik. Bütün çiftçinin ihtiyacını karşıladık, ondan sonra geldik para kazanırdık. Biz onlara hizmet ettiğimizde biz de para kazanırdık...Osmanlı bizden vergi almazdı. Neden almazdı? Osmanlı’nın o Yeniçeri askerlerinin kılıçlarını biz yapardık, demirciler. Şimdi geçende bir şov vardı televizyonda, Romanların yarışması var. Orda hep kalaycı geçti, hiç demircileri geçirmediler, demirci diye söylemediler. Aslında biz Romanların, Romanların piri biziz, demirciler. Bak burda gördüğün 200 senelik körüktür orda gördüğün”.

he was making horseshoe...Well, how that craftsmen was effective. But now ah!...But we needed at that time. That is to say, it is not written in any book, I cannot read my father's heroic deed as what he had done in Fatih's ship. Well my brother, for the sake of God, don't do that!"⁴⁷

These two narrations show that how blacksmith was important occupation for Roma community in both Ottoman Empire and during the nation-state. In addition, these narrations indicate that especially Roma males have historical knowledge of such tax policy towards Roma in Ottoman Empire. This is also an important clue for ethnic awareness. Narrations also show that interviewees need recognition with regard to their identity and occupation. For them, history underestimates how blacksmith was useful in those times. On the other hand, I did not encounter anyone among Dom community who has knowledge about Dom community before nation-state. One interviewee in Diyarbakır mentioned that blacksmith and metal work was done by Armenians. Dom community's crafts were musician and traditional dentistry.

During the nomadic times of Roma community, there was gender division in terms of economic activities. The Roma women knocked on peasants' door and traded commodities like combs, nail scissors, needle or fiber. In response they took provision. This also matches with the concept, *peripatetic*.

Apart from craft of blacksmith, agricultural labor also was widespread. One of the female interviewee remembers her childhood, how Roma people from *Menziliahir (Kıyık)* neighborhood in Edirne set off to the villages. Hence, there was semi-nomadic migration pattern also from Edirne to the villages. She remembers the nomadic days with a proverb: "Inside March, Outside Gypsies". As Meltem (47, F, Metal Worker, Roma) says,

⁴⁷ "Benim babam demirciydi. Demirci ustası, sıcak demirciydi. Sabah namazı kalkardı, bu çiftçilere hizmet verirdi. Benim babam sanatçı olarak olmasaydı vay çiftçinin haline. Çok büyük hakkı geçmiştir. Fatih'in gemisini dahi, Çingene çivisi derler, kasaturasını dahi onlar yapmıştır. Ama bir yazı üstünde şöyle okumadım ya şu Romanlar da şu tarihte şunu yapmış. Benim babam askerken hayvanlar çoktu o zaman, beygirler savaşlarda. Nal yapardı babam, nal ayaklarına beygirlerin...Benim babam sıcak demirci o köyde, on kurşun köyün ağası. Babam yetişmediği usta derdi. Ahmet Usta on kurşun yetişmedi. Babam onu defterine borç olarak yazardı bunu biliyor musun? Hani ya, bu sanat ne kadar geçerliymiş bak. Ama şimdi hah! ...ama o zaman ihtiyacımız vardı. Yani hiç yazmıyor kitapta, benim babamın kahramanlığını da okuyamıyor, şunu yapmış Fatih'in gemisinde. E kardeşim yapmayın bunu Allah aşkına!"

“At that time, for example, when I was 7 or 8 years old, so it was in my childhood. March in, Gypsies out. After that, here childrens’, girls’ hair were tied up with red ribbon in order not to turn black. For not allowing March to turn that black. When they came, they were staying at villages for entire summer. Now, I am telling you aboutbrother’s (her husband) saying. For whole summer, towards the month of November, they were going back to their homes. But how were they coming, do you know? With their donkeys, horses and gathered all their flour, butter that is to say all their staffs suitable for use in winter. Actually, now where do Gypsies go? Did they go to the villages? During November, again they are reaping hook, cutting roses, they go for hoeing, like as they say, their grandfathers and grandmothers open that blacksmith thing, now that in village they go to the farm and forge. They subsist on that; earn their bread, food with that.”⁴⁸

The narrative above indicates that there was also semi-migration pattern from urban to the village. Roma community took provision from the peasants in response to their service such as agricultural labor or blacksmith.

In contrast to Roma peripatetic community, Dom community does not match with the concept of peripatetic, apart from Dom of Siverek. Interviewees mentioned that they were travelling the villages by their horses or donkeys before 1992-93. During the winter months, then just for three months, they were coming back to Diyarbakır and were renting a house. In nomadic times in the villages, women supplied food by knocking on door to door, so did Roma women. Peasants gave them yoghurt, wheat and alike without trade. The difference between Roma and Dom members is that although the first community took provision in response to trade or service, the second community just visited the villages to take provision without trade or service. Agha or peasants gave them surplus of agricultural product. Besides, Dom men like to pick up partridge. After travelling the villages, they returned from the villages to Diyarbakır during September when Kurdish weddings started.

Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician & Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) says that

⁴⁸ “O zaman mesela 7 yaşında, 8 yaşında. Öyle yani, çocukluğumda. Mart içeri, Çingeneler dışarı. Ondan sonra işte çocuklar kızlar kararmasın diye kırmızı kurdele bağlardılar...Mart yapmasın diye. Onlar çıktıkları zaman böyle bütün yaz köylerde dururdu. Şimdi ...abinin (her husband) demesini söylüyorum. Bütün yaz, Kasım ayına doğru bu evlerine dönerdiler. Ama nasıl gelirdiler biliyo musun? O eşeklerde, beygirlerde unlar, yağları yani bütün kışlıklarını köyden toplamışlar. Aslında şimdi Çingeneler nereye gidiyo? Köylere mi gitmiş Çingeneler? Kasımda gene orda onlar orak biçiyolar, güllerini kesiyolar, çapaya gidiyolar, dedikleri gibi dedeleri, neneleri demir şeyi açıyolar oraya, köyde şimdi onlar oraya gidiyo tarlaya, onlar demir dövüyo. Onlar ordan ekmeğini, yemeğini, çıkarıyo.”

“My deceased mother was looking after us and was breadwinning by visiting home by home. What would the father do? He did not have a job anyway. He was going for hunting and coming back. In the morning for example, he was going for hunting, taking partridges and staying until evening and was coming back home at evening anyway. This is all. That is, we do not have anything to do ... This was in the past. In the villages there was appraisal and appreciation. For example, they were all tribe. For example, whichever way you look at it, whoever you stare at, 90 % are tribe. There was tribe and appraising. Now there is not appraising anymore. Now when we go, they just look; there is nothing. In the past, our elders were going; here you see they are. For example, our fathers, even our grandfathers were going to these tribes. They were aghas that one of them had 100 sheep, lambs. He was taking and giving lambs. He was giving a lamb to us and was saying that “these are our spring roses”, those tribes were calling us like that. They were saying that “here comes the spring roses, when they come we know that spring season is approaching to our lands, spring has come. It was in that way; in those days this was how we lived on. Now it is normal anyway.”⁴⁹

It seems that when they were nomadic, Dom women supported their family due to the fact that men had no permanent job. During the nomadic times, when they came to Diyarbakır to stay in winter, Dom men used to go weddings in Diyarbakır. Yet the increase in wedding saloons leads their craft to cease. In the narrative above, Nuri talks about Kurdish society consisted of tribes which indicate a social difference because Dom minority does not belong to any tribe. As it is argued in Chapter III, the tribe structure becomes the main determinant of feudal relations. According to Bruinesen, “approach” (*yanaşma*) lineages have medium position between tribe members and the villagers. Therefore, approach lineages have not belonged to any tribe. In this regard, he evaluates Gypsy community as approach lineages but at the bottom of the hierarchy among other tribes. And even the landless villagers that are considered as the lowest stratum among others despise these Gypsy groups (Bruinesen, 2006:82).

Before Dom community settled in Diyarbakır, the Kurdish tribes supported them in terms of food. Hence, there was a feudal relation based between Kurdish

⁴⁹ “Anam, rahmetli anam ev ev gezerek ekmek getirirdi bize, öyle bakidi bize...Baba ne yapacak ki? Babanın işi yok ki! Ava gidiyor, geliyor. Gündüz sabah mesela sabah oluyo, ava gidiyo, keklikleri alıp ta akşama kadar dışarda, akşamları eve geliyo işte. Budur yani. Yani yapacağımız hiçbirsey yok yani...Eskiden öyleydi. Köylerde mesela kadir kıymet vardı. Mesela aşir, hepsi aşir. Mesela bizim buradan nerden baksan hep yüzde doksan aşir. Aşiret, kadir kıymet vardı. Şimdi kadir kıymet de kalmamış. Şimdi gidiyoruz, mesela bakıyorlar, öyle bir şey yok yani. Eskiden mesela gidiyordular büyüklerimiz, işte bunlar. Mesela bunlar daha önce, bunların babaları, dedeleri de gidiyordular bir şeylerin yanına mesela, biliyordular aşir çocuğular adamlar, biliyodular, ağadırlar...100 tane koyunu var, kuzuları var. alıydı, veriydi yani. Bir tane kuzi alıp diyidi bizimkiler gelmiş bunlar bizim “bahar güllerimiz”, hani bize o zaman o lakabı takmıştı aşirler. Bunlar bahar gülleri, bunlar gelince biz biliyoruz ki memlekete bahar havası geliyor, bahar gelmiş. Böyle yani, işte geçimimiz o zamanlar böyleydi. Şimdi normaldir yani”.

peasants and Dom community rather than peripatetic mobility. Most of the interviewees expressed positive attitude for past nomadic years especially in terms of economic aspect.

Likewise, Hamdi (41, M, Non-Working, Dom) states that

“We do not go to the villages anymore If we have money we go shopping in here. We were going to villages and they were making cheese. When we went, we were acquainted with the villagers. For example, there were the ones who were giving one kilo or two kilo of cheese. Also we were pitching up our tents in their villages; in the morning and afternoon they were bringing us the breakfast. Look! It was in this way in those days. Now when we go to villages and when we pitch up tents, nobody even gives that much of bread. See! The old times and the new times are not the same. That is to say, there is a big difference between the old and new times. There is a huge difference. In those days, that is to say, we were going to a village, we were staying and we were their guests for 4-5 days. I swear this is true that every evening one house were harboring us. If they could not, they would send lots of goods such as: cheese, olive, butter, tandour bread on a plate. They would also make tea and bring forefront of us. Yes, I swear to God it is true.”⁵⁰

This kind of social solidarity is also related to the view of *zekat*⁵¹. As a matter of fact that during the wheat time in the summer I encountered with Dom women who were going to collect their *zekat*. Kurdish people also call it *zekat*, so does Dom community.

Moreover, Dom men used to be musicians playing *davul* and *zurna*. During the wedding times in the villages they were invited. Besides, when they turned back to the city, they were called to play in the weddings to play. That the craft of their music was widely accepted by Kurdish society, they also contributed

⁵⁰ “Şimdi biz bugün köylere gitmiyik. Burda alışverişi hep kendimiz yapıyık. Paramız olduğu zamani kendimiz. Biz köylere gidiydik, peynir yapıydi. Biz gidiydik, taniydik. Mesela vardı bir kilo peynir veren vardı, iki kilo. Köylüler de tanıyodu. Bi de biz çadırı onların köyde kuruydik, sabah öyle kahvaltı kendileri getiriydi bize. Bak o dönemki öyleydi ha! Valla şimdi bu dönemki şimdi biz gidek, bir çadır kurak daha kimse bize bu kadar bir parça ekmek vermiyor. Ya! Eski dönemle bu dönem bir olmaz... Yani o eski döneminki bu döneminki çok fark var ha! Çok fark var. O döneminki kimsenin gözüne bir şey gelmezdi. Yani gidiydik bir köye, oturiydik, misafir oliydik, 4-5 gün misafir oliydik. Vallahi her bi ev akşami bizi misafir ediydi. Bizi misafir etmediği zamani da tabağın üzerinde dolu eşya meşya peynir olsaydi, zeytin olsaydi, yağı olsaydi, ekmek tandiri olsaydi. Çayını da aynı yapıydi, ta getiriydi önümüze bırakırdı. He valla”.

⁵¹ One of the five conditions of Islam is giving alms (*zekat*). In this sense, the ones who have good financial situation should give alms to poor people.

to the tradition of *dengbêjlik*⁵². During my in-depth interview at Diyarbakır Bar Council, lawyer Muhammed Akar explains how Dom community was treated in feudal times. In this sense, he emphasizes the importance of agha and *Mir* (Kurdish Chief) in feudal structure on the ground that they would patronize Dom minority:

“However, it is bizarre that some of imams from our religion have given a fetva stating that alms (zekat) should not be given to them. There was a mistaken fetva stating that neither alms nor offerings should be given, something should be given just only in order to draw them away, but favor should not be directed to them. I know that this landlord was a rich one and had plenty of wheat. I know that he was feeding 3-4 family with his alms. In response, they were going for hunting in winter together with the landlord. For partridge hunting; they were also good at hunting. At that time, during winter nights, they were attending the landlords dewan and were singing songs at that place which we call it as klam; I saw them performing dengbej tradition. I have been to such a night in fact. I mean in Ramadan, during winter nights until suhoor, a beautiful music, story telling, epic telling performed. This is their characteristic, that is to say when they narrate something they carry on the epic culture. They make legendaries of a blood-feud, a love affair, a village event, a bravery event. Narration of that epic is lyric, poetic. Another part is composed in the form of klam and is wonderful. Let me finalize my words with saying this. I am telling this regarding Kurds, I do not have much information about other regions. Doms are the serious passer of Kurdish culture, Kurdish oral culture and dengbej tradition. I encountered in many places that they were under the protection of Kurdish tribal chiefs. But all those things shall not undervalue their distress aroused in the last quarter century, 25-30 years or 40 years distresses.”⁵³

Akar’s statement above shows that imam has a religious power who can affect the society. Therefore, negative *fetvas* could be affective on Kurdish

⁵² Dengbêj means storyteller in Kurdish society. In the stories, the important events in Kurdish society, love, battles, feudal resistance and the conflicts between the tribes are narrated. Oral stories symbolize the Kurdish society’s needs and wishes, hope and frights. Dengbêj generally narrate their stories which are Kurdish society’s important oral culture during the winter so summer is the time of tilling the soil and cropping. Besides, dengbej goes to the one who has the authority in the village’ house and narrate his story (Pariltı, 2006).

⁵³ “Fakat çok tuhaftır, bizim bölgemizdeki imamların bir kısmı bunlara zekat da da verilmez diye fetva çıkarmışlar. Onlara zekat verilmez, onlara fitre verilmez sadece böyle bir onları uzaklaştırmak için bir şey verebilirsiniz ama onlara hayır ve hasanat verilmez diye bir yanlış fetvası vardı. Bu ağanın bunu ters yüz ettiğini, zengin bir ağaydı, buğdayı bol. Zekatınla o 3-4 aileyi beslediğini biliyorum. Ve onlar da kış ayı boyunca ağayla beraber avcılığa, ava çıkardılar. Keklik avına, bunlar avcılıkta da çok iyidiler. Derken işte kış gecelerinde ağanın divanın oturup türkü, şarkı bizim burda “klan” diyoruz, *dengbej* geleneği onları okuduklarını görmüşüm, böyle bir gecede de ben bulumdum açıkçası. Yani Ramazan ayında, kış gecelerinde sahura kadar çok güzel bir müzik ve hikaye anlatımı oldu, destan anlatımı oldu. Onların özelliği öyledir, yani bir şeyi anlatırken bir destan kültürünü sürdürmektedirler. Bir kan davasını, bir aşk olayını, bir köy olayını, bir yiğitlik olayını destanlaştırırlar. O destan anlatımının bir kısmı liriktir, şiirseldir. Bir kısmı klan tarzında bestelidir ve harikadır. Ve ben şunu söyleyerek noktalyım. Kürtler açısından söylüyorum, başka bölgelerle ilgili çok bilgim yok. Fakat Kürt kültürünün, sözlü kültürünün ve dengbej geleneğinin çok ciddi aktarıcılarıdır onlar. Birçok yerde bu Kürt beyleri tarafından da bir şekilde himaye edildiklerini görmüşümdür. Ama bütün bunlar son çeyrek asırda, 25-30 yıllık, 40 yıllık sıkıntılarını göz ardı etmiyor tabii.”

society. The case above indicates that some aghas treat Dom equal and are protective towards them. Akar also indicates that how Dom men who have craft musician are important transmitters of oral tradition. Kurdish society is based on oral culture because written culture has not developed. In other words, Dom community contributed to develop oral history of Kurdish society. Although I did not meet Dom *dengbej* who pulled their weight on this tradition, it seems important to mention it. Christensen (1996) conducted ethnographic and ethnomusicologic research about Kurdish music around Siirt and Hakkari in 1958. Accordingly, Kurds rarely play musical instruments. *Erbane* should be played by a Dom having religious belief. *Davul* and *zurna* are only played by Gypsies during weddings and feasts. He also talks about *dengbej* of Hakkari. *Dengbej* travels from village to village, sings song about local heroic stories or familiar love stories. In response, peasants gave him floor and grain (Christensen, 1996:74). Similarly, Pariltı mentions that *Mirtip* (Gypsy) *dengbêj* contributed to the oral history of Kurdish society. They play *ribab* and travel the villages (Pariltı, 2006:86-116).

To sum up, the section above was an attempt to introduce how nomadic pattern diversified for each Roma and Dom community. The nomadic times of Dom community before 1990s can be seen as feudal relationship among Kurdish peasants which cannot be related to Roma community in Edirne. The next section aims to evaluate transformation of these communities on the ground of how they left nomadic life and became settled communities.

5.3 The Decline of Nomadic Pattern and Transition to Settled Society

The transition of both Roma and Dom communities from nomadic to settled society entails us to take into account the historical effects of first migrant wave of 1950s from rural to urban areas and the forced migration which eventuated mostly in 1992 and 1993. Before agricultural modernization in the 1950s, Roma community was delivering services like blacksmith, tinsmith to farmers. At the same time, Roma community was temporary agricultural laborers.

Thereafter, the proliferation of tractors and the development in the technology led to decrease in their craft in the villages. Afterwards, the migration started from rural to urban areas. Unlike Roma community, Dom community became settled in early 1990s due to the forced migration from the villages. Hence, in opposite to voluntary migration of Roma community from rural to urban areas, Dom community had to leave their nomadic pattern from Diyarbakır villages. The process of forced migration with different stages started in 1980s and lasted until the end of 1990s but Diyarbakır took migration especially in 1993-1994, on which Dom community had to immigrate to Diyarbakır.

In other words, the reasons of leaving nomadic pattern are differentiated for each community. According to the research, it seems that Roma community has been affected from the changing relations of production, while Dom community's settlement process is related to forced migration in South East in Turkey and thereby is related to the Kurdish question. Besides, their musician craft was less demanded due to increase in wedding saloons in Diyarbakır.

The emphasis of the interviewees in Edirne is that technology brought about elimination of Roma crafts blacksmith, tinsmith and basket-making. As Zeki (41, M, Frog Collector, Roma) states,

“I was a kiddy, I remember indeed. We were pitching up tent in every village. My deceased father was a forge welder. My mother was pounding with the hammer and my father was making ...I mean we were migrating from one village to another. They (women) also were walking within the village with a stick and were gathering bread and cheese. It was like this. I wish we were in those years. Technology has developed and therefore, there is no job anymore. Now, let's go back to 5-6 years, I was gathering manual workers and we were taking them to rice milling. We were pitching up tents in the meadow. In the morning, we were riding in a tractor and were going to rice milling. We were for instance stringing, cutting the beet. Now that there is hoeing machine, there is no job. Now there is opalescent, farming rice and we don't have this job anymore. Now there is beet machine. This machine cuts, takes out and loads itself. Would there remain any job for those people? None anymore.”⁵⁴

⁵⁴ “Ufaktım hatırlıyorum yani. Her köyde çadır kurardık. Rahmetli babam benim sıcak demirciydi. Annem ona çekiç vururdu, babam ...yapardı. Yani o köyden o köye göçerdik...Onlar (kadınlar) da köyün içinde sopayla gezerdi; ekme toplardı, peynir toplardı. Böyleydi yani. Keşke o yıllar olsaydı. Teknoloji ilerledi, iş bitti...Şimdi 5-6 yıl öncesine dönelim. Mesela ben amele toplardım, çeltik biçmeye götürürdüm. Çadır kurardık merada. Sabahleyin traktöre binerdik, çeltik biçmeye giderdik. Pancar mesela kesiyoz, çıkarıyoz. Çapa işi vardı. Şimdi çapalamak makineleri çıktı, iş yok. Şimdi yanardöner çıktı, çeltik biçiyoz, o da bitti. Şimdi pancar çıktı, kendi kesiyoz, kendi çıkarıyo, kendi yüklüyo. Bu millete iş kalır mı? Kalmadı”.

This narration indicates how Roma blacksmith craft disappeared and temporary agricultural labor decreased with the intense use of technology. They were dealing with agricultural labor until a decade ago. When I made in-depth-interview at the coffee house (*kahvehane*), manager of the coffee house also participated to the interview. He stated that

“Our ancestors failed to catch up with the technology, then all else is over... The men who had money bought that machine. I mean, the ancestors of all Roma people were artisan. They were basket maker, blacksmith, and tinsmith but as long as the technology has developed we lag behind, and no more jobs anymore.”⁵⁵

These narrations indicate that Roma community’s peripatetic nomadic pattern disappeared with the increasing affect of technology. This process is related to agricultural mechanization which started by 1950s. Agricultural mechanization eventuated with Marshall Plan in 1950s in Turkey. It is a kind of green revolution experience and Third World development strategies in 1960s (Ertürk, 1994; Chapter III). In this transformation, US government had a vital role in economic reconstruction. The new economic agenda which assumes a free market implied investment in agriculture and agriculture-based industry rather than inefficient factories. US financially supported Turkey and provided cheap credit. Through this aid, the most striking investment was the purchase of tractor by which agricultural mechanization emerged (Keyder, 1987; Zürcher, 2000). By that, excess labor appeared and sharecroppers migrated to urban areas. Urban migrants of the first wave (1950-1960) were mostly former seasonal agricultural workers who had found temporary work in the cities (Keyder, 1987:135; Zürcher, 2000:329; Ertürk, 1994:13). Most of the immigrants could not find skilled jobs. We can incorporate Roma interviewees within this group. The other striking effect on Roma community was that the interviewees who dealt with agricultural labor in the villages became temporary seasonal agricultural labor or had some unskilled jobs when they migrated to Edirne. In addition, Roma interviewees who wanted to keep their craft - blacksmith- in Edirne opened a store or continued to repair agricultural implements at industry. This is also related to “pull” factor of

⁵⁵ “Bizim atalarımız teknolojiyi yakalayamadı, yakalayamayınca bitti...parası olan insanlar aldı yani. Yani Roman halkının atalarının hepsi sanatkar insanlardı. Sepetçi, demirci, kalaycı ama teknoloji ilerleyince teknolojiye ayak uyduramadık, bitti iş”.

migration to the cities. Growing industry opened new job opportunities at the cities.

In relation to migration from rural to urban areas in first wave (1950-1960) in Turkey, one of the interviewees remembers that how his family came from villages to Edirne. His father used to be blacksmith. As Ali (50, M, Metal Worker, Roma) declares,

“Now my uncles, my father has come to Edirne and opened a store. Technology developed in that time. We were kids in those times. They have opened a store in this place. Afterwards, technology has progressed. Actually, the farmer started to bring himself and we remained to wander village by village. In those times, some of the people were reaping in the villages for example. They were reaping in the villages for 45 days. See what happened after the of reaping machine came up? There is no need for us anymore.”⁵⁶

Hence, it seems that transformation of agricultural system affected Roma community’s craft and temporary agricultural labor in negative sense. With mechanization of agriculture, farmers did not need for the blacksmith. This could be the main motivation for Roma community to leave nomadic. In addition, most of the Roma members became temporary agricultural laborer when they migrated to Edirne. Nevertheless, agricultural mechanization also deprived Roma community of temporary agricultural labor. During the research, most of the interviewees complained on this development on the ground that they are unemployed or have to work at temporary jobs; such as peddler, porter, paper collector, dustman and stallholder.

With regard to this transformation, one of the interviewee, Kemal (35, M, Grocer, Roma) who worked as repairing agricultural implements at industry also complained about mechanization of agriculture and its negative effects on Roma community:

“Formerly, before those agricultural instruments were fabricated, people were going for hoeing, were earning a little and were meeting their winter storage. They were able to make preparations for the winter. Now they can not even do that. Everything has turned into fabrication, instruments has changed. Therefore, they became

⁵⁶ “Şimdi Edirne’ye amcamlar geldi, babamlar geldi, işte dükkan açtılar. Teknoloji ilerlemiş, o zaman. O zamana göre biz çocuktuk yani. Burda bi dükkan açtılar. Ondan sonra ilerlediler. Tabi çiftçi başladı buraya kendi getirmeye artık biz köy köy kaldık. O zaman bazı kişiler orak biçiyorlardı köylerde mesela. Gidiyodu adam 45 gün orak biçiyodu köylerde. Bak şimdi biçerdöverler çıkınca ne oldu? İhtiyaç olmadı”.

embarrassed of what these people would work at. They are in terrible situation, those slum quarters are in terrible state.”⁵⁷

In contrast to Roma community’s voluntary migration to Edirne, Dom community’s act of leaving nomadism is related to direct consequences of forced migration. They become settled in Diyarbakır after 1990s. Although they would like to continue nomadic around Diyarbakır villages, according to interviewees’ statements village guards do not allow this. As Mehmet (66, M, Non-Working, Dom) expresses,

“In time, we were going to the villages, our wives were travelling the villages. They were bringing us bread, buttermilk and we were eating. Today, there is no more travelling. The village guards do not even give bread to our wife. When we go to the villages, the village guards chase us... In the days of old, everybody loved people. Then those village guards have emerged and the world has turn into worse. Before they emerged nobody would interfere in us. After that, the village guards also hated us. They were saying that “you are providing bread, such things for guerillas; do not come there anymore”. They come to our tent places in the evening and saying that “you should not come to the village anymore, otherwise we will shoot you.” They also threatened us. Therefore, after 1990s we did not go the villages.”⁵⁸

The statement above shows that the reason for Dom community’s not being able to maintain nomadism anymore is related to the Kurdish question in Turkey (see Chapter III). Dom community was providing food from the Kurdish villagers before 1990s. The process of forced migration occurred in Turkey since 1980s until the end of 1990s. As a result of the conflict between Turkish army and PKK, many villages were “evacuated” and many agricultural lands were forbidden to enter into. As Kaya, Şahin and et al. (2009) argue, East and South-East Area of Turkey were governed by state of emergency law (OHAL) after military coup in 1980, which lasted nearly 20 years. This law was implemented in an anti-democratic and lawless way (Kaya, Şahin et al., 2009:58-59).

⁵⁷ “Eskiden bu ziraat aletleri fabrikasyona dönmeden önce millet herkes çapaya gidiyordu, bilmem ne yapıyordu, gene bir parça ekmek kazanabiliyordu, kışlığını çıkartabiliyordu yani. Hazırlık yapabiliyordu kış için. Şu an onu da yapamıyo. Herşey fabrikasyona döndü, aletler değişti. O yüzden yani bu millet ne iş yapıcak diye şaşırıyolar. Çok kötü bir vaziyette, kenar mahalleler çok kötü bir vaziyette”.

⁵⁸ “Zamanında köylere giderdik, eşlerimiz köylere gezerdi. Bize ekmek, ayran getirirlerdi, biz de yerdik. Bugün gezmek de kalmadı. Artık korucular eşlerimize ekmek bile vermiyorlar. Köylere gittiğimizde korucular peşimizden kovalıyorlar...Herkes insanı seviydi. Sonradan korucular çıktı, dünya daha bozuldu. Onlardan önce mesela bizimkiler vardı. Kimse bize karışmıyordu...Onlardan sonra korucular da bizden daha gıcık alıyordu. Diyodu siz gerillalara ekmek veriyosiniz, şey veriyosunuz, hiç gelmeyin bir daha...Oturuosunuz akşamları geliyler size sözde, gelmeyin. Yoksa sizi de vuracağız ha. Bizi de tehdit ettiler. Biz de o yüzden 90’dan beri çıkmadık”.

As Özbek indicates, “the majority of internally displaced people migrated to provincial centers like Diyarbakır and Van, to coastal cities in the south (Mersin, Adana and Antalya) and to the major metropolitan centers of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir where income earning opportunities existed” (Özbek, 2007:35). Diyarbakır’s central city population has increased by 46,1 % between the years 1990 and 2000 which is far higher than the average of Turkey 30,8 %.

Thus, owing to the forced migration, not only Kurds but also Dom community has been affected especially in the years between 1992 and 1994. Village guards who worked for security forces have banned Dom’s nomadic mobility in case of support to PKK. Village guards also underlie as one of the basic reasons of inhabitants of forced migration process.

“Temporary Village Guard” law is regulated under the Village Law in 1986. This law defines duty and responsibilities of village guards. In addition to temporary village guard law, the practice of voluntary temporary village guard law was implemented in 1993. By 2004, there were 12.279 village guards in Turkey. On the one hand, propertyless and poor peasants tended to become village guard, thereby they preferred standing by security forces. On the other hand, the peasants who did not prefer to be village guard were compelled to forced migration (Kaya, Şahin et al., 2009:60).

Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician & Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) states that how village guards prevent their nomadic life.

“This is the reality. We are going to the villages but the village guards do not let us in. This is real indeed. I come up with this even recently. The guy is village guard with state gun in his hand. Look here, my brother, I have also right in this place, so you have. For God’s sake, this place is God’s desert. You even do not leave us alone in this place. “Do not pitch up tents there, go inside the mountains”. There are snakes in there, big snakes. I told him that this place is green grass. For God’s sake! This is the Peak of Karacadağ Mountain. Does this place belong to you? I told him whether it is his domain. They would nearly beat us up since they have guns; guns given by the state authority. The state has given to you that gun. I could also have taken gun if I wanted to. I did not. I felt it beneath to do that. I felt that beneath to my dignity, I did not take my brother. I was also in the village, I was in Yarımkaş, I was in there. You took it, I could also have taken; but I did not. I have escaped and

migrated to the city. I have gone there and the guy again saying that I shall not pitch up tent in here.”⁵⁹

In addition to the village guards, some interviewees mentioned how September 12 1980 coup had lead negative consequences for Dom community in terms of their nomadic pattern. In this regard, Mehmet (66, M, Non-Working, Dom) mentioned that the trust of people to each other has been decreased after the coup because of the political polarization. As he states,

“In the past we liked each other. When we say hello; everything was over, we were like brothers for instance. Now it is not like that. All are shady. There is not a person to trust in one in ten. In the old days, when you go to the villages they were calling you as “Flower of the spring has come”. In Kurdish, for example; “gula bahar e”. Now we go and everybody is different. It was not like that in the past. After September 12th, the one that I say hello was Hizbullah. Some for example became Hizbullah, some became village guard, some became revolutionist, and some became informant. Everyone does not trust each other. For example when we go to the villages... This man has come, either he would spy on us or he would show our places to the opponents. They would not indulge us. For example, let us say our tents are in front of that house, He calls us and says do not put your tents there, go somewhere else. There is no more appraisal, nor trust. That is what happened. However, it was not like that in the past. It was pleasant in the past.”⁶⁰

Likewise, Ahmet (28, M, Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) mentions how he left nomadic pattern after 1990s.

“Musician for example, when there were drum and zurna, when there were weddings in the villages they were calling us and we were playing in there. Thereafter, we came to Diyarbakır. Even in Diyarbakır, after 90s there appeared the organization and religionists and everything is banned. We were scared and were

⁵⁹ “Bu gerçektir. Köylere gidiyoruz, korucular bırakmıyor. Gerçektir yani. Geçenlerde de yaşadım. Adam korucu, devletin silahı. Yav kardeşim, burası benim de hakkımdır, senin de hakkındır. Yav Allahın çölüdür. Sen burada da rahat bırakmıyosun. Yok burda çadır kurmayın, gidin dağların içersine. Yılan var orda, büyük yılanlar var orda. Ya dedim burası yeşilliktir. Karacadağ’ın zirvesidir Allah aşkına! Senin tapun mudur? Tapulu malın mıdır yav dedim. Nerdeyse dövecektiler bizi. Adamlar da çünkü silah var, devletin silahı var. Yav devlet bu silahı sana vermiş. Ben zamanında alsaydım, ben de alırdım. Ben almadım. Ben kendi gururuma yediremedim. Yediremedim ya, ben almadım kardeşim. Ben de köydeydim, ta Yarımkaş’ta idim, ordaydım. Siz aldınız, ben de alabilirdim; ama ben almadım. Ben kaçtım şehre göç ettim. Oraya gitmişim adam tekrar diyor, yok çadırı buraya kurmayacaksınız”.

⁶⁰ “Eskiden insanın sevdiği vardı, birbirimizi seviydik. Merhaba derken bitiydi yani mesela kardeş gibi oliydik. Şimdi öyle değil. Hep üç kağıtçı olmuş. Yüzde onu sağlam yoktur. Eskiden köylere gittiğin zaman böyle çağırıydi. “Baharın çiçeği” gelmiş. Kürtçe mesela “gul e bahar e”. E şimdi gidiyek herkes mesela değişik olmuş millet. Eskiden öyle yoktu ki. 12 Eylül’den sonra sondaki selam verdiğim o Hizbullahtı. Mesela kimi Hizbullah olmuş, kimi korucu oldu, kimi devrimci oldu, kimi ispiyoncu oldu. Herkes herkese de güvenmiyo. Yani mesela biz köye giderken....Bu adam gelmiş şimdi ya ajanlık yapar, ya yerimizi gösterir karşı tarafa. Yüz bize vermiydi. Mesela bu evin karşısındadır. Çağırıy, koymayın oraya, başka yere gidin. Kıymet kalmadı, güven kalmadı yani. Yani işte öyle oldu. Ama eskiden öyle yoktu. Eskiden hoştu”.

unable to go the villages. For example there appeared village guard, hizbullah and we are scared. After 90s we could not go to the villages.”⁶¹

Briefly, today Dom community cannot keep on mobility as it used to be before 1990s. During the nomadic times of Dom community, they were just coming to the city for three months in the winter and renting houses. Or sometimes they were staying in the village. It seems that especially village guards prevented their nomadic pattern in case they help PKK. After the internal displacement from the villages, Dom community had to migrate to city and became settled. Hence, Dom community who had to migrate to city can be considered within United Nation’s definition of “internally displaced persons” because of the fact that it was forced migration effect and migrants stayed in the countryside (Kaya, Şahin et al., 2009:51). Yet, Dom community’s short term mobility keeps going. It is crucial to point out that peasants do not want to give them food as they did in the past. Most of the interviewees complained that their economic relation with the Kurdish peasants changed. As Özbek mentions, Kurdish peasants’ sources of livelihood were based on agriculture and animal husbandry. The clash between the PKK and Turkish army cut off thousand of people from their sources (Özbek, 2007). Most of the interviewees mentioned how they miss their nomadic lives and hospitality of Kurdish peasants. As a result of forced migration, “new poverty” appeared for both Kurds and Dom. All of the interviewees emphasized that there is no job opportunity in Diyarbakır. According to socio-economic development rank in 2003, Diyarbakır is ranked as 63rd among 81 cities. Moreover, Kurds’ and Doms’ social interaction and economic opportunities have changed in urban conditions because both Kurds and Dom have no qualification for the skilled jobs in the city. Dom men’s musician craft have decreased. Forced migration gave rise to increase in shanty houses, unemployment and child labor. Therefore benefiting from citizenship practices had to change in urban conditions.

⁶¹ “Müzisyen mesela köylerdeki davul zurna çıksaydı düğün müğün çıksaydı, bizi çağırırdılar, çalardık odur yani. Sonradan geldik Diyarbakır’a. Diyarbakırda da 90’dan beri sonradan örgüt mörgüt çıktı, sofular çıktı, her şey yasak oldu. Korktuk köylere gidemedik. Mesela korucu çıktı, Hizbullah çıktı, korktuk. 90’dan sonra daha köylere gidemedik ha”.

In sum, in contrast to Roma community's migration to Edirne after agricultural mechanization and declining of their blacksmith and tinsmith craft in 1950s, Dom community had to migrate to Diyarbakır after 1990s, with the result of forced migration. The following section attempts to evaluate both Roma and Dom community's semi-nomadic mobility in urban conditions.

5.4 The Present Nomadic Conditions of Roma and Dom Communities

Although Roma community settled in Edirne nearly 40-50 years ago, and Dom community in Diyarbakır nearly 15 years ago, their semi-nomadic mobility persists. As Mc Veigh (1999) argues, "the nomadic-sedentary transition was neither irreversible nor inevitable" (Mc Veigh, 1999:13). He makes this argument because he criticizes social evolutionism assuming that somewhere in the history societies shifted from travelling to sedentary modes of existence. Furthermore, "social evolutionism almost inevitably regards this shift –as a movement upwards towards civilization, security and modernity" (Mc Veigh, 1999:13) In addition, for him, this transition is not a positive, civilizing development. However, sedentary society is not comfortable with nomads. In response, they draw social boundaries and produce stereotypes.

In Edirne, there is still Roma semi-nomadic group with which I met during master thesis research in 2003. This group was making baskets. They were coming to Edirne in summer for making and selling basket, and then they were going back to Gelibolu's village, Evroşe. They were working as large scale family business. Although they worked under the tents, they had houses in *Gazimihal* district. Besides, respondents emphasized their identity as "settled Roma" while they are semi-nomadic. I noticed that this strong emphasis on claiming their identity as "settled Roma" is associated with nomadic stereotypes about Roma community. Even settled Roma groups indicated that Roma basket-makers in Edirne are nomadic, they know Romani language, and then they are "real Gypsies" (Ceyhan, 2003). I have to mention that I did not meet with basket-maker Roma group for this research in Edirne. But most of the interviewees strongly

emphasized that they had no nomadic pattern when they used to live in the villages. I tried to explain that before Roma community settled in Edirne, some of them were living in the villages and dealing with agriculture or blacksmith. Accordingly they are not peripatetic. In addition, there were other Roma interviewees who were peripatetic traveling around the villages and offering their services. Most of the Roma interviewees whose age ranges from 40 to 60 were born in Edirne villages.

Similarly, one of my respondents in Diyarbakır said that “go and see nomadic Doms. They are real Dom”. Accordingly, respondents see nomadic life as a part of Roma/Dom identity. As I explained in the Methodology Chapter, respondents in both Edirne and Diyarbakır regarded “real Gypsy” as at worst socio-economic condition or having nomadic patterns. In other words, if the degree of benefiting from citizenship rights is limited, it leads to producing stereotypes among Roma or Dom people. For example, Roma people in Edirne call the inhabitants of *Kıyık* neighborhoods as *Poşa* which has a pejorative meaning. Likewise, Dom people in Diyarbakır call nomadic Gypsies as “real Dom” owing to their cultural patterns. Hence, after sedentarization process both communities re-invent their identity. In Edirne, I encountered a strong resistance from interviewees who did not want to be defined as nomadic or mobile Roma in Edirne. Surely, this is related to the settled society’s prejudices or stereotypes about nomads. On the contrary, Dom interviewees mentioned that how nomadic was part of their daily life.

During the field-research in Diyarbakır, one of my key accesses in order to enter the Dom community was an old Dom man, Mehmet (66, M, Non-Working, Dom), who suggested me to visit nomadic Dom groups. We set off to conduct a research with Dom groups who put up a tent near to Eğil town of Diyarbakır. He said that when they were nomadic, 50 households were pitching up 100 tents at the edge of the Dicle River. Today, their numbers have highly decreased. In fact, we could not see any nomadic Dom groups. When Mehmet saw harvesters, he thought that some landowners did not give permissions to the tents in case of fire because it was the time of harvest. I wondered how he knew the exact places of

tents. He was nomadic before 1990s. He said that he knew every inch of the places where to pitch up tents. He also said that how he missed these days when he was travelling village to village but he does not go easily to villages especially because of village guards. After forced migration and “evacuation” of the villages, village guards captured the authority of the villages. They do not let Dom to enter the villages anymore. Village guards have gun with a state authority behind with which they use as a threat.

I met only one semi-nomadic Dom group coming from Siverek. Dom from Siverek group showed a warm welcome by help of my access. They pitched up their tents in an empty field near to a village which is 20 km. distance from Diyarbakır. They stated that although they wanted to pitch up tent in Diyarbakır, they turned back to Diyarbakır villages because Diyarbakır municipality has forbidden tents. Meanwhile, I also learned from interviewees that horse car was also banned in Diyarbakır. These prohibitions show that nomadic pattern of Dom community is not acceptable in Diyarbakır province. It also reflects an anti-nomadism. As Mc Veigh suggests, anti-nomadism is best characterized as sedentarism “as that system of ideas and practices which serves to normalize and reproduce sedentary modes of existence and pathologise and repress nomadic modes of existence (Mc Veigh, 1999: 9). Furthermore, he asserts that sedentarism became a central motif of modernity. With his words,

“[t]he continued existence of nomads and vagrants was a key symbol of the unfinished project of modernity and the evidence of the survival of unwanted elements from the pre-modern. Thus, modernity signaled a profound change in the symbolic function of the nomad and vagrant, especially and crucially in the cityscape of modernity” (Mc Veigh, 1999: 18)”.

Although there are nomadic restrictions, Dom community keeps their semi-nomadic mobility. However, their nomadic conditions are not very well. In this regard, they expressed how hard it is to live in tents. No sooner they had killed a snake than I came. They go to the mosque by cars to bring drinking water. There is a well near to their tents. They use this well but water in the well is dirty. Apart from the physical conditions, their nomadic identity is not easily welcomed. In fact, they could not pitch up tent easily. One Dom woman among Siverek group explains difficulties of being nomadic. As she says,

“We are Dom, but Doms have no life. If we had lives would we live in there in the midst of snakes? Let someone come and kill us in the evening; we are gone, all is up...What is this place my sister? This place is for animals, for cows. We live like animals in these tents. Some Turkish and some Kurdish. When they go somewhere else; Get out! Pack up your tents! That is the sort of thing happens in state. Wherever we go he says, Go! Tenting is forbidden. Get up, hurry get up!”⁶²

On the other hand, I did not see this kind of prohibition in Edirne. When we regard Roma population (21%) in Edirne, it would be hard to implement this kind of prohibitions. Because some of the Roma members maintain their horse car to collect paper or scrap iron. Some of them also have phaetons.

Due to prohibition of tents in Diyarbakır Municipality, semi-nomadic Dom group could only stay two or three weeks around Diyarbakır villages and then they were coming back to their houses in Siverek. Hence, they are semi-nomadic during summer. In addition, there were 15-20 persons in these tents. They were also relatives. Dom men were musicians and women were selling cloth and woman garment by knocking villagers' door. Besides, they mentioned that they were buying these garments from Diyarbakır, Urfa, Gaziantep and Mardin. Moreover, they are sometimes doing this job during winter because they have cars.

Like nomadic Roma groups, this Dom group from Siverek can be regarded as peripatetic. A Dom woman in this group complained about her job. She has been doing it for 20 years on the ground that some peasants do not want to buy garment because of her Dom identity. As she says,

“Actually, I stroll around door by door. Some men while eating his meal says that close the door, let them not in the house. Do not let Gypsies get into the house. Believe me, they say thief, like Gypsies says every words. We subsist on honest earnings still we are remembered notoriously. Yes my sister, this is how it is... Would she put anything to her dowry that Aşık have made? He would go and buy

⁶² “Biz Dom’uz ama Domların hayatı yoktur. Hani hayatımız olsa böyle yılanların arasında yaşar mıydık? Akşam biri gelsin bizi öldürsün; gittik, bitti...Burası ne yeridir bacım? Burası hayvan yeridir, inek yeridir. Biz de hayvandır haşa bu çadırlarda. Bir Türkçe, bir Kürtçe. Başka biz yere gidiyeler, kalkın ha, kalk çadır kalk! Devlette böyledir. Biz nereye gidi, diyi get. Ha çadır yasaktır. Kalkın hemen kalkın”.

from the passage. Believe me he is not even a rich person. His wife even would die of starvation.”⁶³

The Dom woman also added that she had to work because she owed depth because of bride’s dowry. During the nomadic times, dowry could be a horse, a donkey or partridge, where the price of dowry raises up to 10000 TL. In addition to Siverek Dom group, the interviewees in Diyarbakır also complained about this dowry. When I asked why they could not remove dowry, the same Dom woman explained how hard it is to do it. With her words,

“The person stays in a village; he has his own imam, his tribe you know. They can remove the bride money. But it is not like as we do, in our way everybody is up to himself.”⁶⁴

Therefore, she indicates the division between Dom community and Kurdish tribe, as being settled (living in a village), having a religious authority and most important thing having a tribe. Kurdish tribes attribute nomadic to Dom community. Related to this boundary, one interviewee complained about Kurdish peasants’ attitude towards themselves although he left nomadic for 7 years. As Mehmet (66, M, Non-Working, Dom) says,

“When my mother had died, when she passed away we were kid. We were four persons: two boys and two girls. My father was also mute. We were shepherding. We shepherd for seven years. For example when we pass across a waterfront, if the animals get nearby the farm, they were saying that “But these are Dom. But can Dom make shepherding?” We thought that may be that name of Dom would be ceased. That is, no one would call as this is Dom. We have made shepherding for 7 years, this is enough. Again that name remained on us. Then we said that since this name still stands over us, we carry on the same way of life. We again started to be Dom.”⁶⁵

The narrative indicates that Kurdish people perceive that only Kurds could be shepherd. Mehmet tried to prove by becoming a shepherd, get rid of exclusion

⁶³ “Valla kapı kapı geziyem. Bazı adamlar var yemek yiyiler. Diyi kapı kapat, gelmesinler ha, gelmesin, Çingene gelmesin. Valla hırsız diyler, Çingeneler gibi her laf söyliyler. Biz helal çalışıyoruz, gene kötü oluyoruz. A bacım öyledir...Aşıkların⁶³ yaptığı şeyleri çeyizine koyar mı hiç? Pasaja gider alır. Valla zengin de değildir. Kumardan karısı açlıktan öldü.”

⁶⁴ “Adam bir köyde kalır, imamı var, aşireti var, biliyorsun. Onlar kaldırabilir başlık parası. Ama bizimki öyle değil, bizimki herkes kendi kendine”.

⁶⁵ “Anam öldüğü zaman, rahmet ettiği zaman, biz ufaktık. 4 kişiydik. 2 oğlan 2 kızdı. Biz, babam da dili yokti, dilsizdi. Biz çobanlık yaptık. 7 sene çobanlık yaptık. Hani mesela bi derenin kenarına geçseydik, hayvan tarlanın kenarına geleydi, diyidi yav ama bunlar Domdur. Ama Domlar çobanlık yapabili? Biz dedik belki o isim üstümüzden kalkar. Yani o isim, kimse bize daha demesin, Domdur ha. Biz 7 yıl çobanlık yapmışız, yeterdir. Gine o isim üstümüzden kalkmadi. Dediğ madem o isim üstümüzden kalkmi, biz de aynı yolu devam ettik. Gine Domluğa başladık”.

and negative stereotype of nomadic identity. At this time, his situation was found strange. According to Kurds, Dom could not be shepherds. After the situation did not change, he said “We restarted being Dom”. This sentence is critical because Dom identity is seen as equal to nomadic identity. Hence, view of “Dom could not be shepherd” is an indicator of “social closure” indicating the exclusion of Dom identity from settled life and specific jobs, like shepherd. And ethnicity works here as labeling.

Apart from the differences between Kurdish tribe and Dom community, my Dom access who brought me there was talking to a Dom man from Siverek. He told me that he did not understand their dialects. He talked about two dialects among Dom community: “Domari and Karaçi”⁶⁶. Moreover, this nomadic group identified themselves as “we are Dom of Siverek”. In response, Dom group in Diyarbakır identified themselves as “we are Dom of Diyarbakır”. Hence, it seems that they construct their identity based on the city where they live in. My access wondered whether their wives were knocking the peasants’ door to want food. The Dom man from Siverek said that their wives were just going to peasants’ house to sell stuff from their package. In response, they earned money, did not take money. My access was surprised with his answer because their wives were knocking the peasants’ houses only for wanting provisions. As it was discussed in the beginning of the chapter, Roma nomadic women knocked on peasants’ door and traded with commodities like combs, nail scissors, needle or fiber. In response they took provision. Hence, we shall assert that Dom group in Siverek and nomadic Roma group can be peripatetic on the ground that their survival strategy is minimal food production and maximal mobility offering the peasants their goods and services. It seems important to note that there is no unique mobility between Roma and Dom groups. I mean that variety of nomadic patterns in terms of economic activity can be observed. But my interest is that how their nomadic pattern changed and how both Roma and Dom communities have been affected

⁶⁶ Dom community also differentiates themselves according to their occupation. *Karaçi* group makes sieves, Dom group is musicians. Accordingly they speak different dialects of *Domari*. They also speak Kurdish very well. In generally men know Turkish but women especially elder ones do not know Turkish.

from this transformation. In the previous section, I tried to explain it in terms of agricultural mechanization and forced migration which also directly affects the extent to which they benefit from citizenship rights.

The most important effect of nomadic on Dom community is related to their lack of birth registration. When they were nomadic, they had no birth certificate. Most of the interviewees mentioned that having settled to Diyarbakır they acquired birth certificate especially after 1990s. Nevertheless, I encountered many Dom interviewees who have no identity cards. Especially women are considered in this group. Men have to take out birth certificate especially for military service. Yet women are invisible because of the fact that most of them have no official marriage. Besides, all of the Dom women were illiterate. Nevertheless, Dom group from Siverek mentioned that all of them have birth certificate and their children attend to school until the end of primary school. After the primary school, children do their parent's occupation. This situation also differs in Diyarbakır on the ground that Dom children's parents are unemployed. Hence, they have to work in informal sector.

Today Dom community just goes to the villages during summer because they said that there is no job opportunity in Diyarbakır. As far as I observed, they have semi-nomadic pattern during the wheat harvest. They go to villages to collect wheat which is regarded as *zekat*. As Deniz (26, F, Non-Working, Dom) states,

“Plateau, we have our villages, we have cool villages. We go out there. We pitch up tent, that is to say, we pitch up tents where most appropriate. We live in there around a week, a month. In that grassy ground, in that plateau; if we get bored we come back. This is something like that. My children had to attend the school, I came by that reason. They took their school report, but we are still thinking to go there. They (villagers) give us wheat, zekat. When we are there, they send us yoghurt, butter. Well, they are such like that indeed. When we go there they are pleased to see us.

They say “where have you been? Why don’t you come? They send us things. All know us.”⁶⁷

The woman stated that their relation with Kurdish peasants is well, thereby peasant give them provision for winter. She talked about nomadic pattern in a very positive attitude. Deniz’s daughter who is 10 years old said to me that “The places which we are going are to very nice. It does not smell garbage like here. You wake up with bird singing in the morning”. Their houses are shanty. There is no infrastructure at their neighborhood. Deniz compared their present situation in the city and nomadic around villages, the second is better for them.

On the other hand, another interviewee, Nermin (40, F, Beggar, Dom) compared her family’s present condition to nomadic past. She says,

“It was the same in the past; we were travelling the villages in those old days. We were in the tents. Be that water, snow, all were leaking from above of us. We were always falling asleep in wet clothes. Sometimes we were muffling with blanket underneath the muddy ground. There was no comfort. Now it is fine. Now, at least we rent a house and our children attend school.”⁶⁸

Thus, there are different evaluations towards nomadic years among interviewees. Yet, this narration was the only one to evaluate nomadic past as negative attitude. Most of the interviewees talked about their mobility in a very positive attitude owing to the economic reasons. Apart from the time of wheat harvest, Dom community would go to the familiar Kurdish peasants during *Sersal* which refers to the New Year in Kurdish language. As Mehmet (66, M, Non-Working, Dom) explains,

“I mean, we have our *Sersal*. Well, we call the New Year as *Sersal*. He knew that. We call the New Year *Sersal*. The New Year of the government is different, and our *Sersal*; Kurdish *Sersal* is different. 13 days ahead of it. We knocked around the villages, which they knew us. Some gives chicken, some turkey. In the past they were giving sheep and lambs. In the past the tribes were giving us these. But

⁶⁷ “Yayla, bizim köylerimiz var, serin köylerimiz var. Oraya çıkıyoruz. Çadır açıyoruz, yani en uygun yerde çadır kuruyoruz. İçinde öyle bir hafta, bir ay falan yaşıyoruz. O çimenlikte, o yaylada yine sıkılırsak biz geri dönüyoruz. Öyle bir şey. Çocuklarımızın okulu vardı, ben onlar için geldim. Karnelerini aldılar, ama biz yine düşünüyoruz gitmeyi”...(Köylüler) buğday veriyorlar, zekat veriyorlar bize. Ordayken bize yoğurt falan, tereyağı gönderiyorlar. Hani onlar da o kadar şeydir ya. Biz gittiğimiz zaman, onlar seviniyo bizi görünce. Diyo siz nerde kalmıştınız? Niye gelmiyorsunuz böyle? Kendileri bize gönderiyorlar. Hepsi tanıyolar”.

⁶⁸ “Eskiden de böyleydi, eskide köylerdeydik. Çadırların içindeydik. Sudur, kardır hep başımızın üstünden akardı. Sürekli ıslak elbiselerle yataydık. Bazen çamurun altında battaniyeye sarınıyorduk. Hiç rahatlık yoktu. Artık iyi. Şimdi en azından ev tutmuşuz, çocuklarımız okuyorlar”.

nowadays these sheep and lambs became expensive. They give chicken or turkey or some kuruş of money. Some was giving 2 TL or 5 TL. This is done in that new year... the one who are in tribes still give. Now when we go for Sersal, all of them give honestly. The ones like you and me. We know each other. We enjoy from ourselves. They trust us.”⁶⁹

I listened from the other interviewees that they would generally go to the familiar Kurdish villages. The villagers that they did not meet before might refuse to give provision or even expel them. In this regard, a Kurdish man from Lice confirmed this information. In Lice settled Kurds know semi-nomadic Dom community that they establish good relation with Dom and call them as *Mitrip*. On the other hand, Kurds in Lice do not safeguard other Dom groups coming from outside. Kurds call them as *Karaçi*. Therefore, the identity of *Karaçi* signifies “outsider” but Dom or *Mitrip* refers as “insider”. Similarly, Vice Chairman of DTP Cafer Kan mentioned that *Karaçi* refers to outsider owing to the stereotypes. As he says,

“The ones that we call *Karaçi* means they came from the western side of the country. There were such others that coming from other cities. However, the settled people was protecting themselves from them. Those that came from other cities were not welcomed. If they come to a village or a neighborhood, if settled could, they would expel them since there was robbery common in the newcomers, which was not common in the settled ones. I did not witness in fact.”⁷⁰

Consequently, there is a perception of difference between identity attributions of Dom themselves and Kurds’ attribution towards Dom. Although Dom community attributes their identity according to occupation, as sieve

⁶⁹ “Yani, bizim *sersalımız* vardır. Hani yılbaşı biz *Sersal* diyoruz. O bilir. Yılbaşına biz *Sersal* diyoruz. Hani hükümetin yılbaşı ayırır, bizim *Sersalımız* de, Kürt *Sersali* de ayırır. 13 gün onun önündedir. Biz köylerin içinde geziyoruz. Mesela bız gitiğimizde o köye bizi tanılar. Bazi vardır tavuk veri, bazi vardır bize hindi veri. Eskiden kuzu, koyun veridi bize. Eskiden Aşirler öyle veridi. Ama şimdi onlar kıymetli olmuş. Ya bi tavuk veri, ya bi hindi veri, ya kaç kuruş para. Başka, 2 milyon, 5 milyon veri. Yani o yılbaşında... Aşir olanlar veriyor, hala veriyorlar. Şimdi *Sersala* gittiğimizde hepsi veriyor valla. Senin benim gibiler. Birbirimizi tanıyoruz. Birbirimizden keyif alıyoruz. Bize güvenleri var”.

⁷⁰ “*Karaçi* dediğimiz ya da iştedenilen Batıdan gelen anlamında zaten kullanılıyor. Daha çok diğer illerden gelen böylesi gruplar da vardı. Fakat yerleşik halk kendini bu kesimlerden koruyup şey yapardı yani. Bu kesimler daha az sevilir. Bir köye ya da bir mahalleye uğradıklarında eğer yapılabilirse kovulur. Çünkü bu gelen kesimler içerisinde hırsızlık, şu bu vesaire falan şeyler de çok daha fazlayken, o yerleşik olanlarda kesinlikle o tür şeyler olmazdı yani. Ben çok da tanık olmamıştım”.

makers⁷¹ are *Karaçi* and musicians are Dom; Kurds refer to *Karaçi* as outsider and not settled Dom because of some stereotypes about this community such as stealing or prostitution. We shall assert from this kind of social boundaries that nomadic culture of Dom community is not totally acceptable by Kurds who make a social division between “our Dom” and *Karaçi*. It shows a kind of asymmetrical relations of power between nomadic and host society. On the other hand, Dom interviewees attribute all the non-Dom as *Perev*. Thus, there is not one side self-attribution. Nomadism around Diyarbakır was accepted conditionally. Settled should know Dom community in order to give them provision. Other Dom groups are even expelled because they are perceived as criminal.

Moreover, Diyarbakır public prosecutor Alaaddin Atakan gives an example about nomadic Dom in Mardin in 1965, which shows peripatetic mobility. He also mentions the social boundary between nomadic Dom and settled. As he claims,

“But, there is also so called tent nomadism. Of course out of the city and certainly not settled. If they are concerned about animals they live nomadically where grass ends up and where there is much water. However, in my childhood there was not any Roma in Mardin. But how did we know them? They were pitching tents in some parts of the city and we knew that the gypsies have come. Of course, these things that I have told were at 1965’s. We were kids at that time. They were making dental veneers, they were making golden teeth, and they were telling fortune. With some kinds of manipulative skills, they were trading in there. But the people were refraining from them. They were refraining from them as if they were kidnapping, they stealing. They were even scaring us saying that they would give us to Gypsies.”⁷²

According to the narrative, Dom men were traditionally in dentistry making golden teeth and women were fortune-tellers in 1965. In response to their

⁷¹ Meyer’s (2004) research (between 1991 and 1993) in Syria shows that sieve-making and traditional dentistry is also seen as in Syria Dom occupations. Dom women concentrated on tattooing the women of pastoral nomads, fortune telling and begging. Their general name is *Nawar*. To Meyer, like the tem of Gypsy, *Nawar* designates a variety of heterogeneous ethnic groups. The Dom and Turkmen are the largest proportion in this group.

⁷² “Ama bi de çadır göçebeliği dediğimiz şeyler var. Tabi şehrin dışında ve kesinlikle yerleşik değildir. İşte hayvan sürüleriyle ilgiliseler artık otun bittiği yer, suyun fazla olduğu yere göre göçebe şeklinde yaşarlar. Ancak tabi çocukluğumda Mardin’de biz Romanları Mardin’de hiç Roman yok. Ancak ne şekilde tanıdık onları? Çadırlar gelirdi, çadırlar şehrin belli bir yerinde çadırlar kurulurdu ve biz işte Çingeneler geldi, Çingeneler. Tabi bunlar çok eski şeyler anlattığım, 65’li yıllar. O zaman çocuktuk. Bunlar diş kaplama yaparlardı, altın diş yaparlardı, fal bakarlardı. Bir takım böyle el becerileriyle bi alışveriş yapıyordu orda. Ama halk onlardan çekinir, sanki bunlar çocuk kaçıyıyor işte hırsızlık yapıyor anlamında bi çekinceleri vardı. Hatta bizi bakın sizi Çingenelere veririz şeklinde korkutuyorlardı dahi”.

services, they were trading. It is also a typical peripatetic mobility. Traditional dentistry carries on in the villages. Hence, we cannot simply categorize Dom community as whether they are peripatetic or not but interviewees did not mention such kind of mobility. Prosecutor's narrative also shows that there was a social boundary between settled and nomad Dom groups. Berland and Rao (2004) argue that three main characteristics of lifestyle contribute to low social status of peripatetic communities: "they are no owners of soil, their alien or ambiguous origins and the despicable nature of their subsistence activities" (Berland and Rao, 2004:15).

Yet, Berland and Rao indicate that although peripatetic peoples have little power and low socio-economic status, these communities develop survival strategies. These strategies can be called as "subaltern strategies" in the study of colonial history. For them, "[a]t the heart of these strategies lies their capacity for flexibility and resourcefulness" (Berland and Rao, 2004:19). These strategies allow them to adapt to their clients' changing needs. For example, the interviewees and institutions mentioned that Roma community in Edirne has been bearded to deal with livestock in the villages. Edirne villagers call them for this job; thereby Roma households go the Edirne village for nearly six months. Mechanization of agriculture and technology led to change their services.

In Diyarbakır, Dom community's situation is completely different from Roma community because they had to settle owing to the forced migration. Their nomadic pattern was also based on food extracting which was made by Dom women. Yet we can see "subaltern strategies". For example, a Dom man became a shepherd not to be discriminated due to his nomad identity. Hence, it could be one of the different "tactics" but he could not be successful. Owing to the division between "our Dom and Karaçi", interviewees prefer to go to the familiar villages to collect wheat.

Briefly, the attempt in this chapter was to explore the nomadic past of Roma and Dom communities regarding their transformation whether due to agricultural transformation or forced migration, both of which have direct effects

on current position in the urban level. In the next chapter, the attempt is to evaluate both Roma and Dom communities' citizenship rights in urban conditions.

CHAPTER VI

CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS EVALUATION OF ROMA AND DOM COMMUNITIES

6.1 Introduction

What is important for the purpose of this chapter is to compare to what extent Roma and Dom communities get access to basic citizenship rights in urban conditions. In doing so, the chapter aims at going through seven comparative sections apart from introduction and conclusion. These sections namely are: citizenship and lack of birth registration; civil rights; social rights; political rights; cultural rights; identification and belonging into the political community and majority societies and marriage patterns.

First, the chapter will begin with the pattern of lack of birth registration. In order to benefit from citizenship rights, birth registration is a fundamental requirement. Before all else, persons who have no birth registration fall outside of the paradigm or institutions generated by the state. The major citizenship problem of lack of birth registration has been seen especially among Dom women and children in Diyarbakır. Dom community had no birth registration during the nomadic times. Therefore, they were not able to benefit from basic citizenship rights (education, health and other welfare state rights). They took their identity cards after 1990s; thereby they appear as “hidden population”. Lack of birth registration also occurs in Roma community due to the early marriages, which is a common pattern in both communities.

The analysis will continue with T.H Marshall’s (1992) three distinct citizenship rights: civil rights (liberty of person, the right to own property, the

right to sell his labor, freedom of speech, thought and faith and the right to justice), political rights (participation in the exercise of political power) and social rights (welfare state rights)⁷³.

Second, civil rights refer to equal treatment on citizens regardless of race, gender, ethnicity and religion and necessitate liberty of person, the right to own property, the right to work, freedom of speech, thought and faith and the right to justice. To evaluate the civil rights, this section mainly is based on interviewees' self-evaluation of their citizen positions.

Third, Roma and Dom communities' social rights will be compared focusing on following themes: access to job opportunities and labor force, participation in education, housing conditions and social interaction at the neighborhoods and finally access to health.

Comparative analysis will focus on the social rights, which are the main ingredient of welfare state. As Sassen argues, "the development of welfare states in the twentieth century became a crucial institutional domain for granting entitlements to the poor and the disadvantaged" (Sassen, 2006:16). Furthermore, at a transnational level, "Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015) proposed by Soros Foundation, the World Bank and EU encourages states to address inequality of Roma in the sphere of education, employment, housing and health" (Sobotka, 2007:136). As Marsh & Strand address, "the governments of the countries that have signed up for the Decade have an obligation to take measures to abolish the existing inequalities between Gypsy and non-Gypsy citizens" (Marsh and Strand, 2005). However, Turkey has not signed this initiative since Gypsy population is not regarded as official minority. More concretely, benefiting from social rights equally shows the level of integration to the society.

As argued in the previous chapter, job opportunities and labor force of Roma and Dom communities have been affected by economic, social and historical transformation. Although Roma community is settled in Edirne nearly

⁷³ However, this analysis will not follow Marshall's evolutionary classification. In order to introduce communities in a more explanatory way, social rights has been analysed prior to political rights.

for 40-50 years due to agricultural transformation, Dom community settled in Diyarbakır for 15 years due to the forced migration. Roma community like other first wave migrants (1950-1960) participated mostly in low paid and temporary jobs in city conditions. On the other hand, Dom community experienced twofold transformations – forced migration and transformation of Kurdish weddings – which directly affected their access to citizenship rights. Dom community's nomadic pattern has been decreased due to the prohibition of nomadic pattern. Hence, they are internally displaced persons like Kurdish majority. This transformation directly affected their tactics of economic survival. During nomadic process, Dom community had good interaction with Kurdish peasants in the villages both in economic and social sense. When they settled in Diyarbakır they were playing *davul* and *zurna* at the Kurdish weddings. Their musician craft decreased today owing to the increase in wedding saloons and transformation of musical instruments.

Presently, Roma and Dom communities' labor force varies according to gender. Therefore, man and woman participation in labor force will be compared separately in first two subsections under labor force section. In addition, child labor, common in both communities due to poverty, will be discussed within women labor force. The common household labor activity is seasonal agricultural labor, which will constitute the third subsection, and here the aim is to compare how this seasonal agricultural job varies in terms of ethnicity. Following labor force and access to job opportunities, as a final subsection we see poverty as a common pattern in both communities with different degrees and conceptualization. In this regard, Roma community's poverty will be argued as old forms of poverty whereas Dom community's poverty overlaps with new poverty. Roma community tries to stabilize themselves in the present system and even attain socio-economic mobility, developing different tactics, which are not seen among Dom community.

Apart from the labor force, participation in education, housing conditions and social bridges at the neighborhoods and access to health will be discussed as separate subsections under this theme of social rights.

Fourth, political rights refer to participation in the exercise of a political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of a body. The section will hereby compare voting and political tendencies; exercise of political power; Roma and Dom Associations' roles at local and transnational levels.

Marshallian framework underestimates the problem of ethnic identity and cultural rights (to language, to a share in the cultural heritage, and to a religious right). Therefore, fifth, in cultural rights section the aim will be to compare both communities' language, ethnic and religious affiliations. In this section, to what extent and how Roma and Dom communities practice their religious, linguistic, and ethnic practices will be examined.

Sixth, with regard to identification and belonging into political community and majority societies, the section will consider how Roma and Dom communities feel affiliation to the majority (Turks and Kurds) and larger political community, which is Turkish citizenship membership.

Final section of the analysis chapter is the marriage patterns, which is designed to evaluate intermarriage in Edirne and Diyarbakır. Intermarriage between majority and minority also shows the integration levels to the society. In this regard, intermarriage indicates how different groups accept each other as equal (Kalmijn, 1998). Moreover, women experience will be compared in terms of patriarchy and its effects on citizenship rights.

6.2 Citizenship and Lack of Birth Registration

Birth registration is a prerequisite in order to benefit from citizenship rights. As Gündüz Hoşgör (2008) indicates, "birth registration is one of the distinguishing features of the Social State. The official identity card that verifies the registry is necessary and compulsory for defining citizenship rights, obligations, and services" (Gündüz Hoşgör, 2008: 28). Therefore, in this section what follows is an attempt to analyse the situation of Roma and Dom

communities in terms of lack of birth registration. In this regard, I asked to the interviewees whether they have identity cards.

In a comparative perspective, most of the Dom interviewees obtained their identity cards after the settlement process in Diyarbakır. However, lack of birth registration is still a problem especially for Dom women and for their children. Although men take their identity cards due to the obligation of military service, I encountered a great amount of Dom women interviewees who have no identity cards. My findings also overlap with Gündüz Hoşgör's (2008) research conducted in Samsun, Konya and Urfa. In this regard, she found that women and girls are a disadvantaged group because of the lack of birth registration. For her,

“[t]his indicates women are in a disadvantaged position in terms of not practicing the citizenship rights offered by the Family Law (like having the right to practice civil marriage and monogamy) and Inheritance Law, and the right to access education” (Gündüz-Hoşgör, 2008:28).

Moreover, “Hidden population”⁷⁴ is widespread especially in Dom community. As argued in the Methodology Chapter, during the interviews at the institutions, the authorities mentioned that this condition is not only peculiar to Dom community. After forced migration, lots of Kurdish families who migrated from villages also did not have birth certification.

On the other hand, lack of birth registration is not a general pattern for Roma community except for late birth registration. Finally, the common pattern observed in both communities is that newborn child is not registered due to early marriages. Therefore, due to early aged non-official marriages, sometimes the child is registered to any member of the family. For example, grandmothers appear as the mother of a child. I mostly encountered this tactic among Roma community.

In Diyarbakır, Dom interviewees mentioned that they had no birth registration cards during nomadic times and they were officially registered after 1990s. Whereas, in Edirne, Roma interviewees mentioned that they have obtained identity cards with mass weddings performed by governorship. In addition,

⁷⁴ Hidden population includes the persons who are not registered to the family tree in any reason until their 18 aged or the persons who are no citizens of any foreign country.

authorities emphasized that most of the Roma community members have green card, which is affective in getting birth registration.

As a common pattern in both communities, late birth registration leads to “hidden population” which affects their education life. Both Roma and Dom families do not feel a necessity to go to the birth registration office until their children reaches the age to go to the school. For example, one of the Dom interviewees mentioned that he registered for school when he was 10 years old. Even though he was 17 years old, he was attending eight grade in elementary education.

However, it is important here to mention that lack of birth registration is especially widespread among Dom women because official marriages are very rare in Dom community. In addition, polygamy is also widespread. This has also negative outcomes for newborn children. Dom community is a more closed community than Roma community. According to families’ perception, girls should stay at home to help their family. Dom girls drop out of primary school at 5th class. After that, they are married with their parents’ will. However, Dom men enter to the public realm for various reasons. Foremost they take birth registration because of military service.

To sum up, “hidden population” can be seen especially owing to the early marriages in both communities. In contrast to Roma community, especially Dom women face the risk of being in disadvantaged position because of polygamy and unofficial marriages.

6.3 Civil Rights

Civil rights indicate to liberty of person, the right to own property, the right to work, freedom of speech, thought and faith and the right to justice. In addition, civil rights refer to equal treatment on citizens regardless of race, gender, ethnicity and religion. To evaluate the civil rights, this section is mainly based on interviewees’ self-evaluation of their citizen positions.

Regarding the right to work, we see restrictions in both communities which are reflected as hiding their ethnic identity. The main reason is that they do not want to lose their job. Among Roma community, some participants are civil servants but they tend to hide their identity avoid from exclusion. Roma community compares their situation with Turks and Kurds. Most of them mention that Turks and Kurds have privileges and they are first class citizens. They also mention about the importance of education and believe that education would bring mobility to anyone but except for Roma. They mention that once their ethnicity is understood they cannot get “good jobs”.

As Fevzi (46, M, Peddler, Roma) says,

“Have you ever seen a Roma captain, major, colonel, full general? None, I do not suppose. Did you see a Roma police? Did you see any Roma civil servant at a government office? Did you see any deputy governor or a governor at state office? There is no such thing. No matter what people say, I would not believe personally. Maybe one at a million. It would be police anyway. In such military, it is all a lie my brother. I do not believe indeed.”⁷⁵

In Diyarbakır, we cannot see any Dom civil servants but they tend to hide their identity even if they work in low-paid jobs. They mention that when their ethnic identity is understood, they are fired. Moreover, Dom community has to hide their ethnic identity when they go to seasonal agricultural labor in Western and Northern Turkey. Otherwise, they cannot work in seasonal agricultural labor.

Furthermore, Dom women’s civil rights are under threat especially when intermarriage occurs between Kurdish majority and Doms. Intermarriage is very rare among these groups. If it occurs, as Marsh indicates, Dom women hide their identities. Having understood their Dom identity, these women are under threat: they are expelled or even killed (Marsh, 2008b: 83). During the research, I did not hear such examples towards Dom women but I can assert that there are strict boundaries between Dom community and Kurdish society in terms of intermarriage.

⁷⁵ “Sen hiç gördün mü Roman bir yüzbaşı, binbaşı, albay, orgeneral. Yok, tahmin etmem. Bir polis gördün mü Roman? Bir devlet dairesinde çalışan Roman gördün mü? Resmi dairelerde vali yardımcılığını yapan veya vali olan? Yok öyle bir şey. Onun için kim ne derse desin ben şahsen inanmam yani. Bir milyonda bir kişi belki oda. Belki polis o da. Yoksa askeriye maskeriye hepsi yalan kardeşim. Ben inanmıyorum yani”.

To continue with relations with institutions in Diyarbakır, Mehmet Emin Aktar, the chief of Bar Council, expressed that he saw unequal and despised attitude towards members of Dom community at the institutional level. For him, they are noticed by their skin in the society. He illustrated this situation with an example. A Dom man wanted to apply for a driving license but it was not given to him. The reason was explained to him as he injured someone and his legal case was not closed. Lawyer Aktar mentions that the case cannot prevent him from taking his driving license. Aktar defended and helped him to take his driving license. Moreover, ERRC project team also made research in Diyarbakır. In this regard, they found that Dom community also faces with arbitrary detention. Police arrested one Dom man even though he was not guilty for stealing nine kilos of golden. He was also tortured in jail. Having found the thief in İzmir, he was released. However, he was afraid to take judicial proceeding (Marsh, 2008b: 81).

Although Dom community is differentiated within society in terms of race, woman's clothes and Kurdish accent, Roma community is differentiated in Edirne through their race, neighborhood and dressing. Unlike Dom community, the neighborhood works as a stigma owing to the size of Roma population (21%). Roma interviewees mentioned different treatment towards themselves at institutional level like courthouse, hospital, police station, etc.

Müjde (43, F, Peddler, Roma) explains it:

“For example, we are going to the courthouse. We want to get into the courthouse for example and we want to learn why our children are put inside the jail. We are anxious about for example whether our children are going to be imprisoned or not. Our children, what is happening to us? They take precautions. You cannot get into but only the court officials shall enter. Now why us? You would create tension, I knew not what... Nothing would happen, in point of fact, nothing would happen; but since they despise us, they do not let us in. In response to that, somebody else starts to pick a fight. Brothers intervene... This happens always against us. There is this kind of attitude towards us all the time. That is why we are being despised.”⁷⁶

⁷⁶ “Mesela adliyeye gidiyoz. Adliyeye girmek istiyoruz mesela kavgadan neden alındı çocuklar? İçeri mi atılacak çocuklar, meraklanıyoruz mesela. Çoluk çocuğumuz. Noluyo bize? Önlem ediyorlar. Siz giremezsiniz, sade mahkeme görevliler girebiliyo. Şimdi biz neden? Yok olay çıkarmış, yok bilmem ne. olay çıkmaz, aslını sorarsan olay hiç çıkmaz; ama bunu bizi hakir gördüklerinden bizi sokmuyorlar. Şimdi ona kezaat, şimdi daha bi başkaları mesela kavga ediyö. Onların anneleri babaları nasıl giriyor? Kardeşler giriyor...E, bize karşılık hep böyle. Hep bize karşı karşı bu tavırlar var. Onun için biz hakir görünüyoruz yani”.

Kemal (35, M, Grocer, Roma) says,

“Here I already told you, when we go and when they asked which neighborhood we came, even if you go to the police station and if he asked which neighborhood we came from; from Yıldırım. Are you Roma? When you say Roma, they behave differently.”⁷⁷

With regard to self-evaluation of their citizen positions, the main difference between Roma and Dom community appears to be that Roma interviewees feel stereotypes and stigma on their lives more directly than Dom community. For the Roma interviewees, being Roma indicates being “poor, prostitution and thief”. They are stigmatized with their Roma identity. The common pattern is that the interviewees from both communities feel themselves as “second class citizen”, which challenges with the equality principle of citizenship. Feeling second-class citizen also shows the symbolic dimension of social exclusion, which exposes how excluded groups are defined by themselves and wider society.

The elder Roma interviewees mentioned that discrimination was obvious in the past. Their coffeehouses were also separated. The intermarriage was impossible in those times (40-50 years ago). Roma community even could not speak with non-Roma majority. For ex-Çeribaşı Mehmet Ali Körüklü, the process is evolving positively for Roma community. He gave example that the *Kıpti* category was lifted from the religious status of identity cards during Adnan Menderes government. Like him, most of the Roma interviewees criticized the different treatment and categorization related with *Kıpti*. Körüklü said, “There is no *Kıpti* religion, we are Muslims”. In addition, he finds “human rights” as a positive aspect for Roma community in decreasing discrimination. However, stereotypes and stigma are very powerful on their everyday lives. The relationship between Roma and non-Roma is limited to only business life. In addition, baby-sitting and nursing are good interaction ways between Roma and non-Roma. On the other hand, Dom interviewees have no relation with Kurdish majority even in business life in urban conditions. Poverty leads Dom community to commit crime

⁷⁷ “Ya işte anlattım ya gittiğimizde yani hangi mahalleden diye sorduğunda, karakola bile gittiğinizde hangi mahalleden diye sorduğunda; *Yıldırım*’dan. Roman mısın? Roman dediğin zaman daha değişik davranıyorlar.”

such as; prostitution, drug dealer, and thief. Unlike Roma community, public Prosecutor in Diyarbakır did not mention any crime unique to Dom community. Dom interviewees also confirmed this issue. However, they are excluded by the Kurdish majority who lives in same neighborhoods.

As a result, the common pattern is that the interviewees from both communities feel themselves as “second class citizen”. Different treatment at institutions and feeling of second-class citizen also indicate that modern citizenship did not produce principle of equality for both communities. Hence, we can say that there are thin “civil rights” for both communities. However, Dom community’s access to civil rights is very limited. Although stereotypes are powerful in Roma community’s lives, discriminative practices are frequently seen towards Dom community.

6.4 Social Rights

In this section, Roma and Dom communities will be compared in terms of welfare state rights specifically access to job opportunities and labor force, participation in education, housing conditions and social interaction in the neighborhoods and access to health. Following the economic, historical and social transformation in both communities, division of labor according to gender, common household labor as seasonal agriculture labor and reflections of poverty will be analysed under access to job opportunities and labor force section.

6.4.1 Access to Job Opportunities and Labor Force

We see economic, social and historical transformation affecting current Roma and Dom occupations. With regard to economic transformation, both Roma and Dom community’s craftsman ability decreased or vanished. In Edirne, most of the interviewees’ mothers or fathers were blacksmith and tinsmith as well as basketmaker. Moreover, as Gündüz Hoşgör (2007) indicates, Gypsies living in *Kemikçiler* neighborhood in Edirne had a traditional craft in Ottoman Empire that they were collecting bones of animals to prepare soap for concubines in the

Palace. These soaps were designed as fruits. Although Edirne is still famous with these fruit soaps, they are not produced by Roma anymore. Hence, Roma community had traditional occupations since Ottoman Empire. However, three main Roma occupations –blacksmith, tinsmith, and basketry– mostly vanished owing to the increase of technology and basketmaking is only done by small semi-nomadic group. Regarding Dom community, their main craft was musician, playing *davul* and *zurna* at the Kurdish weddings. In addition to musician, traditional dendistry and sieve making are their other traditional crafts, which were not so widespread among Dom community in Diyarbakır. Dom community nearly lost their musician job owing to the transformation of Kurdish weddings.

With regard to historical and social transformation, Roma community lost their craftsmanship with the increase of technology and agricultural modernization in 1950s. Although Roma interviewees were satisfied with their temporary or seasonal agricultural job, they started to lose their former job owing to the technological innovation in agriculture. In response, like other first wave migrants in Turkey (Keyder, 1987:135; Zürcher, 2000:329; Ertürk, 1994:13), Roma community members tended to work at temporary and low-skilled jobs because industry was not developed in Edirne. Some of the interviewees migrated to Edirne and opened a shop or worked at the industry. Hence, they tried to continue their blacksmith skill in urban conditions. The other Roma migrants became temporary or seasonal agricultural laborers. However, most of them participated in the “reserve army” or found casual jobs.

Unlike Roma community, Dom community was travelling from village to village, playing *davul* (drum) and *zurna* (pipe) during weddings. They were coming to Diyarbakır during winter. When they came to Diyarbakır, they were playing their instruments at the weddings in Diyarbakır. Similar to Roma community’s satisfaction from previous agricultural labor, Dom community was satisfied of their musician job until 10-15 years ago. Kurdish chiefs used to provide economic and social protection in the villages. With regard to forced migration and Kurdish question, their mobility was banned. In addition, their musician craft almost vanished owing to the increase in wedding saloon and

transformation of Kurdish wedding instruments in a way that electronic *saz* took place of *davul* and *zurna*.

6.4.1.1 Male Participation in Labor Force

When we discuss the general overview of the communities in terms of male labor force, Dom community seems much more homebound and has limited job activities. They are mostly unemployed or seasonal agricultural laborer, whereas Roma community can be differentiated in two labor groups: first is temporary, flexible and low-paid labors and second is waged labors including mainly retired immigrants from Germany and civil servants. In addition, some of the Dom men are shepherds and perform traditional dentistry at the villages. I met many musicians in almost every household among Dom community who are unemployed today. As argued in the previous chapter, their economic survival depended on nomadic activity and musician craft. However, they cannot go to the villages anymore because of forced migration and Kurdish question. They settled in Diyarbakır in 1992 and 1993 when “evacuation” of the villages took place. Most of the male interviewees in Diyarbakır were musicians and were playing *davul* (drum) and *zurna* (pipe) at Kurdish weddings. Having completed their nomadic pattern in the villages, they came back to Diyarbakır when the wedding season started. Similar to Roma males who were satisfied with their former agricultural labor, Dom males used to be satisfied of their musician craft. Nevertheless, their musician job decreased owing to the increase in wedding salon and transformation of Kurdish wedding instruments in a way that electronic *saz* took place of *davul* and *zurna*. Thus, Dom male interviewees are unemployed today. There are no casual or temporary Dom male workers.

On the other hand, Roma men in Edirne perform mostly jobs like lavatory attendant, metalworker, peddler, house painter, frog hunting, paper collector, musician, grocer, sewerage cleansing, garbage collector, porter, grower, seasonal agricultural laborer, and seasonal livestock. In addition, younger Roma males are mostly waged workers but especially low-paid jobs such as, waiter, clerking, etc. Most of them have no insurance. However, younger Dom generation is

unemployed like their fathers. Hence, we see the first job differentiation among men, unlike Roma community, in Diyarbakır, there are no Dom males working at even casual or temporary jobs.

Although Roma men seems more advantegous in a relative sense –at least they have jobs- some of the casual jobs are dangerous and do not involve insurance. In this regard, I would like to give frog hunting as an example. I conducted in-depth interview at Collecting Frog and Snail Solidarity Association (*Edirne Kurbağa ve Salyangoz Toplama Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği*). This association is established by Roma frog hunters and activated in Edirne. This association has 56 members, all of whom are Roma.

Zeki (41, M, Frog Collector, Roma) mentioned that he is doing frog hunting for 30 years. Before frog hunting, he worked as a hairdresser and temporary agricultural labor. Zeki describes the skills that are needed for hard job of frog hunting: They hunt at dam, lake, pond or other water carrier during the night. The workers do not take precaution when they work. This job is highly dangerous. In addition, workers have no social security. Small- scale enterprises rent low-paid worker. These enterprises are not located in Edirne but in Bandırma and İpsala. The enterprises just pay transportation. In addition, they pay just 1 TL for each kilo of frog. The ultimate aim of the association is to sell the frogs abroad without the intermediaries since these small-scale market exports these frogs to Bulgaria and France with higher prices.

During my case study in Edirne, Collecting Frog and Snail Solidarity Association was trying to become a cooperative. The chief of the association was comparing their labor activity with Europe because their hunted frogs were being exported by small-scale enterprises to mainly Europe with a price of 20 Euro per kilo of frog. In this regard, he finds their labor price so low. Therefore, for him, organizing under cooperation would remove the intermediaries and they would not only hunt frog, but also sell and determine prices. Hereby, we see an important step in organization process. Apart from the Frog Associations, there are other associations related to Roma male occupations like Association of Street Vendors. As different from Dom community, we see other associations

established by Roma males. They seek to find solutions for their Roma employees in their work group whereas due to immense unemployment, we cannot see any kind of organization process in Dom community.

Apart from these flexible jobs, stallholder is also another familiar job among Roma males. The Roma men dealing with this job generally reside at *Gazimihal* district of *Çavuşbey* neighborhood. Children also help their parents doing stallholder. Stallholder is perceived as a kind of good job by interviewees. However, most of the interviewees complained that large-scale markets deprive Roma community of their jobs. This situation leads to unemployment and poverty.

Apart from the temporary and flexible jobs, Roma community participates in waged-labor. On the contrary, there is no waged labor in Dom community. I conducted a pilot study with Roma musicians who work at “Roman Public Dance Assemblage” under the Ministry of Culture. They are civil servants. The chief of the assemblage was also *ex-çeribaşı* (traditional leader) in Edirne but their socio-economic position is unique in Edirne. Moreover, I heard that there are other waged Roma waged workers like nurses, teachers but they hide their Roma identity due to the fear of exclusion.

Until now, I tried to categorize male occupations in both communities. We can maintain that Roma men tend to perform flexible and low-paid jobs when they lost temporary or seasonal agricultural labor as well as their craft. Although the interviewees were satisfied with their temporary or seasonal agricultural job, they started to lose this job owing to the technological innovation in agriculture. On the other hand, Dom men became unemployed in Diyarbakır, had to be seasonal agricultural laborer. As a striking difference, Dom community does not evaluate this job in a positive sense due to devastating conditions that they face. I will evaluate seasonal agricultural labor as a common pattern in a separate section.

It seems necessary hereby to take into account economic and social profile of Edirne and Diyarbakır. In 2000, Diyarbakır is still an agricultural province (63,86% labor force) with little economic and technological resources devoted to

industry (only 3,82% in industry), whereas 49,60% of Edirne's economy is agricultural sector reflecting almost Turkey's average (48,38 %) and 9,01 % employment in industry, nearly 2,5 times higher than Diyarbakır but far less than Turkey's average of 13,35 %. Nevertheless, city profiles vary more strikingly according to unemployment rates in 2009. Diyarbakır is ranked as 2nd with 20,6 % unemployment rate, whereas Edirne is ranked as 36th with 13,4 % unemployment rate among 81 cities. Moreover, according to socio-economic development rank among 81 cities in 2003, although Edirne is ranked as 16th, Diyarbakır is ranked as 63th (see, Table Economic and Social Profile of the Research Cities in Chapter III).

We can surely see from the indicators above that unemployment and poverty is huge in Diyarbakır. Unlike Roma community, poverty and unemployment is not unique to Dom community that especially internally displaced Kurdish majority also affected from unemployment and limited job opportunities. As Diyarbakır Development Centre (2006) indicates, job opportunities are limited to both men and women among internally displaced families. They generally found mostly temporary, unqualified jobs which are based on manual labor. Similar to Dom males, the number of unemployed Kurdish males is very high (see, section 3.3.2 Resettlement and Forced Migration in East and South East Turkey in Chapter III).

Unlike internally displaced Kurdish families, we cannot see any Dom man even at low-paid and casual jobs. In this regard, Dom community and institutions indicated that they are excluded from job market resulting from their "ethnic identity". Low paid and casual jobs are offered to Kurdish families living in poverty not to Dom community so "ethnic networks" are advantageous for internally displaced Kurdish households for resource sharing.

In this regard, Hamdi (41, M, Unemployed, Dom) says,

Almost half of the Diyarbakır is unemployed. Even they (Kurds) can not find job, how come we find one? Truly, we are also unemployed. If only the municipality had taken us for a job and we were at least a garbage collector. At least we could earn

some bread for our children. There is no job. Therefore, we stroll around all for nothing.”⁷⁸

Hamdi’s statement indicates that poverty affects both Kurds and Dom community. Even if Kurds could not find a job in Diyarbakır, his community had no chance at market. Competition between internally displaced Kurdish persons and Dom community leads to their exclusion from job opportunities. This is also an indicator of social exclusion, which leads to unequal occupational opportunities. An another example that was told to me was that they apply for a job opportunity at a construction, but they have lost their chances when their Dom identity is understood because employer asks their tribe and they are not hired for the job. Having lost their musician craft, Dom men started to subsist on their wives’ begging and children’s working.

As Baran (42, M, Non-Working, Dom) says,

“What are the problems of Doms? The problem is hunger; we do not see money in our pockets. They do not give us job; the government does not give us job. We go for military service, we go for war, we do everything but there is not any job for us. Then let them not take us for the military, let them send us to Europe. They do not give us any kind of jobs. We say that we are also Muslim, Muhammed is our prophet. We go to military for them. If they do not give us job, what else could we do? There is not also drum anymore. In wedding saloons, they play saz and sing in Kurdish. They took our job from our hands. Why does not the government ban the instrument? Take us also to the university, patisserie, if also we had worked in such kinds of jobs. Otherwise, are not we able to mop or brooming?”⁷⁹

Baran’s statement shows two things. First, although they fulfill their citizenship duties, they are not hired for any jobs. He also emphasizes that they are Muslim. As argued in the theoretical consideration, Turkey’s citizenship practices in an overall perspective reflects republican citizenship, which emphasizes duties rather than rights. In addition, Baran states that they are

⁷⁸ “Diyarbakır’ın yarısı belki yemin ederim en çoğu da hepsi işsiz kalmışlar.Onlara [*Kürtlere*] iş çıkmıyo, bize bu Diyarbakırda bize mi çıkacak? E valla biz de işsizik. Bizi belediye alsaydı, biz de kendimize çöpçü möpçü olsaydık hiç olmazsa. Mesela kendimize bi. Hiç olmazsa çoluk çocuğumuzun ekmeği suyu çıkıy. İş yoktur, boşu boşuna geziyik”.

⁷⁹ “Domların derdi nedir? Açlıktır, cebimizde para görmüyoruz. İş vermiyorlar bize, devlet bize iş vermiyor. Askerliği yapıyoruz, savaşa gidiyoruz, her şeyi yapıyoruz; ama bize iş yok. O zaman bize yaptırmasınlar, bizi Avrupa’ya göndersinler. İş miş vermiyorlar. Biz diyoruz, biz de Müslamanız, Muhammed peygamberimizdir. Onlar için askerlik yapıyoruz. Bize iş vermeseler ne yapalım? Davulda yok artık. Düğün salonlarında saz maz, Kürtçe söylüyorlar. İşimizi elimizden aldılar. Devlet niye çalgıyı yasaklamıyor? Bizi de fakültede, pastanede, o tür işlere bir şekilde giriyor olsak. Yoksa biz yapamıyor muyuz o paspası, süpürgeyi?”

Muslim, which is also an advantaged identity in Turkish citizenship. However, they are excluded economically and socially. Having decreased or vanished their musician craft, they turned into “new poor”. They cannot find even casual jobs owing to social exclusion.

Likewise, Ahmet (28, M, Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) states that

“Among present-day Dom, women maintain the family. There is no work actually. If we could also work, but there are not such opportunities. Wherever we go, they do not want to hire us since we are Dom.”⁸⁰

The feeling of exclusion from the job market is very strong among Dom community. At this point, I also conducted in-depth interview with institutions in Diyarbakır on the issue of how exclusion occurs at the job market. Lawyer Muhammed Akar explains that Dom community has no opportunity even at low-paid jobs in Diyarbakır because of discriminatory practices. As he says,

“When doing manual labor or when you work in a patisserie, I don’t know, when you work for any jobs other than for public, now did not come to my mind; lets say when you work in a hotel; I heard that. When working in a hotel as a bellboy or maid, when it is understood that the person is Gypsy, he is fired. That is to say, they are being excluded because of the fact that they put forward in such a way: you would make robbery in here, your criminal record is worse anyway. Clearly, I saw these men facing serious problems at many points. None of them have social security, let me not talk for entire general but exceptions do not break the rule. I saw a little benefitting from health care even including green card. That is to say a group, which does not have green card and insurance. They have such natural thing. They have various problems that they face in their daily life which I do not remember now.”⁸¹

Akar indicates discriminative attitudes towards Dom community at the job market. Besides, he also considers Dom community’s lack of social rights and social security. In parallel lines, I encountered the exclusion of Roma community

⁸⁰ “Şimdiki Domlar, kadınlar onlara bakıyor. Çalışma yok yani. Biz de çalışsaydık, o imkanlar yok. Nereye gitsek biz “Dom”uz diye işe almıyorlar”.

⁸¹ “Mesela amelelik işinde çalışırken, yahut da bir pastanede çalışırken, bilemedin işte şu an aklıma gelmeyen başka bir kamu sektörü dışında bir işte bile çalışırken otelde varsayalım ki çalışıyor. Kulağıma geldi yani. Otelde komi yahut da kat görevlisiyken Roman olduğu anlaşılınca görevden ayrılmak zorunda kalan insanları ben öğrendim. Yani burda siz hırsızlık yaparsınız, siciliniz zaten bozuk gibi çeşitli bahanelerle bu insanların toplum dışına itildiklerini gördüm. Yani bu insanların açıkçası birçok noktada ciddi sorunlarla karşı karşıya olduğunu gördüm. Hiçbir tanesinin ben tabi tamamen öyle demiyim ama istista kaideyi bozmaz, sosyal güvenlik eğer çalışan varsa da sosyal güvenceden bir şekilde mahrum olduklarını gördüm. Yeşil Kart dahil sağlık güvencesinden çok az yaralandıklarını gördüm. Yani, Yeşil Kartsız, sigortasız bir topluluk. Öyle bir tabi şeyleri var. Şu an hatırlayamadığım birçok sorunları var. Gündelik hayatta karşı karşıyalar”.

from job opportunities in Edirne. As a comparative perspective, discriminative attitudes towards Roma community in terms of job relation are not so widespread.

For example, Celal (45, M, Unemployed, Roma) used to be a blacksmith in a village of Edirne. He migrated to Edirne in 1976 owing to the dam construction in his village. However, he could not open a shop owing to the financial restriction. There are six persons living in his household. Their sons are also married and unemployed. Although Celal applied for a position of garbage man at the private sector, he has not been accepted. In this respect, he explains his situation with his ethnicity:

“...I went and reordered everything, ...I would like to apply for cleaning, they would not take. Why they do not take, shall I speak honestly? They do not choose me since I am a Roma. Go and search for it, how many Gypsy work in there? Go and see. Accordingly am I right or not? (His wife: they discriminate persons). If we go for military service for this country, then why do they not take us for jobs? This is a very wrong behavior. (His neighbor: As I have told you, gradually indeed)... Actually, shall I tell you the reason? Since we are Gypsy, they do not want to hire us; they think us as a last resort. How do they think, do you know? They are in needful, they stuck into, if they could not find anybody else, they hire from Gypsies. This is how it happens actually.”⁸²

Celal thinks that discrimination he came across was due to his ethnic identity. Here, we see the relation between ethnicity and labor. Other interviewees think that being Roma might be disadvantage at labor market. Municipality also privatized the job of garbage collector. Before privatization, a lot of Roma members used to work at this job at the municipality, today they consider that it is very hard to work in this job. Some jobs like garbage man are under *taşeron* firms (subcontractor firms). Hence, Roma community's current labor position is also affected by neo-liberal politics.

I can assert that most of the first wave Roma migrants work at casual, low-skilled and low-paid jobs without insurance. There are some jobs which are only performed by Roma; like sewerage worker, lavatory attendant. Roma community

⁸² “...Gittim, her şeyimi düzeltiltim,Temizliğe gircem, almıyolar. Niye almıyolar, açık açık konuşayım mı? Çingeneyim diye almıyolar. Bi gidin, araştırın, kaç tane Çingene var orada, kaç tane başka insan var? Bi görün. Ona göre benim dediğim doğru mu çıkıyo, doğru değil mi? (Karısı: İnsan ayırıyorlar, insan). Biz bu vatana askerlik yapıyosak, bizi niye o zaman Çingeneleri işe almıyorlar? Çok yanlış bir şey yani (Komşusu: Dediğim gibi kademe kademe yani)...Hani kardeşim daha doğrusu size söyleyeyim mi? Biz Çingeneyiz diye bize iş vermek istemiyolar, en son plana düşünüyolar bizi. Nasıl düşünüyolar biliyo musun? Çok lazım sana, çok sıkıştın, artık bulamazlarsa Çingenelerden adam alıyolar. Bu şekilde oluyo yani”.

fills in the gap in low-paid and uninsured jobs. Moreover, ethnic lines between Roma and non-Roma (mostly Turks) lead to the job segregation. Only Roma community performs “dirty jobs” such as sewerage worker. In this respect, interviewees are sensitive and argue this issue. Many interviewees showed “sewerage worker” as an example.

Kemal (35, M, Grocer, Roma) complained how just Roma community does the dirty jobs.

“They always give these dirty jobs to Roma. Let them go and work in there. Look! I am sorry but we throw peoples dirtiness and bring a piece of bread by that way in order to look after our child. Go and look for the municipality, search for it, really, search for that, ask them and you will find all Roma working in sanitary sewerage; they are all Roma. Why any easterner or a Laz, a Kurd or a Turk does not work there? This results from because we are considered as second-class. Do not they give these jobs to anyone else? They could. But no one would like to work there. They would despise that job. But we are not like that. When appropriate we throw shit but I would not let my child hungry. I would throw, I would also sell bagels, also throw shit but I would not let my child be in destitute.”⁸³

The other example Roma interviewees or their relatives perform is “lavatory attendant” job. This job also creates competition among Roma community since municipality gives this job to Roma community members who work alternately. Meltem (47, F, Metal Worker, Roma) explains how Roma identity is stereotyped with regard to relation between job and ethnicity.

“Now you will say that the Roma in Kırıyık neighborhood is sack maker, bond collector. Kurds are also doing these stuff. There are also in İstanbul. Go and see the Kurds, Turks in İstanbul. So, what Turks do, which jobs do they do? But why, because he is Turk. Why is he Turk? He wears sportswear when he collects paper, not baggy trousers. Our Roma looses because of that. The woman ties her hair up, wears sportswear and collects paper and subsist by that... But she is Turk. When our

⁸³ “Devamlı bu şekilde pis işlere Romanları sokuyolar. Onlar da gidip çalışınlar. Bak biz afedersiniz milletin pisliğini atarak ekmek bir parça getiriyoruz çoluk çocuğumuza bakalım diye. Yani gidin belediyeye bakın, araştırın, gerçekten araştırın bunu, kanalizasyonda çalışanları sorun hepsi Romandır, hepsi Romandır. Neden başka bi efendime söyliyim Doğulu veya bi Laz, bi Kürt veya bi Türk gidip çalışmıyo? İşte bu ikinci sınıf görülmekten dolayı kaynaklanıyo. Başka birine vermezler mi o işi? Verirler. Ama gidip de çalışmaz kimse. O işi hakir görürler. Ama biz öyle değiliz. Yeri geldi mi bok atarız, ben yine de çocuğumu aç bırakmam. Atarım, ben simit de satarım, bok da atarım ben çoluk çocuğumu kimseye muhtaç etmem”.

women wear that baggy trouser over her leg, when she pin up this circle, she becomes Gypsy. That is all. The simplest example is that.”⁸⁴

In fact, we see the relation between ethnicity and class⁸⁵ in both Edirne and Diyarbakır. We can see that although Roma males mostly work at temporary and casual jobs, Dom males cannot even be seen at informal sector owing to their identity and result of exclusion from job market. Having their musician craft vanished, Dom men started to be excluded from job opportunities completely. During their nomadic pattern, Dom community had good relations with Kurdish peasants in economic and social sense that identity and boundaries were not noticeably outstanding or they were ignored. Kurdish question and forced migration process underlie a conflicted ground in that two internally displaced groups come up against each other to compete for scarce resources, which are seen as casual or temporary jobs in Diyarbakır. This situation leads to ethnic closure creating a sub-category of second-class citizens of Dom community. Following Weber, Parkin (1997) defines exclusionary social closure as “which is thus action by a status group designed to secure for itself certain resources and advantages at the expense of other groups” (Parkin, 1997:100). Moreover, he indicates that social closure is used to mark out the social boundaries between groups and maintain the hierarchical ordering of society. This definition stands near circumstantialist approach in ethnicity, as Cornell and Hartman suggests, “[t]hey emphasize the ethnic or racial identities of others when it is advantageous to set those others apart or to establish a boundary between those viewed as

⁸⁴ “Ha şimdi sen diyen ki Kıyık’taki Romanlar çuvalcı, kemikçi. E Kürtler de de var. İstanbul’da da var. Git İstanbul’daki Kürtleri gör, Türkleri gör. Ya Türkler neler yapıyo, ne işler yapıyo? Ama neymiş o, Türk tabi. Tabi o Türk. Çünkü neden o Türk? O eşortman giyiyo; yani kağıt topladığı zaman, şalvar giymiyo. Bizimkiler burdan kaybediyo, bundan kaybediyo. Kadın toplamış saçını, eşortmanı gelen sırtında çuvala çöplerden onu topluyo, şunu topluyo geçimini sağlıyo... Ama o Türk. Bizimkisi bu şalvarı giydiği zaman ayağına, bu çemberi taktığı zaman Çingene oluyo. Bu kadar. En basiti.

⁸⁵ I do not apply the term “underclass” for both communities. The concept of underclass is very problematic in Romany studies. This concept was applied in America indicated the American poor spatially concentrated in big cities, particularly in the Black ghettos of the traditional industrial cities before 1980s. It also indicated long-term unemployment, the persistently poor, and the disadvantaged ethnic groups. However, this term might threaten and criminalize ethnic minorities. In this respect, Stewart (2002) criticizes this term owing to racial perspective and economical deterministic understanding. In addition, for him, the term does not fit the eastern European context. The term underclass is not suitable for these cases. In order not to make epistemological violence, I used the social exclusion among the concepts.

eligible for certain goods and those viewed as ineligible” (Cornell and Hartman, 1998:58).

Unlike Dom community Roma community members work mostly at temporary, flexible jobs and low-status dirty jobs, but Turks –majority- are not working at these jobs in Edirne. Edirne’s socio-economic profile is higher than Diyarbakır. Turks do not need to compete for casual jobs but also there is a need for unskilled or unqualified labor, which are done by only Roma. Meanwhile, Edirne also took migration from South and South East of Turkey due to the forced migration in the last ten years. Migrants are also Kurds and they work at especially construction and service sector in Edirne. Hence, we see a kind of division of labor or ethnicity and class relations. As Rex (1996) suggests, “if class is seen as arising from the relation of varying strength and weakness in relation to the means of production, bears the consequence that regional and ethnic groups become quasi-classes or, as some like to say, class fractions”(Rex, 1996:192).

Hence, we can affirm that although forced migration and vanishing of their musician craft are key factors of Dom community’s socially excluded labor position, Roma community who settled in Edirne with the affect of agricultural modernization has positioned their quasi-class in last 40-50 years owing to mainly urbanization and modernization.

Moreover, as a different manner from Dom community, Roma community is not homogenous within itself. The reason of working at casual and temporary jobs also related to access to education. In other words, ethnicity is not only reason for Roma community to work at these casual jobs. Interviewees mentioned that becoming a waged labor requires at least graduation from high school. On the one hand, Roma interviewees regard that education has a great importance to find a job but they are financially restricted. On the other hand, most of the Roma interviewees regard that even if they get education, they could not get a position like “civil servant” because they are Roma. Hence, we see a dilemma to get education, which is a basic citizenship right. Hence, there are also Roma males civil servants in Edirne but they hide their ethnic identity (see, Participation in Education section). This situation also indicates social exclusion in the job market

for Roma community. Unemployment among men is widespread in both communities. In response, women are more actively working, especially among Dom community.

6.4.1.2 Women Participation in Labor Force

With regard to women's labor experience, women generally earn money from begging, going for seasonal agricultural labor in Dom community. I also met a few female interviewees who are cleaning workers without insurance. On the other hand, Roma females are domestic cleaners, stair cleaner, baby-sitter, paper collector, temporary and seasonal agricultural laborer, peddler and nursing. I can assert that in both communities, women are more active in labor participation than males. However, Roma women's labor opportunity is far wider than Dom women's labor access. In addition, baby-sitter and nursing are good indicators of social interaction with Turkish majority, which cannot be seen between Dom community and Kurdish majority.

Similar to Roma men, Roma women work at casual jobs. Mehtap (60, F, Temporary Worker, Roma) mentions her labor past:

“When I was young, as my husband died I did not do anything. After he died, I started to go for work. I go for onion, potato, for hoeing. When my husband was alive I never went for work because of taking care of children. The children were just kids. Who were going to look after them? My mother in-law could not do. Can an old woman look after them? Nevertheless, after my husband died, I started to work in any jobs I found. I even had worked as toilet cleaner. I disappeared from here (Edirne) for 3 years. I went to Balıkesir side... I went there. I took all my three children. One of them was single in that time. I took them and went there. There was a place called Güler's Park in there, I was waiting for the toilet there. My children went for olive collecting with my daughter. We lived there also for 3 years. Like that, wherever we find a job, we go there; what else can you do?”⁸⁶

This livelihood strategy shows that this woman works when she finds a job with her children. Among the other female jobs, baby sitter has a special place

⁸⁶ “Gençken, benim adam ölünce ben hiç yapmadım. Ne zaman öldü, ondan sonra ben başladım işe gitmeye. Soğana giderim, patatese giderim çıktığı zaman, çapaya giderdim. Adam sağken ben işe gitmedim hiç çoluk çocuğa bakmaktan. Ufak ufak çocuklara kim bakacak onlara? Kaynanam bakmaz, yaşlı kadın bakabilir mi? Ama adam öldükten sonra her işe girdim afedersin, her işe girdim. Tuvalaetde bekledim. Ben buradan (Edirne) 3 sene kayboldum. Gittim Balıkesir tarafına ...oraya gittim. Aldım 3 çocuğumu. O zaman bekarı küçükken. Aldım oraya gittim. Güler'in parkı var orda, orda tuvalet bekledim. Çocuklarım zeytine gitti, kızımın beraber. Geçindik orda da 3 sene. Böyle nerde bulursak oraya gidiyoruz ne yapcan?”

that we should pay attention. Roma females go to the non-Roma houses and look after their children. This is a very important element of social interaction and trust. When the child they take care of grows up, they drop the job and work at the other casual jobs.

For example, some Roma women are peddler, which is not performed by Dom women. However, this occupation is not so easy to do. They do not work in Edirne but at border gates. In this respect, interviewees create casual labor in the city's conditions. Peddler becomes a seasonal job during June and August because of the fact that Turkish immigrants from Germany visit Turkey. When they enter and leave the border, Roma peddlers sell them such as trinket. Apart from peddler, Roma man porters work at transportation of freight at custom. It should be emphasized that these are casual and manual jobs. Great majority of interviewees emphasized that money to be earned in one day with these jobs is indeterminate. For example, Müjde (43, F, Peddler, Roma) explains her economic activity:

“We call it German-Turk season. Guestworkers come. We have to sell Koran, verses of the Koran, prayer beads, cheesecloths to them. We provide our living with that. For that reason, every year, for three months, we work like that. If we find, we go for cleaning job. If we could not, we stay at home. Sometimes hungry, sometimes filled, it is the way our life goes on.”⁸⁷

However, Müjde also states that military does not give permission to peddlers recently. She complains how it is hard to do her job. In addition, as a Roma woman she is scared to go the border gate alone because of the fact that there are stereotypes about Roma women like prostitute. She takes her son when she works there to be safe.

Similar to Roma males, some Roma women also worked at flexible production (Ceyhan, 2003:82). During my master research, I saw Roma females making brooms at their houses in *Gülbahar* district of *Küçükpazar* neighborhood. The women were taking production order from the small-scale firms and they were making these brooms at their houses. This is also another highly flexible

⁸⁷ “Almancı sezonu diyo biz buna. Gurbetçiler geliyo ya. Biz onlara Kuran-Kerim, gevşen, tespih, tülbent bunları satmak zorundayız. Geçimimizi ondan sağlıyoruz. Onun için her seneyi üç ay böylelikle çalışıyoruz. Bulduk, temizlik işlerine gidiyoruz. Bulamadık evde oturuyoruz. Bazen aç, bazen tok bu şekilde yürüyo, gidiyo”.

low-paid job. The firm decreases its cost by the work giving to the houses. Owing to the low-paid job, these women were also domestic cleaners.

When I visited Roma households in Edirne, I saw the women as more active in labor market. However, although the women work at these casual jobs it is still very hard for a family to subsist on. When I visit *Menziliahir* neighborhood, one interviewee's wife shared her ideas about labor condition in her neighborhood:

“Around 80-90 % percent of this neighborhood subsist on apartment's stair cleaning, since most of husbands are unemployed. Sometimes the woman goes for stair cleaning with her husband, since what else could he do? Shall he remain hungry, or make robbery? He is obliged to go, to clean and he takes his bread money.”⁸⁸

Like to Roma females, mostly Dom women are working. Although Roma women work as a peddler and other jobs, Dom women's labor activity is just limited to begging and seasonal agricultural worker. Moreover, the livelihood of Dom families depends on woman begging. Although begging is not a main economic survival strategy among Roma community, I also encountered woman and child begging owing to poverty. Besides, I also encountered begging just in one neighborhood called *Menziliahir* or *Kemikçiler* (informal name of neighborhood) of which socio-economic level is worst among other Roma populated neighborhoods. On the other hand, begging⁸⁹ is main survival strategy for Dom families. Dom households are generally more crowded than Roma households owing to widespread polygamy pattern in Dom community. I met with Dom women who subsist on at least 15 persons in one household. Having musician craft vanish, Dom women's begging activity has increased. There are not so many economic differences among their neighborhoods in terms of economic activity. Apart from begging, there are a few Dom women who are temporary building cleaners and agricultural laborers.

⁸⁸ “Şu mahallenin %80, %90'ı merdivenden geçiniyor. Çünkü beyinin işi yok. Ama kadın ne yapıyo? Bazen kadın kocasıyla gidiyo merdiven siliyo. Çünkü napsın? Aç mı kalsın, hırsızlık mı yapsın? Mecbur gidiyo, temizlik yapıyo, alıyo ekmek parasını yiyo”.

⁸⁹ According to Matras's (2000) argument, begging activity was also seen among many Dom women in Jerusalem until a system of social services and benefits was introduced. The Jerusalem Doms now distance themselves from the begging activities of other Doms, who come from Egypt, Jordan to meet begging in and around the Old City of Jerusalem during the Muslim holiday seasons.

Furthermore, a Dom woman interviewee said that she wanted to work at a carpet workshop in *Suriçi* area very much. A woman officer from municipality was informing about the workshop door by door. Municipality is very sensitive in integrating the internally displaced persons in Diyarbakır by opening such workshops. However, her father did not give permission to her. She also cannot go outside by herself. Hence, patriarchy is visible among Dom community. I did not meet with this situation among Roma women because all of the members of the household try to contribute family budget to fight with poverty.

Zerrin (35, F, Beggar, Dom) explains what she does:

“Actually, who understand our suffering? Our problem is that we are hungry, we are naked. No one helps us. Our lives are in God’s hand. See, who asks about us? We do travel, we beg for, one gives a bread, another gives a bread. Well, who take cares for us? Our husbands do not also take care of us. No one gives a job to them.”⁹⁰

Likewise, Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician and Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) complains that Dom women are begging because of poverty and exclusion.

“If they had money my brother, they would not beg. This woman has pride, you know. Yes, they are also preserving honour, purity. We are human indeed. All in all why do not we have rights? Why do we live in that way? Is not that a crying shame for us? We are human, come and see us. But we are ownerless. Oh! no one sees us. Sometimes I think myself in that way. I am saying that, among Dom-Perev (non-Gypsies in Domari language), I am saying but let me not be misunderstood; my elder brothers are here (my mediators from municipality). I feel sorry; I am saying this word apologetically, they see us as a second-class, individuals treat us as a second class. As being Dom, they hurt us. Let my faith be from God, my music is excellent. My music is perfect, look! I have albums. Get into internet site, listen my cassettes... get into internet... I sing in Zazaish, Kurdish, Turkish. See, how many

⁹⁰ “Hani kim bizim çilemizi anlıyor, derdimiz biz açız, biz çıplamız, kimse bize yardım vermiyor, yaşamımız tanrının elinde, hani kim halimiz soruyor?...Geziyoz, elimizi açıyığ, bi ekmek o veri, bi ekmek o veri. Hani kim bize bakıyo? Kocamız da bakmıyor. Kimse onlara iş vermiyor”.

languages the man sings. They do not call for us to the weddings, since we are Dom.”⁹¹

In both communities, female-headed households are widespread. In Diyarbakır, we can see Dom female-headed households since their husbands were in the jail. Crime also was widespread when it is compared to Roma community. Dom women whose husbands are in jail could not go to the seasonal agricultural labor by themselves. Hence, these women can only beg. In a comparative sense, female-headed households are also widespread among Roma community resulting from divorce. We cannot see divorce pattern among Dom community, official marriages are very rare anyway. Mainly two reasons bring about divorce. First is related to poverty and patriarchy that expose women to violence by their unemployed husbands. Roma women generally complained that their husbands drink too much and they are not interested in their houses. Hence, these complaints indicate poverty. Second, municipality stated another reason of divorce, which has increased in last ten years. Divorced Roma women take over their father’s social security. This can be seen as an economic “tactic” to fight with poverty. However, divorce not only affects women but also affects Roma children because they have to work in order to support their single mothers.

As we see above, active female labor and female headed houses are common pattern in both communities. This pattern does not make women independent and free whereas it overlaps with the “feminization of poverty”. As Gilbert suggest, this term was “coined by Diana Pearce (1979) to highlight the fact that poverty disproportionately affects women and their children” (Gilbert, 2000:68). This situation results from an increasing disengagement of the state

⁹¹ “Kardeşim bunların parası olsa, aldığı bir maaş olsa valla bunlar dilencilik yapmazlar. Bu kadının gururu var ya. Ya bunlar da şeref, namus koruyorlar. Hepimiz insanık yani. Sonuçta hakkımız niye yok? Biz niye böyle yaşıyoruz? Yazık değil mi bize? Biz insanız, gelin bizi görün o zaman. Ama sahibimiz yok. Hiç kimse bizi görmüyor ha! Bazen kendi kendime böyle düşünüyorum. Ben diyorum ki Dom-Perev (*Domari dilinde Çingene olmayan*) arasında ben diyorum yanlış olmasam, ağbiler buradadır (*belediyeden araçlarım*). Özür diliyorum, özür dileyerek bu kelimeyi söylüyorum, bizi sanki ikinci sınıf görüyorlar; sanki ikinci kılıfta yani gören insanlar, şahıslar bizi görüyorlar. Dom olarak yani bizi rencide ediyorlar. İnancın Allahtan olsun, benim müziğim dört dörtlüktür. Dört dörtlük müziğim, bak kasetlerim var. İnternet sitesine girin, benim kasetlerimi dinleyin.....internet sitesine girin. Zazaca konuşuyor, Kürtçe konuşuyor, Türkçe okuyor. Bak kaç tane dil. Adam okuyor. Biz Dom olduğumuz için bizi düğünlere çağırıyorlar. Dom olduğumuz için”.

from responsibility of welfare and the greater burden on women as working at casual jobs and unpaid domestic work. As it was argued in the theoretical citizenship consideration (Chapter II), feminization of poverty caused by erosion of ‘dominant paradigm’ or ‘Marshallian paradigm of social citizenship. Structural and economic changes led to the disappearance of full employment, the flexibilization of labour, the decline of the nuclear family, the growth of new forms of poverty and unemployment and feminization of poverty (Roche, 1992).

Hence, poverty affects especially women and children. In both communities, child labor is a common pattern but division of labor varies according to gender. With regard to boys, Roma boys who also go to primary schools work on street or work in some shops such as internet cafes and barbershop. Many Roma boys help their parents for stallholder. Apart from these jobs, Roma boys leave their school and go to the seasonal agricultural livestock and seasonal agricultural labor for six months. In Diyarbakır, Dom boys who are under the age of primary school also work on street as weigher, in the industry, working in the car park. Seasonal livestock is not seen in Diyarbakır but boys go to seasonal agricultural labor with their parents. The difference between communities regarding child labor lies in girls’ labor differentiation. The girls in Diyarbakır are beggars and go to the seasonal agricultural labor with their parents. Yet among Roma community, girls work on the street and help their parents such as for stallholder job (see, participation in education section in this chapter).

The difference between communities lies in parents’ socio-economic level. In Edirne, most of the members of household work at temporary jobs. Child generally gives money to her mother with expectation that money returns to them in some way from their mothers. On the contrary, child labor is one of the main economic activities of looking after the household in Dom community because of the fact that mothers are beggars and fathers are unemployed. The second difference from Roma community is that not only Dom children but also Kurdish children who resettled in Diyarbakır owing to the forced migration work on the streets. However, we see just Roma child labor in Edirne. This also reflects the level of poverty in both cities.

6.4.1.3 Seasonal Agricultural Labor as a Household Labor

We see common labor pattern as “seasonal agricultural labor” in which all of the household members (man, women and children) participate but vary in terms of ethnic practices in both communities. As it was indicated previously, Roma community was satisfied with agricultural labor until technological implementation in agriculture. On the other hand, Dom interviewees go to the seasonal agricultural labor because of the fact that there is no job opportunity for them in Diyarbakır. Although Roma community goes to the seasonal agricultural labor to İpsala, Keşan, Muratlı, Tekirdağ, (all of them are placed in Marmara region), Dom community goes with Kurdish majority to Manisa, Adapazarı, Bursa, Ankara-Polatlı, Samsun, etc. Hence, Dom community goes to Western and Northern part of Turkey where mostly Turks live.

Roma community’s agricultural mediators are called as *Dragoman* who is members of Roma community. Mediators are the persons who make the deals with between the employees and employer. *Dragoman* persons are assigned by heredity that new dragoman takes over the job from ex-dragoman from his/her family. In addition, there are two *Dragomans*: woman and man. Female dragoman is responsible for women employees and male dragoman is responsible from man employees. On the other hand, Dom community’s mediators are called as *çavuş* or *dayıbaşı* who are Kurds. Although *Dragoman* mediators work for the landowner, they defend their communities’ rights. However, we cannot say the same thing for *çavuş* or *dayıbaşı*.

In this regard, for Dom community, employer determines the daily fee before they go to seasonal agriculture which is generally 20 TL for per day. In addition, *çavuş* takes double daily fee of the employees and takes 10% commission per employee. Employees have no chance to determine their wages. However, the wage might decrease to 10-12 TL. One of the Dom women mentioned that her household has been going to seasonal agricultural labor for 20-25 years. However, when they went for the last time, they could not take their daily fee for two months (nearly 8.000-9.000TL). In addition, *çavuş* had

disappeared. I asked her in response what she had done. She said, “What we could do?”

On the other hand, *dragoman* works like the employees and take the same daily fee. Some of the dragomans take commission, which is not so acceptable in the community. Unlike Dom community, employees bargain their daily fee with their employer. Yet *dragoman* has a positive role in this bargaining procedure. There are different types of bargains. In the first condition, employee might claim advance pays before going to the fields. In response, *dragoman* receives money from the employer. This advance is deducted from employees’ daily fee. In the second condition, employer might hire the employees for next year. Hence, he bargains with the employees at the field because the employees do not want to work at same price for the next year. Employees request money according the field’s square measure. *Dragoman* calculates the fields square. Although employees agree on the same year’s wages, they put a price on the harvest and they finish bargaining. In the third condition, employees can find the wages low so they convey their request through *dragoman*. *Dragoman* also benefits from this bargain because his/her wages increases by this way. In fourth condition, employers can determine a fixed daily fee to put down bargain.

Hence, Roma community has more advantages than Dom community in seasonal agricultural labor. It should be emphasized that although Roma community was satisfied with seasonal agricultural labor, Dom community do this job since they have no alternatives in urban conditions. Moreover, one of the basic problems for Dom community is that they get into debt before going to fields since they should before all else provide for their food and transportation. When they arrive to the fields, the work might not start at once. They sometimes wait for 10-15 days to work. Therefore, they run out of their food supply. Most of the Dom interviewees complained about this job because they do not earn but they get into debt. In addition to disadvantaged sides of this job, Dom identity is obstacle for the interviewees since *çavuş* warns them not to declare their Dom identity. When the employer learn their identity, they were getting thrown out of the fields. Hence, this situation also shows discrimination. They go to the fields with Kurds.

As Gürsoy (2010) argues, Kurds who go for seasonal agricultural labor also encounter ethnic discrimination from the native people especially in North region of Turkey. The reason is that most of the seasonal agricultural laborers are Kurds. Native persons perceive Kurds as terrorist. This might lead to a tension (Gürsoy, 2010:46). However, Dom community faces double exclusion owing to having Dom and Kurd identity.

Seasonal agricultural labor also leads health problems because they stay in poor conditions. As Nermin (40, F, Beggar, Dom) indicates,

“We do not have money to open a store. Also no one gives us a waged job. We go to Ankara, Bursa, Aydın. We go for hoeing, no matter what the job is we do. This time we are coming back and all of us are getting ill. No matter what we do, we can not take care of our ill persons. It is no use for us. Only, we do not pay rent, but that house is also ours. It is not a house but we entered in an empty house. Now after the bairam the schools will get started. I have bought neither school bag nor book. If the school hand in, it will, otherwise...”⁹²

The statement indicates that their earnings from seasonal agricultural labor could not afford their medical treatment since their health gets worse after this job. Furthermore, children’s education interrupted because they had to go with their families between May and November. Parents mention that they have no chance of leaving them in both communities.

In short, for seasonal agricultural job, Dom community’s working conditions are more disadvantageous than Kurds not only in Diyarbakır but also in Western or Northern side of Turkey. During the seasonal agricultural labor, hiding Dom identity is also against to civil rights. They cannot work without hiding their ethnicity. They have no power to determine their wages. On the contrary, Roma community has power for bargaining for the seasonal agricultural labor. Working conditions also cause the health problems. In addition, children also have been affected from seasonal agricultural labor owing to suspension their education. Unlike Dom community, seasonal agricultural labor has been declining

⁹² “Paramız yoktur ki bi dükkan açalım. Yevmiyeli bir iş de kimse bize vermiyor. Ankara’ya gidiyoruz, Bursa’ya, Aydın’a gidiyoruz. Çapa yapıyoruz, hangi iş için olsa yapıyoruz. Bu sefer dönüyoruz, hepimiz hastalanıyoruz. Ne yapsak da o kazandığımız para ile hastalarımız ile ilgilenemiyoruz. Bize hiç faydası yok. Sadece ev kirası vermiyoruz, o da ev bizim evimiz. O da ev yok da boş eve yerleşmişiz. Şimdi bayramdan sonra okul açılacak, üç tane çocuğum var. Daha ne çanta aldım, ne kitap aldım. Okul verirse verir, vermezse...”

in Edirne owing to the technological innovation in agriculture. Therefore, Roma community has been working at seasonal livestock in the Edirne villages. In sum, we see poverty in both communities in male, women and household labor. In addition, child labor is another indicator of poverty.

6.4.1.4 Reflections of Poverty within Roma and Dom Communities

Poverty is a common element in Roma and Dom community but it has different reflections and conceptualizations. Roma community's poverty can be seen in the old forms of poverty or as absolute poverty, which means being deprived of material needs. In this regard, Roma community has some opportunity to work at casual and temporary jobs, which is situated at informal sector. Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2005) indicate that old poors try to stabilize themselves in the present system developing different strategies. The poors apply to these strategies⁹³ in order to access the possible mobility or to heal their present socio-economic conditions. Accordingly, we will see below different "tactics" developed by Roma community to maximize their benefits. On the other hand, Dom community appears as "new poors". New poverty is not only related to living in an absolute poverty line considering income and consumption. In addition, new poors have no power and resources to improve their conditions (Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2005:72). They also do not know how to access and benefit from resources. In this regard, Dom community cannot develop even tactics to integrate to the society. In addition, they are not only economically but also socially and politically isolated.

⁹³ Although Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2005) use the term strategy, following Certau (1984), I will prefer to use the term "tactic". Certau developed the terms "strategy" and "tactics" in order to understand "ways of operating" or doing things. He calls strategy as "the calculus of force-relationship which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from the environment" (Certau, 1984: Preface;xix). In addition, strategy assumes a place. For Certau, political, economic and scientific rationality has been constructed on this strategic model. On the other hand, he calls tactic "a calculus which cannot count on a 'proper' (a spatial or institutional localization), nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality" (Certau, 1984: Preface;xix). Tactic does not have a place but depends on time. Certau says that "[I]t must constantly manipulate events in order to turn to their own ends forces alien to them...but of the decision itself, the act and manner in which the opportunity is "seized" (Certau, 1984: Preface;xix). In this regard, I tried to understand the agents' "tactics" towards majority or the state institutions in the way of benefiting from citizenship rights in both cities.

Dom community's current economic position can be explained by Buğra and Keyder as "[e]conomic exclusion, or a permanent state of unemployment, has been progressively leading to cultural exclusion, which has been reinforced with political exclusion, especially in cases where these people are originally immigrants, or from different ethnic backgrounds" (Buğra and Keyder, 2003:21). Hence, new poverty appears as an interaction between social exclusion, inequality and relative poverty, which signifies the existence of inequality likely to stem from social exclusion (Özbek, 2007). Dom community's new poverty conditions can be seen directly as outcome of forced migration, and indirectly of loss of their traditional musician craft rather than transformation of welfare state, which affects Roma community's poverty conditions.

To tackle poverty, Roma community has developed different tactics. The major structural tactic can be seen as migration pattern: immigration to Germany and internal migration to other cities like İstanbul. Roma community has applied to these migration patterns owing to the low industrialization level of Edirne and low degree of job opportunity, which are seen as casual jobs as discussed earlier. On the other hand, I did not see any migration pattern among Dom community but their semi-nomadic pattern retains (see, Chapter V). Now, I will discuss the affects of both migration patterns on Roma community's citizenship rights. Then, I will compare their tactics to overcome poverty.

Being an immigrant in Germany is a familiar pattern among Roma families whereas there are no Dom interviewees went to Germany as an immigrant. Following the first wave migration (1950-1960), migration process occurred from Turkey to Germany by the end of 1960s. The first immigrants who went to Germany were skilled laborers. Nevertheless, the following immigrants were unskilled ones who had just migrated from village to the cities (Zürcher, 2000:394). According to Zürcher's argument, many immigrants were bringing their families to Germany. This also overlaps my interviewees' statements. Many Roma immigrants brought their families to Germany. They worked as apartheid or in illegal way. They had no social security and they were working in unskilled jobs.

Nevertheless, their socio-economic status is higher than Roma interviewees living in Edirne. There are retired Roma workers from Germany that their social citizenship rights are extended in some degree among Roma community. They are called *Alamancı*⁹⁴ in Roma community. According to interviewees, some of these families tend to reject their Roma identity. It is a kind of “tactic” to fight with exclusion because of the fact that being Roma is assumed as being “poor”. Therefore, we cannot generalize the Roma community in Edirne as living in the same poverty conditions. The immigration pattern to Germany generally expanded their social citizenship rights like pension benefit and therefore, they want to give more education to their children. Yet this pattern is also not homogenous that there is no direct relation between social mobility and being immigrant.

I also conducted in-depth interview with Roma returned immigrants whose socio-economic level is considerably high. Müzeyyen (47, F, Retired Worker from Germany, Roma) explained that she went to Germany as an illegal worker, which is a familiar way used by other Roma immigrants. She also worked as a cleaning worker and shop assistant in Germany. She states her experience:

“It has been something like 24-25 years. When I first went to Germany, until doing something, I worked as an illegal. After that, a work place showed me as an employee. In order to stay there I had started German courses. If you go there with tourist visa and go for German courses, they do not take you out. After that, meanwhile we settled there. After a while I brought my son to there and made him attend to the school. I did all these by myself, without any support from anyone. As I have told you, you can succeed if you want to. I also tried to make everything by my own. But, I have officially been married for a long time. I gave never did stuff, that is I did not worked most of the time, I preferred to work as illegal after I maintained my rights. It seems to me more logical to work as an illegal and get extra money from the government. Of course, your unemployment benefit works, you are paid

⁹⁴ Alamancı is a Turkish citizen work and live in Germany. Furthermore, this definition mostly refers to a distance of the immigrants to both their own culture and Germany. After their immigration pattern, they are not totally Turk, not German either.

for insurance and you got retirement, any kind of social opportunities. In addition to that, if you work as a fugitive, you could earn a great deal of money at that time.”⁹⁵

In addition, Müzeyyen evaluates her present condition and she says, “I am living in best condition which is even superior to a king”. Hence, as a return immigrant Müzeyyen’s current conditions are seen as socio-economic mobility. In the statement, we can also see how Müzeyyen applied “tactic” to extend her rights. In addition to take pension from government, she worked as apartheid and thereby increased her income. In addition, she took also unemployment income. She has only one child who will be a teacher in Germany. She is also living in a luxury flat in *Gaco* (non-Roma) neighborhood. Meanwhile, other Roma *Alamançı* families’ children graduated from university and they became engineers or other white-collar jobs in Germany but their parents tend to hide or reject their Roma identity.

The critical point is that the interviewee does not hide her Roma identity. On the other hand, other interviewees stated that when Roma community members’ socio-economic level increases, they tend to hide their Roma identity. Some interviewees showed their houses in *Yıldırım Beyazıt* and *Küçükpazar*. Retired Roma immigrants from Germany are living in Roma neighborhoods and their houses are strikingly different from other interviewees’ houses. They built two or three storey houses. Some of them rent their ground floor of their houses. The *Alamançı* Roma families have different position in terms of benefiting from social rights. Some of them get pensions from Germany. Moreover, immigration process has not been completed. Some of them are still living in Germany and they are coming to visit their parents during summer time. Hence, their socio-economic level seems higher than other Roma community members.

⁹⁵ “24-25 sene kadar filan oluyo aşağı yukarı. Ben işte Almanya’ya gittiğimde orda ilk önce kaçak olarak çalıştım şey yapana kadar. Ondan sonra bir işyeri beni işçi olarak gösterdi. Almanca kurslarına gittim ki orda kalabilmek için. Kursu gittiğin zaman zaten sana çıkış vermiyolar turist olarak gittiğinde. Ondan sonra öyle öyle darken oraya şeyi attık. Ondan sonra oğlumu getirttim, oğlumu okuttum orda. Hep bunları tek başıma yani kimseden bir yardım almadan. Dedim ya, insan istediği zaman bir şeyler başarabiliyo yani. Ben de her şeyi kendi kendime bir şeyler yapmaya çalıştım...Ben nikahlı baya uzun kaldım ama. Ben hiç şey yapmadım, yani böyle çok çalışmadım çoğunlukla kaçak çalışmayı tercih ettim bütün haklarımı elime geçirdikten sonra. Kaçak çalışıp bi de devletten maaş almak daha mantıklı geliyodu bana. Tabi o arada işsizlik paran çalışıyo, sigortan çalışıyo, emeklilik her türlü sosyal imkanın var. bide yanına kaçak çalıştığında daha güzel bir para kazanabiliyosun o zaman”.

Furthermore, immigrant experience did not always bring socio-economic mobility to Roma community. Interviewees emphasized that they are loyal to their community. After mother or father returned to Edirne, their children also came to their family's houses. I also conducted in-depth interview with the Roma female return immigrant who expressed that Germany experience could not be successful for her family since her husband was giving their savings into the gambling.

Although German return immigrant experience is not also homogenous in itself, when their socio-mobility increases, they tend to hide or reject Roma identity. According to the interviewees, being Roma indicates poverty and discrimination so they would like to get rid of this stigmatized identity. Mobility becomes a kind of "tactic". Nevertheless, also other Roma immigrants have not been successful in mobility. They present as its reason their powerful community links. If father or mother returns to Turkey, children should follow them.

With regard to internal migration, Roma interviewees mention that they go to Çorlu and İstanbul to work where industrialization has developed. Interviewees gave me example of İstanbul and complained about especially how hard it was to live in this city. Although all members of the household worked at informal sector, they could not manage. As Zeki (41, M, Frog Hunting, Roma) states,

"I have stayed in İstanbul for seven months. Four of us from the family worked: my two sons, my wife and me. Four persons. I was a hairdresser, my wife worked in textile and my two sons worked for bike, in Bisan brand bicycle. In the first days of the month, I was keeping money in my hand but never see it in my pocket. 600 TL was for rent, water bill, electricity bill. I wish help, for goodness sake! I left my wife there. I took my jacket and came. I left my wife with her mother and I would never go there again. I told her to choose either me or İstanbul. She had chosen İstanbul. Ok. She is from İstanbul, you see!"⁹⁶

Moreover, interviewees mentioned that rents in İstanbul are too expensive to afford. Roma are generally house owners in Edirne. Hence, in Edirne, outcomes of internal migration do not affect their citizenship rights. Immigrant experience in Germany and dual citizenship affected their healing of social rights naturally.

⁹⁶ "Yedi ay İstanbul'da kaldım, 4 nüfus çalıştım: İki oğlum, hanım, ben. Dört kişi. Kendim kuaförüm, hanım tekstilde, iki oğlumda bisikletde, bisan bisikletinde çalışıyo. Aybaşı geldiği zaman parayı görürdüm elimde, cebimde göremezdim parayı. 600 milyon kira, su ceryan. Aman aman dedim. Yengeyi de bıraktım orda. Aldım ceketimi geldim. Annesine bıraktım onu, bir daha da gitmem oraya. Ya dedim beni tercih etcen, ya İstanbul'u. O İstanbul'u tercih etti. Tamam. Kendisi İstanbullu ya."

Apart from the migration patterns, Roma community also develops different tactics to fight with poverty. In this regard, extended family is seen as not only as result of patriarchy but also as a kind of survival tactic since all members of the household contribute to family budget. Dom community is also extended family but Roma women and children have the opportunity to work. Unlike Dom community, parent-in-laws contribute to the family subsistence in a way that they take old age pension, disabled pension or they are retired workers from Germany.

At this point, it is important to consider to what extent Roma and Dom community can benefit from welfare state resources. As for pensions, Roma community access to welfare state pensions is considerably higher than Dom community. Roma community benefit from Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) in Edirne, Dom interviewees do not know how to benefit from and access this foundation. Especially Roma women go to the foundation. When I asked to women why their husbands do not come to take assistance, most of them replied me by saying that their husbands were shamed of their poverty. In Diyarbakır, we see Suriçi Municipality as more active than SASF to provide social assistance. Similar to Roma women, Dom women and children are coming to take these assistances.

Furthermore, I observed the feeling of shame of their poverty among Dom community. For this reason, they do not go the SASF in Diyarbakır. Roma women actively go to the SASF, municipality and governorship, whereas Dom community members actively go to these institutions in a limited way. Bora (2007:109) also encounters poor women rather than men going for social assistance. However, for her, it does not indicate freedom of women. Women have to resort to social assistance, which does not only create discredibility but also something that devitalizing and breaking the meaning coordinates. Bora also emphasizes “desolation” in her research. Similarly, in the narratives of Dom interviewees, desolation is so apparent that I heard this sentence “we have no owners” from Dom interviewees at many times. As Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician&Seasonal Agricultural Laborer, Dom) states,

“We wish to stay like other persons living there in 7th floor (their shacks were built in front of the apartments); we cannot even find place on the ground. None indeed, we are ownerless. I am talking as of a Roma person. Roma are ownerless; neither in here nor in the earth. I do not believe that they have even in heaven. Let me say that, they would not even send us to heaven.”⁹⁷

Similarly, Zerrin (35, F, Beggar, Dom) says,

“Actually, who understand our suffering? Our problem is that we are hungry, we are naked. No one helps us. Our lives are in God’s hand. See, who asks about us?”⁹⁸

On the other hand, EDROM has considerably important intermediary role in helping their community by writing petitions, giving knowledge about assistance, etc. In this respect, I assert that situation of Dom community is not only related to poverty but also deprivation. In Diyarbakır, Suriçi Municipality helps Dom interviewees in social assistance.

Both Roma and Dom interviewees manage to become indepted to grocer in their neighborhood. I also talked grocers in Roma neighborhoods. I listened how Roma community is living in poverty. Unlike Dom community, credit cards were given to Roma males who are unemployed. For both communities, if industry were developed in their cities, they would not be unemployed or poor. Additionally, when I asked interviewees’ future expectations in both communities, I get very pessimistic answers.

Briefly, both Roma and Dom communities are living under poverty of different degrees. Roma community mainly manages with temporary and manual jobs. By these jobs, they try to manage in the informal sector. However, they try to develop different tactics such as; immigrating to Germany and hiding their identity to heal their present socio-economic conditions. However, Dom community can be seen as new poors since they have no power and resources to improve their conditions and could not develop even tactics to integrate to the society. Unlike Roma community, Dom community’s conditions can be seen as deprivation and poverty. Desolation is a distinguishing feature in Dom community

⁹⁷ “Biz de insanlar gibi taa millet hep yedinci katta (*gecekonduları apartmanların önündedir*); biz yerde de yer bulamıyoruz! Yok yani, sahibimiz yok. Biz bi Romen çocuğu olarak konuşuyorum, Romenin sahibi yok. Ne burada var, dünyada da yok. Ben inanmıyorum, cennette de yok. Ben diyem, cennete de göndermiyer bizi”.

⁹⁸ “Hani kim bizim çilemizi anlıyor. Derdimiz biz açız, biz çıplağız. Kimse bize yardım etmiyor. Yaşamımız Tanrının elinde. Hani kim halimizi soruyor?”

from Roma community of whose rights are defended by EDROM. In addition, Roma community can access to institutions to resort to their welfare rights. On the other hand, Roma community also approaches new poverty because their temporary or casual jobs also have been decreasing. In other words' equality and rights are threatened by market driven economy. This transformation has been resulted from the weakening of dominant paradigm or Marshallian paradigm of social citizenship, which led to the disappearance of full employment, increase in flexibilization of labor, the growth of new poverty and feminization of poverty, which are seen as familiar issues in both communities.

6.4.2 Participation in Education

Access to education is one of the indispensable elements of social citizenship rights. This section will follow the differences and similarities in participation of education of both communities considering gender dimension. In this regard, I tried to compare "opportunity cost of education" between Roma and Dom communities. This term expresses the profit loss/trade-off resulted from not directing individuals efforts/resources –time, energy and material values – other than educational matters (Kavak, 2005 cited in Gündüz Hoşgör, 2005:12). In this regard, three dimensions appear as ethnicity, poverty and gender. Although poverty and gender are common issues, their evaluation varies in ethnicity. Before evaluating the comparison of opportunity cost of education, it is useful to introduce the general education profiles of the communities.

With regard to female dimension between the communities, Roma adult female interviewees are generally uneducated but some of them graduated from primary school. However, illiteracy is so widespread among Dom community that there are not any female adult graduated from primary school. They also drop out of primary school when they pass on to fifth grade. For Roma adult male interviewees, most of them graduated from primary school and one interviewee graduated from secondary school. However, all of Dom male interviewees are illiterate except for one interviewee who is graduated from primary school. Illiteracy is a common pattern among Dom adults owing to their lack of birth

registration and nomadic pattern before 1992-1993. Therefore, they did not have the opportunity of getting access to education. Dom community's access to education starts with after resettlement in Diyarbakır.

Access to education also varies in terms of generations. In Roma community, girls and boys attend to high school. Besides, there are ten university students among Roma community. With regard to Dom community, only some boys graduated from primary school. Girls drop out of school when they pass on to 5th grade at primary school. There is only one Dom university student who is studying in İstanbul. The difference between the communities is that although primary school is compulsory in Turkey, I encountered many Dom children (boys and girls) who do not go to the primary school. However, Roma children attend and graduate from at least primary school. High school graduates are also high among Roma community. As a common pattern between the communities, Roma and Dom children do not go to the kindergarden except for one example in Dom community. One interviewee's daughter is going to the kindergarden in Diyarbakır. Although my interviewee is living in poverty, governorship supports financially their daughter's education.

In general, Roma community's access to education is higher than Dom community's educational access but they evaluate education strikingly in a different way. First of all, opportunity cost of education varies between the communities in accordance with ethnicity. In Roma community, the most striking reason in not attending to school is related to their ethnic identity, which distinguishes themselves from Dom community. In this regard, Roma interviewees (both male and female) believe that even if they get education, state does not let them get the positions such as teacher, governor, police, etc. For them, education is not a way of mobility because of their Roma identity.

As Fevzi (28, M, Musician, Roma) says,

“Even if you get your child educated, she would not be able to put herself up in the end my brother. This child has gained the capacity to become a doctor, that is to say,

he is educated but they even still bring problem in there. They investigate your origin whether you are Roma or something else.”⁹⁹

Erdinç Çekiç, who is president of EDROM (Edirne Roma Association), tries to demolish this view by giving importance to education. EDROM supports 17 Roma university students who are successful and poor by awarding scholarship by Global Dialogue Institute. Çekiç’s aim is to introduce to his community that educated Roma young people also get mobility. With his words,

“If we can build up a scholar, an academic titled individual from each Roma neighborhood, if we can generalize the idea that they can pull themselves up by education, that education is also their rights and there is no one blocking them. I think that the problem will be solved by that way, since they have prejudice created in their mind; you will come across with persons thinking in that way or just you did encounter. There is a prejudice that nothing would come out of anything among us. What will happen if we get the child educated? Would they make him a police? Would they make him a public officer? Will he be a prime minister? Let him go and work and be tradesmen. The only sole element that would break this prejudice is to make the son of aunt Ayşe, Ali work as a doctor in that neighborhood or home street or to make the daughter of Sister Hatice a nurse from other neighborhood. If we could not break this, the prejudice would remain there forever... There Mustafa Aksu, more than 65 years old, I told him and he replied that he had to otherwise he would not be able to promoted.”¹⁰⁰

This view also indicates that equality principle of modern citizenship does not provide a real equality. Roma adults do not want to send their children to the school, for them, it is useless. They believe that their children cannot be civil servant since they are “Gypsies”. Hence, it seems as a real handicap for Roma community. Actually, there are also educated Roma but they hide their identity. Likewise, Diler (2008) indicates that Roma university students who are not active in Roma Rights Movement tend to hide their identity. Apart from her research, she noticed a powerful tendency in hiding Roma identity among civil servants or

⁹⁹ “Okutsan bile belli bir yere gelemiyorsun be ağbicum sonuçta. Bu çocuk doktor olacak kapasiteye gelmiş, yani okumuş, orda bile bir pürüz çıkartıyorlar yani. Araştırıyorlar kökünü, Çingene misin, nesin.”

¹⁰⁰ “Eğer her Roman mahallesinden bir tane okumuş yazmış akademik anlamda ünvanı olan insanlar, eğitilmiş olan bireyler oluşturabilirsek, insanlara siz de eğitimle bir yerlere gelebilirsiniz, eğitim de sizin hakkınız, sizin önünüzü kimse kesmiyor düşüncesini yaygınlaştırabilirsek bu işin, sorunun çözümü buradan geçer diye düşünüyorum. Çünkü kafalarında önyargı var, alanda göreceksiniz veya görmüşsünüzdür. Bizden bir şey olmaz önyargısı çoktur. Biz çocuğu okutsak ne olacak? Polis mi yapacaklar? Devlet memuru mu yapacaklar? Başbakan mı olacak? Gitsin çalışsın, esnaf olsun. Bu önyargıyı kırca tek yegane unsur da burda o mahalleden o sokaktan bir tane Ayşe teyzenin çocuğu Ali’yi doktor yapmaktır. Öbür mahalleden Hatice Abla’nın kızını bir hemşire yapmaktır. Bunu kıramazsak bu önyargı ordan ebediyen çıkmaz... İşte Mustafa Aksu 65 yaşından sonra diyor söyledim adam, ne yapıyıym kardeşim diyor yoksa yükselemezdim”.

the ones participating higher education. However, for her, they hide their identity due to the “stigma of inferiority reinforced by the discrimination against the Roma people in all walks of life, they were hiding their identity to make something out of themselves” (Diler, 2008:128).

In addition, the common view among Roma community is that, Turks and Kurds are more advantegous than their own Roma community’s citizenship right status. In generally, they evaluate their citizenship rights position compared to Turks and Kurds. They find their status in the bottom of the hieararchy. For them, Kurds can benefit from citizenship rights equally even though they are not loyal to the state. As Meltem (47, F, Metal Worker, Roma) says,

“There comes out the prodecutor, the judge or whatever else, or some do not attend to school although he could have. This is why they are being precluded due to the fact that they are Roma. So tell me what it is, he/she is Roma; there is prevention. Let us say that he is Kurd; the one who gets angry now blast away PKK. Let me tell you that get angry anyway. They go and give importance to him. That is, he says I am PKK and still they get him educated, they still do that. But this Roma child has nothing to do with anything; he will servebetter for the country, nation. It is only him that they hook up: You are Rome, get away.”¹⁰¹

This example is striking to Roma community’s view of limited civil rights. However, Dom community did not evaluate education in this way. Roma community feels inequality in terms of civil rights.

The second dimension of opportunity cost of education depends upon gender issue. In both communities, girls are more disadvantegous than boys because of patriarchy. Nevertheless, patriarchy is so visible in Dom community that Dom girls cannot continue to the school. Dom female interviewees mentioned that when they become 10 years old, they drop out of school. I did not see any exception in Dom girls’ with regard to continuation to education. They are seen as grown ups by their parents and are supposed to get an arranged marriage. In response, their fathers take dowry. Hence, education seems useless in cultural sense. Early marriage is a common pattern between Roma and Dom communities.

¹⁰¹ “ ... Savcısı çıkıyo, hakimi çıkıyo, bilmemnesi çıkıyo, yahut da okuyacağı yerde okuyamıyo. İşte bu Romanlıktan engelliyolar. Neymiş Romanmış, engelleme var. O Kürt diyelim, şimdi PKKnin üzerine gidiyo kızan. Kızan diyim artık, çocuk. Gidiyo, ona gene önem veriyolar. Yani ben diyo PKK’yim diyo, gene de okutuyolar onu; gene de yapıyolar. Ya ama bu Romanın çocuğunun hiçbir şeyle alakası yok; vatana,millete daha iyi böyle şeylik yapacak. Ona tak kancayı atıyolar: Sen Romansın, çık”.

The difference is that Dom girls are supposed to drop out of school and after that, they get married even at 12 years old. In Roma community, I also encountered early marriages but Roma girls generally elop. For Dom girls, before marriage, are supposed to help their mother at home.

Roma community is not as strict as Dom community regarding girls' drawing back from education. In fact, I also made an in-depth interview with a Roma girl who is going to university in Edirne. She is the youngest one among four children in her family. Although her elder sister could not get an education because her family did not let her, she takes support of her family in case she gets a job. Her condition is unique to her neighborhood. Her neighbours criticize her in the following manner: "After the education, what could you do?" The same handicap appears. Roma members perceive their ethnicity as a real barrier for getting a job at the state. They perceive themselves as capable of only temporary jobs and agricultural labor. During the research, she was taking scholarship from EDROM. She emphasized that financial conditions are very important for continuing university education.

Similar to Dom community, Roma families generally support boys rather than girls in getting education. Elder brother generally works for their families so they cannot continue to the school. Elder sisters work outside or inside home. In response, the youngest boy of the family is generally supported to get education.

For example, one Roma female interviewee is the fourth of eight siblings in her family. Only youngest brother who is half-brother of the interviewee go to the university. My interviewee graduated from primary school and she regrets not continuing to her education. Her father was *çavuş* -intermediary between employer and employees-in the porter job. He was illiterate. He signed some documents about work, which led him to loose a lot of money. She said, "I wish I could have get education, which would be good for me. When you look for a job, they look for at least high school graduation. We just go for domestic works if we can find". Hence, this statement indicates two dimensions. First, we can see gender inequality in Roma community because families generally support their

sons rather than daughters. Second, we can see the relation between education and labor force. Low level of access leads to exclusion from job market.

Similar to Roma community, Dom families support boys in education as long as their financial conditions cover educational costs. Zerrin (35, F, Beggar, Dom) states her ideas about children's access to education:

“I have a son going to school. My daughter attended up to 5th grade. I took her away. She is grown up. Here is tribe; they would not let us send her. After sometime when the girl has grown up, they took the girl away from the school. I mean owing to the tribe, they do not approve. One of my sons goes to elementary school this year with the help of God. I would not take him away, never. Let him attend the school. May he rescue us from this suffering! To tell the truth, what kind of a life do we live. We are creeping down with those kids in such homes.”¹⁰²

In Dom community, girls cannot get education owing to their gender and cultural values. It is important to address that patriarchy is not unique to Dom community. Among Kurdish society, patriarchy limits also Kurdish women's citizenship rights. Hence, societies reflect the general tendency. Dom community's patriarchy is also visible in Kurdish society. Although patriarchy is not as strong in Roma community, boys are supported rather than girls to get education in both communities. Furthermore, marriage at early ages with elopement is one of the reasons for not going to the school. This is also common pattern in both communities.

In both communities, girls have important contributions to the family economy in terms of both use labor value and exchange labor. Hence, girls have much chance in the decision process regarding which child should benefit from educational opportunities. Gender inequality has close relations with cultural values and social structures (Gündüz Hoşgör, 2005:35).

With regard to third dimension, both Roma and Dom communities evaluate poverty with regard to opportunity cost of education. Among Dom community Veli (42, M, Musician, Dom) expressed his idea about education and his child's crime situation:

¹⁰² “Benim oğlum var, okula gidiyor. Kızım şeye gitti 5'e. Çıkarttım. Büyüktür yani. Aşirettir, burası kabul etmezdi. Biraz büyük kız olduğu zaman insanı çıkartırlar. Yani aşirettir, Kabul etmiyler ha. Benim bir oğlum bu sene ortaokula gidiyor Allah'ın izniyle. Yani onu çıkartmam, hiç bi zaman. O okusun. Bari bizi bu çileden çıkartsın. Hani hayatımız ne hayattır. Sürünüyoruz, böyle çocuklarla böyle evlerle”.

“I have never attended. I have never gone to (the school) even for one day. How could I go anyway? My mother was working in one place and my father in another place. How can I go to the school? They could hardly feed us, how could I go to the school?... Honestly one of my children is in jail. He is constrained to make theft. I can not look after 7-8 person. Even though the government does not, how could I look after? I was sending them to the school; we did not have the opportunity and the child dropped out the school, gone wrong on the streets. He rambled on with his friends whom were thief; then he also became a thief. Now he is in jail in Erzurum. He is in jail because of robbery. He took the phone from a lady’s hand; look what the state has done to him! They have sentenced with robbery and punished for 5 years and 6 months imprisonment. He is still a child of aged 14. These things are wrong, all is wrong.”¹⁰³

Similar to Veli’s ideas about education, Celal (45, M, Unemployed, Roma) also does not consider education as a prior need of the family. For him, work has a priority rather than education because of poverty. As he states,

“In the first place, you should eat to be full then after we will get education. We are already hungry; here today and gone tomorrow. We think about a job indeed, we could not think of the education. We cannot react to that anyway.”¹⁰⁴

With regard to poverty, child labor is a common pattern in both communities. Children tend to drop out from the schools in both communities in order to work. For Roma community, parents get permission when they go the seasonal agricultural livestock between May and November. One interviewee mentioned that her daughter is going to first class at *Fevzi Paşa Primary School* in *Menziliahir* neighborhood, which is in the worst socio-economic level among other Roma populated neighborhood in Edirne. Although her daughter’s class is nearly composed of 24 students, it decreased to nine students in May. She mentioned that when the parents go to the seasonal agricultural livestock, they are supposed to take their children from the school. Apart from seasonal jobs, Roma children are also working in the street, selling paper tissue and water, helping their parents at stallholder and such. For this reason, I saw elder sister and younger

¹⁰³ “Hiç gitmedim. Bir gün gitmedim (okula). Nasıl giderdim ki? Annem bir yerde, babam bir yerde çalışıy. Nasıl okula gideyim? Karnımız zor doyuruyorlar yani, nasıl okula giderdim?...Valla bir tane şu an cezaevinde. Mecbur kaldı, hırsızlık yaptı. Ben bakamam ki yedi sekiz kişiye. Devlet bakmadıktan sonra ben nerden bakabilirim? Okula gönderiyordum, imkanımız yoktu, çocuk okuldan çıktı, kötü yola girdi. Arkadaşlarla gezdi, arkadaşları da hırsızdiler, o da hırsız oldu. Şu an yatıyor, Erzurum’da yatıyor. Gaspten yatıyor. Bir bayanın elinden telefonu alıyor, devletin yaptığına bak! Gaspten koymuş, adama beş sene altı ay ceza vermiş. O, 14 yaşında bir çocuktur ha. Bunlar yanlıştır, hepsi yanlıştır”.

¹⁰⁴ “Evvvela karnımız doycak, ondan sonra eğitim yapıcaz. Biz zaten açız biz, bu gün varsa yarın yok. Biz iş düşünüyöz yani, eğitimi düşünemiyöz. Ona yetişemiyöz yani”.

brother studying in the same class. In the past, children were failing the class because they had to work. Today, teachers tolerate the children who are working. However, working life affect their studying conditions. I listened to such complains from the children; oversleeping, not listening teacher in the class, etc.

In Diyarbakır, I encountered Dom boys who are working and had to drop out of school. They also leave school for six months during the seasonal agricultural job. Girls already drop out when they become 10 years old. In addition, girls are working as beggars and agricultural laborers apart from their school life. As a difference in pattern from Edirne, some of the Dom children start school at older ages because of late registration. Most of them had no birth certificate when they were nomadic. However, the most visible pattern is that there are many Dom children not going to the school. When I asked to children for its reasons, they replied me saying that the teachers are yelling to them, so they do not want to go. Many Dom children do not attend to the primary school, even though it is compulsory.

Furthermore, child labor and in relation dropping out school is not a unique pattern to Dom community in Diyarbakır, whereas it is only seen among Roma community, not among Turkish majority in Edirne. The children of internally displaced Kurdish people also work on the streets and tend to drop out of the school. There is a Child Education Centre in *Bağlar* neighborhood where internally displaced Dom community lives with Kurdish IDP. This centre works under the municipality. Their aim is to provide help to children who are working, subjected to violence within the home, pushed to crime and afraid of the school. In other words, these children are seen as under risk and they are mostly children of internally displaced Kurdish people. This centre arranges cultural, educational and sporting activities. However, social worker said that there were no Dom children who applied to this centre even though nearly 800 children benefit from this service every year. Dom community lives more isolated and deprived from these services.

Hence, dropping out of school and poverty are closely related and appears as a common handicap in both communities in access to education. The common

issue for Roma and Dom communities is that financial restrictions prevent the parents from sending their children to the school. Now, how Roma and Dom communities cope with poverty to get education will be discussed. In other words, how they access to welfare state's assistances. We can see Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) and conditional cash transfer.

Although Roma community benefit considerably from Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) in Edirne, Dom interviewees do not know how to benefit and access to this foundation. When I visited EDROM when the schools started in September, especially Roma women were coming to Roma NGO to demand help about petitions. They mentioned that they want their children to get education but they have no financial budget to cover children's school uniforms, shoes and other expenses. EDROM has a critical role in helping these women to write their petitions and notice them. However, SASF can give educational budget to these parents at least one month later. The budget should be given to these parents before the school period starts. This issue has a special place for social policy. Unlike Roma community, Dom interviewees do not know how to access to SASF. There is no mechanism to help their access to welfare grant. Poverty and deprivation are barriers so that Dom interviewees cannot support children's educational expenses.

The other example is about conditional money transfer (*ŞNT*). Here, money is given to mother in poor families. In response, they enroll children in to public schools, getting regular visit to doctor, regular attendance in school, and so on. Although a great many Roma families benefit from this mechanism, there are a few Dom families who benefit from *ŞNT*. Besides, most of them complain that they did not get money although their children enrolled in school. When I asked them whether they applied, I got the same answer. "We gave the petition to the governorship". However, application should have been made directly to the schools. Again, they are deprived of the access to social mechanisms. These two examples about access to Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (SASF) and conditional cash transfer demonstrate that although Roma community benefits from the welfare state in some degree, Dom community is totally isolated and

deprived from these mechanisms. For Roma community, EDROM acts as an intermediary between state and Roma members, but there is no kind of foundation for Dom community. Moreover, although conditional cash transfer motivates Roma families to send their children to the school, it has a negative affect on most of Dom families since they could not benefit from it so they would not send their children to the school.

It is also useful to compare the conditions of primary schools in Edirne and Diyarbakır. I visited four primary schools in Edirne and Diyarbakır. They are *Fevzipaşa Primary School* and *Cumhuriyet Primary School* in Edirne; *Beyaz Tebeşir Primary School* and *Mardinkapı Primary School* in Diyarbakır. The common feature of these schools is that they are situated in Roma and Dom populated neighborhoods. The parents' socio-economic level is considerably low. Co-directors and directors of these schools mentioned that Dom/Roma children could not study at home because households are so crowded. The difference is that child labor is nearly 50% in *Mardinkapı Primary school* that both Kurdish and Dom children are working because of poverty. Unlike Roma children, co-director of this school also mentioned that she is writing to the court since children sometimes get involved in crime. Meanwhile, there is no distinction between Kurdish and Dom children because their parents' socio-economic level is similar. Owing to their unemployed fathers and mothers, they tended to commit petit crimes like stealing. However, teachers or co-directors did not encounter such crime in schools. It shows level of marginalization Dom community.

Moreover, social exclusion is apparent in Edirne since schools are mostly homogenous. Although schools are mixed in Diyarbakır, there are stereotypes toward Dom pupils by families of their classmates. In Edirne, *Fevzipaşa Primary School's* students are 100 % Roma and *Cumhuriyet Primary School's* students are 70-80% Roma. Although primary schools are generally homogenous in Edirne, in Diyarbakır it is generally mixed since Kurds and Dom children study together. *Fevzipaşa Primary School* in Edirne composed of nearly 100 % Roma students, which is one of the indicators of social exclusion. In Diyarbakır Dom students who inhabit in *Hasırlı* and *Hançepek* neighborhoods go to the *Mardinkapı*

Primary school. The school is also situated at periphery of the Diyarbakır. The parents are generally settled in Diyarbakır because of forced migration. Co-director of the school mentioned that Dom students are nearly 40% and others are Kurdish students. *Fevzipaşa Primary School* and *Mardinkapı Primary School* resemble each other. They are situated in periphery and only “poor” families send their children to these schools. Moreover, *Mardinkapı Primary school* was an ex-house of prostitution. When I see it, it looks like a prison building enclosed with barbed wire. When the school was ex panel house, the inhabitants of neighborhood’s survival strategy were washing the clothes of prostitutes working on this building. It shows the poverty situation of the inhabitants.

There are 70-80 Dom household’s children attending to the *Beyaz Tebeşir (White Chalk) Primary School* in Diyarbakır, but Kurdish children are majority. This school is not situated at periphery but also middle class families send their children to this school. Likewise, *Cumhuriyet Primary School* is also situated in the centre but majority are Roma children.

Roma families complain of the fact that their children go to homogenous schools. Turks children and Roma children cannot be mixed because of the fact that inhabitants are required to attend a school situated within their neighborhoods. When I visited *Fevzipaşa Primary School* in *Menzialiahir* neighborhood, one interviewee gave me example about discrimination. One Roma family wanted to give a “good education” to their daughter. She was a student at *Fevzipaşa Primary School*. They registered her in another primary school situated in the centre of Edirne. However, the child could not stand that school since her classmates were calling her as Gypsy girl. Therefore, she came back again to her previous school. The other example showed me that the primary school in *Gülbahar* district was a mixed school in the past. However, non-Roma people took their children from this school. Social exclusion is apparent in the schools.

In Diyarbakır, although the classes are heterogeneous, the interaction between Kurdish and Dom children are disgracefully weak. In addition, directors of the schools in Diyarbakır mentioned that Kurdish parents wanted to take their children to other classes. If a Kurdish child comes up with a problem, his/her

parent finds Dom children guilty. Moreover, the Kurdish parents do not want their children get education with Dom children because of the stereotypes like “Gypsies are criminal”.

In short, social exclusion is apparent in Edirne primary schools owing to the homogenous structure of the schools. For Dom community, although the classes are mixed and there are no socio-economic differences, we see stereotypes about Dom students. Teachers note that social interaction level between Kurdish and Dom children increases in advanced classes.

The teachers in both Diyarbakır and Edirne noticed that Gypsy students have tended to play music and dance. *Cumhuriyet Primary School* in Edirne developed such a uniform pattern that there is a rhythm group including 13 Roma students. Roma students are also very satisfied from this band. There is also a computer lab at this school. Roma students are interested in computer and they would like to come to school even on Saturdays. I learnt from EDROM that the Chief of Security General Directorate had established this lab. On the other hand, teachers request their assignation after one or two years. For the co-director, kinds of incentives should be given to teachers in order not giving up teaching at this school after one year.

To sum up, there is a sharp contrast between Dom and Roma community in terms of their access to education. For adults, females are in more disadvantaged position than men in both communities. Illiteracy is a common pattern among Dom community owing to the lack of birth registration in their nomadic years. Men among Roma community graduated generally from primary school. Most of the female adult Roma women are also illiterate but there are Roma females who finished primary school. We see outstanding differences in younger generation between the communities, since Roma students attend high school and university. Children of Dom community started to enroll in schools after their resettlement process. However, many of Dom children do not enroll to the school. Although early marriage is widespread in both communities, Dom girls are more disadvantaged and they cannot benefit from equal citizenship rights. Dom community is a more closed community than Roma community. Girls get

education until only 5th grade at primary school. Their fathers do not let them go to the school, because they are seen as grown ups. They get into arranged marriages. Dropping out of school is also another problem for boys because of labor participation. Child labor is common element in both communities. Children are working on the street and go for seasonal labor. Although Roma community households go for both seasonal agricultural and livestock labor, Dom community households go for seasonal agricultural labor. They took their children with them for six months. These children cannot attend school. As a social policy, this issue should be considered in order to continue for their education.

The other sharp difference can be seen as evaluation of ethnicity with regard to opportunity cost of education. Roma interviewees evaluate their ethnic identity as a barrier to get a job even if they get educated. Therefore, they believe Roma community cannot benefit from equal citizenship rights. This belief is strong among Roma community so that their children should work on the street being peddler or being tradesman. Feeling exclusion also distracts Roma parents from education. However, I did not come across such feeling among Dom community. The common pattern of poverty is considered as barrier to give their children to educational access.

6.4.3 Housing Conditions and Social Interaction at the Neighborhoods

This section aims to compare population features of Roma and Dom neighborhoods, their housing conditions, symbolic boundaries within the neighborhoods and distinctive problems of these neighborhoods.

First, we intensely see Roma populated neighborhoods in Edirne but we cannot claim the same pattern for Dom community in Diyarbakır. In fact, Dom community settled in blighted areas in Diyarbakır and their settlement process occurred at the periphery zone of Diyarbakır. Their neighborhoods are generally situated in *Suriçi* district. They live with internally displaced Kurdish majority who also came from “evacuated” villages around Diyarbakır.

There are eight Roma populated neighborhoods in Edirne: *Yeni İmaret, Karaağaç, Umurbey, Menziliahir, Yıldırım Beyazıt, Ayşekadın (Araplar District) Yıldırım Hacısarraf and Çavuşbey neighbourhood*. These neighborhoods and especially *Menziliahir* neighborhood is known as “Gypsy” neighborhoods in Edirne. These are old settlement areas and are homogenized because non-Gypsies generally live in new settlement areas, such as *Binevler, Ayşekadın*. Edirne also has started to receive migrants from East and South-East of Turkey for the last ten years. Most of them are Kurds and are settled in Roma neighborhoods owing to the financial limitations. Roma interviewees have relations with Kurds, Pomak and Turks but only for business purposes. Roma neighborhoods are situated at city-centre and can be reachable even by walking. However, apart from other Roma populated neighborhoods, *Menziliahir* neighborhood had an image that “even police cannot enter” or other Roma neighborhoods inhabitants indicate *Menziliahir* where “real Gypsies” are living. By this way, this neighborhood was stigmatized by both non-Roma and even Roma inhabitants. Nevertheless, the inhabitants of *Menziliahir* have a very low socio-economic situation, which leads to symbolic boundaries among Roma community. The other Roma interviewees call the inhabitants of *Menziliahir* neighborhood as “Poşa” which has a pejorative meaning.

Therefore, first impression we face is that Roma neighborhoods are stigmatized. For example, police made operation towards *Menziliahir* neighborhood in 2006¹⁰⁵ since some inhabitants stole iron and ran away to their neighborhood. This situation turned into a conflict between the inhabitants and the police. Apart from this event, there was no conflict but generally Roma neighborhoods are stigmatized and socially excluded¹⁰⁶.

¹⁰⁵ <http://haber.mynet.com/detay/yasam/edirne-romanlar-polis-le-catisti/213293> (last access 12.01.10)

¹⁰⁶ For İncirlioğlu (2006), using the term social exclusion might not so valid in Romany neighborhoods. As she claims, “we can safely generalize that they are socially excluded from the rest of the population in all societies they live in...There is also widespread evidence that Gypsies themselves have chosen to maintain their separate identity and rejected assimilation into the larger society” (İncirlioğlu, 2006:194).

On the other hand, Doms' settlements are mixed with Kurds who resettled owing to forced migration. Dom community inhabits *Ali Paşa, Hasırlı, Cemal Yılmaz, Hançepek, Yeniköy, Bağlar and Benusen*. Unlike Roma community, their neighborhoods are known as only periphery and poor neighborhoods in Diyarbakır. Unlike Roma community's neighborhoods, Dom community's neighborhoods are not indicated ethnically but in terms of poverty. Dom community lives with internally displaced Kurdish majority in these neighborhoods.

It is estimated that nearly between 60 % and 70 % of inhabitants in *Cemal Yılmaz* and *Hasırlı* neighborhood are Dom people. They settled to Diyarbakır after 1990s. *Alipaşa, Bağlar* and *Benusen* are more mixed neighborhoods. However, we see again spatial exclusion because only internally displaced persons (Kurds and Dom community) live at these blighted areas. In a different manner from Edirne, the ones who succeed in socio-economic level move to neighborhoods which have higher level of socio-economic conditions. However, Dom community has no chance in mobility.

Furthermore, interaction levels between Dom and Kurds are very weak. Dom inhabitants were excluded by Kurdish neighbors in these neighborhoods. Ex-mukhtar of Savaş neighborhood mentioned that when Dom community wanted to settle in these neighborhoods, Kurdish householders did not accept them at first. For him, they were accepted when Dom community made money from "informal forms of self-aid". Poverty and low socio-economic conditions did not lead to solidarity between Kurdish and Dom households living in the same neighborhood. In *Suriçi* district, social interaction level between Kurdish and Dom families is very low. However, in *Cemal Yılmaz* neighborhood which is so close to *Hasırlı*, interaction level is higher than *Hasırlı* neighborhood. Nevertheless, I should emphasize that interaction levels vary according to gender. Although men say they have social interaction with their Kurdish neighbors, women act differently. Their social interaction is also limited with only greetings. Berfin (20, F, Non-Working, Dom) says,

“They do not come to us. We do not go to them. We want to go to them indeed, but they do not trust us.”¹⁰⁷

According to ex-mukhtar of Savaş neighborhood, Lokman Demir, Dom community is stigmatized collectively for performing the jobs like prostitution and drug dealing. If a Kurdish woman goes to Dom woman’s house, she would be called as “prostitute”. Besides, people generally called *Hasırlı* as *Kore* neighborhood where ex-panel house used to be. In this regard, Mutlu (2009) also conducted a research in Diyarbakır among internally displaced persons. She also went to *Suriçi* district and one of her informants had problems with Dom community. Her informant mentioned that “nobody gets on very well with them”. Mutlu (2009) says, “relations between Kurds and Romans, who has to share the blighted areas in the cities, seems to construct another conflictual area within which Romans stands for a category of other’s other” (Mutlu, 2009:166).

In addition to low interaction level between Kurds and Doms, Kurds are requested to expulse Doms in *Hançepek* neighborhood. For this aim they collected 2000 signatures and gave it to the mukhtar. Nevertheless, the mukhtar rejected this petition (Promoting Roma Rights Project Evaluation Meeting, 2008).

With regard to social exclusion dimension, I also encountered different treatment towards Dom women in the neighborhoods. Moreover, there is a municipality service called White Butterfly Laundry in *Hasırlı* neighborhood. The women not only wash their clothes at the laundry system, but also get education or benefit from other social services. When I visited this service, I was really affected with their system but people in charge did not answer my questions about Dom women. They replied me saying that they did not know whether Dom women were coming to the laundry. On the other hand, Dom woman interviewees expressed that they are just going to the laundry one day a week since one day is departed to Dom women. Moreover, they do not benefit from their educational system. They just go for washing their clothes. Hence, this separation is also against to equality. This is also multidiscrimination because Dom women face to discrimination practices owing to their ethnic and woman identity.

¹⁰⁷ “Onlar bize gelmiyor. Biz onlara gitmiyoruz. Yani biz onlara gitmek istiyoruz ama onlar güvenmiyorlar”.

Furthermore, the way of conflict resolution is significant in evaluating the relation between majorities and “minorities”. The common pattern is that both Roma and Dom community resort to their elders when a conflict occurs in their neighborhood. Unlike Roma community, there are some conflict resolution mechanisms between Dom and Kurdish majority: sheiks, muhktars, municipality and Democratic Society Party (DTP). DTP is the last mechanism for solving the conflict that it undertakes conflict resolution role when a death occurs. In Edirne, on the other hand, the conflict is notified to police, court, etc. Hence, although legal procedure is widespread in Edirne, the conflict is tried to be solved before legal procedure in Diyarbakır. In both communities, abduction of girl is main conflict. In Edirne, if families do not solve this problem, legal procedure starts. However, abduction of girl is a crucial problem in Dom community because it might be turn into gunfight.

So far, I discussed the dimensions of social exclusion in Roma and Dom neighborhoods. Although social exclusion works for especially *Menziliahir* neighborhood in Edirne, Dom community is isolated in their neighborhoods and their interaction with Kurdish majority is very weak because of stereotypes attributed to them. Not renting them a house or different treatment at social services is also indicators of social exclusion, limitation of civil rights and discrimination towards their ethnic identity. Moreover, Kurds wanted to demand Dom community’s expulsion from their common neighborhood. We see discriminative practices towards Dom community. Unlike Roma community, Dom community is socially isolated.

Second comparative issue is that both Roma and Dom communities have poor housing conditions. This situation does not only affect their health but also the success of their children at the schools. Roma and Dom children complain on the fact that there is no space for them to study at their houses. Roma and Dom families are extended families, however all the family should stay in one room. Although poverty is common pattern between these communities, Roma communities’ houses are not homogenous. As I argued before, some Roma families retired from Germany built two or three stores houses and they are

economically well off. I saw the worst housing conditions in *Menziliahir* neighborhood in Edirne. When I visit *Menziliahir* neighborhood, I also noticed the differences among other Roma neighborhoods, which are told by other interviewees and institutions. It is the oldest Roma neighborhood in the city. Poverty is so visible that some houses had no electricity. They were using candles. Most of the houses are *gecekondu*, which have no titles. In other neighborhoods, Roma interviewees have their houses with titles. However, for Dom community they just entered an “empty house” or built a shanty. Dom community’s housing conditions are weak when it is compared to Roma community.

Moreover, Dom community’s houses are situated on blighted areas. Some of the houses even cannot be called as *gecekondu*. One Dom female interviewee wanted to show me her house. She said that “come and see our horrible house”. Her house is in *Hasırlı* neighborhood and near to the city walls. Toilet and bath are outside. They have to take a bath at outside of their home even in winter times. In addition, she heads her household since her husband is in jail. She is scared because she does not feel safe in her house.

Roma community is living in their neighborhoods since Ottoman period. Owing to the Dom community’s nomadic pattern in the past, some districts appeared new. Most of the Dom inhabitants settled in Diyarbakır after the forced migration since 1990s. In Bağlar, Dom inhabitants came from Lice, Hazro, etc, therefore, out from Diyarbakır. Although the other Dom inhabitants of different neighborhoods know Dom people in Bağlar, their interaction is low. Especially *Yeniköy* is totally a new district. Before 1990s, Dom people used to live in tents in this district. Afterwards, when they understood they could not carry on with their nomadic anymore, they built *gecekondu* [shacks]. When I visited *Yeniköy* district, a person from Suriçi municipality accompanied me. He is municipal police but he has good relations with Dom community. One of Dom female interviewee said, “I thought you would destroy our houses. Let you destroy and we will get rid of”.

Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician, Dom) says,

“For example; I have five children and I am 32 years old. Excuse me and I am so sorry to tell you that we do not have toilet, bathroom and washbasin. My kids go to

the neighbours' toilet anyway. We use the neighbours' staff, since I do not have the opportunity to make it. I should buy pipe and should dig from here to there. So, if there is no money? If I have money I would do it. How will I do then? How could I make washbasin, bath? In a shanty made up of four piece of wood and covered by a tent; we use a room as both kitchen and bathroom. Honestly, I use these. I have five children and we all stay in that boxy room. Now if you go in an apartment, it has separate child room, separate lounge and separate guest room. We do not have such thing.”¹⁰⁸

Nuri's housing conditions resemble to many interviewees' houses but it looks the same as especially to the inhabitants living in the *Menziliahir* neighbourhood in Edirne. In addition, the interviewees in *Yeniköy* district in Diyarbakır mentioned that if AKP won the elections, they would have destroyed their houses. For them, the municipality shows tolerance to them. However, some of the houses in *Suriçi* area were demolished because of the reconstruction of city walls. For this reason, the inhabitants of *Hasırlı* moved to *Benusen* or *Bağlar*.

Third issue is that although there are symbolic boundaries among Roma neighborhoods in Edirne, Dom community's neighborhoods seem homogenous in terms of social boundaries and interviewees did not differentiate neighborhoods since their socio-economic levels are the same. In a common sense, Dom women are beggars, in response men are unemployed. However, interviewees in Edirne differentiate the neighborhoods according to the participation of the labor force. In other words, jobs varied according to the neighborhood. In these neighborhoods, mostly Roma population inhabits. In this respect, *Yıldırım Beyazıt* and *Çavuşbey* are mostly Roma neighborhoods and their socio-economic levels appear as higher than other neighborhoods. The inhabitants of *Yıldırım Beyazıt* mentioned that their neighborhood used to involve mostly waged Roma laborers who were garbage collectors at the municipality. Meanwhile, most of them are retired today. According to the interviewees, Roma people cannot work at cleaning jobs owing to the privatization of this job. Moreover, they compare the *Gazimihal* district of

¹⁰⁸ “Mesela ben şahsım beş çocuk babasıyım, 32 yaşındayım. Hani çok af buyrun ha, üzülerek bunu söylüyorum. Benim daha tuvalet, banyom, lavabom yok yani. Komşulara valla, çocuklarım komşulara gidiyor yani. Komşularınkini kullanıyoruz. Çünkü fırsatım yok, yapayım yani. Alacağım boru lazım, ordan ta şuraya kadar yer açmam lazım. E Para yoksa? Para olsa yaparım. Nasıl yapcam onu? Lavabo, banyo nasıl yapıcım? Yo, imkanım yok, maddi durumum yok. Yapmam işte. Kaç yıldır öyle gidiyor. Bir barakada dört tane tahta yapıştırmışım, üstüne bir çadır örtmüşüm, oranın içinde mutfak olarak banyo olarak orayı kullanıyoruz. Valla onları kullanıyorum. Beş çocukluyum, bir gözlü odada kalıyoruz. Şimdi daireye girsen çocuk odası ayrıdır, oturma salonu ayrıdır, misafir salonu ayrıdır. Bizde öyle bir şey yok”.

Çavuşbey neighborhood with their neighborhood in terms of socio-economic level. They consider *Çavuşbey*'s inhabitants to have better position. Since the inhabitants of *Gazimihal* are dealing with stallholder.

On the other hand, all the neighborhoods evaluate the *Menziliahir* or *Kemikçiler* neighborhood as in worst situation in terms of socio-economic level of people and housing conditions. The livelihood of inhabitants are collecting paper, seasonal agricultural labor, seasonal livelihood, collecting frog, domestic cleaner. The inhabitants of *Menziliahir* also symbolically differentiate their neighborhood according to their job. Accordingly, in *Yukarı Kıyık* (Above Kıyık) or *Çadırcılar* (Tenters) agricultural laborers reside in and in *Aşağı Kıyık* (Below Kıyık) remaining inhabitants reside. The next neighborhood is *Küçükpazar* where mostly Roma inhabitants reside in but they differentiate themselves from *Menziliahir* Roma neighbors. They say, "We don't know Romani language and we are not so poor like them". Hence, if the access for benefiting from citizenship rights is low, the inhabitants are perceived as "real Roma" among Roma community.

These symbolic boundaries lead to increase in neighborhood consciousness in Roma neighborhoods. I mean that collective consciousness is very strong in these neighborhoods. However, for Dom communities, this is not valid. They have social integration problems to the city.

The fourth issue is about neighborhood problems. Drug addiction, which is mentioned by both Roma and Dom interviewees, is seen as a real problem. Especially younger generation tended to use drug. Apart from drug usage, Dom interviewees mentioned that prostitution, robbery and other criminal events increased in their neighborhoods. Dom community's neighborhoods seem more problematic than Roma community. Yet Dom interviewees also emphasize that *Perev* (non-Gypsies) also have same problems in their neighborhood. Dom community and internally displaced persons have integration problems to the city; there are also boundaries and conflictual area between them. As a different pattern, although Roma interviewees are satisfied with their neighborhood, Dom interviewees would like to continue with their nomadic pattern.

6.4.4 Access to Health

This section will compare the way of access to health as a final issue of social rights. As a common pattern, many of Dom and Roma interviewees have Green Card which is given to the poor people (without any income, job and property) to access for health care. It only gives them a chance to see the doctor in a public hospital and a diagnosis, but no medical treatment. During the Edirne fieldwork, some of the Roma interviewees mentioned that their Green Cards were canceled. The reason for cancellation of their Green Cards was explained to them as one of their acquaintances has other social insurance. Roma households are extended family, which is one of the major tactics to cope with poverty. For example, one old Roma woman was living with her sons and brides. Her son was painter and he had social insurance. Therefore, her Green card was canceled. Another example is that one Roma man's daughter had given birth to a baby. However, his Green card was canceled because his father had a grocer. He was thinking of helping his wife and newborn daughter escape from the hospital because he could not afford to pay hospital expenditures. He also found relation between his father's social insurance and his own social insurance unreasonable because he was living in a separate house. He was saying, "We have just solely one life. Let them come and take it". Hence, we see the dismantling of the basic right to access to health care by the state.

I did not encounter the process of cancellation of Green cards among Dom community. Nevertheless, especially Dom women who have lack of birth registration cannot benefit from health services. In addition, polygamy is general marriage pattern in Dom community. As a result of unofficial marriage, the children are under the risk of not having birth registration and they cannot benefit from health and other social welfare system. Among Roma community interviewees who did not have identity cards were using their acquaintances' Green cards. It was a very common "tactic" used in accessing to health care. On the other hand, I did not hear any kind of usage by Dom community.

Hence, Roma and Dom community members have no social insurance with regard to their job and unemployment conditions. The jobs they perform, on the other hand, require dangerous risks especially for seasonal agricultural laborers for both communities. In fact, a Roma woman who is 50 years old had an accident when she was working at the field. The machine crashed her, so she became physically disabled. She cannot walk. Although she is disabled and cannot walk without help, doctor does not give her a disabled report in order for her to get disabled pension. Doctor said she could work. However, when I saw her she was walking by using her hands on the ground. Her husband is also mentally retarded and he took pension for his illness.

Furthermore, I encountered many nerve patients in Roma community rather than Dom community. High increase of nervous derangement can be seen because of poverty. For example, I visited a household in *Yıldırım Hacı Sarraf* neighborhood in Edirne. My interviewee Pınar (32, F, Domestic Cleaner, Roma) was staying with her mother-in-law in the same house. The entire household was in the yard, which is used by all members of the household. There was a room in the yard. Kitchen was added to the room. Actually, kitchen materials were piled out of the room, which was surrounded by nylon. I also encountered the same kind of kitchen in other Roma neighborhoods. Pınar was staying with her husband and her two children in that room. Her mother-in-law was staying with her two sons at the upstairs. When Pınar got married, her husband and she moved to her mother-in-law's house due to financial difficulty. The conditions of the house also show the level of poverty they live. At first, I was talking with her at the yard but she became restless and suggested me to go to their room. She had health problems such as dizziness and malaise. They were in debt. They got credit but they cannot pay back. Although her mother-in-law had retirement pension from Germany, she did not help them. Her husband was working at the coffehouse but they could not subsist. After the interview, she told me that she thought I was sequestrator at first. She was in depression. She was taking medicine. She also said, "God forgive me, I wish I had not give birth to my children". She showed

me her daughter's school bag. She said, "It is 15 TL. My daughter liked it and we bought". When she was saying, she was laughing as an unstrung way.

The example above shows close relation between poverty and neurological disease. I generally encountered mental illness in Edirne. The common pattern is that many interviewees or their acquaintances could not work because of health problems. The conditions of the house also affect the increase of health problems. Weak housing conditions are also common problem for both communities.

Apart from the access to health care, some Roma interviewees mentioned that they get different treatment in the hospitals due to their ethnicity. One interviewee complained that he lost his son because of disinterest at the hospital. He filed a case in court. His son was taken out his grave for autopsy. He is still waiting for the result. He relates this case with his ethnic identity. As Coşkun (38, M, Unemployed, Roma)

"I really do not know, I astonished. Do you know the reason? They care a lot for the tidiness ones, but not for the ones like us and ...second-class, third-class."¹⁰⁹

This is also another social exclusion and discriminative attitude towards his Roma identity. I never heard such an event from Dom interviewees. They are satisfied with the health institutions. In short, both Roma and Dom community have health problems especially chronic diseases and mental illnesses. For this reason, they are unable to work. The persons having not lack of birth registration cannot benefit from health right. In addition, both Roma and Dom community are seasonal agricultural laborer but they have no social insurance, which leads to dangerous results.

So far, the attempt was to compare social rights as rights to work, education, housing conditions, health and benefit from social services. Dom community's social rights are very limited when it is compared with Roma community. They could not produce "tactics" to integrate to the mainstream society. The next section will elaborate political rights of the both communities.

¹⁰⁹ "Ne bileyim ben efendim. Şaşırdım, kaldım. Niye biliyor musun? Çekidüzeni iyi olan insanlarla çok ilgileniyorlar, ama bizim gibilerle geri kalmış ve....ikinci sınıf, üçüncü sınıf. Ne bileyim şaşırdık kaldık".

6.5 Political Rights

Political rights refer to participation in the exercise of a political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of a body. Accordingly, the section will try to compare voting and political tendencies; exercise of political power; Roma and Dom Associations' roles at local and the transnational levels.

First, the analysis will compare voting and political tendencies between Roma community and Dom community. Roma community does not have positive attitude to any specific party. Accordingly, it is indefinite whether Roma community supports left or right wing parties. Most of the interviewees complained that the representatives of political parties visiting their neighbourhood only before election process. On the other hand, majority of Dom interviewees support DTP in Diyarbakır. Dom interviewees adopted twofold identities. They own both Kurdish identity and Dom identity. With regard to adopting Kurdish identity, they support DTP and they are satisfied with their municipality services.

In addition, political parties at rulership generally distribute social assistance to the poor families before election. My research process in Diyarbakır encountered after the local elections. I learnt that AKP (Justice and Development Party, which came to power since 2002) gave financial aid to only the “poor women” as 1500 TL, in Diyarbakır. Most of the female Dom interviewees took this financial aid. I asked them whether this financial aid affected their voting process. In this respect, most of the Dom women gave their vote to AKP. Some of them mentioned that although they took this aid, they would never change their party, namely DTP. One interviewee said that although her wife voted for AKP, he voted for DTP. He considered his family as “democratic family” that everybody can vote whatever she/he would like to select.

Unlike Dom community, there is no one among Roma community, who votes to DTP. In addition, Roma interviewees consider Kurdish identity as “separatist” and farthest identity to them. I will also evaluate this issue under the

section called Identification and Belonging into the Political Community. Unlike Dom community, I noticed a tendency among Roma community that they support the political parties in rulership or potential rulership. Before the elections, they support the parties who gave them financial support. However, after the elections, the interviewees mention that they cannot even being taken into the political parties. They can benefit from short-term intimacy with political parties but it does not lead structural transformation in their lives. In addition, the interviewees generally do not care about politics since none of the parties could heal their social rights position. In addition, the political parties did not do anything about Roma community's social exclusion problems. From Roma community, Coşkun (38, M, Unemployed, Roma) says,

“Education, social life, health; we remain behind in all of these aspects. We are poor people living at back-streets in suburbs. All our family lags behind than others in benefiting from education and health services. The problem is that we do not have any other problems. The country has already its own problems; we cannot overcome these problems in any cases. ... Today AKP is the ruling party. What that brother has told that Genç Party, DYP; all of which are the ruling parties. Today, as a person worked for the ruling party, we made a man of. He does not come. When we are going to the provincial head or mayoralty, we can not tell off our problems, since they do not let us in... We are the ones who love the flag but the one who are excluded. Today, we are willingly going to the military service.”¹¹⁰

With regard to their political tendency, Roma community rather than Dom community stands near Gramscian “subaltern” consciousness. As Crehan (2002) summarizes,

“Gramsci certainly never denied that subaltern peoples had their own conceptions of the world, he just sees these as inherently fragmentary, incoherent and contradictory, and as lacking the kind of clear, rigorous insight into how local environments of oppression are located within larger economic and political realities, which is essential if a subaltern account is to have any hope of becoming genuinely counter-hegemonic...Gramsci's discussions of subaltern culture begin from the assumption that it is unable to produce effective, genuinely transformative, political movements”(Crehan, 2002:104).

¹¹⁰ “Tahsil, sosyal, sağlık bunların hepsinde geri kalmış insanlarız. Yoksul insanlar arka sokaklarda yaşayan, varoşlarda yaşayan insanlar bizim çoluğumuz çocuğumuz okul okumaktan, sağlık hizmetlerinden yararlanmakta hepsinden gerideyiz. Sorun bu başka sorun yok. Zaten ülkenin kendine göre sorunları var, bunları aşamıyoruz bir türlü. ...Bugün iktidar parti AKP. Bu kardeşimin anlattıkları yok Genç Partiymiş, yok DYP'ymiş. Bunların hepsi iktidar partisi. Bugün iktidar partiye çalışmış bir eleman olarak ordaki insanları adam ettik. Gelip burayla ilgilenmiyor, gidiyoruz bir il başkanlığına veya belediye başkanlığına, derdimizi anlatamıyoruz, kapıdan içeri almıyorlar.... Bayrağını seven bizleriz, dışlanan bizleriz. Bugün askerlik görevine gönüllü gidiyoruz.

I do not reduce Roma community to a subaltern community but I just indicate their political consciousness and the way of benefiting from citizenship rights with different “tactics”, such that their nationalism behavior show similarities with Gramsci’s subaltern term. They have eclectic and fragmented consciousness. However, I cannot assert the same consciousness for Dom community since they adopted Kurdish identity and supports the Kurdish movement.

Second, analysis tries to compare the degrees of participation in the exercise of a political power as a member of a body invested with political authority. To evaluate this differentiation, it seems necessary to argue for the interaction between local and global space. For the local space, although Roma community’s exercise of political power is limited, we cannot see any political power among Dom community. In Roma community, we see eight Roma populated neighborhoods but there is only one Roma mukhtar selected in *Menziliahir* neighborhood. However, we cannot see any Dom mukhtar although their population is high in some neighborhoods. In Roma community, I conducted an in-depth interview with ex-mukhtar of *Yıldırım Beyazıt* neighborhood in Edirne. For him, there is no solidarity between Roma inhabitants. This factor is affective for inhabitants are not voting for candidates of Roma mukhtar. With his words,

“During election time, they sell out each other for 10 Lira, 5 Lira. Actually, if they unite, they could adopt an emperor among them. We came up with such a situation, I am telling the old thing; but there is not togetherness and unity. For example; I did not apply for that election, one of my Roma friend had applied and lost with 3 votes. Whichever way you look at it, about what percent I don’t know, did not participate in voting in the election, and since they did not vote, he had lost.”¹¹¹

I also heard from other interviewees that there are other disturbing factors that Roma Mukhtar candidates are sometimes forced to withdraw their candidates. There is an invisible pressure on them. Furthermore, there are other exclusive

¹¹¹ “Seçim zamanı geldiği zaman birbirlerini satmaya çalışıyorlar 10 liraya, 5 liraya. Esasında bir birleşeler burdan padişah bile çıkarırlar. Öyle bir duruma geldik, eski şeyini söylüyorum; ama beraberlik birlik yok. Mesela bu seçimlerde ben girmedim, bir arkadaşım girdi Roman, üç oyla kaybetti. Nerden baksan yüzde bilmem kaç atmadı çocuğa zaten; atmayınca kaybetti”.

factors on them. My interviewee, Müzeyyen (47, F, Retired Worker from Germany, Roma) gave me a striking example:

“My father was the member of Edirne municipality council. He applied for the municipal election, he was elected for the candidacy of mayoralty, but he drew back his application. They refrain from Roma thing. I remember clearly ... in that time he has intentionally abdicated, there were some people who had opposed to that. After that my deceased father, for trouble not to occur, resigned with his own accord.”¹¹²

This example is not new, since Müzeyyen was a child in those years. Hence, there are limitations in political rights on Roma community. This also shows another indicator of social exclusion. For Dom community, there is no such kind of pressures but they do not participate in local political power exercises. There are some local administrative mechanisms, which are not seen in Edirne. One of this administrative mechanism organized within Diyarbakır Municipality is called *Belediye İl Halk Meclisi* (Provincial Community Council). This council is organized in the neighbourhoods that local problems are argued and solved. Although majority of Dom interviewees support municipality, they do not participate in their councils. According to ex-mukhtar of Savaş neighborhood,

“Doms do not attend. They never attend. But Doms have a tendency to the council and in addition to DTP Kurdish rights. This is all. But they do not come and participate to the arguments, do not join to the any kind of initiation. Neither a mukhtar nor a candidate emerges among them. Nobody make them well, they also do not improve themselves. That is how it happened and how it will happen. There is a proverb stating as “Karaçi girl may not become wife.”¹¹³

In fact, we see the limitation of political rights in both communities. Although Roma community would integrate to the political sphere of society in limited degree, the social exclusion is apparent. Dom community does not involve in any kind of political exercise. The only political activity is voting.

¹¹² “Babam Edirne belediye meclis üyesi başkanıydı. Ondan sonra belediye seçimlerine girdiğinde belediye başkanlığını kazandığı an bıraktı, çekildi. Hani işte Roman şeyi diye biraz orda kaygılanma yaptılar. Ben çok iyi hatırlıyorum...orda bilerek şey yaptı, çekildi yani, biraz karşı çıkmalar filan oldu. Ondan sonra hiç şey olmasın diye rahmetli babam da kendiliğinden istifa etti, çıktı”.

¹¹³ “Domlar katılmıyor. Hiç bir zaman katılmıyor. Ama Domların Meclise, bi de artı DTP Kürt haklarına meyilleri var yani. Hepsi onlar yani. Ama meclislere gelip tartışma, herhangi bir inisiyatife girmiyorlar yani. Onlardan ne bir muhtar çıkar, ne bir aday çıkar. Kimse onları şey yapmıyor, onlar da kendi kendilerine geliştirmiyorlar. Böyle geçmiş, böyle gidecek. “Kız Karaçi hatun olmaz” diye bir kelime var”.

Third, the role of the NGOs will be discussed at local and trans-national level. So far, we saw political rights of Roma and Dom communities in the local space. The other space is global in which Roma/Gypsy communities are regarded as trans-national minority group. Although Roma NGO has entered transnational political sphere in Edirne and Europe, Dom Association could not be successful and it was closed. I met Dom leader, Mehmet Demir at Diyarbakır Dom and Roma Youth Sport Club Culture Association in 2007. Dom Association was established as a result of a visit by the project team called “Promoting of Romani Rights Project” which was implemented by EDROM, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), and Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly in Turkey between 2005-2008. The aim of the project was “to build capacity of Roma and other civil society actors to engage in effective advocacy for the Rights of Roma and to raise awareness in Turkish society about the human rights problems facing the Romani population” (<http://www.hyd.org.tr/?pid=371>, last accessed as 30.11.2010).

EDROM and Dom Association met by means of this project. Mehmet Demir who was the leader of Dom association expressed how hard it was to find a place for the association since nobody wanted to rent their places in central of Diyarbakır called *Ofis* area. The challenging issue was their Dom identity. Dom Association failed to succeed because there was no one to keep NGO’s activities alive since all of the members of the association were illiterate and inexperienced. Civil Society Development Centre in Diyarbakır visited Dom association to give education about capacity building but there was no one to take education except for Mehmet Demir’s son. Mehmet Demir’s son is the only person who is university student in İstanbul.

Furthermore, I encountered the critiques and negative attitudes among Dom community toward the Dom association thereby they did not support the association. All members of the association were Dom leader’s acquaintances. For the interviewees, association was always requesting money from Dom interviewees, even though they support it as financially. With regard to institutional dimension, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality was also supporting them giving their rents on the ground that they were aware of Dom

community's social exclusion position. Nevertheless, the association kept their requests only in financial aid. Moreover, according to them, Demir said "after I died, my son would be leader of association". Dom association took reactions from both Dom community and institutional level, and could not take in grassroots movement. Therefore, its activities lasted only for one year and it is closed.

Unlike Dom community, Roma community's NGO started with *Edirne Çingene Kültürünü Araştırma, Geliştirme ve Yardımlaşma Derneği* (Edirne Research, Development and Solidarity Association of Gypsy Culture) and was established in 2004. After Turkey's acceptance as an official candidate for membership to the European Union, Roma Rights movement appeared (Diler, 2008:127; Kaya, 2005:5). This process led to a change in the Association Law in 2004. Until 2004, associations in Turkey could not establish in terms of area, race, ethnicity, religion and social class. For example, İzmir Romanlar Beneficiary and Solidarity Association was established in 1996. However, it was closed due to the old Association Law. Accession process to EU especially between 2002-2005 accelerated Romani movement in Turkey (Uzpeder, 2008). They changed Gypsy word on their association took the name Edirne Roman Association (EDROM) at present. EDROM became federation in 2006.

Before the establishment of EDROM, I conducted my master research in 2003 (Ceyhan, 2003). That time, Roma community was hesitating about Roma Association since they were afraid to act against the state. Roma community always emphasizes their loyalty to the state. In fact, Abdullah Gül, who is the president of the republic, provided some part of rent of the association. In the process, Roma community adopted EDROM. In a different manner from Dom community, EDROM has a special place for Roma community in Edirne. Moreover, Roma community members support them actively. EDROM ensured that Roma community recognized at local and national level since 2000. Before EDROM, even the word of Roma was like a taboo in the society. Today, the municipality officials asked me whether I visited EDROM or not. It was very difficult to conduct a research in 2003. Hence, EDROM changed the atmosphere in last six years.

EDROM has a mediator role between state and its community since Roma community is minority in Edirne. In this regard, it seems that EDROM created a dialogue mechanism with stakeholders. As a local scale, institutions like governorship, municipality come firstly to EDROM for cooperation or solving problems. Likewise, Roma interviewees (both male and females) go to the EDROM for asking help like writing petitions or asking other questions related to bureaucratic institutions. EDROM also has good relationship with government (Chapter IV, Methodology).

As a global scale, we can see EDROM as a transnational actor. EDROM is a member of European Roma Grassroot Organisation (ERGO), The European Roma Information Office (ERIO) and European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF). EDROM also has been in a communication network with other international Romani and human rights associations such as INTEGRO, SPOLU, Global Dialogue and ERRC.

On the one hand, EDROM's activities are not only limited to nation-state. It oriented to transnational spaces compromising transnational organizations and association with non-spatial expressions and de-territorialized symbolisms. Their efforts also fight against discrimination towards Gypsy identity not only in Turkey but also in European scale. For example, EDROM criticized France's expulsion of Roma population in terms of human rights context. As argued in theoretical consideration of citizenship, we can suggest that EDROM also has been affected by the decline of modern citizenship and political transformation of citizenship. As it was discussed in the theoretical chapter, human rights undermine the boundaries of nation-state providing a hegemonic language for formulating claims to rights above and beyond national belonging (Soysal, 1994). Furthermore, members of EDROM participated in many human rights activities and trainings like "Promoting of Romani Rights Project" which was implemented by EDROM, European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), and Helsinki Citizen's Assembly in Turkey between 2005-2008.

On the other hand, EDROM's activities are limited within Turkey's republican citizenship practices. They defend their Roma identity as not

challenging in a way to Turkish citizenship. In other words, Roma identity persists under the private sphere. I also visited other Roma NGOs in Bulgaria and Serbia, both of which display the transnational Romani flag. This flag is approved by international Romani representatives at the First Romani Congress held in London in 1971. However, lack of flag in EDROM is just symbolic indicator of Roma identity's invisibility in the public sphere.

In general, EDROM advocates the healing of social rights of Roma community. EDROM gives importance to education among other social rights. In this regard, EDROM supports 17 Roma university students who are successful and poor by giving scholarship of which donor is Global Dialogue Institute. These students are not the only the ones getting education in Edirne but also in Thrace Area. For Erdiñ Çekiç who is leader of EDROM, education is the best way to solve Roma community's problems creating uniform patterns for their community.

Hereby, we can assume that EDROM's efforts can be seen in new modes of belonging as glocal spaces that accommodate 'regional multilateralism' (Hettne, 2000) that facilitating a regional civil society transcends the nation-states. In the glocal level, EDROM also represents Turkey in Europe. Erdiñ Çekiç participated in European Commission of Roma Summit in 2008. Çekiç differentiates Roma community's citizenship problems in national and European level. For him, Gypsies face anti-Gypsism in Europe but in Turkey social exclusion appears as the main problem. As argued in the theoretical consideration, EDROM's activities are seen in the democratic citizenship. The search of equality operates around sub-national, national and transnational level.

When we evaluate the situations of Roma and Dom NGOs, it seems necessary to consider their relations with power. I assert that EDROM stands near both state and EU. On the other hand, Dom community is far away from power relations and they stand in the periphery.

In short, Roma community's political rights are limited owing to exclusion of their identities. Roma community criticizes itself for not showing solidarity

about Roma muhktar in their neighborhoods. A few Roma muhktars can be seen in Roma neighborhoods. On the other hand, their efforts are suppressed and they are reduced to subaltern community. However, EDROM is an important step for Roma community to represent Roma identity and heal their rights. Nevertheless, Dom community does not take place in any political decision making mechanisms. We can say that Roma community's political rights are limited but Dom community is totally excluded from politics. Hence, social exclusion can be seen politically for Dom community. Following Turner (1990), their citizenship practices are passive and private.

6.6 Cultural Rights

In this section, cultural citizenship rights of Roma and Dom communities will be examined on the ground that how they practice their religious, linguistic, and ethnic practices. In generally, Dom community seems more integrated to Kurdish society in terms of ethnic, religious and linguistic practices. On the other hand, Roma community's ethnic practices are unique to themselves, which they keep since Ottoman Empire.

With regard to their religious practices, Roma and Dom communities belong to both Muslim and Hanefi sect. Religious practices are the same but religion has more powerful affect on Dom community. Unlike Roma interviewees in Edirne, Dom interviewees ask for advice to their sheiks in Kurdish majority. Sheiks also have roles in conflict resolution in a way that if problems with majority arises, sheiks would intervene to Dom community and Kurdish majority. Religion has more impact on Dom community than Roma community. Moreover, Dom community has close bonds with sects. Nevertheless, Dom community is socially excluded by religious imams. The imams who are religious officials of the state are active in community orientation. They also remove fetva¹¹⁴ by their own initiative. There are some discriminatory statements in fetvas. For example, "Dom cannot go to heaven", "Don't give *zekat* to them". In addition, Dom

¹¹⁴ Fetva is imam's advisory opinion.

community is also excluded by majority in terms of religious aspects. Lawyer Muhammed Akar gives an example:

“I realized that women also have serious problems. For example, some of them are fortune tellers but it is claimed that they are irreligious, worship to the stars. For example, one woman gave me information about this issue. She said she was hungry and wanted bread from one house. The girl’s –who opened the door- mother replied as “No, she does not believe in god, they are sinner and they worship to the moon, the stars and the sun. Therefore, do not give”. As the girl show mercy, -excuse me- she put the food like anyone throw to the dog plate and I was very upset from that. I left that place and also did not want to eat. In many places, they consider these people irreligious, cooperating with evil, worshipping to the star, the sun and as if the evilness stem from them.”¹¹⁵

The statement above shows exclusion practices towards Dom community. During the research, I noticed the interviewees’ emphasis on religion. When I asked to the interviewees whether they send their children to the school, they replied me as positively but in other sense. They send their children to recite the Quaran. I never met such practice in Roma community. Furthermore, unofficial marriage is widespread among Dom community. On the other hand, they are excluded by religious aspects even though they emphasis their religion as Muslim.

The common pattern between Roma and Dom community is that interviewees emphasize that they are Muslims but they are discriminated. The emphasis can be explained by Turkey’s citizenship practices in which being Muslim and Turk are main components of Turkish citizenship. Although they are Muslim, they interrogate why they are discriminated.

The differences can be observed in their linguistic and ethnic practices. For their linguistic practices, Roma interviewees speak Romani language but Dom interviewees speak Domari language. Hence, the language varies also according to the communities.

¹¹⁵ “Kadınların da ciddi sorunları olduğunu ben fark ettim. Mesela bir kısmı fala falan bakar ama; bunların dinsiz olduğu, yıldızlara tapıkları şeklinde kınandıkları söylenmektedir. Mesela bir kadın bu konuda bana bilgi vermişti. “Yani çok acıkmıştım ben, ekmek istedim bu evden. Evin kızı annesine ben yemek veriyim mi? yani bu yaşlı kadın yemek istiyor. Kızın annesi de hayır, o Allaha inanmıyor, onlar günahkardır ve onlar yıldıza ve aya, güneşe tapıyorlar. O yüzden verme. Fakat kız merhamet edince böyle, çok affedersiniz köpek çanağına konur gibi bir şeye koyup önüme koydular ve ben üzülüm dedi yani. Terk ettim orayı, yemeyi de istemedim”. Bir çok yerde bu insanların böyle dinsiz, şeytanlar işbirliği yapan, yıldıza güneşe tapan, kötülük onlardan doğan insanlar gibi anılıyorlar”.

Meanwhile, as Matras suggests, “all three ethnonyms- Dom, Rom, Lom- are derived from the Indic *dom*, a caste name, although their origin in a low-caste of marginalised and stigmatised service- providers of various kinds has more recently been constested” (Hancock 1998, cited in Matras, 1999:2). In addition, according to Matras’s argument, both Romani and Domari languages is part of the historical legacy of Indo-Aryan and Domari spread throughout Central Asia, the Near East and Europe by the descendants of itinerant castes of artisans and entertainers. Modern studies in Romani linguistics indicate at least the possibility of a close link between Domari and Romani but exact historical connection remains unclear. However, through the historical transformation, “Romani is typically considered a Balkanism, while in Domari it can be explained as an outcome of Persian, Kurdish or Arabic influence” (Matras, 1999: 50).

The usage of language also differentiates in Roma and Dom communities. Although especially elder interviewees know Romani language in Roma community, all of the interviewees including children speak Domari language in Dom community. When I asked Roma elders the reasons why they did not teach Romani language to their children, the answer was the same: “avoiding from exclusion”. However, I did not encounter a kind of taboo among Dom community. Knowing Romani language also leads to symbolic boundaries among Roma community. When I go to the neighborhoods, some people rejected me on the ground that “we are not Gypsy” ”we do not know Romani language”. Hence, I also encountered a kind of distinction that the ones who know Romani language are Gypsy; we are Roman who do not know the language. The reason behind is that they would like to be integrated or assimilated within major society. Since exclusion towards Roma community is so strong, they deny their ethnic background. On the other hand, when I asked to Dom interviewees whether they know Domari language they were surprised. They said to me “How do you know?” They do not need to hide their language. Yet Domari language also varies. When I visited semi-nomadic Dom group coming from Siverek, my elder Dom interviewee, who brought me there, said that he did not understand Siverek Doms’ language. Domari language also varies in itself. Unlike Roma community,

all of the Dom interviewees speak Kurdish language in their everyday lives. However, Dom women especially elder ones do not know Turkish. Kurdish language is not known among Roma community since majority speaks Turkish.

The common element between Roma and Dom community is that they also use their language (Romani or Domari) when they speak about secret things in order to not to be understood. Language becomes a kind of “tactic” in both communities. And again common issue is that Romani and Domari language tend to be forgotten. It is just oral language and transmitted through family channels.

With regard to ethnic practices, although Roma community celebrates Hidrellez on May 6, Dom interviewees do not know Hidrellez. On the other hand, they celebrate Newroz on March 21 with Kurdish majority. This difference shows that there is a kind of cultural integration to Kurdish majority. Roma community has also traditional symbolic leader called *çeribaşı* continues to be selected during Hidrellez. Hidrellez celebration and *çeribaşı* elections were arranged thenceforth Ottoman Empire.

Hidrellez celebrations start at night on May 5. This day is called as *Kakava*. However, for Roma community, the important day is Hidrellez. In Edirne, Hidrellez is known as Gypsy festival and *Gaco* people (Turks) also come to celebrate. Edirne Municipality arranges Hidrellez fest on May 5 and Edirne Governorship arranges Hidrellez on May 6. Hidrellez festival is arranged in an international platform. Hidrellez festival has become an official festival for six years. We can assume that liberal citizenship can be seen in some degree in Edirne respecting to Roma cultural rights.

During my research, I also participated to the *Kakava* festival, which is celebrated in *Sarayıçi*. I went to the festival place with my one of the female interviewees who also introduced me her community. Governor and Mayor came to the festival place. The festival began with the bonfire. My interviewee's neighbour asked to her “What is this fire?” She said “It is Thrace bonfire”. She asked again “Then, what is the fire in our neighborhood?” In response, my interviewee replied, “It is Gypsy fire”. In fact, this distinction signifies how Roma

fest is perceived by Roma community. Roma community members celebrate their festival in their neighborhoods. We watched municipality festival by drinking tea. Roma girls were dancing; there was Roma folk-dance team, etc.

Moreover, *Gaco* people (non-Gypsies) also came to the festival place. They seem to be enjoying. One of *Gaco* woman wanted to give money to dancing girls. When money was grapped up a *Gaco* woman said “they are thieves”. Hence, stereotypes also work against Roma community. Having watched the instutional celebration fest, we came back to *Gazimihal* district of *Çavuşbey* neighbourhood. She prepared food at the house. As night fell, bonfires began and people started to dance around them. We jumped over the fire three times so for not to be ill and for the wishes. Next-door neighbour’s girl wore a wedding dress because she would like to get married for next year. A little girl also attached a moustache. The other belief is that how you enter Hidrellez, the year passes such that way. When I sit with my houseowner and other neighbours, a man asked them “Will you go to the river tomorrow? Baba Fingo (Father Fingo) would come and look like this”. Women said “we do not believe him, he is superstition”. Although women do not accept him, there is a myth about Baba Fingo.

According to the myth, Roma people had a commander called Baba Fingo. He was very powerful and unbeatable. Roma people were safe owing to their commander. *Gaco* people (non-Gypsies) searched for a solution to defeat him. He had weakness for drinking and women. They sent a beautiful woman to make him drunk. Baba Fingo could not reject her and got drunk. Woman pushed Baba Fingo to the river and he was drowned. It is believed that Baba Fingo will reappear from the river and save Roma people again. According to the myth, Gypsies started to search for Baba Fingo and divided into three branches. In this way, their migration started from India. The myth has relevance with Gypsy community’s history of migration. In addition, Baba Fingo represents a messiah person for Roma community. When he recomes to the river, tyranny¹¹⁶ will be solved.

¹¹⁶ Roma groups living in Balkans (Serbia, Romania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Kosova, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) also celebrate Hidrellez on 6th May. In Balkans, Hidrellez are called as *Ederlezi*. It is also known as Saint George day. Accordingly, “Roma consider Saint

The common element between Baba Fingo and Newroz is that both of them are “revolt against tyranny”. Aydın’s (2005) study indicates two perspectives of Newroz myth: “On the one hand, Newroz is taken as a myth which has been used in the construction of national identity. On the other hand, Newroz is considered as a tool for counter-hegemony against the hegemonic culture to cultural unity” (Aydın, 2005:15). Moreover, for Aydın, although Newroz is a battlefield for ideological struggle, we cannot attribute Hidrellez the same meaning for Roma community. Baba Fingo legend character is not known by young generation. In addition, even elder Roma interviewees were not willing to betray their legendary character. It sounds like a secret knowledge so it leads to a common consciousness.

Roma interviewees especially elders mentioned that Hidrellez is the beginning of spring. Hidrellez was important especially during their nomadic years. Nomadic tribes would gather and it would be a way of selecting wife and husband. Unlike hegemonic battlefield, it is a way of continuation of ethnic identity. There are some rituals which should be done like entering the river at morning of May 6, breaking a branch of fruit tree, taking ant-soil, having picnic, etc.. In the day of Hidrellez no work is done in order to be healthy, fertile and work better throughout the year. *Çeribaşı* elections are done at May 5. *Çeribaşı* also call the inhabitants of Edirne and especially non-Roma people with an invitation. This tradition keeps going since Ottoman Empire (see Appendix for the *Çeribaşı*’s invitation in Romani language and new ones).

Hidrellez can be seen as an “invented tradition”. As Hobsbawn defines it, “is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past” (Hobsbawn, 1993[1983]:1). Following Hobsbawn,

George their patron saint and believe in the past he protected them from being hurt by evil tyrants. Today the Roma still face a lot of discrimination ...so on the evening of May 5th entire Roma communities of the Balkans rise up to celebrate the spirit of Saint George” Like Roma community’s belief, Roma in Balkans May 6th has come to signify a rebirth of nature.

(http://www.stgeorgesdayproject.org.uk/index.php?category_id=102) last access as 06.05.2010.

Hidrellez as an invented tradition establishes social cohesion among Roma community. It also functions as a sense of identification with a ‘community’. However, Dom community celebrates Newroz in forming their Kurdish identity. From Dom community, as Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician, Dom) says,

“We have our Newroz. We celebrate Newroz. We celebrate Newroz as a festival, get involve in Newroz. How shall I tell you indeed? For instance, as I have told you, we are also Kurdish Roma. Our mother-tongue is Kurdish. We can not throw off ourselves to any other places. But they are different, they (Roma community) perform, celebrate Roma festival.”¹¹⁷

Apart from Newroz, Dom males contributed to the *dengbej* tradition, which is important in cultural transmission of Kurdish society (see Chapter V). The Dom males were musicians and some of them are storytellers travelling from village to the village. Moreover, the other cultural interaction between Kurdish society and Dom community is the example of wet-nurse in the past. Some Kurdish men who have a status in the society mention that they had Dom wet-nurse. For Kurdish males, the reason of selecting wet-nurses among Dom community is that Dom community was nomadic and having strong stances against the difficult living conditions.

However, the cultural affinity between Kurdish and Dom community has been disassociated after forced migration and settlement process. They started to be excluded culturally by their Kurdish accent, women dressing and accused of lack of religious belief, which are indicators of social exclusion.

On the other hand, Roma community keeps their ethnic traditions and customs since Ottoman Empire. Both communities also have their ethnic languages: Romani language and Domari language. Although Dom community speaks Domari language widely in Diyarbakır, Romani language is being forgotten and not taught in case of being excluded in Edirne. Moreover, both communities emphasized that they are Muslims but they are discriminated. The way in which Dom community is excluded by religious authorities are obvious. In either situation, we again come up with social exclusion. With regard to cultural

¹¹⁷ “Newrozumuz var. Newrozu kutluyoruz. Biz Newroz, bayram olarak, Newrozu kutluyoruz biz. Newroza katılıyor. Çünkü Newroz, biz diymiş ki mesela, nasıl anlatayım yani. Mesela dedim ya biz de Kürt Romeniyiz. Bizim de anadilimiz Kürt. Biz kendimizi atamayız başka bir yere. Ama onlar ayrı, onlar (Roma community) Romen şenliği şey yapıyorlar, kutluyorlar”.

rights, both communities have no demand about their ethnic languages or ethnic identities in the public place. The effects of republican citizenship and universalistic notion of citizenship affect both communities, which drives difference and identity into the private sphere. For example, Romani language has been forgotten owing to the fear of exclusion. Both communities just demand the healing of social rights and right to justice referring not to be discriminated and not being treated as a second-class citizen owing to their identities. In other words, they demand equality principle of citizenship.

6.7 Identification and Belonging into the Political Community and Majority Societies

This section is prepared to consider Roma and Dom communities' identity and belonging to the major societies and their proximity or distance to the political community. As it was argued in the theoretical consideration, citizenship is not just a certain status defined by a set of rights and responsibilities, but also an expression of one's membership in a political community (Delanty, 2000:10; Turner 2001b:11). In this respect, the section will present how different ethnic Gypsy communities feel affiliation to the majority (Turks and Kurds) and larger political community, which is Turkish citizenship membership. Feeling affiliation to Turks or Kurd not only shows their integration level to the major society but also helps us understand their ethnic affiliations to each other. Hence, I will continuously compare Roma community's affiliation to Turks; Dom community's affiliation to Kurds; Roma and Dom communities' identification within and towards each of other. Despite the fact that Roma community lives with Turkish majority, it is significant to consider Roma perception of Kurdish society. I will argue their political belonging to the national level that this comparison will consider citizenship approaches (radical democrat, liberal, republican or communitarian) which are related to their citizenship practices.

As Hall suggest, "identities are never completed, never finished; that they are always subjectivity itself is, in process" (Hall, 1993:47). Hence, for him, identity is the process of identification. Similarly, Isin (2002) suggests that "group

identifications or affiliations and disassociations are multiple, fluid and overlapping” (Isin, 2002: 28). Hence, Roma and Dom identities are not fixed and durable but they are constructed in identification process. In order to evaluate the relational Roma and Dom group formation, Isin’s (2002) formulation of “alterity” which is the core of investigating citizenship and being political directed to this comparison. As he claims,

“[s]olidaristic, agonistic, and alienating strategies and technologies constitute ways of being political insofar as they enable agents to take up positions via each other and articulate forms of sociation and identification. These relationships are not simply inclusory or exclusory but dialogical. Ways of becoming political, such as being citizens, strangers, outsiders, and aliens, do not exist in themselves, but only in relation to each other”(Isin, 2002: 29).

In this regard, Roma and Dom communities position themselves relationally and dialogically according to the majorities they live namely Turks and Kurds. Roma and Dom communities’ membership in a political community begins with self-ascription of identities. The common point for Roma and Dom communities is that Roma community attribute non-Roma as *Gaco* and Dom community calls non-Dom tribe as *Perev*. Hence, being Turk or Kurd does not matter in this attribution. In a different manner from Dom community, Roma interviewees criticized their past religious identity called *Kıpti*. For *ex-çeribaşı* Mehmet Ali Körüklü in Edirne, identity differentiation among Gypsies started with *Kıpti* identity in Ottoman Empire and went through different local terms such as *Abdal*, *Cano*. For him, there is only one identity as Gypsy. In my master research (Ceyhan, 2003), I also encountered with critiques about *Kıpti* identity. For them, different identity attribution and mentioning it on identity cards are discriminative. Interviewees mentioned that *Kıpti* word was removed during A. Menderes government, which equalized them with other citizens. Hence, *Kıpti* attribution on their identity card is considered by interviewees as unequal treatment towards Roma community. However, I did not hear any critique about the word of *Kıpti* from Dom interviewees because they had no identity cards.

Roma interviewees, especially elder ones identify themselves as “Roma” or “Gypsy”. Younger generation tends to identify themselves as “Turk”. On the other hand, Dom interviewees’ identity attribution is very different from Roma

community. They identify themselves as “Kurdish Gypsies”. They sustain a twofold identity. On the one hand, they feel Kurd in terms of linguistics practices, customs, marriage pattern, etc. On the other hand, they belong to Dom community attributing a sense of group consciousness. However, Roma community directly attribute themselves as Roma or Gypsy. They never mentioned themselves as “Turkish Gypsies”¹¹⁸. Thereby, we can state that owing to the powerful exclusion mechanism and stereotypes, young Roma community members avoid their ethnic identity. The other example is about Roma immigrants in Germany. When I asked them how they introduce themselves to Germans citizens; they replied me as “Turk”. Moreover, some Roma interviewees define themselves at first “Turkish Republic” citizens and then become prominent with their Roma identity. Hence, they define themselves with citizenship status, which cannot be seen in Dom community.

As Simmel indicates, “multiple group affiliations therefore become tactical resources” (Simmel, 1922 cited in Isin, 2002:24). For example, regarding Dom community, they introduce just Kurdish identity when they go for seasonal agricultural labor in western part of Turkey; otherwise, they are not hired due to their ethnic identity. Likewise Roma community immigrated to Germany introduce just Turkish identity with the same reason arises from the fear of exclusion. Nevertheless, the basic distinction within the communities occurs in a dualistic way: Dom/Perev and Roma/Gaco. The other identities can be seen as tactical resources to affiliate the political community. Members of Dom community can be differentiated from Roma members sustaining twofold identities: Kurd and Dom. After their settlement process in Diyarbakır, Kurdish majority has neglected their Kurdish identity; in response, “Gypsy” identity has become prominent. Although Dom community define themselves as Kurdish Gypsies among Kurdish majority, they are socially and politically excluded from labor market, from public and private spheres. They are also isolated. In addition,

¹¹⁸ Unlike Roma community in Edirne, Gypsies identify themselves as Turkish Gypsies called *Horahane* in Stara Zagoro city of Bulgaria. Most of them, especially elders know Turkish. Some of the elder population also came from Edirne. Now, Horahane and Turks live outskirts of the city together at present.

symbolic dimension of social exclusion appears. Although their Kurdish neighbors also have the same economic conditions, they are stigmatized with their “Gypsy identity”. Kurdish majority does not even know the self attribution of “Dom” community. Kurdish majority call Dom community as *Mitrip*, *Karaçi*¹¹⁹ or *Âşık*. In fact, it also shows another distance between majority and Dom community.

The other issue is that Dom community members are also discriminated and excluded owing to Kurdish identity in Western side of Turkey. They generally go West for mainly seasonal agricultural labor, labor at construction and military. In this regard, their Dom and Kurdish identity is excluded. When Dom interviewees go for seasonal agricultural labor, they hide their “Dom” identity not to lose their job. When employers learn their Dom identity, they are fired. Moreover, they are excluded for their Kurdish identity in Western side of Turkey. One interviewee’s acquaintance went to West of Turkey to work at construction. When he was working, he was singing Kurdish songs. His friends from construction told him not to sing Kurdish songs. My interviewee criticized this threat since he considers Kurdish language as his mother tongue.

Moreover, Dom community is not only excluded by Turks but also by Roma community in the Western Turkey. One of my Dom interviewee mentioned that he lived in Roma neighborhood in İzmir for a short time. Roma neighbors considered him as Kurd not as a Gypsy man. He could not make them believe he is Gypsy.

In Edirne, I also asked to the interviewees whether they have any idea about Dom community. Apart from EDROM members, nobody knew about Dom community. When I explained to the interviewees that Dom community lives with Kurdish majority in South East and East of Turkey, they were surprised. One interviewee said “Is it possible being Kurdish Gypsies?” In addition, some interviewees differentiated “Kurdish Gypsies” from themselves and produced

¹¹⁹ In the previous chapter, I explained how *Karaçi* identity varies in group and out group relation. On the one hand, Dom community attributes *Karaçi* identity in terms of occupation that they are sieve-makers. On the other hand, Kurds refer to *Karaçi* as outsider and not settled Dom community because of some stereotypes like stealing or prostitution.

stereotypes. For example, from Roma community, Meltem (47, F, Metal Worker, Roma) stated that

“Now we see from TV. There is purse snatching, whatever else. They say whoever made a snatch and run theft, who commits a crime in İstanbul attributed as Roma. Let’s look if these persons are Roma? Make him stand faced to face, how is that person Roma? Where did this Roma come from? Maybe he/she is a Kurdish Gypsy; his/her origin is Kurd.”¹²⁰

EDROM visited Diyarbakır for ERRC project called “Promoting Romani Rights in Turkey”. They compared their situation with Dom community in terms of citizenship rights. They evaluated Dom community as “other of other”. In this sense, although Kurds are other of Turks, Dom community is other of Kurds owing to exclusion practices towards Dom community.

The perception of Dom interviewees about Roma community is also important. In addition, my interviewee who lived in İzmir made a distinction that their Domari language is different from Romani language spoken by Roma community in İzmir. Furthermore, for him, some habitual aspects such as belly-dance and drinking of Roma community do not fit habit of his Dom community. In addition, he emphasized he is also Kurd and his community does not tolerate these things. He adds that their Dom women’s clothings are different because, for him, Dom women should not dress that revealing. Other Dom interviewees get information about Roma community from television. They mentioned that “We are not like them. They dance too much”.

In short, Dom community can be differentiated from Roma community that they attribute themselves as twofold identity: Kurd and Dom. Although their Dom identity is excluded by majority in Diyarbakır, their Kurdish identity is excluded by Turks and even Roma living in Western side of Turkey. This multiple

¹²⁰ “Televizyonda şimdi görüyoruz biz. Kapkaççılık var, bilmem ne. Ya diyelim ki İstanbul’un bir şeyinde kapkaççılık yapmış, hırsızlık yapmış, bilmem ne yapmış. Romanlar diyolar. Romanlar. Bakalım o insan Roman mı? Onu al bakalım bi karşısına, nasıl Romanmış bu? Nerden gelmiş bu Roman? Belki Kürt Çingenesidir, onu kökeni Kürttür”.

group affiliations are not tactical resources for Dom community any more. Now, they have outsider or even alien position¹²¹ between Turks and Kurds.

Unlike Dom interviewees, Roma community attribute themselves as Roma (*Roman*) or Gypsy (*Çingene*); only younger generation tends to identify themselves as Turk. The sharp difference from Dom community is that most of the Roma interviewees find Kurdish identity farthest from them. They consider Kurds as “separatist”. Nevertheless, I heard from different institutions and authorities (school, municipality, bar president) that the intermarriage between Roma and Kurdish persons has increased in last 10 years. I also encountered some couples where Roma women got married to Kurdish men but findings of the research are insufficient to reveal it as a pattern. However, this situation does not conflict with their evaluation since Roma households do not approve these marriages. I will also evaluate this pattern in the marriage section in a more detailed way. For Roma interviewees, government makes an investment in East like South East Project (*GAP*) even though Kurds are not loyal to the state. For them, Kurds benefit from citizenship rights more than Roma community even though Roma are loyal to the state. Unlike Kurds, Roma community is discriminated based on their ethnicity.

One Roma male says,

“Particularly I want to mention this. We fulfill our military service for our country with pleasure. There is no any terrorist among us. Kurds have terrorists. Kurds are terrorists. We do not pull a gun on our soldier, we do respect for our flag, country... But when it comes to work, there is no job.”¹²²

¹²¹ (Isin, 2002:30) applies three overlapping and distinct categories -stranger, outsider, and alien- to investigate the citizenship as alterity. He argues that stranger is the potential wanderer, who although an insider, interacts as though he is an outsider... Being estranged from a group is a condition of both being a member of the group and being distant from it”(Isin, 2002:31). Both Roma nad Dom community can be seen in stranger category when they were nomadic. Outsiders neither belongs to the group nor interacts with it but they belong to and necessary for the city in which citizens and strangers associated. On the contrary, the logic of exclusion constitutes aliens with othering strategies. Isin gives such examples: orientals are aliens for modern Europea and Islam has become alien of Eurocentricism.

¹²² “Özellikle şu konuyu demek istiyorum. Vatanımızı seve seve askerliğimizi yapıyoruz. Bizde terörist yok. Kürtlerde terörist var. Kürtler terörist. Biz askerimize silah çekmiyoruz, bayrağımıza saygı duyuyoruz, vatan...İşe gelince, iş güc yok”.

The distance of Roma community towards Kurds can be seen not only in Edirne but also in İzmir (Eren, 2008:139-140) and Thrace region where Roma population lives in high intensity. The conflict between Kurds and Roma is visible in *Tarlabası* neighborhood in İstanbul. Mutlu (2009) indicates that when Roma community fights with Kurds, Roma attribute their identity as Turks. The distance between Roma community and Kurds are related to Roma community's self-evaluation of their citizenship practices.

In this respect, I will assert that Roma community's citizenship practices can be explained with different citizenship approaches. First, cultural rights of Roma community stand near radical democratic citizenship or liberal citizenship. Roma community keeps their cultural and ethnic practices since Ottoman era. Roma community also can be differentiated from non-Roma in terms of their customs, marriage patterns, Romani language, etc. In addition, as argued in the cultural rights section, *Hıdrellez* is not celebrated by Roma community themselves but the fest is arranged by municipality and governorship in an international platform. Hence, liberal citizenship can be seen in some degree in Edirne as respect to Roma cultural rights and recognition their cultural identity. In addition, Mouffe's (1992) radical democratic citizenship conception which envisages a form of commonality that respects diversity and makes room for different forms of individuality is present in Edirne. Through this conception of citizenship, as Mouffe (1993) suggests, "a sense of we is created by a recognition that the demands of these various movements can form a chain of democratic equivalence". Thus, on the one hand, Roma community demands recognition for their cultural rights. On the other hand, they feel strong attachment to the political community.

Second, Roma community's demands of social rights are close to the communitarian approach of citizenship. In this regard, Roma individuals' demands of healing of their social rights are not related to only individual ends but also related to communal ends. They do not evaluate themselves as atomized individuals. Hence, their healing of social rights would be good for common good since for Roma community, rights and duties should be reciprocal, which

nessitates a member of a political community. Moreover, they demand equality like any member of political community. For them, being Roma could not be a challenge to benefit from equally citizenship rights.

Third, Roma community's evaluation of duty based citizenship practices is close to the republican citizenship but it is also related to loosing their citizenship rights and social exclusion. As long as their citizenship rights are dismantled, they try to compensate it with republican citizenship. For Roma community, we see the commodification of citizenship, which is a process driven by the withdrawal of the state accompanied by civil, political and social citizenship rights. As Somers's (2006) statelessness nationals, Roma community move from the exclusions of citizenship to the inclusions of nationalism. By this way, they try to approach "power" by compensating their dismantled rights. They have no rationally intention, but it develops in an unintentional way.

In this regard, all of the interviewees emphasized duties and they also mentioned how they are loyal to the state and their flag. The main indicator is that all the men interviewees gave the example of military. They said that they would even die willingly for their country.

Kemal (35, M, Grocer, Roma) says,

"When we go for military service we lay on entertainment, we draw henna to our hands, we sacrifice an animal for god, and we give mawlid. That is to say, we go for military service as if we are going to be sacrificed. Let them not be nationalist as much as we but let you not behave us as a second-class."¹²³

In other words, Roma male interviewees' perception of citizenship is based on duty and responsibilities and they highlight "military service". During the Ottoman Empire, Roma community was exempted from military service. They were recruited to fill auxiliary military duties such as; army labor gangs, ship construction, roadwork, transport services and the like (Lindner, 1983: 62) and served in military bands (Ginio, 2004:135). However, the state did not grant the Gypsies the status of military (Çelik: 2003: 67, Ginio, 2004:135). Hence, the

¹²³ "Biz askere giderken eğlencemizi yaparız, kınamızı ellerimize vururuz, kurban keseriz, mevlüt okuttururuz. Yani kurban olacağımız gibi gideriz yani askere. Bizim gibi milliyetçi olmasınlar, ama bize ikinci muamele yapmasınlar bize".

emphasis on military duty is also related Roma community's exemption from military service in history. Moreover, Roma male interviewees criticized this exemption in the history. Therefore, doing military service is a kind of indicator of equal citizenship for them.

Republican citizenship is seen more higher than Dom community owing to the fact that ethical dimension of republican citizenship, in which civic virtue is widespread among Roma community. As Dagger (2002:150) argues, "the republican conception seems to demand unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizen" (Dagger, 2002:150). Roma interviewees emphasize their loyalty and military service. As it was argued in the theoretical consideration, civic republican citizenship is underpinned by an attituded of mind. Hence, republican citizenship appears among Roma community as a way of defining themselves. However, their connection to nationalism does not overlap with nationalist argument but eclectic and fragmented subaltern conciousness. In this regard, Müzeyyen (47, F, Retired Worker from Germany, Roma) states,

"I feel more intimate with Turks. Before all else you will ask why? My son also carries Kurdish blood, my daughter in law is also from Diyarbakır. No matter what happens I convey myself Turk ... (indistinct record) because my native shore, my native country is my identity, my being in at here. For my part, I am Turk more than any Turk. I am nationalist even more than any nationalist. For me, the one who is harmless, who is useful is the most nationalist person."¹²⁴

Although Dom community's citizenship practices stands near communitarian approach of citizenship, they do not define their identity like Roma community. Dom community interrogates the duty based republican citizenship because they do not benefit from social rights. Both Roma and Dom communities critisized their access to welfare social rights in a limited way. They discussed although they completed duty-based citizenship practices (military service is emphasized by both communities), they do not benefit from social citizenship rights. Both Roma and Dom community believes that duties and rights should be reciprocal. In fact, their demands overlap with Tocqueville's political

¹²⁴ "Ben kendimi Türklere daha yakın hissediyorum. Her şeyden önce neden diyeceksin? Benim çocuğum da Kürt kanı taşıyor, gelinim de Diyarbakırlı. Ne olursa olsun ama ben kendimi Türk...(kayıt anlaşılmıyor) çünkü benim vatanım, anavatanım benim kimliğim, benim varoluşum burda. Benim için Türkten çok, Türküm ben. Çok milliyetçiden, milliyetçiyim ben. Çünkü zararsız, faydası olan şey demek ki en milliyetçi kişi demekki benim"

community where the reciprocity of rights and obligations as the hallmark of the community (Bendix, 1964). In both communities, ethnicity is seen as a barrier in order to benefit from equal citizenship rights.

As Nuri (32, M, Temporary Musician, Dom) expresses,

“Some of them expel us, saying fuck off and go work, we got hell something indeed. All in all, we are also human, we also have rights. In Republic of Turkey, we went and completed our military service. If that is so, do not let us; do not call us for military service. We do not have any kind of social right; we have nothing, have not all of us done our military service for this state?”¹²⁵

In fact, the reasoning behind Roma and Dom communities' claim is related to skepticism about universal citizenship's promise of equality. Two main reasons are effective for inequalities in public sphere: first reason is limited access to benefit from social rights and the second reason is exclusion of both Dom and Roma identities with stereotypes and different treatment towards them in the public sphere. Stereotypes have been affecting Roma community rather than Dom community. The common pattern of the feeling “second class citizen” shows unequal treatment towards them.

With regard to unequal treatment towards Roma community, İlyas (32, M, Housepainter, Roma) expressed a striking example:

“Besides, the truth of the matter is that we are not protected. Really, no one claims on us. During the time of Turgut Özal, new facility had opened in Binevler. Building complexes, what do they call it? There are immigrant houses, you know that. Also there was a war or an earthquake; I would not say falsehood. Those immigrants came to Turkey. When they got visa procedures completed, houses have been built up before they arrive. Look, they have made houses for them. We are Turk. Your blood is red, mine is too. You live under this flag, so do I. Did not I complete military service? Yes, I did. Why does not a house given to me? Why they give house to those? He is a stranger infidel. God watches over us, he is a stranger infidel. Did I serve for the Turkish nation? I did. Then, did I spend my 18 months for this country? I spent. Even if they demand now, today, look I am Roma, second-class citizen, I would again go for military for the country. If my people will feel in comfort, I

¹²⁵ “Kimi bizi kovuyorlar, hadi siktir olun gidin çalışın diyorlar, bize çok fırçaları yiyoruz yani. Sonuçta biz de insanız yani, bizim de hakkımız var. Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde gittik yani, vatani görevimizi bitirdik yani, madem ki öyle bize askerlikte yapmasınlar, bizi askere çağırmasınlar. Bi sosyal hakkımız yok, bi şeyimiz yok, hepimiz askerlik yapmamışsınız bu devlete?”

would give my neck; I would give my head indeed. O god. If I am Turk, you are Turk also.”¹²⁶

Although the state built houses for the immigrants coming from Grece and Bulgaria, it did not build houses for Roma community even though they were not able to afford it. In this regard, interviewee is offended about the state’s immigrant politics. According to the interviewee, the immigrants are foreigner but Roma community is loyal to the state and they sacrifice themselves for their state. However, they are discriminated.

In short, Dom community adopting both Kurdish and Dom identity seems naturalized into the Kurdish society. Yet, they feel second-class citizens like Roma community. Roma community’s prior identity is their ethnic identity but it depends on the generations in which younger generations identify themselves as Turk. Roma community has no initial contact with Dom community but they exclude “Kurdish Gypsies” from themselves. With regard to communitarian approach, they see their Roma community as part of an organic community as “Turkish Republican citizens” and demand healing of their social rights. The common pattern is that although both Roma and Dom communities perform duties, they cannot benefit from social citizenship rights equally. Besides, feeling as second-class citizen is common in both communities, which challenges the equality principlality of citizenship. Stereotypes seem more affective on Roma community than Dom community. I assert that it depends on the “size” of the community. Unlike Dom community, Roma community’s political belonging is related to the exclusion practices. As long as they are excluded by majority, they adopt nationalism in way of eclectic conciousness. Republican citizenship is widespread among Roma community rather than Dom community in terms of

¹²⁶ “Bi de biraz aslına bakarsan sahip çıkılmıyor. Gerçek sahip çıkılmıyor. Turgut Özal’ın zamanında Binevler’de yeni tesisler açıldıydı. Siteler, buna ne diyolar ona? Göçmen evleri var biliyosun. Hatta bir savaş olayı mı vardı orda, bi deprem olayı mı, valla yalan atmayayım. Göçmenler Türkiye’ye girdi. Vize çıkışı verildi onlara. Göçmenlere daha onlar gelmeden ev yapıldı. Bak, onlara ev yapıldı. Biz Türk. Senin de kanın kırmızı, benim de kanım kırmızı. Sen de Türk bayrağının altındasın, ben de. Ben askerlik yaptım mı? Yaptım. Neden bana ev verilmiyor? Neden o adama? Elin gavuru kardeşim ya şimdi. Allah var yukarda, elin gavuru. Ben buraya hizmet yapmış mıyım Türk milletine? Yaptım, E, on sekiz ayımı harcamış mıyım? Harcadım. Bugün gene isteseler, bak Romanım sözde bak ikinci sınıf insan, bugün gene isteseler ben gene askere giderim. Vatan için. Eğer benim milletim rahat edecekse ben boynumu veririm, kellemi veririm ya. Alah Allah. Ben Türksem, sen de Türksün ya!”

military service and high level of commitment to the political community. Like city-states in Athenia, Sparta and Rome, active military service is seen as essential duty by Roma interviewees. As I explained above, emphasizing military service is also related to the exclusion practices in the Ottoman Empire. For the Roma males, it is a way of becoming an equal citizen. Roma community tries to approach “power” by compensating their dismantled rights. However, we cannot see this pattern among Dom community because of the fact that Dom community adopted Kurdish identity as a kind of “upper identity”. Moreover, Roma community’s demand of cultural rights stands near radical democratic citizenship. They want recognition for their cultural identity without underestimating majority. As last words, the common demand for both communities is to get access to social citizenship rights and equality, not to be discriminated against owing to their ethnic identities. In other words, they demand full citizenship rights.

6.8 Marriage Patterns

This section will mainly discuss whether intermarriage occurs with majority to understand the social interaction and equality levels between different groups. As Kalmijn argues, “intermarriage or heterogamy not only reveals the existence of interaction across group boundaries, it also shows that members of different groups accept each other as social equals” (Kalmijn, 1998:396). On the other hand, Kalmijn regards endogamy or homogamy as Weberian social closure. In this evaluation, women’s experience is also significant for marriage pattern.

For Roma community, intermarriage is seen between Kurds and Roma but intermarriage pattern is very rare between Dom community and Kurdish majority. Roma community’s inter-marriage pattern with Turks is very rare. In fact, Roma interviewees and institutions mentioned that the inter-marriage between Roma and Kurds has increased for 10 years in Edirne because of migration from East to West. However, the inter-marriage between Dom and Kurdish majority is very rare. In addition, the main conflict appears if a Dom man kidnaps a Kurdish girl. Because of this, the conflict might turn into gunfight. The institutions also

confirmed that there are no inter-marriage between Dom community and Kurdish majority. Lawyer Muhammed Akar expressed a case from village of Elazığ in 1987. When a Dom man kidnapped a Kurdish girl, all Dom tribe was expelled from the village. In similar lines, Dom interviewees also explained a similar example. A Dom man kidnapped a Kurdish girl to İzmir. For the interviewees, they love each other and the situation should not turn into a conflict. Yet girl's family threatens them and they feel unsafe.

Moreover, there are some stereotyped proverbs like "*Kız Karaçi hatun olmaz*" (Karaçi girl cannot be a woman). I heard this proverb many times. In this proverb, Karaçi girl is Gypsy. Even if you married a Gypsy girl, she might leave her husband or she might humiliate her husband. In fact, this proverb reflects clear-cut social boundaries between Dom community and Kurdish majority. Moreover, ERRC project team asserts that some Dom women get married with Kurdish men only hiding their Dom identity. Having understood their Dom identity, these women were under threat: they are expelled or even may be killed (Marsh, 2008b: 83). However, I did not hear such events from the interviewees.

Unlike Dom community, there are examples of intermarriages between Roma community and Kurdish families in Edirne. However, the findings from the study are insufficient to reveal it as a fact. I also encountered inter-marriage between Turks and Roma community but it is very rare. In Edirne, although Turkish families resist intermarriage between Turks and Roma community, Roma families do not approve of the intermarriage between Kurds and Roma community. There were some cases at the court in the past. The marriages occur because of elopement of the girl from Roma community. Then, the willing and love are main features of getting married.

Unlike Roma community, Dom parents arrange marriage for their girls. The spouse is generally relatives. Nevertheless, marriage with relatives is forbidden among Roma community. In fact, their marriage patterns also reflect the majority's marriage patterns. Although marriage with relative is seen acceptable in Kurdish majority, it is forbidden by Roma community. Such marriage patterns are coming from the majority especially for Dom community. I

participated in Roma and Dom wedding ceremonies. Although Roma marriage ceremony has unique to community, Dom community's wedding ceremony is similar to Kurdish majority. They play with Kurdish songs and they dance in Kurdish style.

Early marriages are a common pattern between Roma and Dom community. Girls get married at 14 years or under it. It affects their children's being under the risk of lack of birth registration and access to education.

Patriarchy affects Dom women more than Roma women. This situation affects their citizenship rights. Dom girls should drop out of school when they pass on to 5th grade at primary school. When a Dom girl becomes 10 years old, she is assumed as grown up. Father is the decision-maker in a Dom family. All the Dom female interviewees mentioned they could not go to the school since their fathers did not let them to continue to schools. In Roma community, similar to Dom community, boys are more encouraged than girls in terms of getting education but we encounter some Roma girls attending to high school and university. Unlike Roma girls, Dom girls should get arranged marriages. From Dom community, Deniz (26, F, Unemployed, Dom) explains her childhood:

“We do not live our childhood. When we are ten years old, “come inside”, “do not play”. Once, I have badly gotten beaten up by my father for playing with kids. Honestly! He asked why I was playing? I am ten years old, maybe no more than ten. He said why you are playing? You are grown up. He asked whether I was playing in the home street. I seriously gotten beaten up by him. That day, he beat me up too much. My uncle saved me. I went to the roof, our roof and cried. I cried. My mother was looking for me, and asked where I had gone. He has seriously beat me up that I had gone to the roof and got into coma. We cannot live our childhood, they do not also send us to school. Besides, “do not play”, “stay in home”. Let one propose for marriage, they would take the bride price and send us.”¹²⁷

As the statement shows, dowry is a common pattern among Dom community. Dowry is also widespread among Roma community. In both

¹²⁷ “Biz kendi çocukluğumuzu görmüyoruz ki! 10 yaşına gelince, tamam, içeriye geçin, oynamayın. Bir kere ben bu oynamak için, hani çocuklarla oynamak için babamdan çok dayak yedim. Valla. Dedi ki niye oynuyorsun? Daha 10 yaşında, belki 10 olmamıştım daha. Dedi sen niye gidip oynuyorsun? Büyümüşsün. Dedi sokaklarda mı oynuyorsun? Ben ondan çok dayak yedim. O gün beni çok dövdü. Benim amcam beni kurtardı. Gittim ağladım damda, bizim kendi damımızda. Ağlamıştım. Anam beni aramış, demiş, hani bu nereye gitmiş? Ben de gitmişim damda komaya girmişim. O kadar ki beni dövmüş. Bizim kendi çocukluğumuz da göremiyoruz, okula da göndermiyorlar. Bi de oynamayın, içerde oturun. Bi kişi gelsin sizi istesinler, başlık parası alıp bizi gönderiyorlar.

communities, dowry is generally money, which is nearly 10.000 TL (nearly 5000 Euro). Unlike Dom community, Roma families bargain on dowry. Roma girl's family might request house appliances instead of money. Groom is also responsible for wedding expenditures. Furthermore, bride's family gives symbolic presents to the groom. Marriage cannot be canceled owing to the dowry. However, dowry is prerequisite for marriage in Dom community. Some male Dom interviewees criticized dowry saying the girl was sold by her family owing to the dowry.

Dowry is not the only challenge for Dom women. Unlike Roma community, they get married with unofficial *imam* (religious) wedding. Hence, these women lack civil rights. I encountered the Dom women who are left by their husbands. These women have no official marriages. The other pattern among Dom community is fellow wife (*kuma*) in a polygamous household, which is never seen among Roma community. These Dom women totally lack citizenship rights. When the fellow wife comes, they have no place to go. They have to live with the fellow wife and husband.

Apart from dowry, Dom women also face to "töre" (custom) in their community. My interviewee's sister had to get married because of custom. His sister said to me that she was unhappy because she did not love her husband. This marriage occurred because of conflict between two Dom families. Moreover, the marriage was arranged because a person was died. This marriage is seen as "blood money" to solve the conflict.

Most of the Dom women are breadwinners. Their husbands are unemployed or in jail. However, it does not affect their positions at their households. Economic dependence does not lead them to get rid of patriarchy. Roma women are also working but patriarchy is more observable in Dom households that Dom women face to violence in family household owing to the poverty and living conditions.

In brief, Dom women' civil, social, political rights are much more limited when it is compared to Roma women. Extended family is seen in both Roma and

Dom households where the bride lives with mother-in-law and father-in-law. Unlike Dom women, Roma women get married with their own will. Official marriages are widespread among Roma community but it is very rare among Dom community so that Dom women cannot benefit from civil rights. Although dowry is common in both communities, some Dom girls are forced to marry by their families just in order to get dowry. Custom and polygamy are not seen in Roma community. In addition, marriage with relatives is forbidden among Roma community in case disabled children are born. On the other hand, parallel cousin marriages are widespread among Dom community. Moreover, although intermarriage between Kurd and Roma can be seen in Edirne, it is not seen in Diyarbakır. Resistance is coming from Turkish families to the inter-marriage but Roma families do not want their girls get married with Kurdish men. Intermarriage between Dom community and Kurdish majority is seen as a kind of conflict and might turn into gunfight. Dom community's marriage ceremony is similar to Kurdish wedding. However, Roma community's marriage ceremony is quite different from majority. They have their own customs and dances. We see Roma community keeping their customs.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Roma, Dom and Lom are three Gypsy groups living in Turkey. Edirne and Diyarbakır are selected as comparative cases owing to their ethnic components of the cities. In Edirne, Roma population lives with mostly Turks who are the ethnic majority in Turkey. On the other hand, Dom population lives with mostly Kurds who are the majority in Diyarbakır. As a common element, Gypsies appear as a minority of both ethnic groups with regard to their size.

In this regard, the study aimed to compare Roma community in Edirne and Dom community in Diyarbakır with regard to what extent they can benefit from full citizenship rights in relation to equality principle of citizenship. By equality the study implied economic and cultural justice. In this regard, on the one hand, everyone has to have equal opportunity to benefit from resources provided by welfare state. On the other hand, “difference” should not be set as a kind of injustice when the resources are distributed. Thus, the study also compared how the resources are shared by different groups: Roma/Turks and Dom/Kurds.

The increasing identity politics, human rights discourse and transnational Romani movement bring about the significance of Romani studies not only in national but also in transnational level since 1989. Romani studies in Turkey have become visible with the the affects of transnational space in last five years. In this process, we see new political space in which sub-national, national and transnational levels are interrelated. For the analysis, these three parts are considered.

The study with an overall view compared the equality and integration levels of Roma and Dom communities in the major society and distribution of resources on the basis of citizenship rights. For the local level, equality is evaluated according to how resources are shared by different groups with regard to economic and cultural justice. In this regard, the study compared Roma and Dom communities the extent that they can benefit from full citizenship rights (civil, political, social and cultural). For the national level, in order to evaluate Roma and Dom community's citizenship practices their proximity and distance to the political community is compared. At the transnational level, the effects of transnational citizenship on Romani activism on Roma and Dom communities are compared.

According to all dimensions, the general conclusions are generated with respect to the analysis of data, which compares the Roma and Dom community's citizenship rights in Edirne and Diyarbakır.

To begin with, first finding of the study indicates that when Roma and Dom communities were nomadic, social interaction level between Roma/Turks and Dom/Kurds was different compared to that in urban conditions.

Dom community was nomadic before 1990s and their cultural affinity with Kurdish society was considerably high in terms of economic and social dependency. Unlike Roma community, Kurdish social structure was affective on Dom community. As Bruinessen (2006:186-197) indicates, the main division within Kurdish society is tribe. He suggests three stratum: the people belonging to a tribe, the people do not belong to any tribe and Gypsies (Dom). Likewise, Dom interviewees also positioned themselves in terms of tribe relations because they attribute themselves as not having tribe. In this sense, the agha appeared as a powerful authority patronizing the members of the Dom community in the villages. Besides, agha or peasants gave them surplus of agricultural product. Dom males used to play their musical instruments (*davul* and *zurna*) at Kurdish weddings and feasts in the villages. These instruments were not used to be played by Kurdish majority. When the wedding season ended, they were travelling to villages for food extracting. Kurdish peasants were offering food without a trade.

Dom women were collecting food from door to door. This kind of social solidarity is called as *zekat* both by Dom community and Kurdish society. On the other hand, social boundaries were apparent for these groups as Doms were excluded from intermarriage, specific jobs like shepherd. Moreover, nomadic pattern was attributed to only Doms. Occupational difference is a way of identity attribution among Dom community: Karaçi are sievemakers and Dom are musicians. On the other hand, some Kurds call Karaçi as outsider and unsettled Dom due to some stereotypes directed to this community. In Kurdish society, there was a division between “our Doms” and Karaçi, which reflects a kind of asymmetrical power between nomadic and host society. Hence, it is not possible to assert integration between Dom community and Kurdish society in those years since they are dependent societies. However, it is important to note that cultural affiliation was incredibly high between Doms and Kurdish society before 1990s.

Unlike Dom community, Roma community had only business relations with Turks during their nomadic times and settled Roma villagers were socially and spatially isolated 40-50 years ago. Moreover, it is not possible to talk about cultural affinity with Roma community and Turks. Not all Roma population was nomadic that they were living in the villages doing agricultural labor, blacksmith, tinsmith and livestock seller (*cambaz*). Meanwhile, some of the Roma interviewees’ mothers or fathers came from Bulgaria and Greece. According to the Lausanne Convention, compulsory migration between Greece and Turkey took place in 1923. The mass deportations of the 1923 convention occurred as an exchange between Christians and Muslims rather than an exchange between Greeks and Turks (Clark, 2007). Gypsies were also affected from this population movement. This population movement shows that Turkishness was open to Gypsies owing to their Muslim identity but Gypsies were not totally accepted by Turkish neighbors in Turkey. According to the interviewees’ statements, their immigrant ancestors were settled in the villages but were not welcomed and Turks left villages when they came. This experience shows spatial exclusion at that time. Moreover, Roma interviewees who used to live with Turks in the villages stated

that discrimination and segregation was obvious in public places; such as coffee-houses or mosque in those years. Nevertheless, there were no Dom villages.

Although the study compared two communities' citizenship practices in urban conditions, Dom community and some households of Roma community had a nomadic pattern before their settlement process, which has affected their current citizen positions in the city. Although Roma community's settlement process in Edirne is associated with agricultural mechanization in 1950s, Dom community settled in Diyarbakır mostly between 1992 and 1994 when intensive "evacuation" of the villages occurred. Dom community was providing food from Kurdish villagers before 1990s. Village guards also underlie as one of the basic reasons of inhabitants of process of forced migration. Moreover, September 12, 1980 coup brought about negative consequences for Dom community in terms of their nomadic pattern. The trust of villagers has diminished towards nomads due to the political polarization. Today, even if they go the villages, peasants do not give provision them and they are even expelled.

Second finding of the study indicates that lack of birth registration which is a prerequisite in order to benefit from citizenship rights and duties is still a handicap for especially Dom community rather than Roma community. Most of the Dom interviewees obtained their identity cards after their settlement process in 1990s. Lack of birth registration still stands for especially Dom women and their children. Although Dom men took their identity cards due to the obligation of military service, Dom women are unlikely to have no contact with government officials. Thereby, "hidden population" is widespread especially in Dom community. On the other hand, lack of birth registration is not a general pattern for Roma community except for early age marriages. The common pattern observed in both communities is that new-born child is not registered due to early marriages. Hence, false declaration can be seen that sometimes the child is registered to any member of the family. For example, grandmothers appear as the mother of the child. This tactic is especially seen among Roma community.

Third finding of the study shows that Dom community has very limited and thin civil, social, and political rights compared Roma community but social

exclusion appears in both communities in different degrees with regard to symbolic, spatial, political, educational and labor opportunities. The denial of full citizenship rights are identified as social exclusion in the theoretical consideration.

With regard to civil rights, hiding ethnic identity is a common pattern in Roma and Dom community in order to get a job (for Dom community) or not to lose job (for Roma community). Unlike Dom community, there are Roma civil servants among Roma community but they tend to hide their identity to avoid the exclusion. Dom community tends to hide their identity even if they worked at low-paid jobs. When their ethnic identity is understood, they are fired. In addition, Dom community has to hide their identity when they go to the seasonal agricultural labor in Western and Northern Turkey. Thus, they hide their Dom identity from both Kurds and Turks. Unlike Roma community, they maintain twofold identity. Dom identity is excluded by Kurds in Diyarbakır and their Kurdish identity is excluded by Turks. In both situations, social exclusion leads to unequal occupational opportunities. This situation shows disparity on civil rights, which also challenges with equality principle of citizenship.

Furthermore, both communities confront different treatments at institutions but Roma interviewees feel stereotypes and stigma on their lives more directly than Dom community. Dom community is differentiated within society in terms of race, woman dressing and Kurdish accent, on the other hand, Roma community is differentiated in Edirne with their race, neighborhood and dressing. As a common pattern, the interviewees from both communities feel themselves as “second-class citizen”, which challenges with the equality principle of citizenship. Feeling second-class citizen also shows the symbolic dimension of social exclusion which exposes how excluded groups are defined by themselves and wider society.

With regard to social rights, Roma community has more access to benefit from welfare state rights in terms of job access, education, health and other pensions (disabled, old-aged pension ... etc.) with a certain degree. In both Edirne and Diyarbakır, we figure out the relation between ethnicity and class. I can deduce that although Roma men mostly work at temporary and casual jobs, Dom

men cannot even find any jobs at informal sector owing to their identity. Having the gradual loss of musician craft, Dom men started to be excluded from job opportunities completely. Forced migration process underlies a conflict on the ground that two internally displaced groups come up against each other to compete for scarce resources, which are casual or temporary jobs in Diyarbakır. This situation leads to ethnic closure creating sub-category of second-class citizens of Dom community. However, Roma community members mostly work at temporary, flexible and low status dirty jobs of which Turks are not willing to work in Edirne but there is a need for unskilled or unqualified jobs, which are mostly carried out by only Roma.

The common citizenship problem is poverty in both communities. In this regard, Dom community's socio-economic conditions are seen as "new poverty", Roma community's as "old poverty". Long-term unemployment, lack of resources to improve their conditions, desolation and social exclusion together with isolation leads to new poverty. Dom adults are illiterate, males are unemployed and they do not know how to get state benefits. Dom community has dissolved in Diyarbakır after resettlement process and their musician craft has vanished after 1990s. They could not integrate to the society. They could not find even casual or temporary jobs since they are excluded from job opportunities. Therefore, Dom community is new actor of new poverty. The only survival strategy for Dom community is begging, whereas seasonal agricultural labor and child labor is a common pattern in both communities. The difference is that Dom community not only lives in poverty but also deprivation. They do not know to get access to resources. On the other hand, Roma community tries to stabilize themselves at the informal sector or even produce tactics such as immigration practices to get socio-economic mobility. The immigrant pattern to Germany generally expanded their citizenship rights. Hence, we cannot generalize Roma community in Edirne as living in the same poverty conditions. The immigrant pattern is not also homogenous that there is no direct relation between social mobility and being immigrant. Moreover, Roma community's casual or temporary jobs are also decreasing. In other words, equality and rights are threatened by market-driven

economy. The study indicates that transformation of welfare state leads Roma community to approach new poverty conditions. In both communities, women and children are in more disadvantaged positions and we come up with “feminization of poverty”.

In benefiting from social rights, education is one of the indispensable elements of social rights. In a comparative perspective, Dom community has limited access to education. Illiteracy is a common pattern among Dom adults owing to the lack of birth registration and nomadic pattern before 90s. Dom community’s access to education starts with settlement process in Diyarbakır. Roma adult females generally are uneducated but some of them graduated from primary school. Most of Roma men graduated from primary school. For the younger generation, differences are striking. In Roma community girls and boys attend to the high school. There are also 10 university students. However, many Dom children do not attend primary school.

With regard to opportunity cost of education, three factors appear: ethnicity, poverty and gender: Roma community also does not believe that education leads to social-mobility. Even if they provide education to their children, they think that they cannot be civil servants because state would not let them do these jobs owing to their ethnic identity. For them, being Turk or Kurd is being first class-citizens but Roma is situated at the bottom of hierarchy. Poverty is another barrier to get education for both communities. Dropping out of school and child labor appears as a common handicap in both communities. Gender is another factor in getting education. In both communities, girls are more disadvantaged than boys because of patriarchy. Nevertheless, patriarchy is visible in Dom community that Dom girls cannot continue to school after 10 years old. They are supposed to get arranged marriages. In response, their fathers take dowry. Patriarchy is not as much as strong in Roma community but boys rather than girls are supported to get education.

Moreover, we see social exclusion in both communities in unequal occupational and educational opportunities. In Edirne, primary schools are homogeneous, which is an indicator of social exclusion. Turkish majority also

take their children from mixed schools. In Diyarbakır, primary schools are mixed but Kurdish parents demand to change their children' class. Unlike Roma children, many Dom children do not attend to the primary school.

Housing conditions and social interaction are also important for evaluating social rights and integration. Poverty and poor housing conditions are common element in both communities but Dom community entered the houses in blighted area after the forced migration. Recently, their houses have also started to be demolished owing to the urban reconstruction plan. In addition, there is very limited social interaction between Kurdish majority and Dom community in their neighborhoods. Stereotypes work against Dom community like prostitution or thief. Some institutions like (White Butterfly Laundry) also have discriminative attitudes towards Dom community. Unlike Kurdish women, Dom women can go to the laundry only one day at a week. In addition, Kurdish majority wanted to expulse Dom community by gathering signatures (Marsh, 2008b). Although it was rejected, it shows social isolation of Dom community.

Unlike Dom community, Roma neighborhoods are prominent since Ottoman Empire. When Roma community was nomadic, they were staying in these houses during winter. Social exclusion especially can be argued for *Menziliahir* neighborhood, which is not only differentiated by institutional level but also from Roma community. Unlike Dom community, Roma community has business relations with Turkish majority in Edirne. Baby-sitting and nursing are good indicators of social interaction between two groups.

In access to political rights, Roma community has limited political rights but Dom community is totally excluded from political life at present. Social exclusion appears in both communities constituting a denial of equal opportunity in relation to politics. In the past, nearly 30 years ago, Roma community' participation of political exercise was prevented in terms of their Roma identity. Today, a few Roma mukhtars can be seen in Roma neighborhoods but there are indirect barriers for involvement in political life and decision-making process. In Dom community, there are no Dom muhktars. There are some local administrative mechanisms, which are not seen in Edirne. One of this

administrative mechanism organized within Diyarbakır Municipality is called *Belediye İl Halk Meclisi* (Provincial Community Council). This council is organized in the neighborhoods where local problems are argued and solved. Although majority of Dom interviewees support municipality, they do not participate in these councils and are not expected to participate in. They have little access to power and decision-making bodies.

Roma and Dom communities have become visible in the public sphere owing to their associations. Dom community's association was opened in 2007 and lasted for only one year. However, Dom Association failed to succeed that there was not anyone to take education capacity building since all the members of the association were illiterate. Dom community also was reacting to the association because the leader was only demanding financial requests from the members of the community. As in a difference manner from Dom community, EDROM has a special place for Roma community in Edirne at present. Moreover, Roma community members support them actively. EDROM ensured that Roma community recognized at local and national level since 2004. Before EDROM, even the word of Roma was like a taboo in the society. Hence, EDROM changed the atmosphere in the last six years. EDROM has a mediator role between state and its community since Roma community is minority in Edirne. In this regard, it seems that EDROM created a dialogue mechanism with stakeholders. As a global scale, we can see EDROM as a transnational actor. Their efforts fight with discrimination towards Gypsy identity not only in Turkey but also in Europe. It can be suggested that EDROM has been affected by the decline of modern citizenship and political transformation of citizenship. As it was discussed in the theoretical chapter, human rights undermine the boundaries of nation-state providing a hegemonic language for formulating claims to rights above and beyond national belonging (Soysal, 1994).

For evaluating the situations of Roma and Dom NGOs, it seems necessary to consider their relations with power. In this regard, EDROM stands near to both state and EU. For EDROM, the search of equality operates around sub-national, national and transnational level. On the other hand, Dom community is far away

from power relations and they stand in the periphery. In other words, living with Turks who are the ethnic majority is as more advantageous for Roma community to access state benefits and EU.

Fourth finding of the study is that both communities position themselves with different identification in major society. Dom community identity attribution is different from Roma community. They sustain twofold identity: Kurd and Dom. They also attribute themselves as “Kurdish Gypsies”. On the one hand, they feel Kurd in terms of linguistic practices, customs, marriage pattern, etc. On the other hand, they belong to Dom community attributing a sense of group consciousness. After their settlement process in Diyarbakır, Kurdish majority has neglected their Kurdish identity; in response “Gypsy identity” has become prominent. However, Roma community directly attributes themselves as Roma or Gypsy. Only younger generation tends to identify themselves as Turk. In fact, multiple group affiliations are useful for these communities. For example, Doms go with other Kurdish seasonal agricultural laborers, as if they are Kurds or Roma immigrants introduce themselves as Turk in Germany. The basic distinction within the communities occurs in a dualistic way: Dom/Perev and Roma/Gaco. The other identities can be seen as tactical resources to affiliate the political community.

Fifth finding of the study shows that Roma community’s citizenship practices can be explained with radical democratic citizenship, communitarian approach and republican citizenship respectively along with their demands about cultural rights, social rights and duties. On the other hand, Dom community’s evaluation of rights and duties stands near communitarian approach.

Roma community stands near radical democratic citizenship or liberal citizenship with regard to cultural rights. Roma community keeps their cultural and ethnic practices since Ottoman era. Roma community also can be differentiated from non-Roma in terms of their customs, marriage patterns, Romani language, etc. In addition, as argued in the cultural rights section, Hidrellez is not celebrated by Roma community themselves but the fest is arranged by municipality and governorship in an international platform. Hence, liberal citizenship can be seen in some degree in Edirne respecting to Roma

cultural rights and recognition of their cultural identity. In addition, Mouffe's (1992) radical democratic citizenship conception which envisages a form of commonality that respects diversity and makes room for different forms of individuality can be shown in Edirne. Through this conception of citizenship, as Mouffe (1993) suggests, "a sense of we is created by recognition that the demands of these various movements can form a chain of democratic equivalence". Thus, on the one hand, Roma community demands recognition for their cultural rights. On the other hand, they feel strong attachment to the political community. However, Dom community has cultural affiliation with Kurdish society in terms of language, marriage patterns, *dengbejlik* tradition, religion etc. In this regard, Kurd appears as a upper identity for them. On the other hand, they started to be excluded culturally by their Kurdish accent, women dressing and accused of lack of religious belief after the forced migration and settlement process.

Roma community's social rights demands are close to the communitarian approach of citizenship. In this regard, Roma individuals' demanding the healing of their social rights are not related to only individual ends but also related to communal ends. They do not evaluate themselves as atomized individuals. Hence, their healing of social rights would be good for common good since for Roma community, rights and duties should be reciprocal, which necessitates a member of a political community. Moreover, Roma community demands equality like any members of political community. For them, being Roma could not be a challenge to benefit from equal citizenship rights. In fact, EDROM also advocates that by the healing of social rights Roma community would approach non-Roma, then equal citizenship. Although Dom community's citizenship practices stands near to communitarian approach of citizenship, they do not define their identity like Roma community.

With regard to duties, republican citizenship is more apparent among Roma community than Dom community in terms of military service and high level of commitment to the political community. Active military service is seen as essential duty by Roma interviewees. For Roma males, fulfilling military service indicates being equal citizen. Roma community adopts republican citizenship in a

way of defining their identity, which cannot be seen in Dom community. On the one hand, for Roma community, citizenship stands like “differentiated machine” concede privileges to Turks and Kurds, in response leave Roma at the bottom of hierarchy. On the other hand, they try to compensate their loosing citizenship rights by republican citizenship. Roma community defines themselves by emphasizing their duties and loyalty. Dom community does not define themselves with republican citizenship. However, both communities interrogate that although they fulfill duty-based citizenship practices, they do not get access to social citizenship rights. In both communities, ethnicity is seen as a barrier in order to benefit from equal citizenship rights.

Final finding of the study shows that intermarriage pattern varies in Edirne and Diyarbakır. It is possible to encounter intermarriage between Roma and Kurds in Edirne rather than Dom and Kurds in Diyarbakır. It is related to cultural patterns, which are not strict for Roma women that they can select their husbands by their own will. Moreover, both Roma and Kurds appear as minorities in Edirne. In addition, Roma and Turks marriages rarely occur in Edirne. Sometimes the legal procedure starts if the Turkish girl’s age is young. Nevertheless, Dom community’s marriage pattern is similar to Kurdish society. Cross-cousin marriage is widespread and even their marriages ceremonies are similar to Kurdish marriage ceremony. On the other hand, Roma has their own customs related to marriage ceremony, which is sharply different from Turks. Intermarriage between Dom community and Kurdish majority is seen as a major conflict and might turn into tribes’ conflict due to the strict social boundaries. Unlike Roma women, Dom women cannot select her husband and get into arranged marriages with their relatives.

Unlike Roma community, Dom women get married with unofficial *imam* (religious) wedding. Hence, these women lack from civil rights. The other pattern among Dom community is fellow wife in a polygamous household (*kuma*), which is never seen among Roma community. These Dom women are totally lack citizenship rights. When the fellow wife comes, they have no place to go. They have to live with the fellow wife and husband. The children are under the risk of

birth registration owing to the unofficial registration. Moreover, Dom women face to *töre* (custom) in their community. In this regard, some women had to get married as a result of conflict resolution between Dom families. In other words, these marriages are seen as “blood money” to solve the conflict.

The main argument of this study asserted that Roma population in Edirne access more to citizenship rights than Dom community. This is related with the fact that Roma lives with Turks, who are ethnic majority in Edirne and in Turkey whereas Dom lives mostly with Kurds, who are majority in Diyarbakır, but minority in Turkey. Foremost, Roma population has closer connections with state and transnational space than Dom community in Diyarbakır. Consequently, Dom community has very limited and thin civil, social and political rights than Roma community but social exclusion appears in both communities in different degrees with regard to symbolic, spatial, political, educational and labor opportunities. Roma community can be seen in old forms of poverty and try to stabilize themselves. Unlike Dom community, they can produce different tactics to overcome poverty and exclusion. Moreover, they position themselves near to power and benefit from welfare state rights in some degree. However, Dom community can be regarded as new actors of new poverty. They are totally isolated from welfare state rights and power decision-making process. Hence, they could not even produce tactics to integrate to the society. Although there are different levels of poverty, Roma community is approaching new poverty with the transformation of welfare state. With regard to integration levels to the major societies, Roma community appears as a minority of Turks with their self-evaluation of citizenship practices and cultural habitus. Although Dom community seems adopted Kurdish society’s linguistic, social, cultural and even marriage practices, they are not integrated to Kurdish majority because of strict social boundaries which have been apparent after the forced migration process and resettlement in Diyarbakır.

In both communities, women have more unequal position in terms of benefit from citizenship rights. However, Dom women have more unequal position having not only limited citizenship rights but also patriarchy

overshadowing the equal status of women in public and private sphere. Hence, social policy makers should take into account firstly Roma and Dom women as well as children at first. They are being affected from poverty much more than male. As a common pattern, both communities demand healing of their social rights and cultural justice since they feel they are second class citizens because of their ethnic identities.

As argued in the theoretical consideration, to make citizenship's promises real, citizenship's universalistic claims from the particular perspectives of a range of marginalized groups and of nation-state "outsiders" has to be interrogated. In this regard, right based approach should be extended from "below". As Kabeer (2005) suggests, the four values of inclusive citizenship emerged from below are: justice, recognition, self-determination and solidarity. In addition, Fraser's (1998) suggestion can be considered for both Roma and Dom communities' citizenship positions. In this regard, the remedy for economic injustice is called as "redistribution", which is political-economic restructuring of some sort. That might refer to redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labor or transforming the other basic economic structures. The other remedy for cultural injustice is some sort of cultural or symbolic change. For Fraser (1998), this could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups.

Romani movement from below might extend Turkish citizenship practices, but it is so early to discuss its effects on the political sphere. At that point, healing of social rights are not sufficient for Gypsy communities in Turkey. Herein, new measures related to economic and cultural justice should be taken for inclusive and full demanded citizenship.

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<http://www.romadecade.org>

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM (ENGLISH)

IN- DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRES

Demographic Questions:

Age:	Educational Status:	(If any) Number of
Child:		
Sex:	Marital Status:	Neighborhood:
Place of Birth:	Employment Situation:	Number per
Household:		

Household

- How long have you lived in the place where you have born? Where did you live afterwards? If you moved out, do you remember what has happened?
- What your mother and father have been up to? Where do they stay?
- How many brothers and sisters do you have? Are you the oldest/middle/youngest child?
- Who else live in your house?
(Number/Age/Education/Gender/Employment division)

Employment

- What is your occupation?
- How long have you been working in that job?
- How did you find that job?
- Do you have any insurance?
- Are you member of any organization or institution related to your job?
- With whom do you work in that job? How are your relations?
- In which jobs did you work previously? If you had worked, how did you find that job? Did you have insurance?
- Apart from your job, do you have other means of existence?

- Who else supports means of household? (Reasons to work - not to work)
- Have you ever thought about working in another job?

Education

- What is your educational background?
- Do you know to read and write?
- (If has children) How many boys/girls do you have?
- Do they go to school?
- How is the school's condition?
- Which profession do your children plan to choose in the future?
- What is your point of view regarding education?
- Are there any areas that you find problematic in education?
- Do your children have birth registration cards?
- Did your children work in the past or do they work at present? (Comparison of girl-boy)

Marriage

- How did you met with your wife/husband?
- How old were you when you get married?
- Did you perform other marriage ceremonies before the official marriage?
- Is your wife/husband Roma/Dom?
- What has been exchanged as a dowry for the marriage?
- How would you react to your child marriage with a non-Roma/non-Dom?
- What do you think about divorcement?
- Who participate in the important decision-making process in your household?

Health

- Do you have any health insurance or security?
- How long have you been benefitting from the insurance or security?
- If your health security is Green Card, have you ever faced with any problems in obtaining this card?
- Where do you apply to when you become ill? How do you evaluate hospital personnel's behavior?
- Do you have any health problems?
- Who deals with domestic works when you become ill?
- How do you think the health related problems can be solved?

Accommodation

- When did you come to this neighborhood?

- Is it a rental house or is it yours?
- How many rooms does it have?
- Where is the toilet and bathroom of the house?
- How do you get heat during winter?
- Are there any problems about the house you live in?

Relations with Institutions

- Do you go to the hospital, governorship, municipality, and courthouse? Could you tell your experience?
- Which institution do you go for most and for what reason?
- Do they listen to you when you go there? How do you evaluate their services and their behavior towards you?
- If there are, would you tell me the matters that constitute a problem?

Political Participation

- What do you think about the Roma/Dom associations in your city? Have you ever been there?
- Do you support any political party?
- Do you generally vote for the same political party? (Formerly-Presently)
- Are you member of any association, institution or a political party?
- Do you get assistance from municipality, district governorship or charitable institutions?
- Who visits your neighborhood with the aim of assistance?
- Is your mukhtar Roma/Dom? If not, would you prefer a Roma/Dom mukhtar?
- Are you able to tell the neighborhood problems to your mukhtar?
- Where do you go in case of problems related with your family?
- Do you know the *Çeribaşı*? What does the *Çeribaşı* express for the Roma community?
- Do you think that Roma/Dom are represented in mukhtar, municipality or in other institutions?

Neighborhood and Social Relations

- When did you come to this neighborhood?
- Who lives in your neighborhood?
- How is the neighborhood's condition?
- How is your relation with neighbors?
- Do you visit mutually non-Roma/non-Dom?
- What are the problems of your neighborhood?
- Would you like to live in another neighborhood?

- Is there any difference between your childhood and present conditions of Edirne/Diyarbakır?

Religion and Ritual

- To Roma community;
Do you celebrate Kakava/Hıdırellez? What do you do in those celebrations?
- To Dom community;
Do you celebrate Newroz? What do you do in that celebration?
- How were you celebrating in the past?
- Is there anyone that you consult at religion matters?

Identity

- How do you define yourself? Can you tell me about yourself?
- Which languages do you know? Which language do you speak in your house?
- To Roma community
a) Do you know Dom? Where do they live?
- To Dom community
b) Do you know Roma? Where do they live?

Future

- What do you expect from the future?

QUESTIONS TO BE DIRECTED TO THE INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS

(Municipality, Social Assistance and Solidarity Fund, Bar Association, Mukhtar)

- Could you introduce yourself related with your role in that institution?
- Could you tell me about the Roma/Dom experiences within the context of your institution?
- Are there any facilities provided by your institution that Roma/Dom members benefit from?
- Are there any problems in your city? If there are, what do you offer for solution?
- How are the Roma/Dom relations with non-Roma/non-Dom?
- Are there any intermarriages between Roma/Dom and non-Roma/non-Dom?
- Have you ever met with stereotypes related with Roma/Dom?

SCHOOL QUESTIONNAIRES¹²⁸

- How long have you been working in that school?
- What is the proportional representation of the Roma/Dom students in your school?
- Are they successful in their lessons?
- Are there any working children? If there are, could you tell me about them?
- What are the basic problems that Roma/Dom students face? If there are, what is your solution offer?
- Are there any activities in the school? (If there are) What is the participation level?
- Do Roma/Dom parents come to the school and take an interest in their children' situation?
- How is the communication between Roma/Dom and non-Roma/non-Dom children?
- How do you evaluate the school' infrastructure as an educator?
- Is there anything in the school that needs revision?
- Can you compare the school you are working now and other neighborhood schools?

QUESTIONS TO BE DIRECTED TO THE CHILDREN

Age:

Educational Status:

Number of Brothers/Sisters:

- Are you the oldest/middle/youngest child?
- What is your parents' occupation?
- Who has supported your education in the family?
- What do you like or dislike in the school?
- Are there any of your brothers/sisters attending/not attending to the school? If there is the one who does not attend to school, what is the reason?
- Are there any facilities that you wish for your school?
- Can you attend to the school regularly? What are the reasons for not attending?
- Are you able to study your lessons regularly at home?
- Are you going to continue to the school? Up to which class do you plan to attend?
- What do you need in order to continue to the school?
- Did you work in a job in order to support your family financially while attending to the school?
- Do you think that education will provide benefit to you in the future?

¹²⁸ These questionnaires are prepared to be asked to the teachers or administrators in the school.

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM (TURKISH)

DERİNLEMESİNE GÖRÜŞME SORULARI

Demografi Soruları:

Yaş: Eğitim Durumu: (Varsa) Çocuk sayısı:
Cinsiyet: Medeni Durumu: Mahalle:
Doğum Yeri: İstihdam durumu: Hane halkı sayısı:

Hane Halkı

- Doğduğunuz yerde ne kadar yaşadınız? Daha sonra nerede yaşadınız? Taşındıysanız neler olduğunu hatırlıyor musunuz?
- Anneniz babanız ne yapıyorlardı? Nerede oturuyorlar?
- Kaç erkek ve kız kardeşiniz var? Siz kaçıncısınız?
- Evinizde kimler yaşıyor? (Sayı/Yaş/Eğitim/Toplumsal Cinsiyet/ İstihdam dağılımı)

İstihdam

- Ne iş yapıyorsunuz?
- Bu işte ne zamandır çalışıyorsunuz?
- İşinizi nasıl buldunuz?
- Sigortanız var mı?
- İşinizden dolayı herhangi bir dernek ya da kuruluşa üye misiniz?
- İşinizi yaparken kimlerle birlikte çalışıyorsunuz? İlişkileriniz nasıl?
- Önceden hangi işlerde çalıştınız? Çalıştıysanız, nasıl buldunuz? Sigortanız var mıydı?
- Bu işiniz dışında başka geçim kaynaklarınız var mı?
- Evinizin geçimine kimler katkıda bulunuyor? (Çalışma-çalışmama nedenleri)
- Başka bir işte çalışmayı düşünür müydünüz?

Eğitim

- Eğitim durumunuz?
- Okuma yazma biliyor musunuz?

- (Çocukları varsa) Kaçı kız, kaç erkek?
- Okula gidiyorlar mı?
- Okulun koşulları nasıl?
- İlerde hangi mesleği seçmek istiyorlar?
- Eğitime bakışınız nedir?
- Eğitimde sorunlu bulduğunuz alanlar var mı?
- Çocukların nüfus kâğıdı var mı?
- Çocuklarınız hiç çalıştılar mı ya da çalışıyorlar mı? (Kız çocuk-erkek çocuk karşılaştırması)

Evlilik

- Eşinizle nasıl tanıştınız?
- Evlendiğinizde kaç yaşındaydınız?
- Resmi nikahtan önce başka bir nikah kıyıldı mı?
- Eşiniz Roman mı/ Dom mu?
- Evlilik için neler alıp verildi?
- Çocuklarınızın Roman/Dom olmayan birisiyle evlenmesine nasıl bakarsınız?
- Boşanma hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
- Evinizde önemli kararların verilmesine kimler katılıyor?

Sağlık

- Sağlık için sigortanız veya güvenceniz var mı?
- Ne zamandır faydalanıyorsunuz?
- Sağlık güvencesi yeşil kartsa, bu kartı edinirken herhangi bir sorunla karşılaştınız mı?
- Hastalık durumlarında nerelere başvuruyorsunuz? Hastanedekilerin davranışları nasıl?
- Herhangi bir sağlık sorununuz var mı?
- Siz hasta olunca evin işleriyle kim ilgileniyor?
- Sağlıkla ilgili sorunlar nasıl halledilir?

Barınma

- Bu mahalleye ne zaman geldiniz?
- Eviniz kira mı kendinizin mi?
- Kaç odalı?
- Tuvalet, banyo evin neresinde?
- Kışın nasıl ısıniyorsunuz?
- Evinizle ilgili yaşadığınız sıkıntı var mı?

Kurum ve Kuruluşlarla İlişkiler

- Hastane, valilik, belediye, adliye ile işiniz oluyor mu? Tecrübelerinizi anlatır mısınız?
- En çok gittiğiniz kuruluş hangisi ve ne vesile ile oluyor?
- Gittiğiniz yerde sizi dinliyorlar mı? Hizmetleri ve size davranışlarını nasıl buluyorsunuz?
- Sorun alanları varsa bana anlatır mısınız?

Politik Katılım

- Şehrinizdeki Roman derneği hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Oraya hiç gittiniz mi?
- Herhangi bir politik partiyi destekliyor musunuz?
- Genelde aynı partiye mi oy verirsiniz? (Eski-Şimdi)
- Herhangi bir dernek, kuruluş ya da partiye üye misiniz?
- Belediye, kaymakamlık, vakıflardan herhangi bir yardım alıyor musunuz?
- Mahallenizi yardım amaçlı kimler ziyaret ediyor?
- Muhtarınız Roman mı? /Dom mu? Roman/Dom değilse, olmasını ister miydiniz?
- Mahalleyle ilgili sorunlarınız olursa muhtara anlatabiliyor musunuz?
- Ailenizle ilgili problemleriniz olursa, halletmek için nereye gidersiniz?
- Çeribaşını tanır mısınız? Roman toplumu için ne ifade ediyor?
- Romanların/Domların muhtarlık, belediye ve diğer kuruluşlarda temsil edildiğini düşünüyor musunuz?

Mahalle ve Sosyal İlişkiler

- Bu mahalleye ne zaman geldiniz?
- Mahallenizde kimler yaşıyor?
- Mahallelinin durumu nasıl?
- Komşularınızla ilişkileriniz nasıl?
- Roman/Dom olmayanlarla birbirinize gelip gider misiniz?
- Mahallenizde sizin gördüğünüz sorunlar var mı?
- Başka bir mahallede yaşamak ister miydiniz?
- Çocukluğunuzdaki Edirne/Diyarbakır ile şimdi arasında fark var mı?

Din ve Ritüel

- Romanlara;
Kakava/Hıdrellez'i kutlar mısınız? Neler yaparsınız?
Domlara; Newrozu kutlar mısınız? Neler yaparsınız?
- Eskiden nasıl kutlardınız?
- Din ile ilgili danıştığınız kimseler var mı?

Kimlik

- Kendinizi nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? Bana kendinizi anlatır mısınız?
- Hangi dilleri biliyorsunuz? Evde hangi dili konuşuyorsunuz?
- Romanlara
 - a)Domları tanıyor musunuz? Nerede yaşıyorlar?
 - Domlara,
 - b)Romanları tanıyor musunuz? Nerede yaşıyorlar?

Gelecek

- Gelecekte ne bekliyorsunuz?

KURUM VE KURULUŞLARA SORULACAK SORULAR (Belediye, SYDGM, Baro, Muhtar)

- Bu kurumdaki görevinizle ilgili kendinizi tanıtabilir misiniz?
- Kurumunuz kapsamında Romanların/Domların ne tür deneyimler yaşadığını anlatır mısınız?
- Kurumunuz içerisinde Romanların/Domların faydalandığı hizmetler nelerdir?
- Şehrinizde gördüğünüz sorun alanları var mıdır? Varsa sizce çözüm önerileriniz nelerdir?
- Roman/Dom olanlar ve olmayanlar arasındaki ilişkiler ne boyutta?
- Roman/Dom olanlar ve olmayanlar arasında evlilik oluyor mu?
- Romanlar ve Domlarla ilgili önyargılarla/sterotiplerle karşılaştınız mı?

OKULDA YAPILACAK MÜLAKAT SORULARI¹²⁹

- Okulda ne zamandır beri çalışmaktasınız?
- Okulunuzda Roman/Dom öğrencilerin oranı nasıl?
- Derslerindeki başarı durumu ne düzeyde?
- Okulunuzda çalışan öğrenciler var mı? Varsa, anlatır mısınız?
- Roman/Dom öğrencilerin temel sorunsalları sizce nedir? Varsa, çözüm önerileriniz nedir?
- Dersler dışında okulun düzenlediği aktiviteler oluyor mu? (Oluyorsa) Katılım nasıl?
- Roman/Dom çocukların velileri okula gelip çocuklarının durumlarını takip ediyorlar mı?
- Roman/Dom ve Roman/Dom olmayan çocuklar arasındaki iletişim nasıl?

¹²⁹ Bu sorular okulda görüşülecek öğretmen veya idarecilere sorulmak üzere hazırlanmıştır.

- Bir eğitimci olarak baktığınızda okulunuzun altyapısını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?
- Okulda yapılması ya da düzeltilmesi gereken şeyler var mı?
- Çalıştığınız okulu, diğer mahallelerdeki okullarla karşılaştırabilir misiniz?

ÇOCUKLARA SORULACAK SORULAR

Yaş:


Eğitim durumu:

Kardeş sayısı:


- Ailenin kaçınıcı çocuğusun?
- Anne baba ne işle meşgul?
- Ailende senin okula gitmeni kim destekledi?
- Okulda neyi seversin ya da sevmezsin?
- Senin dışında okula giden/gitmeyen kardeşlerin var mı? Gitmeyen var ise, neden o kardeşlerin okula gitmiyor?
- Okulda istediğin ama bulunmayan imkanlar var mı?
- Okula düzenli gidebiliyor musun? Gidememe nedenlerin nelerdir?
- Evde düzenli ders çalışabiliyor musun?
- Okula devam edecek misin? Kaçınıcı sınıfa kadar?
- Okula devam etmen için neler lazım?
- Okula devam ederken aileye destek olman için çalıştın mı?
- Okuyunca faydasını görecek misin?

APPENDIX C: HIDRELLEZ INVITATIONS

Picture 1: Hidrellez invitation handed out by Çeribaşı in 2008



Picture 2: Hidrellez invitation in 1934



Source: Tarih ve Toplum, May 1995, Issue: 137

APPENDIX D: TURKISH SUMMARY

Romanlar, Domlar ve Lomlar Türkiye’de yaşayan üç Çingene grubudur. Edirne ve Diyarbakır, şehirlerin etnik öğelerinden dolayı karşılaştırmalı çalışmalar olarak seçilmiştir. Edirne’de Roman nüfusu Türkiye’de etnik çoğunluk olan Türklerle birlikte yaşamaktadırlar. Öte yandan, Dom nüfusu Diyarbakır’da çoğunluk olan Kürtlerle birlikte yaşamaktadırlar. Ortak unsur olarak, Çingeneler iki etnik grubun da sayısal olarak azınlığı olarak gözükmektedir.

Bu açıdan çalışma, Edirne’deki Roman topluluğu ile Diyarbakır’daki Dom topluluğunun vatandaşlığın eşitlik ilkesince tam vatandaşlık haklarından ne ölçüde yararlandıklarını karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışma, eşitlik ile ekonomik ve kültürel adaleti işaret etmiştir. Bu açıdan, herkesin refah devletinin sağladığı kaynaklara ulaşmada eşit fırsatları olmalıdır. Diğer yandan, “farklılık” kaynakların dağıtımında adaletsizliğe yol açmamalıdır. Dolayısıyla, çalışma aynı zamanda kaynakların farklı gruplar arasında (Romanlar/Türkler, Domlar/Kürtler) nasıl paylaşıldığını karşılaştırmıştır.

1989’dan beri yükselen kimlik politikaları, insan hakları söylemi ve uluslararası (Çingene) “*Romani*” hareketi, Çingene çalışmalarının önemini sadece ulusal değil, uluslararası boyutta da gündeme getirmiştir. Türkiye’deki Çingene çalışmaları son beş yılda uluslar ötesi alanın etkisiyle görünür olmuştur. Bu süreçte yerel, ulusal ve ulus-ötesi alanların içiçe olduğu yeni bir politik alan görmekteyiz. Analiz için bu üç bölüm göz önünde bulundurulmuştur.

Çalışma genel itibariyle, çoğunluk içindeki Roman ve Dom topluluklarının eşitlik ve entegrasyon seviyeleri ile temel vatandaşlık ilkeleri temelindeki kaynakların dağılımını karşılaştırmıştır. Yerel düzeyde eşitlik, kaynakların farklı gruplar arasında ekonomik ve kültürel adalet açısından nasıl paylaşıldığını değerlendirir. Bu bakımdan çalışma, Roman ve Dom topluluklarının tam

vatandaşlık haklarından (sivil, politik, sosyal ve kültürel) ne ölçüde faydalandıklarını karşılaştırmıştır. Ulusal seviyede Roman ve Dom topluluklarının vatandaşlık pratiklerini değerlendirmek için, politik birliğe yakınlık ve uzaklıkları karşılaştırılmıştır. Uluslararası seviyede, ulus-ötesi vatandaşlığın Çingene hareketi üzerinden Roman ve Dom topluluklara etkileri karşılaştırılmaktadır.

Bu boyutlara göre, genel sonuçlar Romanlar ve Domların vatandaşlık haklarını karşılaştıran veri analizi çerçevesinde oluşturulmuştur.

İlk bulgu olarak çalışma, Roman ve Dom topluluklarının göçebe olduğu zamanlarda, Romanlar/Türkler ve Domlar/Kürtler arasında sosyal etkileşimin şehir şartlarına göre farklılık arzettiğine işaret etmektedir.

Dom topluluğu, 1990'lerden önce göçebe bir yaşam sürmekte ve Kürt toplumuyla ekonomik ve sosyal bağımlılık temelinde önemli oranda kültürel ortaklıkları bulunmaktaydı. Roman topluluğundan farklı olarak Kürt sosyal yapısı Dom topluluğu üzerinde etkiliydi. Bruinessen (2006:186–197)'in işaret ettiği üzere, Kürt toplumunda temel ayırım aşirettir. Bruinessen Kürt toplumunda üç tabaka olduğunu önermektedir: Aşireti olanlar, aşireti olmayanlar ve Çingeneler (Domlar). Aynı şekilde Dom görüşmeciler kendilerini aşiret ilişkilerine göre konumlandırmışlardır. Bu açıdan ağa, köylerde Dom topluluğunun üyelerini himaye eden önemli bir otorite olarak gözükmektedir. Dom erkekleri köylerde Kürt düğünleri ve festivallerinde müzik enstrümanları olan davul ve zurna çalarlardı. Bu enstrümanlar Kürt çoğunluğu tarafından çalınmamaktaydı. Düğün sezonu sona erdiğinde Domlar köyleri erzak toplamak için dolaşırlardı. Kürt köylüler ticaret amacı gütmeyen erzak vermekteydiler. Dom kadınları kapı kapı gezerek yiyecek toplamaktaydılar. Bu çeşit sosyal dayanışma hem Domlar, hem de Kürt toplumu tarafından zekât olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Diğer taraftan bu gruplar arasında sosyal sınırlar çok belirgin olup Domlar, Kürtlerle yapılan evliliklerden ve çobanlık gibi belirli mesleklerden dışlanmışlardır. Ayrıca göçebelik sadece Domlara atfedilmiştir. Mesleki farklılık Domlar arasında kimliklerini tanımlamalarının bir şeklidir: Kalburcular Karaçi, müziyenler Dom'durlar. Diğer taraftan, bazı Kürtler stereotiplerden dolayı Karaçileri yabancı ve yerleşik olmayan Domlar olarak anmaktadır. Kürt toplumunda “bizim Domlar”

ve Karaçi arasındaki farklılaşma göçebe ve yerleşik topluluk arasındaki asimetrik güç ilişkisini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, o yıllarda Dom topluluğu ve Kürt toplumu arasında bütünleşme olduğunu ileri sürmek mümkün değildir, çünkü Dom topluluğu Kürt toplumuna bağımlı bir topluluktur. Öte yandan, 1990'lerden önce Domlar ve Kürt toplumu arasındaki kültürel ortaklığın yüksek olduğunu ifade etmek önemlidir.

Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak, Roman topluluğunun göçebe olduğu zamanlarda Türklerle yalnızca iş ilişkileri bulunmaktaydı ve Roman köylüler 40–50 yıl önce sosyal ve mekânsal olarak dışlanmışlardır. Ayrıca Roman topluluğu ve Türkler arasında kültürel ortaklıktan söz etmek mümkün değildir. Roman toplumunun hepsi göçebe olmayıp köylerde yaşayanlar tarım işçiliği, demircilik, kalaycılık ve hayvan alım satımıyla uğraşmaktaydılar. Bu arada bazı Roman görüşmecilerin anneleri ya da babaları Yunanistan ve Bulgaristan'dan gelmiştir. Lozan Anlaşmasına göre, Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında 1923'te zorunlu göç olmuştur. 1923 anlaşması gereği toplu yer değiştirmeler Yunanlılar ve Türklerden ziyade Müslümanlar ve Hristiyanlar arasında gerçekleşmiştir (Clark, 2007). Çingener de bu nüfus hareketinden etkilenmişlerdir. Bu nüfus hareketi Türklüğün Çingenerlere karşı Müslüman kimliklerinden dolayı açık olduğunu, fakat Çingenerlerin Türkiye'deki Türk komşuları tarafından tamamen kabul edilmediğini göstermektedir. Görüşmecilerin belirttiğine göre, göçmen olan ataları köylere yerleştirildiklerinde Türkler tarafından hoş karşılanmamışlar ve de Türkler onların yerleştiği köyleri terk etmişlerdir. Bu tecrübe o zamanki mekânsal ayrışmayı göstermektedir. Ayrıca köylerde Türklerle birlikte yaşayan Roman görüşmeciler o yıllarda kahvehane, cami gibi kamusal alanda ayrımcılığın ve ayrışmanın çok açık olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Öte yandan, Dom köyleri bulunmamaktaydı.

Çalışma iki topluluğun vatandaşlık pratiklerini şehir koşullarında karşılaştırmasına rağmen, Dom topluluğunun ve bazı Roman hanehalklarının yerleşmeden önceki göçebe yaşayış tarzları şimdiki şehir hayatlarındaki vatandaşlık konumlarını etkilemiştir. Roman topluluğunun Edirne'ye yerleşme süreci 1950'lerde tarımsal mekanizasyonla birlikte gerçekleşmesine karşın, Dom

topluluğunun Diyarbakır'a yerleşmesi köy boşaltmaların yoğun olarak yaşandığı 1992-1994'te gerçekleşmiştir. 1990'dan önce Dom topluluğu, Kürt köylülerden erzak temin etmekteydi. Korucular, zorunlu göç sürecinde Domların şehre yerleşmelerinde temel neden teşkil etmektedir. Ayrıca 12 Eylül 1980 darbesi Dom topluluğunun göçebe yaşam şekli açısından olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Bugün eğer köylere gitseler de köylüler onlara erzak vermek istememekte, hatta kovulmaktadırlar.

Çalışmanın ikinci bulgusu, vatandaşlık hakları ve görevlerinden faydalanabilmenin temel gerekliliği olan doğum kaydının olmamasının Roman topluluğundan ziyade, özellikle Dom topluluğu için dezavantajlı bir durum teşkil ettiğine işaret etmektedir. Dom görüşmecilerin pek çoğu nüfus cüzdanlarını 1990'lardan sonra yerleşme süreciyle birlikte almışlardır. Doğum kaydının olmaması özellikle Dom kadınları ve çocukları için geçerlidir. Dom erkekleri nüfus cüzdanlarını askerlik hizmeti sebebiyle çıkartmış olmalarına rağmen, Dom kadınlarının devlet görevlileriyle ilişkisi bulunmamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, "saklı nüfus" özellikle Dom topluluğu arasında yüksektir. Diğer taraftan doğum kaydının olmaması erken evlilikler dışında Roman topluluğu için genel bir kalıp değildir. Ortak bir unsur olarak, iki toplulukta da yeni doğan çocuk erken evliliklerden dolayı kaydettirilmemektedir. Dolayısıyla çocuğun ailedeki herhangi bir üyesinin üzerine kaydettirilmesiyle yanlış beyan görülebilmektedir. Örneğin büyükanne çocuğun annesi gibi görülebilmektedir. Bu taktik özellikle Roman topluluğu arasında görülmektedir.

Çalışmanın üçüncü bulgusu Dom topluluğunun Roman topluluğuna göre sınırlı ve cılız sivil, sosyal ve politik haklara sahip olduğunu göstermektedir. Fakat sosyal dışlanma, sembolik, mekânsal, politik, eğitim ve iş fırsatları olarak farklı derecelerde iki toplumda da gözükmektedir. Tam vatandaşlık haklarının esirgenmesi teorik değerlendirmede sosyal dışlanma olarak adlandırılmaktadır.

Sivil haklara ilişkin olarak, etnik kimliğini saklamak iki topluluk için de ortak bir davranışken, Dom topluluğu işe girmek, Roman topluluğundakiler ise mevcut işlerini kaybetmemek için kimliklerini saklamaktadırlar. Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak Roman topluluğu arasında devlet memurları

bulunmakta fakat dışlanmadan kaçınmak için kimliklerini saklama eğilimindedirler. Dom topluluğu kimliklerini düşük ücretli işlerde bile çalışmak için saklamaktadır çünkü kimlikleri anlaşıldığı takdirde işten kovulmaktadırlar. Ayrıca Dom topluluğu mevsimlik tarım işçiliği için Türkiye'nin kuzey ya da batısına gittiklerinde de kimliklerini saklamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla, Dom kimliklerini hem Kürtlerden hem de Türklerden saklarlar. Roman topluluğundan farklı olarak Domlar iki kimliği sahiplenirler. Dom kimlikleri Diyarbakır'daki Kürtler tarafından dışlanırken, Kürt kimlikleri Türkler tarafından dışlanmaktadır. Bu durum sivil haklardaki eşitsizliği göstermekte olup vatandaşlığın eşitlik ilkesiyle de çelişmektedir.

Ayrıca iki topluluk kurumlarda farklı muamelelerle karşılaşmaktadırlar; fakat Roman görüşmeciler stereotipleri ve *stigmatı* Dom topluluğundakilerden daha fazla hayatlarında hissetmektedirler. Dom topluluğu ırk, kadınların kıyafeti ve Kürtçe aksanları ile ayırt edilmekteyken, Edirne'deki Roman topluluğu ırk, mahalle ve kıyafet olarak ayırt edilmektedirler. Ortak bir bulgu olarak, iki topluluk da kendilerini "ikinci sınıf vatandaş" hissetmekte olup bu durum vatandaşlığın eşitlik ilkesiyle çelişmektedir. İkinci sınıf hissetme aynı zamanda sosyal dışlanmanın sembolik boyutunu göstermekte olup kendilerini dışardaki toplum tarafından nasıl tanımlandıklarını açığa çıkartır.

Sosyal haklara ilişkin olarak, Roman topluluğu iş olanaklarına erişim, eğitim, sağlık hakları ve diğer sosyal güvenlik fonlarından (engelli aylığı, yaşlılık maaşı) belirli derecede daha fazla yararlanabilmektedir. Edirne ve Diyarbakır'da etnisite ve sınıf ilişkisi olduğunu görebiliriz. Roman erkekler çoğunlukla geçici ve gündelik işlerde çalışırken, Dom erkeklerinin enformel sektörde bile iş bulamadıklarını söyleyebilirim. Müzisyenlik mesleklerinin zamanla kaybolmasıyla, Dom erkekleri iş fırsatlarından tamamen dışlanmaya başlamışlardır. Zorunlu göç süreci, yerinden edilmiş iki grubu kıt kaynaklar olan geçici ve gündelik işler için rekabet etmelerinde çatışma yaratan bir zemin hazırlamıştır. Bu durum etnik kapanmaya yol açıp Dom topluluğunun ikinci sınıf kategoride olmasına yol açmıştır. Fakat Roman topluluğunun üyeleri, Edirne'deki

Türklerin çalışmak için gönüllü olmadığı geçici, esnek ve düşük statülü kötü işlerde çalışmaktadırlar ve bu işler sadece Romanlar tarafından yapılmaktadır.

İki toplumda da ortak vatandaşlık problemi yoksulluktur. Bu bakımdan, Dom topluluğunun sosyo-ekonomik koşulları “yeni yoksulluk” olarak görülürken, Roman topluluğunki eski yoksulluktur. Uzun dönemli işsizlik, koşullarını iyileştirecek kaynaklarının olmaması, sahipsiz hissetme, izolasyonla birlikte sosyal dışlanma yeni yoksulluğa neden olmaktadır. Dom yetişkinlerinin okuma yazması olmayıp erkekleri işsizdir ve devlet yardımlarına nasıl ulaşacaklarını bilmemektedirler. Dom topluluğu 1990’dan sonra zorunlu göç ile birlikte Diyarbakır’da yerleşik hayata geçmeleri ve müziyenlik mesleklerinin kaybolmasıyla çözülme içine girmişlerdir. Topluma entegre olamamışlardır. İş fırsatlarından dışlandıkları için geçici ya da gündelik işler bile bulamamışlardır. Dolayısıyla, Dom topluluğu yeni yoksulluğun yeni aktörleridir. Dom topluluğu için tek yaşam stratejisi dilenmek iken, iki toplulukta da mevsimlik tarım işçiliği ve çocuk işçiliği görülmektedir. Dom topluluğunun farkı sadece yoksulluk değil, yoksunluk içinde de yaşamalarıdır. Kaynaklara nasıl ulaşacaklarını bilmemektedirler. Diğer taraftan Roman topluluğu enformel sektörde tutunmaya çalışmakta veya sosyo-ekonomik hareketliklerini sağlayacak göçmenlik pratikleri gibi taktikler üretebilmektedirler. Göçmenlik olgusu da kendi içinde homojen değildir ve göçmenlik ile sosyal hareketlilik arasında doğrudan bir ilişki bulunmamaktadır. Çalışma, sosyal devletin değişimiyle birlikte Roman topluluğunun yeni yoksulluğa yaklaştığını işaret eder. İki toplulukta da kadınlar ve çocuklar dezavantajlı durumda olup “yoksulluğun kadınlaşmasına” rastlanmaktadır.

Eğitim, sosyal hakların vazgeçilmez bir ögesidir. Karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle Dom topluluğu eğitime sınırlı bir şekilde ulaşmaktadır. Okumamışlık Dom yetişkinlerinde ortak bir unsur olup 90’lardan önce göçebe örüntüsü ve doğum kaydı olmamalarından kaynaklanır. Roman yetişkin kadınlar genelde eğitimsiz olup bazıları ilkokul mezunudur. Pek çok Roman erkeği ilkokul mezunudur. Genç kuşaklar arasındaki farklılıklar çarpıcıdır. Roman topluluğunda

kızlar ve erkekler liseye devam etmektedirler. On tane üniversite öğrencisi bulunmaktadır. Fakat pek çok Dom çocuk ilkokula bile devam etmemektedir.

Eğitimin fırsat maliyeti açısından üç faktör belirlemektedir: etnisite, yoksulluk ve toplumsal cinsiyet. Roman topluluğu eğitimin sosyal hareketlilik getireceğine inanmamaktadır. Eğer çocuklarını okutsalar bile devlet memuru olamayacaklarını, çünkü devletin etnik kimliklerinden dolayı bu işleri yapmalarına izin vermeyeceklerini düşünmektedirler. Romanlar için, Türk ya da Kürt birinci sınıf vatandaşken, Roman hiyerarşinin en sonundadır. Yoksulluk, iki toplumda da eğitim almalarına ortak bir engeldir. Okulu terk etmek ve çocuk işçiliği iki toplumda da ortak dezavantaj olarak gözükmektedir. Toplumsal cinsiyet eğitimi etkileyen diğer bir faktördür. İki toplumda da kız çocukları ataerkillikten dolayı erkek çocuklarına göre dezavantajlı konumdadır. Fakat ataerkillik özellikle Dom topluluğunda görünmektedir, nitekim Dom kız çocukları 10 yaşından sonra okula devam edememektedirler. Ayrıca görücü usulü evlilikler yapmak zorunda kalmaktadırlar. Karşılığında babaları başlık parası almaktadır. Ataerkillik Roman topluluğunda keskin bir şekilde görülmemesine rağmen, kız çocuklarından ziyade erkek çocukları okumaya teşvik edilmektedir.

Ayrıca iki toplumda da eşitsiz iş ve eğitim fırsatları olarak sosyal dışlanmayı görmekteyiz. Edirne’de ilköğretim okullarının homojen olması sosyal dışlanma göstergesidir. Çoğunluk olan Türkler, çocuklarını karma eğitim yapılan okullardan almaktadır. Diyarbakır’da ilköğretim okulları karma olmasına rağmen, Kürt aileler çocuklarının sınıfını değiştirme talebinde bulunmaktadırlar. Roman çocuklardan farklı olarak pek çok Dom çocuk ilköğretime devam etmemektedir.

Barınma koşulları ve sosyal iletişim, sosyal hakları ve entegrasyonu değerlendirmek için önemlidir. Yoksulluk ve yetersiz barınma koşulları iki toplumda da ortak unsur olmasına rağmen, Dom topluluğu zorunlu göç sonrası yıkıntı bölgesindeki evlere yerleşmiştir. Son dönemde kentsel dönüşüm nedeniyle evleri yıkılmaya başlamıştır. Ayrıca yaşadıkları mahallelerde Kürt çoğunluk ve Dom topluluğu arasında çok sınırlı sosyal etkileşim vardır. Dom topluluğu aleyhinde fahişelik ya da hırsızlık gibi stereotipler yoğun olarak işlemektedir. Beyaz Kelebekler Çamaşirevi gibi bazı kurumların Dom topluluğuna yönelik

ayrımcılık yapan tutumları bulunmaktadır. Kürt kadınlarından farklı olarak Dom kadınları çamaşirevine sadece haftada bir gün gidebilmektedir. Ayrıca Marsh'ın belirttiğine göre, Kürt çoğunluk imza toplayarak Domları mahallelerden çıkarmak istemiştir. İmzaları reddedilmiştir (Marsh, 2008b). Bu durum Dom topluluğunun sosyal izolasyonunu göstermektedir.

Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak Roman mahalleleri Osmanlı döneminden beri görülmektedir. Roman topluluğu göçebe olduğu zaman bu evlerde kalmaktaydılar. Sosyal dışlanma özellikle *Menziliahir* mahallesi için tartışılabilir. Bu mahalle hem kurumlarca, hem de Romanlar tarafından ayırt edilmektedir. Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak Roman topluluğunun Edirne'deki Türk çoğunlukla iş ilişkileri bulunmaktadır. Bebek bakıcılığı ve hasta bakıcılık iki grup arasında sosyal etkileşimin olduğunu gösteren göstergelerdir.

Politik haklara erişimde Roman topluluğunun sınırlı politik hakları bulunurken, Dom topluluğu politik hayattan tamamen dışlanmış durumdadır. Otuz yıl kadar önce Roman topluluğunun siyasi hayata katılımı Roman kimliğinden dolayı engellenmekteydi. Bugün Roman mahallelerinde bir kaç Roman muhtar görülürken, politik hayata ve karar verme mekanizmalarına katılmalarına dolaylı engeller bulunmaktadır. Dom topluluğunda Dom muhtar bulunmamaktadır. Diyarbakır'da, Edirne'de olmayan bazı yerel yönetim mekanizmaları bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan biri Belediye İl Halk Meclisi olup mahallelerde yerel sorunların tartışılıp çözüldüğü bir yapılanmadır. Mülakatçıların çoğu belediyeyi desteklemelerine rağmen, bu meclise katılmamakta ve katılmaları da beklenmemektedir. Yani karar verme mekanizmaları ve güç ilişkilerinden uzaktırlar.

Roman ve Dom toplulukları kamusal alanda dernekleri sayesinde görünür olmuşlardır. Dom topluluğunun derneği 2007'de açılmış ve bir yıl sonra kapanmıştır. Diğer yandan, Dom derneğindeki okuma yazması olmadığından dolayı kapasite geliştirme eğitimini alamamışlar ve dernek başarısız olmuştur. Dom topluluğu da derneğe tepki göstermiştir, çünkü dernek başkanı kendi topluluğundan sadece finansal destek bulunmasını istemiştir. Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak EDROM'un Edirne'de Romanlar için günümüzde önemli bir yeri

vardır. Ayrıca Romanlar, derneği aktif olarak desteklemektedirler. EDROM, Romanların yerel ve ulusal seviyede 2004'ten beri tanınmasını sağlamıştır. EDROM'dan önce Roman kelimesi bile toplumda tabuydu. Dolayısıyla EDROM son altı yılda atmosferi değiştirmiştir. Roman topluluğunun Edirne'de azınlık olmasından dolayı, EDROM'un devlet ve kendi toplumu arasında aracı bir rolü vardır. Bu bakımdan EDROM paydaşlarla diyalog mekanizması yaratmıştır. Küresel ölçekte EDROM'un ulus-ötesi bir aktör olduğunu görüyoruz. EDROM'un çabaları Çingenelere karşı olan ayrımcılıkla yalnız Türkiye'de değil, Avrupa ölçeğinde de mücadele etmektir. Dolayısıyla EDROM, modern vatandaşlığın gerilemesi ve vatandaşlığın siyasi dönüşümünden etkilenmektedir. Teori bölümünde tartışıldığı üzere, insan hakları ulus devletin sınırlarını zayıflatarak, ulusal aidiyetin ötesinde hakların talep edilmesinde hegemonik bir dil sağlamıştır (Soysal, 1994).

Roman ve Dom derneklerinin durumlarını değerlendirmek için, güce olan yakınlıklarını değerlendirmek önemlidir. Bu bakımdan EDROM hem devlete hem de AB'ye yakın durmaktadır. EDROM açısından eşitlik arayışı yerel, ulusal ve ulus-ötesi seviyede gerçekleşmektedir. Diğer taraftan Dom topluluğu güç ilişkilerinden ve merkezden uzakta olup çevrede yer almaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle Roman topluluğu için etnik çoğunluk olan Türklerle yaşamak devlet yardımlarına ve AB'ye ulaşmalarında avantajlı bir konum sağlamıştır.

Çalışmanın beşinci bulgusu, sırasıyla kültürel hak talepleri, sosyal hak talepleri ve görevler bağlamında Roman topluluğunun vatandaşlık pratiklerinin radikal demokratik vatandaşlık, toplulukçu yaklaşım ve cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık ile açıklanabileceğini göstermektedir.

Kültürel haklar ile ilgili olarak Roman topluluğu radikal demokratik veya liberal vatandaşlığa yakın durmaktadırlar. Roman topluluğu kültürel ve etnik pratiklerini Osmanlı İmparatorluğu döneminden bu yana sürdürmektedirler. Roman topluluğu aynı zamanda gelenekleri, evlilik örüntüleri, Romani dili... vb. açısından Roman olmayanlardan ayırt edilebilmektedir. Buna ilave olarak kültürel haklar bölümünde tartışıldığı üzere Hıdırellez sadece Roman topluluğu tarafından kutlanmamakta, bu festival belediye ve valilik tarafından uluslararası bir

platformda düzenlenmektedir. Bu nedenle Edirne’de, Romanların kültürel haklarına saygı duyulması ve kendi kültürel kimliklerinin tanınması nedeniyle bir dereceye kadar liberal vatandaşlığın görülebildiğini ifade edebiliriz. Ayrıca, Mouffe’nin (1992) farklılığa saygı duyan ve farklı şekillerde bireyselliklere yer açan, bir çeşit ortaklık imgeleyen radikal demokratik vatandaşlık kavrayışı Edirne’de görülebilir. Bu vatandaşlık kavramında Mouffe’(1993) nun önerdiği üzere biz duygusu ile muhtelif hareketlerin tanınma talepleriyle demokratik eşitlik zinciri oluşturulabilir. Böylelikle, Roman topluluğu bir yandan kültürel haklarının tanınmasını talep etmekte, öte yandan ise politik topluluğa yönelik güçlü bir bağlılık hissetmektedirler. Ancak Dom topluluğu, dil, evlilik örüntüleri, *dengbejlik* geleneği, din... vb. bakımından Kürt toplumu ile kültürel yakınlık göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda Kürt kimliği, kendileri için bir üst kimlik olarak görülmektedir. Öte yandan, zorunlu göç ve yeniden iskan sonrasında Kürtçe aksanları ve kadınların giyim şekli nedeniyle kültürel olarak dışlanmakta ve yetersiz dini inanışlara sahip oldukları yönünde suçlanmaktadır.

Roman topluluğunun sosyal hak talepleri vatandaşlığın toplulukçu yaklaşımına yakındır. Bu açıdan, Roman topluluğunun sosyal haklarının iyileştirilmesi talebi sadece bireysel amaçlar için değil, fakat aynı zamanda topluluk amaçları ile de ilgilidir. Roman topluluğu kendilerini atomize bireyler olarak değerlendirmemektedirler. Dolayısı ile Roman topluluğu için bir politik topluluğun mensubu olmayı gerektiren haklar ve görevlerin karşılıklılığı nedeniyle sosyal hakların iyileştirilmesi herkesin iyiliği içindir. Buna ek olarak Roman topluluğu, politik topluluğun diğer üyeleri gibi eşitlik talep etmektedirler. Onlar için Roman olmak vatandaşlık haklarından eşit bir şekilde yararlanmada engel oluşturmamalıdır. Aslına bakılırsa EDROM aynı zamanda, Roman topluluğunun sosyal haklarının iyileştirilmesi ile kendilerinin önce Roman olmayanlara, sonrasında ise eşit vatandaşlığa yaklaşacaklarını savunmaktadır. Dom topluluğunun vatandaşlık pratikleri vatandaşlığın toplulukçu yaklaşımına yakın durmasına rağmen kendi kimliklerini Roman topluluğu gibi tanımlamamaktadırlar.

Haklar ile ilgili olarak, askerlik hizmeti ve politik topluluğa yüksek düzeyde bağlılıkları bakımından Roman topluluğu arasında cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık Dom topluluğuna göre daha belirgindir. Aktif askerlik hizmeti Roman görüşmeciler tarafından temel görev olarak görülmektedir. Roman erkekler için askerlik hizmetini yerine getirmek eşit vatandaş olmaya işaret etmektedir. Roman topluluğu cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlığı kimliklerini tanımlamanın bir şekli olarak benimsemektedirler. Bu durum Domlarda görülmemektedir. Romanlar için vatandaşlık, bir yandan Türklere ve Kürtlere ayrıcalıklar sunan fakat Romanları hiyerarşinin en alt katmanına terk eden “farklılaştırılmış aygıt” olarak durmakta, öte yandan cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık aracılığı ile Roman topluluğu kaybettikleri vatandaşlık haklarını telafi etmeye çalışmaktadırlar. Roman topluluğu, görevlerine ve sadakatlerine vurguda bulunarak kendilerini tanımlamaktadırlar. Dom topluluğu, bu açıdan kendilerini cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlık ile tanımlamamaktadır. Fakat iki topluluk da görev temelli vatandaşlık pratiklerini yerine getirmelerine rağmen sosyal vatandaşlık haklarına erişememelerini sorgulamaktadırlar. İki toplulukta da etnisite, tam vatandaşlık haklarından yararlanmada bir engel olarak görülmektedir.

Çalışmanın son bulgusu, Edirne ve Diyarbakır’da topluluklar arası evliliklerin farklılık gösterdiğine işaret etmektedir. Diyarbakır’da Dom ve Kürt evliliklerinden ziyade Edirne’de Roman ve Kürt evlilikleri ile karşılaşmak olasıdır. Bu durum, Roman kadınların kendi istekleri doğrultusunda eşlerini seçebilmeleri konusunda çok katı olmayan kültürel kodları ile ilişkilidir. Bundan başka, hem Romanlar hem de Kürtler Edirne’de azınlığı oluşturmaktadırlar. Buna ilave olarak Roman ve Türkler arasında evlilikler nadiren görülmektedir. Bazen, Türk kızının yaşının küçük olması durumunda yasal yaptırımlar devreye girmektedir. Bununla birlikte Dom topluluğunun evlilik biçimi Kürt toplumu ile benzerlik göstermektedir. Akraba evliliği çok yaygın olup evlilik törenleri bile Kürtlerin evlilik törenlerine benzerdir. Öte yandan Romanların evlilik törenleri, Türklerinkinden keskin bir şekilde farklı olarak kendilerine özgü gelenekleri yansıtmaktadır. Dom topluluğu ile Kürt çoğunluk arasında yaşanan evlilikler, katı sosyal sınırlar nedeniyle temel anlaşmazlık nedeni olarak görülmekte ve aşiret

anlaşmazlığına dönüşebilmektedir. Roman kadınlardan farklı olarak Dom kadınlar kendi eşlerini seçememekte ve akrabaları ile görücü usulü ile evlenmektedirler.

Roman topluluğundan farklı olarak Dom kadınlar resmi olmayan imam (dini) nikâhı ile evlenmektedirler. Böylelikle, bu kadınlar sivil haklardan yoksun kalmaktadırlar. Dom topluluğunda bulunan ve Roman topluluğunda bulunmayan bir diğer bulgu çokeşli hanehalkına kadının kuma olarak gelmesidir. Bu Dom kadınlar vatandaşlık haklarından tamamen yoksun kalmaktadırlar. Kuma eş gelince bu kadınların gidecekleri bir yer bulunmamakta, ayrıca eşi ve kuma ile birlikte yaşamak zorundadırlar. Resmi olmayan nikâh nedeniyle çocuklar nüfus kaydına alınamama riski ile karşılaşmaktadırlar. Buna ilaveten Dom kadınlar, topluluklarında töreye maruz kalmaktadırlar. Bu bakımdan bazı kadınlar Dom aileleri arasında yaşanan anlaşmazlıkların çözümü sonucunda evlenmek zorunda kalmaktadırlar. Başka bir deyişle bu evlilikler anlaşmazlığın çözümünde “kan parası” olarak görülmektedir.

Bu çalışmanın ana argümanı, Edirne’deki Roman nüfusunun, Dom topluluğundan daha fazla vatandaşlık haklarına eriştiklerini ileri sürmektedir. Bu durumda Romanların Edirne’de etnik çoğunluk olan Türkler ile yaşıyor olmaları, öte yandan Domların Diyarbakır’da çoğunluk olan fakat Türkiye’de azınlık olan Kürtler ile birlikte yaşıyor olmaları ile ilintilidir. Her şeyden önce Roman nüfusu Diyarbakır’daki Dom topluluğu ile karşılaştırıldığında devlet ve ulus ötesi alanla ile daha yakın bağlantı içerisindedir. Bu nedenle Dom topluluğu, Roman toplumuna göre çok daha sınırlı ve cılız sivil, sosyal ve politik haklara sahiptir; fakat iki topluluk da sembolik, mekânsal, politik, eğitsel ve iş olanakları bakımından farklı seviyelerde sosyal dışlanmaya maruz kalmaktadırlar. Roman topluluğunda yoksulluğun eski tezahürleri görülmekte ve kendilerine istikrar sağlamaya çalışmaktadırlar. Dom topluluğundan farklı olarak yoksulluk ve dışlanma sorunları ile başa çıkabilmek için farklı taktikler üretebilmektedirler. Buna ek olarak, kendilerini güç ilişkilerinin yanında konumlandırarak refah devleti haklarından bir dereceye kadar yararlanabilmektedirler. Öte yandan Dom topluluğu, yeni yoksulluğun yeni aktörleri olarak değerlendirilebilirler. Refah devleti haklarından ve güç ilişkilerine yönelik karar verme süreçlerinden tamamen

soyutlanmışlardır. Böylelikle, topluma entegre olabilmek için taktik bile üretememektedirler. Farklı seviyelerde yoksulluk görülmesine rağmen Roman topluluğu refah devletinin dönüşümü ile birlikte yeni yoksulluğa yaklaşmaktadır. Çoğunluk toplumuna entegrasyon seviyeleri bakımından Roman topluluğu, kendi vatandaşlık pratiklerini değerlendirmeleri ve kültürel yaşayışlarıyla Türklerin azınlığı olarak gözükmektedir. Dom topluluğu, dilsel, sosyal, kültürel ve hatta evlilik pratikleri bakımından Kürt toplumunu benimsemiş görünmesine rağmen Diyarbakır’da yaşanan zorunlu göç ve yeniden iskân süreci sonrasında belirginleşen katı sosyal sınırlar nedeniyle Kürt çoğunluğuna entegre olmamışlardır.

İki toplumda da kadınlar vatandaşlık haklarından yararlanma açısından daha eşitsiz konumdadırlar. Bununla birlikte Dom kadınlar, sadece sınırlı vatandaşlık haklarına sahip olmakla kalmamakta; fakat aynı zamanda kadınların kamusal ve özel alandaki eşit statüsünü gölgeleyen ataerkillik nedeniyle de daha eşitsiz bir konumdadırlar. Bu nedenle sosyal politikada öncelikle çocukların yanı sıra Roman ve Dom kadınları dikkate alınmalıdır. Bu kesim erkeklere nazaran yoksulluktan daha çok etkilenmektedir. Ortak bir bulgu olarak iki topluluk da kendilerini etnik kimliklerinden ötürü ikinci sınıf vatandaş olarak hissettikleri için sosyal haklarının iyileştirilmesini ve kültürel adaleti talep etmektedirler.

Kuramsal değerlendirme bölümünde tartışıldığı üzere, vatandaşlığın vaatlerini gerçekleştirmek için bir dizi marjinalleşmiş ve ulus-devlet tarafından dışarıda bırakılan grupların belirli bakış açısıyla vatandaşlığın evrensel talepleri örtüştürülmelidir. Bu bağlamda, hak temelli yaklaşım “aşağıdan” genişletilmelidir. Kabeer’den (2005) anlaşılacağı gibi, aşağıdan oluşan kapsayıcı vatandaşlığın dört değeri şunlardır: adalet, tanınma, kendi kaderini tayin etme ve dayanışma. Bundan başka, Fraser’in (1998) önerisi Roman ve Dom topluluklarının vatandaşlık durumu için değerlendirilebilir. Bu bakımdan, ekonomik adaletsizliğin çözümü bir bakıma politik-ekonomik yeniden yapılanma olan “yeniden dağıtım”dır. Bu durum, gelirin yeniden dağıtımı, işbölümünün yeniden organizasyonu veya diğer temel ekonomik yapıların dönüştürülmesine işaret edebilir. Kültürel adaletsizliğe yönelik bir başka çözüm ise bir tür kültürel

veya sembolik deęiřimdir. Fraser (1998) için bu çözüm küçümsenen kimliklerin ve kötölenen grupların kültürel ürünlerinin deęerinin yükseltilmesini içermektedir.

Tabandan gelen Roman hareketi Türkiye vatandaşlık pratiklerini genişletebilir; fakat bunun politik alana etkisini tartışmak için henüz çok erken. Bu noktada sosyal hakların iyileştirilmesi Türkiye'deki Çingene topluluęu için yeterli deęildir. Bu aşamada, kapsayıcı ve tam vatandaşlık için ekonomik ve kültürel eşitsizliklere yönelik yeni önlemler alınmalıdır.

APPENDIX E: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Önen, Selin
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
Ph.D	METU Sociology	2011
MS	METU Sociology	2003
BS	H.U. Sociology	1999

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
Aug 2006 – Jan 2007	SYDGM, UNDP - Ankara	Counselling for the Project for “Promotion of Cooperation in the Area of Social Assistance Project”

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English

PUBLICATIONS

Ceyhan, Selin (2006) « Çingene/Roman Toplumunun Yurttaşlık Profili », *Kırkbudak Anatolian Folk Beliefs*, Year.2, Number .8, (pp.96-105).

CONFERENCES AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

Invited guest lecturer to the comparative sociology and presentation called “Citizenship, Contested Identities and Their Reflections on Roma Community in Turkey” (July 6) is made at the Summer University Course Multi-Disciplinary and Cross-National Approaches to Romany Studies-A Model for Europe, held at the Central European University in Budapest (June22- July 10 2009) financed by

the European Union Marie Curie Conferences and Training Courses ‘Romany Studies’ (Marie Curie SCF-CT-2006-045799).

« Regenerating Gypsy Identities in Turkey : Finding New Ways of Doing Citizenship » presentation at IIS 38th World Congress, Budapest, 26-30/06/2008

« The Role of Identities in the Social Inclusion/Exclusion of the Gypsy/Roma Community in Edirne, Turkey » was presented along with presented along with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu at annual Gypsy/Roma Studies Conference (Gypsy Lore Society) (presented by Önen, S), University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 3-4 September 2004

« Shifting Identities of Gypsy/Roma Community in Edirne in terms of Modernity and Popular Culture » presented at II Roma Studies, Bilgi University, İstanbul, November 2004.